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THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

THE NETHERLANDS DURING
GERMAN OCCUPATION

VOLUME 245

MAY 1946

THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

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MAY

THE ANNALS

*of The American Academy of Political
and Social Science*

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*



THE NETHERLANDS DURING GERMAN OCCUPATION

Edited by

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1946

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FOREWORD

IN this volume there is told something of the history of a small and peaceful nation during its five years of life under enemy rule. The brief prelude of disorganized military resistance—five days in all—which introduced the long period of enemy occupation is barely mentioned by the authors. They write, indeed, of war, but of another kind—a war waged by hunted and hungry people, armed with a brave determination to retain their self-respect and some semblance of their traditional freedoms. Therefore, it is hardly strange to find in all of the articles here assembled, the recurrence of the theme of the underground battle against the conquerors.

Many persons have co-operated in making this number of *THE ANNALS* possible. The assistance of Dr. N. A. C. Slotemaker de Bruine, director of the Netherlands Information Bureau in New York City, made it possible for us to secure the help of the distinguished historian Professor N. W. Posthumus in assembling the articles. Professor Posthumus is professor of economic history at the University of Amsterdam. He has held this post since 1922—except for a period between March 1942 and May 7, 1945 when he was not allowed to retain it because of “his obstinate attitude.” Prior to 1922, he was professor of economic history at the Rotterdam School of Economics. In 1914 he established the Netherlands Archives of Economic History at The Hague, with a branch library at Amsterdam. In 1934 he founded the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, with branches in Paris and Oxford. During the occupation period he laid the groundwork for a State War Documentation Institute. He also served as the vice-chairman of the government committee for the discovery of war criminals. His proposal for the establishment of a faculty of political and social science at the University of Amsterdam is under consideration. Professor Posthumus is president of the Netherlands Historical Institute and secretary of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences. Among his published works are: a *History of the Leiden Cloth Industry* (Vols. 1, 2-3; 1908-39) and a *History of Prices in Holland* (Vol. 1, 1943).

We are happy to express to Professor Posthumus and all his collaborators our gratitude for their labors. Some of the articles have been translated by Mrs. Margaret Mathews Hordijk, Mrs. Martha Elisabeth Koessler, Miss Jo Mayo, Mr. Theodore Bodde, and Professor Jacob Van der Zee.

All the articles were written late in 1945, and represent the first survey of the occupation period prepared in the liberated country. All of them have been written by Netherlanders, living in the Netherlands, who have firsthand knowledge of their subjects.

We are glad to publish this volume. It is a case history of enemy occupation but it is also a small tribute to a people who, although their physical defenses were crushed, held firm behind the barricades of the mind.

THEORSTEN SELLIN

Order and Disorder

By J. H. POSTHUMUS

TO understand what "order" means to the German mind, one would have to have lived for some time under the German occupation. At first everything was so orderly, so entirely according to formal rule, that it was difficult to realize what terrible things were bound to result from this "order." Every German command was issued on the basis of a former general order, everything fitted neatly into something else, so that one constantly forgot that a solid foundation was lacking.

STRUCTURE OF OCCUPATION GOVERNMENT

The injustice which characterized Hitler's attack on the Netherlands and the enslavement of our people was also shown in his decree for governing the country. This decree, dated May 18, 1940, ruled that the Dutch-occupied area be subject to "the High Commissioner of the occupied Netherlands." The High Commissioner was to be protector of imperial interests and chief executive in civil affairs. It was optimistically stated that current laws would still be in force in so far as they were agreeable to the forces of the occupation. The following years, however, were to teach us the fallacy of this decree.

The High Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, declared in an appeal to the Dutch people on May 25, 1940 that the catastrophe which had befallen the Netherlands was entirely due to the former Dutch Government, but that through the magnanimity of the Fuehrer and the strength of the German Army, it had already been possible to create a state of order. Now, what did the Germans mean by the term "order"? (1) The High Commis-

sioner was to have the same prerogatives as those of a king or of a national government. (2) He could take measures having the force of regular laws (decrees). Acts of violence on the part of the Germans, which they often represented in official books and documents as a necessity in the interest of the war campaign, remained, nevertheless, acts of violence and injustice, and nothing else.

Following the military occupation one wondered whether, according to international laws of war, the occupied area would be governed by the invasion army, as had happened in Belgium and France. To the Netherlands, however, as well as to Norway, the doubtful honor was paid of granting it a "civil government." On May 29, 1940 the Austrian traitor, Seyss-Inquart, assumed his post of High Commissioner, and with this he also assumed the highest governmental authority in civil affairs.

If at first one expected this civil government to be bearable or to have some definite advantages, he was certainly doomed to disappointment. "We will not persecute imperialistically this land and its people, nor will we force our political convictions upon the population." Thus spoke the new High Commissioner, while at the same time there streamed into our country Gestapo agents, men of the Security Service (*Sicherheitsdienst*) and the *Ordnungspolizei*, and members of Hitler's Nazi party who insinuated themselves into homes, business offices, and government departments. Not immediately, however, did this move appear in its true light. Indeed, it was much later, in 1941 and 1942, that the subtle shrewdness of German politics revealed itself.

On June 6, 1940 appeared the first number of the Journal of Decrees (*Verordeningenblad*), the paper in which, throughout the years of occupation, appeared, printed in two languages, all the decrees issued by the Nazis. The first number contained the decree of the Fuehrer, mentioned above, together with rules relating to the organization of the office of High Commissioner. It announced that German commissioners-general were to control the Dutch governmental departments and the town councils. Special agents for the provinces and for the large cities, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, were appointed as inspectors. The head of the German police, the S.S. and Police General, Rauter, was to be in control both of the various German police organizations and of the Dutch police.

We suspected the sinister meaning of these rules, but at first no one grasped how serious would be their consequences. Only a few people understood; they banded together to form the first resistance groups.

On the basis of the above decree, the High Commissioner appointed four commissioners-general: (1) for general order and justice, Wimmer; (2) for public safety, Rauter; (3) for economy and finance, Fischboeck; (4) for special tasks, especially the dissemination of National Socialist ideas, Schmidt.

A basis was thus laid for an intense penetration of the Dutch administration, which before the war had been considered one of the best in the world. Administration and records had been so perfect in every detail that the Germans had only to bring the administration under their own domination to learn practically all they wanted to know about the Dutch people. They understood this very well, and noticed only too soon how little inclined the Dutch were to war, hatred, or sabotage. In any case, the Germans thought, only

severe punishment was needed to restrain the Dutch from such actions. The Germans' criticism of the administration, however, was aimed at justifying their own meddlesomeness. Without much opposition the new situation was forced on the people, and, this having been successfully accomplished, the suffering was without end.

GERMAN DECEPTION

The Germans, however, went to work very cautiously, and refrained from starting at once with force and threats. They tried to give the impression that they were not so bad, after all, and that they would bring about great social improvements for labor. The rule was announced that no dismissals could be made unless permission had been obtained. Dutch workmen were to be "allowed" to go to work in Germany. "Force will not be applied; it will be left entirely to a man's own free decision whether he goes or not" declared Commissioner-general Fischboeck. And at just the right moment the citizens of Rotterdam received the heartening news of the establishment of a fund for the reconstruction of their city.

These, however, were empty words, and nothing more. Social improvements were not realized. On the contrary, the situation of the workers became more and more difficult, and at last unbearable. As for the reconstruction, the ruins of Rotterdam are eloquent witness. It is only now, six months after liberation, that concrete preparations for this reconstruction can be undertaken.

In June 1940 the representatives of the Dutch people, the deputies of both chambers of the States-General, were retired to inactive service. Thus any direct influence which the Dutch might have continued to exert on the state of affairs was eliminated. The States-General had indeed always consisted of

the chosen leaders of different political parties. As they were not bureaucrats, they had not been subject to departmental chiefs or to the German authorities. Thus they had been the only ones who by right could defend the interests of the conquered people. Thus in this very order there lay the seeds of disorder.

Slowly the Nazis went farther. Like experienced assassins they began to lay nets and traps so that later they could easily catch their victims. It now became compulsory for the Dutch to work in Germany. Those who had depended on influence for keeping their jobs now lost that support if they refused to go. Now, also, an order was issued prohibiting listening to broadcasts coming from outside Germany. German courts-martial now sat in cases concerning Dutch citizens. Many were arrested and imprisoned for long periods for offenses which in our estimation were trivial.

The number of decrees issued during the years 1940, 1941, and 1942 was simply stupendous. More than six hundred rules and regulations of the most diverse character were heaped upon the conquered people and were supposed to be familiar to every eventual transgressor.

DUTCH POPULAR MOVEMENTS

Our people now began to weigh matters and divide themselves into two groups (aside from the Netherlands National Socialist Party). One group included those who wished to work with the Nazis in order to protect the country from utter destruction. The second group consisted of those who, at any price, wanted to prevent co-operation with the Nazis; hence they became outlaws.

To the first group belonged the "Netherlands Union," formed in 1940. Its aim was to promote the solidarity

and co-operation of the Dutch people. The Germans viewed this with satisfaction. They wished to saturate our people with their ideas of National Socialism. Their self-assurance had been unpleasantly shocked by the indifference shown them by the Dutch and by the latter's hatred of the members of the National Socialist Movement (N.S.B.), the Dutch Nazis. Now the Germans saw in this new popular movement a chance to get a hold on our people, even though at first this movement was not outspokenly pro-Nazi. This "Union," though weak in its defense of national rights, very soon proved to be of very little use to the Germans.

It was also in 1940 that the already secretly armed party of the N.S.B. obtained the right to parade. The extent to which this endangered the general peace and safety was shown as early as 1941. These rascals, on the lookout for sensation and blood, raised rows everywhere, in the hope that fighting would result, as indeed happened. In February 1941 the Jews in Amsterdam were suddenly provoked and waylaid. Serious fighting resulted. But instead of disciplining the guilty Nazi bandits in uniform, the German police began a veritable campaign of persecution against the Jews.

In other cities also fighting occurred which the Germans could easily have stopped. Instead, they allowed it to continue, probably to give the impression to the public that the N.S.B. was taking over the political power on its own initiative. But this time, no one swallowed the bait. The Dutch people did not answer the provocation, but remained aloof and even ignored it.

The Germans have never been able to understand the things which count in the Dutch mind, or the essential traits of the Dutch national character. They understood nothing of our democratic ideals or our belief in equality

for all men, regardless of race or social status. Tolerance and love of liberty, typical traits of the Dutch, are unknown to the Germans. They could not understand why our people should take the side of the persecuted Jews. They suspected propaganda from a few resistance men, and could not believe that moral conviction alone was the reason for our actions.

As far back as 1940, formations of the N.S.B. were tolerated officially on the streets. The public was provoked and teased; quarrels and fights naturally burst forth. The Germans did nothing to prevent this; on the contrary, they approved these disturbances.

GERMANIZED POLITICS

In 1941 the former democratic parties were dissolved; but this regulation brought very little change, as, without exception, these parties had already ceased their activities directly after the capitulation. At the end of 1941, however, the N.S.B. was proclaimed by Seyss-Inquart to be the only political party in the Netherlands. The reaction to this proclamation was zero; the people remained indifferent. This made the Germans furious—furious because they felt themselves powerless. Everybody laughed at the role the N.S.B. had to assume as the plaything of the enemy. This party had lost all persuasive force. The danger of its influencing any large group of the Dutch people had passed by that time; in their eyes, the N.S.B. had become an impossible element in social life.

If the proclamation that the N.S.B. was to be the only party made little impression, even more ridiculous became the figure of the quisling Mussert, when one year later, in December 1942, he was proclaimed by the enemy as "leader" of the Dutch people. This event was celebrated by the Dutch

Nazis with great acclaim; flags, uniforms, and swastikas were everywhere in evidence. But the Dutch people remained cool. That which had succeeded in Germany was a complete failure in the Netherlands; we simply took no notice of these activities.

When, a few months later, in February 1943, a secretary of state was installed by the figurehead dictator, there were some anxious moments. Did this mean a new government? Would strikes occur? Would there be fighting? All these questions arose in the first excitement, but time was soon to show that the Mussert cabinet meant nothing. It had no executive power, its only duty being to advise German officials in the execution of their occupation duties. No wonder, then, that these N.S.B. authorities were not looked upon with respect by either the Dutch or the Germans.

On August 12, 1941 a new ordinance was issued for the municipal and provincial governments. The burgomasters (mayors) were to become small dictators. Everywhere the N.S.B. men tried to become burgomasters. Special courses were conducted for them so that they might at least get some idea of municipal affairs. The strangest people were suddenly appointed heads of good-sized municipalities; knowledge counted for nothing; loyalty to Hitler was appreciated above all else.

BAFFLED PATRIOTS

The position of Dutch civil servants who still remained in office became more and more difficult. If one resigned, a Nazi immediately took the vacant place. If, on the contrary, he remained in office, he had to endure continual conflict with his conscience; the enemy forced all functionaries to observe regulations which were aimed against the interests of the Netherlands.

In the end, however, the best one could do was to keep the place warm for an N.S.B. A good official had to cede his place as soon as a fair candidate from the N.S.B. appeared, and nothing could be done about it.

Many clung to the idea of protecting a small part of the country from worse things. Such was the official who after 1942 stuck to his post in order to save what could be saved; or the professor who continued giving courses in order to save the university; or the workman who went to work for the army in order not to risk the safety of his family. All of them tried to save something, and yet the only result was that one thing after another went to pot. Rule after rule followed till at last nothing was spared the Nazi terror. Many did not realize that yielding only encouraged the Germans to demand more and more, so that instead of saving something, everything was lost. And that happened to the country as a whole, as well as to the individual. Alas that a few Dutch authorities gave the wrong example and tried to discourage the spirit of resistance!

A reward of a thousand guilders was offered to anyone who reported offenses against the Germans. This premium was offered, it was deceptively proclaimed, in order to prevent innocent compatriots from suffering because of the criminal mistakes of others, i.e., the resistance men. The feeling of respect for law and authority dwindled more and more. The Dutch people had to swallow so much that gradually they became hardened to the "wholesome" laws of the new order. They simply did not care whether a thing was forbidden or not. They became more and more skeptical as to whether they would ever be able to lead their society back into the right path.

At the same time, the "terror" took on increasingly evil forms. At first,

only the Jews felt the brutal violence of a barbarism sanctioned by law. Sadists, drunk with power, were sent out to kick these people into a corner, deprive them of every possibility for economic and cultural development, and finally drive them from their homes to unknown places of horror in eastern Europe. Stories about this are only too well known, and we have no desire to repeat them here. But we wish to point out that a people who tolerated these excesses without protest could never oppose other rules of terror. Thus the "state built on law" changed into a state of terror.

EMPHASIS ON FOOD PRODUCTION

As the situation of Dutch functionaries became more and more dependent on German regulations, independent effort became well-nigh impossible. It was only in matters concerning food supplies that Dutch and German interests were identical. Both wished to obtain the largest production possible. That of this total production an unjustly large part was intended for the army and for export to Germany, and that several of our Dutch products now almost never appeared on our markets —these were things which could not be prevented.

The German enthusiasm for the expansion and increase of agrarian production at the sacrifice of industry took hold, alas, of several high officials. Whether they meant to do a service to their country by working with the occupation forces in this connection or whether they merely thought that they could improve their own position by this means, such collaboration was a sad phenomenon in almost all the occupied countries. People generally called such officials collaborators. They did what the enemy desired, made it easier for him to execute his schemes or to pre-

pare the way for them, and worked hand in hand with him, often under the pretext that in this way they were furthering Dutch interests. It is a question whether they actually believed that they were doing so.

THE TURN OF THE WAR

The year 1943 produced the darkest threats against the existence of the Dutch people. Stalingrad brought a complete change in the course of the war, and the more Germany lost, the worse became the situation in the occupied countries. The Nazi monster was insatiable in its greed for workmen and war products. "Total war," an invention of the Germans, demanded every possible working force, not only from the Germans but also—and especially—from the occupied countries. Said Hitler:

We will not hesitate for one second to impose upon the countries who are responsible for the outbreak of this war [all countries except Germany] the burdens of this historical strife. We will consider it only natural not to consider foreign lives at a time which requires such heavy sacrifices from ourselves.

More and more disorder resulted from the decrees; social life was disturbed and men were forced to leave home and family and go into hiding in order to escape the threatening grasp of the Nazis. Until the end of 1942 the Germans had at least been careful not to antagonize the population as a whole. Now, however, it was different; entire age groups were called up for work in Germany. Chaos increased, and no man between the ages of 18 and 50 felt safe. Without warning and at any time, in the office, on the street, with only the clothes he happened to be wearing at the moment, a man could be mustered out for service. Thus

were innumerable men sent to Germany. Every day new laws and new calls to service were issued. Soldiers, students, laborers, Jews, and finally the entire youth were faced with the choice of working for Hitler or going into hiding.

THE GERMAN METHODS

Very skillfully did the Germans execute their system. A change of work without permission of the German-controlled labor office was forbidden. A decree issued to students ordered them to sign a declaration of loyalty to the Germans or else go to Germany to work. Many enterprises which the Germans presumed to designate as "luxury trades" were abolished. Commercial traveling was forbidden. Banks and navigation companies were forbidden to employ men between 18 and 45 years of age.

The Government in exile, headed by Queen Wilhelmina, now urged a resolute stand in the struggle for the liberation of our country.

The methods by which the Nazis maintained their power in Germany were applied also in the Netherlands. Their aim was to produce disorder, and then suddenly to deal a blow. Raids in the streets, raids in public buildings, the searching of houses, everywhere arrests, concentration camps with their terrors in the background, death sentences by the hundreds concerning which nothing ever came to light, executions in public places as deterrent measures—all this was aimed at making the Dutch people nervous and submissive.

Yet this also did not succeed. The Dutch resisted everything that came from the Nazis, and they were able to maintain this resistance and even to intensify it, notwithstanding all the blows and losses they endured. The Nether-

lands remained true to character, refusing to become Hitler's slave by yielding to threats. One rule after another was ignored and the people only became toughened through the experiences of this reign of terror.

More than by the deeds of the Gestapo and the S.D. rabble, from whom after all one could expect nothing else, the Dutch people were struck by the fact that the authorities themselves were expressing an antisocial mentality in their laws. The Jews were being got rid of by official means. Official orders were issued to deport soldiers, laborers, and students. Sinister threats against illegal workers (those who belonged to a secret organization) were threatened with death by a decree of May 28, 1942) inspired the actions of numerous paid Gestapo spies, among whom, alas, were also some Dutchmen. Neither international law nor freely signed agreements were now considered binding in Berlin. Hostages were taken, sometimes to be shot later in reprisal for the deeds of others. Private property, such as automobiles, radios, bicycles, blankets, and copper or other metal objects, was commandeered. People were dragged abroad against their will. All this was unlawful according to the rules of war; but what did the enemy care?

CORRALING THE YOUTH

After some of these attempts to deport workers had failed and it became evident that the Dutch enterprises did not wish to co-operate in this deportation movement, whole age classes of youths were summoned. Only those who possessed an *Ausweis* (permission to stay) dared to be seen on the streets. The others could be arrested at any time, on the street, on trains, in public places. Even the distribution of rations was controlled, and many arrests

were made in this connection. Ration cards were declared invalid—*gesperrt* as it was called.

Many young people now joined the underground and received their rations through illegal channels. Others yielded to temptation and requested an *Ausweis*. This was exactly what the Germans wanted. The petitioners obtained an *Ausweis bis auf weiteres*—that is, until a final decision on them could be taken—and at the same time they were registered. At a convenient time, the Germans had not the least difficulty in calling up these registered men, since the *Ausweis* itself, of course, had meanwhile lost all value. Thus did many dig their own graves, for no trust could be put in the Boche!

THE END STRUGGLE

After the invasion of France, and especially after the liberation of France and Belgium by the Allied armies, the legislative activity of the Germans diminished enormously. But other terrors made their appearance. There was no more business, no industry, no coal, no food. A winter of famine seized the western provinces. Seyss-Inquart continued to rule only by threats which were publicized by means of pamphlets distributed on the streets. In the beginning of September a "state of exception" was declared. Henceforth the Germans considered the Netherlands an "enemy country." They no longer spoke of us as "friends" but definitely as enemies—a wonderful advance! This meant that now practically every offense would be punished by death.

Seen in this light, the work of the underground groups—the strikers on the railroads, all who fought in the interests of the Allies in the occupied countries—bears witness to great heroism and unselfish idealism. It is thanks to their efforts as well as to those of the

Allies that the Netherlands has been liberated. The Dutch people are deeply grateful to those who dared to sabotage the German "order" and, during the period of chaos, to create the required conditions for a new democratic order.

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Law Enforcement

By H. R. DE ZAAIJER

IT IS no easy task to describe briefly the events and the attitude of courts and police during the occupation of the Netherlands, especially for a public abroad that does not know, or scarcely knows, the real situation and conditions in our country.

Before May 10, 1940, the day of the brutal invasion by the German army, the Netherlands was a constitutional state par excellence. At the head of the Government stood our revered Queen Wilhelmina, assisted by a number of Ministers responsible to her and to the representatives of the people. Among them, the Minister of Justice was and is entrusted with the administration of justice, and the police was also mainly under his control. The Minister of Justice could therefore always be taken to task by Parliament for all arbitrary police or court actions, while the press, free to express its opinion, also kept watch. I shall revert to this presently in connection with the "Oss case," which made feeling run high throughout the Netherlands shortly before the Second World War.

While the organization of the courts in the Netherlands was simple, that of the police was complicated. First let us describe—naturally only in rough outline—the organization of our courts as it has chiefly remained for more than a hundred years, since the separation of the Netherlands from Belgium.

ORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS

We must distinguish between what is called in the Netherlands the sitting judiciary and the standing judiciary; that is to say, between the bench and the public prosecutor. At the head of the courts we find the Supreme Council of the Netherlands at The Hague,

which, as the Supreme Court of Appeals, assures a just application of the law and supervises all judges. Then there are five district Courts of Appeals—at 's Hertogenbosch, Arnhem, The Hague, Amsterdam, and Leeuwarden—below which there are in turn twenty county courts that mainly administer justice in more important cases both criminal and civil. Finally, the settlement of minor cases is entrusted to Justices of the Peace. All these judges, from the members of the Supreme Council down to the Justices of the Peace, are appointed for life by the Queen on the nomination of the Minister of Justice, with the provision of a retirement age of 70 years. They can only be dismissed by the Supreme Council for misconduct, and are thus completely independent of the Government. This independence was one of the most important foundations of our constitutional state!

The public prosecutor, on the other hand, charged with the investigation and prosecution of punishable acts—but in connection with the Supreme Council, mainly acting as an adviser of that body—was completely dependent on the Government. The Minister of Justice, from an administrative point of view, was the head of the public prosecutors. There was no question of life appointments, with one exception. The public prosecutors attached to the five courts, and called Attorneys General, were also ordinary officials, like other state officials. At the same time the five Attorneys General were, each in his district, charged with the administration of the police. This temporary function of Police Commissioners they have "temporarily" held for more than eighty years!

POLICE ORGANIZATION

I now come to the somewhat confused organization of the Netherlands police, which, as has already been seen, has been waiting for over eighty years for a strong consolidation. Not that our police was bad, and certainly not its individual members. On the contrary. But, a better-organized police would perhaps have had more success with fewer men and less means.

The main strength of the Netherlands police in our small country of about nine million inhabitants in more than a thousand municipalities was the municipal police—in other words, more than a thousand police forces. At the head of the police in each municipality was the Burgomaster, an official appointed by Her Majesty the Queen and under the supervision of the Minister of the Interior. The Burgomaster, merely by the fact that he had to be reappointed every six years, was completely dependent on the Government. In municipalities of more than 100,000 population, the police force was directed—under the Burgomaster—by a Chief Police Commissioner, and in smaller municipalities by a lower official. These thousand or more police forces were of highly varying importance. They contained about two thousand men, including highly developed detective bureaus, in cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam, while in the smallest municipalities the force commonly consisted of one man, the ubiquitous and popular village constable.

Before the occupation there were, furthermore, two state police forces—the Royal Mounted Police and the State Constabulary. These were of about equal size (fewer than two thousand men each) and both were scattered throughout almost the entire country.

The difference between these two organizations was that the Royal Mounted

Police was a military unit under professional officers headed by a major general or a colonel, and housed in barracks in small groups of five to twenty-five men. The State Constabulary, on the other hand, was a civilian unit, directed by civilian officers headed by an inspector. There was no question of barracks, for the state constables lived separately and were stationed specially in rural districts. It is self-evident that the mutual relations of these two forces, whose spheres of action and division of labor were almost identical, were far from ideal, jealous as they were of each other.

More or less above this confused police organization, the Attorney General at the district court "temporarily" functioned as Chief Police Commissioner in his district comprising two or three Netherlands provinces.

That conflicts, even serious conflicts, could not be avoided when the police was organized in such a manner became evident, for example in 1938 when the Oss case, which I have already mentioned, came to public notice.

Oss is a little town in the province of North Brabant. A veritable nest of criminals was cleaned out there by the men of the Royal Mounted Police in a most creditable manner. When, subsequently, the Attorney General in 's Hertogenbosch, in his capacity of Chief Police Commissioner, interfered with the police at Oss for other reasons, a storm of public indignation arose. The Oss case became a Netherlands *cause célèbre*. It provided the newspapers with headlines and the public with conversation, it was the subject of a debate lasting for days in Parliament, and later it was the reason for lengthy sessions of the Civil Service Court, in first instance and on appeal. This instance is recounted not because of the importance of the affair, but to emphasize that the Netherlands was de-

cidedly a constitutional state, where even the unjust discharge of a few ordinary policemen was sufficient to arouse the people's feelings to the utmost.

THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT AFTER INVASION

This was the condition of the Netherlands until May 10, 1940. Then came the brutal invasion by the Germans. *Quantum mutatus ab illo!* ("How much has changed since then!")

The main body of the Netherlands Army capitulated, after five days of bitter fighting, to enormously superior numbers. Let it be mentioned here that the Royal Mounted Police, as a subdivision of the Army, joined in the fight bravely whenever possible. A contingent of this unit after the great retreat via Belgium and France landed in England, where the picturesque uniforms of officers and men attracted much attention.

But let us return to the Netherlands. The Queen and her Ministers, as is well known, had to leave the country in order to form the Netherlands Government in London, although large territories in the east and in the west of the Netherlands were still unoccupied by the enemy. The supreme government agency left in the home country was the Board of Secretaries General (the administrative heads) of the various departments. The Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice, however, went with his chief, Dr. Gerbrandy, later Prime Minister, so that an Acting Secretary General had to fill his place temporarily. Even before the occupation, circulars were addressed by the Government to all authorities and officials and courts instructing them to remain in operation as long as possible in case of occupation, for the sake of the people. That the Government itself could not remain in The Hague,

but had to find a seat in free England, requires no explanation. Every right-thinking patriot understood and appreciated this from the beginning.

GERMAN INTERFERENCE IN GOVERNMENT

In May 1940 Dr. Artur Seyss-Inquart arrived, already notorious because of his treachery toward Austria and the then Chancellor Schuschnigg. Seyss-Inquart grasped the reigns of government here as "High Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands." In his first resounding speech he promised to uphold the existing system of government as much as possible. This promise was followed, in later periodically delivered speeches by him and his sinister satellites, by many similar promises and others, of which practically none were kept. That National Socialist Germans would fulfill their promises in this respect was believed in the Netherlands at most by their adherents, the N.S.B.-ers (adherents of the National Socialist Movement).

These traitors, about 5 per cent of the Dutch, were slowly but surely helped into the saddle by the Germans, and so achieved their brief hour of glory. Under Dr. Seyss-Inquart, a certain Dr. Wimmer functioned as Commissioner General for Justice and Administration, but never sought public notice; and the notorious police hangman, S.S. Head Groupleader, and Police General, Rauter, functioned as Chief of the Security Police and the S.D. (*Sicherheitsdienst*).

It is really unnecessary to mention that the Germans brought their own courts and police with them. Immediately, the Netherlands courts were deemed unworthy to administer justice in whatever form, criminal or civil, to persons elevated as high above everyone else as were the Germans. For

that they had their own courts, to which innumerable Netherlanders were, unfortunately, also dragged. In this connection I had better not speak about the many different kinds of German police—"Green Police," "Security Police," "S.D.," "Military Police," and many others—with which our country was blessed; this article will be long enough anyway.

There is a proverb in the Netherlands which says: "Easy does it." The Germans acted according to this when they attacked the governmental machinery. At the outset the Burgomasters of the large cities—Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht—i.e. the heads of the municipal police, were successively dismissed for more or less trumped-up reasons and after varying periods in office their legal substitutes were replaced by members of the N.S.B., or adherents of the German regime, without exception absolutely unreliable individuals in the political sphere and lacking capacity for their tasks. Not unjustly the revolution of the National Socialists was in Germany called "The Revolution of the Retarded." This expression was certainly confirmed in the Netherlands! During the five years of the occupation, many more than half the number of Burgomasters—that is a total of more than a thousand—were gradually dismissed by the enemy occupier. The N.S.B. was compelled to arrange a "quick course for Burgomasters" for their adherents in order to smooth the way to the seat of honor for a number of absolutely unworthy human specimens!

GERMAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE COURTS

What would happen to the courts was promptly seen in the summer of 1940, when the enemy authorities made

known that "in order to simplify the administration of justice" a short paragraph had been removed from the Code of Criminal Procedure. This paragraph provided that anyone who wanted to see a punishable act prosecuted could lodge a complaint concerning it with a competent court, which could then compel prosecution by the appropriate public prosecutor. The court could thus give rise to prosecutions that did not suit the enemy administration. So, away with this paragraph! To call this amendment of the law a "simplification" was a gross lie, which showed how Dr. Goebbels' methods had sneaked in here also, although they could be seen through quickly.

It was furthermore forbidden to administer justice "In the name of the Queen," as formerly. Justice had to be administered "In the name of the law"—a meaningless formula.

In September 1940 came the entirely unexpected dismissal of three of the five Attorneys General, functioning also as Chief Police Commissioners, to be replaced by individuals more pleasing to the occupier. Among the newly appointed was the notorious N.S.B.-er Dr. Van Genechten, who was recently condemned to death by the Special Court at The Hague. One of the dismissed Attorneys General, knowing nothing of the matter, came to his office that morning, only to find his successor already there.

These were but the first difficulties that the courts had to put up with. In the autumn of 1940 the Germans began the persecution of the Jews; but, indeed, so "easy" that it "did it"! The Netherlands police had practically no Jews in its ranks, but the courts on the other hand had, and first among them the Chief Justice of the Supreme Council of the Netherlands.

The Netherlands officials, high and

low, did not realize what they were doing when they signed the so-called "Jew Declaration"—that is, a declaration that they were not of Jewish descent or of a given Jewish descent. By doing so, they drew a boundary line between "Aryan" and Jewish colleagues, and the latter were to be the victims. In the beginning, the Jewish officials were relieved of their functions. Later they were dismissed, including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Council of the Netherlands and various others. As far as is known, all the Netherlands Jews except those who went underground were deported to Germany and Poland, via the transfer camp at Westerbork.

The positions left vacant for the above or other reasons were increasingly filled by adherents of the N.S.B. or by other Germanophiles unworthy of their new functions. Even to the highest office, that of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Council, a professor who was almost unknown and remained almost unknown was appointed, whose greatest and perhaps only merit in the eyes of the Germans must have been his pro-German attitude. From a scholarly point of view he was of no more significance to the Supreme Council than were some other members appointed later merely on account of their pro-German disposition. They all did grave harm to the name of the Supreme Council.

The majority of the members of the Council, however, remained "good," as we used to say in the Netherlands, as did those in other courts, although many of them had to put up with an N.S.B. Chief Justice and one or more other traitors as members. We were fortunate in that the supply of pro-German lawyers was relatively small and could therefore not be drawn on indefinitely by the occupier. The few there were, were promoted at fantastic speed.

ATTITUDE OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL

I must now touch upon a question that was and still is all too often asked in the Netherlands. Should not the Supreme Council in the Netherlands have taken a strong attitude from the very beginning? Should it not have stood in the breach and tried to prevent the violations of the law which occurred, such as the persecution of the Jews, the deportation of the male population for forced labor in Germany, the arrest of innumerable innocent people without any form of trial, the shooting of hostages, and other injustices? Let it be noted at once that the Supreme Council was in a very difficult position in that its own Chief Justice was a Jew.

Should not the Supreme Council have hurled a flaming protest into the world, as did the Belgian Supreme Court of Appeals? Let us not forget that we were under the thumb of a nazified civil government, with criminals like Seyss-Inquart and Rauter at the head, while the Belgians had to deal with a military government under General Von Falkenhausen, one of the conspirators of July 1944, who was later found by the Allies in a German concentration camp.

A few matters, however, seem perfectly clear to me. A "flaming protest" in whatsoever form by the Supreme Council would have been of little use. It would, without doubt, have been a splendid gesture, but there would have been a grave danger that the enemy would take entire control of the administration of civil and penal law, which was still in the hands of good Dutchmen. This would have been a great disadvantage to the Dutch people. The Belgian people learned the consequences of such a state of affairs in the beginning of 1918, when, after the Belgian courts went on strike, the

entire administration of justice passed into German hands. I am also certain that the "good" members of the Supreme Council, in remaining in it, had only the interests of the country in mind.

Great displeasure with the Supreme Council was aroused, among other things, by its decision concerning the war regulations of the country. But to discuss this would necessitate consideration of legal questions which have nothing to do with an article such as this.

SUFFERINGS OF THE COURTS

The suffering of the Netherlands courts lasted five long years. The acting Secretaries General of the Department of Justice, who were "good," disappeared from the scene one after the other and were succeeded by the German satellite, the N.S.B.-er Professor Schrieke, who had had an honorable career in the Netherlands Indies, where he had been Chief Justice. At the same time, Professor Schrieke became Commissioner General of Police. Now, the fences against German arbitrariness were completely down. Whenever possible, a Nazi friend was pushed into every vacancy.

After so-called "Economic Judges" and an "Economic Court" had been introduced for the adjudication of all criminal cases in the economic and rationing spheres, there followed the establishment of Justices of the Peace and of Justice Courts, all within the framework of the ordinary court system. The Justices of the Peace and the Justice Courts had to deal with those political misdemeanors and transgressions which the Germans transferred to them. It is clear that there were not many, although the appointment of Justices of the Peace was practically in N.S.B. and S.S. hands. The German

"S.S.," "Special," and "Field" courts had to be kept busy, too.

In the spring of 1943 the horrible conditions that prevailed in the Netherlands prison camp at Ommen became known. This camp was established by the Germans, but sentences of Netherlands judges were executed there. Indignation was great and strong protests were lodged by many, including the Supreme Council. The Leeuwarden Court expressed its uneasiness in a proclamation. The justices concerned were summarily dismissed by High Commissioner Seyss-Inquart personally, "for gross dereliction of duty." The tension in the whole country became great. A general strike of the courts was contemplated by all judges. The Germans and Professor Schrieke then gave up. The prison camp at Ommen was abolished. The tension diminished, and the strike did not take place.

The Netherlands courts also paid their toll to the war and to the Germans. Besides their Jewish members, several others were dismissed summarily by the occupiers. Some others, who felt they could no longer justify their being official servants of the law, resigned. Many were arrested, as political offenders or as hostages. One of them was shot as hostage—the Arnhem court official, Count Van Limburg Stirum. In 1945, when the quisling Attorney General in Amsterdam was shot by a rabid patriot, some of the most esteemed court officials in Amsterdam were dragged out of their houses and murdered. A similar tragedy took place in Leeuwarden.

CRITICISM OF THE COURTS

Yet it is true that however bravely some of its members, in the underground movement or otherwise, behaved themselves, the attitude of the Netherlands courts, taken as a whole, was not satisfactory. I believe, however, that

it was as good as it could be, looking at it rationally. But one likes to hear the emotions, the heart, speak for once. One painfully missed a *cri de coeur* at the time of the occupation. Therefore, after the Allied invasion in September 1944, when Nijmegen (where the Germans had transferred the seat of the Supreme Council for fear of invasion) was liberated, the Netherlands Government in London felt it necessary to take measures against the Supreme Council. It was provisionally suspended. It became the scapegoat. Only in October 1945, after an enlightening exchange of letters with the Government, did the Supreme Council resume its functioning.

The lower courts did not seem to be out of favor with the Government or with the public, in spite of the fact that it was from their members that the judges of the Special Courts and Tribunals were for the most part recruited—a fact which did not meet with criticism from any side.

GERMAN INTERFERENCE WITH POLICE

In the discussion of the courts I have already mentioned that the traitor Professor Schrieke, who was made Secretary General of the Department of Justice, was also appointed Commissioner General of Police. Such an office had never before existed in the Netherlands. The Minister of Justice had always been the immediate superior of his five Attorneys General, who were, at the same time, Chief Police Commissioners. The obvious purpose of the Germans was to unify and nazify the police in the shortest possible time.

The confused situation in our police setup greatly facilitated German interference. The Mounted Police, the picked military police force that had had to drop its title of "Royal," was naturally preferred by the Germans;

not that this arm of the service sought German favor, but such an organization suited the enemy occupier. The Netherlands Army had been made prisoners of war and then sent home. Officers and men had become civilians. This was not the fate of the Mounted Police. This force, just as it was, with officers and men—except the contingent in England—remained intact and armed in the occupied territory. It was even expanded.

First the State Constabulary—the civilian state police corps—was merged with the Mounted Police in toto. The State Constabulary ceased to exist. This created bad blood among its leaders, and a grievance was expressed that the Mounted Police, to say the least, wanted to profit by the occupation. But what could the Mounted Police do? It was soon to be struck a heavy blow when, on May 15, 1942, all so-called unreliable, i.e. "good," former career officers, including Mounted Police officers, were lured into a trap and deported as prisoners of war, first to Germany and then to Stanisławów in Poland.

POLICE STRUCTURE UNDER GERMANS

The leadership of the Mounted Police (whose personnel had meanwhile had to exchange their picturesque uniforms for a simpler German uniform) then fell into the hands of the N.S.B.-ers and other pro-German elements. They were vested with higher military ranks, such as colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, and so forth. When the local police of the smaller municipalities were also added to the Mounted Police, it was clear that one would get into difficulties with the cadre of this arm of the service that had been expanded beyond all proportions. Men of the rank and file who were politically reliable in German eyes were made officers after a short training. The nucleus

of this arm of the service—the men, the noncommissioned officers, and the brigadiers—remained “good,” however. I shall revert to this later.

In the police forces of the larger municipalities one found a similar development. I have already mentioned that the prewar Burgomasters successively disappeared, to be replaced by political adventurers. That is the way it went with the chief commissioners and Police Commissioners who remained true to their Queen and their country. For one reason or another, they were dismissed and were lucky if they did not land in a prison or concentration camp for some farfetched reason. They were replaced by “retarded” men, low-ranking inspectors, and even by ordinary policemen. The police in the larger municipalities, like those of the smaller municipalities, were incorporated into the Mounted Police and militarized, the Chief Commissioner and Commissioners becoming colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, or captain, each according to the importance of his municipality, while the lower officials received the rank of lower officers or noncommissioned officers.

Thus the Burgomaster lost all connection with the police all along the line. There was no room there for civilians. The police in the larger places became “State Police”; in the smaller, “Mounted Police.” The highest chief of both State Police and Mounted Police in the province was no longer the Attorney General, functioning also as Chief Police Commissioner, but a Police President completely corresponding to the German pattern.

Above the five provincial Police Presidents was the Commissioner General, the already mentioned Professor Schrieke, a sorry puppet of the Germans, who is now awaiting his fate in the prison at Scheveningen. In police matters, the professor was assisted by

his “Chief of Staff,” a position occupied by various unworthy individuals with the rank of colonel or lieutenant colonel. The best of them was doubtless a former policeman from Delft, who had voluntarily joined the S.S., had fought bravely in Russia, had acquired high rank in the S.S., and had returned to the Netherlands as “commanding officer.” First he became Police President of the southern provinces, then Chief of Staff. Within a year he had had enough of it, returned to his S.S. unit in Russia, and presumably perished there.

It can be said of the new “State Police” in the towns and other large municipalities that the majority were still absolutely “good” Dutchmen. They had an advantage over the Mounted Police in that their officers had not been summarily removed to Germany as prisoners of war. They had all been civilian officials (police commissioners and inspectors).

THE POLICE AND THE UNDERGROUND

The services rendered the Netherlands people by the “good” remnants of the Mounted Police, the State Police, and what was left of the municipal police, have been inestimably great. No outsider can form an idea of it.

Does the American reader know what a “diver” is? It is a man who, being sought by German police for any reason whatsoever, must stay in hiding. Among those who went underground were all Jews who had not yet been seized, all men in the “dangerous” ages who were earmarked for labor in Germany and had no “certificate,” all political offenders or those who were suspected of being such offenders and in whom the German police was interested, all former military men who had not reported, and, after September 1944, all railway men in the territory still oc-

cupied. I have certainly forgotten a few categories.

There were tens of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of "divers." A Dutch play on words read: "Only by 'diving' can you keep your head above water." It is true that during each raid in a village or in a certain street or district of a town, people who had gone underground were seized by the hundreds and, via concentration camps, taken to Germany.

The great problem was to procure shelter for the people who had gone underground and to provide them with rationed items. Innumerable people helped in this connection—organizations of brave men and women, as well as loosely organized citizens—but above all, the still "good" police. We all knew dozens of people all over the country who had gone into hiding; but especially did the police know them.

Rationing bureaus had to be raided to get ration books, transports were waylaid, town halls were searched, strong rooms were burglarized. Not only that, but prisons and jails and even police stations had to be invaded in order to free people who had been arrested. In 1943 and 1944 one could count on the average of one big "haul" a day. It happened mostly with the collaboration and always under the eyes of the "good" police, who naturally never found the culprits. Finally, the investigation of such matters as these was no longer entrusted to the Netherlands police, but to the German *Sicherheitsdienst* and to the traitors who called themselves *Nederlanders* who were attached to it.

HEROISM OF THE POLICE

Of course, some black pages are found in the book of the Netherlands police during the years of occupation. If Jews or doctors (the doctors in the raids of the summer of 1943) or others had to

be arrested, it had become a habit for the police to warn those concerned; but it could also happen that they were arrested forthwith by police officers who called themselves "good." One should not forget that we lived under a frightful terror and that the nonobservance of any German order whatsoever was ruthlessly punished. Whole brigades of the Mounted Police went underground en bloc in order to escape tasks like dragging out Jews, participating in raids, and so forth. It happened that entire raiding units, together with the people they arrested, disappeared from the scene rather than deliver those arrested to the hated enemy.

This mostly meant a sad and dangerous existence in the future for those concerned, for nobody knew how long the occupation would last, and a grave danger for the members of the family who remained behind. Their arrest, imprisonment, and transportation to notorious concentration camps like those at Vught and Amersfoort, with confiscation of house and household effects, were common occurrences.

Not every policeman dared to run such a risk. After all, not everyone is a hero. A young unmarried policeman can dare more than a colleague with a large family. But many were heroes; those who, while in active service, at the same time played a great part in the underground movement, and who despite everything took a clear-cut position, taking no heed to the consequences which they simply awaited.

GERMAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE POLICE

And yet, in a sense, the Netherlands police was the pet child of the German occupation. Lots of money was spent on it. Financially, its personnel had greater advantages than others. One day a year, in November, was sentimentally dedicated to the police—the

"Day of the Netherlands Police." Police reviews and parades were organized. A "Comradeship Association" with compulsory membership was organized to include the entire personnel. Former associations were abolished. The enemy did not understand that the revolting individuals who were placed at the head of the "Comradeship Association" by the Germans were enough to frighten away the "good" members of this association with its "comradeship evenings" together with the Germans. The one-sided love of the Germans thus remained unrequited.

A number of "good" policemen lost their lives in the uneven struggle. I shall mention only one, the Rotterdam Chief Inspector, Bennekers, who was shot as an innocent hostage.

Of course, it was known to the Germans that they could not rely on the police, and that the people hated its profiteers—those promoted from policeman or constable to commanding officer. Many of them were murdered, which in turn provoked so-called "counter" murders of absolutely innocent citizens by the N.S.B. and the Germans. For instance, after the murder of a police lieutenant in Groningen in the night of December 31, 1943, five respectable inhabitants were dragged out of their houses and slaughtered in front of their doors on January 1, 1944. The unsuccessful attempt on the life of Police General Rauter cost the lives of hundreds of Netherlanders all over the country in March 1945. This was the last massacre that the enemy occupa-

tion managed to organize before the liberation.

The occupation tried, through the establishment of police schools, training battalions, and so forth, to introduce among the police, people who were favorably inclined to the Germans; but this was only partially successful. There was of course no question of any fairly decent technical police training. Drill, marches, reviews, singing exercises, and the ill-digestible Nazi doctrine formed the staple ingredients of the program. When, however, a battalion of Mounted Police, mindful of the instructions, went on a march singing patriotic songs, it was arrested en bloc and sent to a concentration camp.

Finally, the Germans decided to establish a National Guard, which became very notorious. It was a kind of auxiliary police consisting of the most repulsive individuals from the scum of society. Even the N.S.B. police looked down on it with contempt. This National Guard terrorized the populace appallingly, especially during the last months of the occupation.

THE AFTERMATH

From the dark tunnel we have again emerged into the light of day. We are at long last free. The chaos caused by the Germans in our once orderly country has been terrible, and especially in the police field. The Netherlands people and their Government have courageously gone to work to set their house in order again. May their efforts be successful!

H. R. de Zaaijer has been Chief of the P.O.D. (Political Police) in the district of Arnhem since the liberation of the Netherlands, and in August 1945 he became a member of the Special Court of Justice. In 1927 he became Public Prosecutor at Arnhem. In 1936 he was appointed Judge there, and in 1941 he became Presiding Judge for Criminal Investigations. In 1935 he was active in connection with the Saar plebiscite.

Concentration Camps in the Netherlands

By A. TIMMENGA

AMERSFOORT, Vught, Westerborck—names which evoke in every Netherlander a complex of memories of one of the horrors of German rule. They served as the threats by which the enemy sought to overcome resistance in the Netherlands. To them were conveyed all who could be a hindrance to the "Heil" state.

About 180,000 Dutchmen passed through the gates of these camps during the occupation. A few of them were discharged after a certain time; others died there; but most of them were transferred to German camps where a large proportion lost their lives. At the present time some 10,000 prisoners have been repatriated from Germany, so that the number of dead will reach rather more than 100,000. Of these a large portion consisted of the Jews who were sent via Westerborck to the gas chambers of Polish annihilation camps.

CATEGORIES OF PRISONERS

Non-Jewish prisoners may be divided into the following categories:

1. Those who had received normal punishment: people who had listened to Allied radio broadcasts, students who had joined the underground, laborers who had refused to go to work in Germany, workers in illegal enterprises, communists, Jehovah's Witnesses, black-market operators, clandestine butchers, and so forth.

2. Hostages: people who had been taken into custody as a precautionary measure or who had been arrested because members of their families had committed punishable offenses and could not be found. Such people at first received better treatment than fell the last ones, among whom were

many women and children and even babies.

3. People who had not yet been sentenced and had to wait for the further disposal of their cases. For the most part such proceedings did not take place in the camps themselves, and so these people were removed; although it frequently happened that cases never came up at all, and people sat imprisoned for months without final judgment, so that actually one prisoner was declared innocent after his death in the camp at Vught.

4. A separate group consisted of the workers who had been arrested in police raids and were temporarily detained in the transfer camp at Amersfoort to be forwarded later to a German work training camp.

The Jews may be divided into two groups: those who had committed punishable offenses and those who were concentrated in certain camps exclusively on the basis of existing regulations.

CAMP STRUCTURE

All three of the camps are located in the midst of woods and heather some kilometers¹ distant from the business district of their respective municipalities. They are surrounded by high barbed-wire fences which could eventually be charged with electric current. Outside the enclosure were observation posts placed at intervals of two hundred meters (about 219 yards), manned by members of the S.S. (*Schutz-Staffel*), and supplied with machine guns. At Vught a deep canal also surrounded the camp. Yet, despite all obstacles, prisoners succeeded in making their escape.

¹ One kilometer equals nearly five-eighths of a mile.

Most German camps are built according to the same systematic plan, i.e., a large open space or courtyard for roll call, and around that the barracks.

Of the three camps, the one at Vught is the most modern, and was regarded by the Germans as their model concentration camp in the Netherlands. At the beginning of the occupation there was also a small concentration camp at Schoorl, but it was very soon abandoned and prisoners were transferred to Amersfoort, while most of the Jews were taken to the camp at Westerbork, which existed even before the war and housed the Jews who had fled from Germany. It consists of wooden barracks, like the camp built later at Amersfoort. When these camps became too small the one at Vught was begun, at the close of 1942; and in January 1943, long before the construction and the installations were completed, the first prisoners were brought from Amersfoort to help finish the camp. The barracks at Vught are built of stone, and next to them stand stone structures in which were the eating and sleeping quarters of the staff and barracks for the S.S.

CAMP ADMINISTRATION

The administration of the camps in general was left to the S.S. At the head stood the commandant, whose task it was to guard the prisoners. He was strictly charged not to commute the sentences of prisoners. Indeed, it was seldom that a prisoner was freed at the expiration of his term. About the time of his expected release, the Dutch National Socialist party (*Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging*, or N.S.B.) at The Hague sent notice of it to the commandant with a request that he report on the prisoner's conduct during his imprisonment. Because the commandant very seldom visited the camp, he was certainly in no position to prepare

such a statement. According to the testimony of prisoners, the utmost arbitrariness resulted. The actual proceeding was that the appropriate dossier was placed before the commandant or his representative, whereupon he asked, "What did the man do?" And after a glance at the dossier, "Clergyman?—That is not in question. Member of the resistance? Let him recuperate here awhile longer. Is he a member of the Dutch Communist Party?—He's always a menace to the state. Write this down: The man constantly shirks his work, is a saucy fellow, hasn't altered his political views, is after many months of arrest still friendly to the Jews. . . . I advise against his discharge." Such a report nullified the release of the prisoner, who was totally unaware of what had taken place.

Under the commandant were officers who commanded the S.S.-ers, Germans as well as Dutch, who formed the camp guard.

The prisoners were under the daily command of so-called Capos, who were prisoners of German nationality, most of whom had already spent a very long time in concentration camps. They were mostly professional criminals (thieves and murderers), and some were political prisoners and black-market operators. After many years of living in concentration camps these fellows had become hard and brutal and treated prisoners accordingly. They knew exactly how many blows of a stick a prisoner could stand short of killing him, and they had very great influence in the camp. For instance, if a prisoner felt ill, the Capo decided whether he was in good enough condition to work or whether he should be considered for consignment to the hospital barracks. According to the regulations, a prisoner who had a fever under 39° C. (102.2° F.) had no chance to be seriously considered.

MEDICAL CARE AND FOOD

For medical care, separate hospital barracks were established in charge of a German physician who, generally speaking, did not take his work very seriously. He was aided by doctors and nurses among the prisoners. The hospital barracks were improved in the course of months. There was a time when Amersfoort had no medical care whatever. In 1944 Vught had the best-arranged hospital barracks of all, although they too lacked very many facilities. Operations could also be performed, so that even prisoners from Scheveningen and Amersfoort went to Vught by ambulance to be treated.

Food at the hospital barracks was generally better than in the remainder of the camp. Food was much the worst at the close of 1942 at Amersfoort and early in 1943 at Vught, a fact which is reflected in the high mortality figures of those months. By reason of malnutrition and unsatisfactory clothing, prisoners showed very little resistance to contagious diseases, and scores of them died. In that winter there were times when thirty prisoners died daily. The feeding then consisted of a piece of bread, often moldy, and at noon watery soup which had very little nutritive value.

RECEIPT OF PARCELS

In the summer of 1943, however, when the prisoners were allowed to receive parcels quite regularly, food conditions improved. At Amersfoort the sending of parcels was not permitted so regularly as at Vught, where each prisoner might have one from home every week. This, however, had to satisfy various wants, and if the prisoner did not keep his hands on it, it was stolen or, to use a camp expression, "organized" by the S.S.

The weight of each parcel could not

exceed more than 5 kilograms (about 11 pounds). When this matter was not strictly regulated for a while, families soon began sending 10-15-kilogram parcels, despite warnings; so the commandant at one time allowed everything to be confiscated, and prohibited further sending. Then followed a regulation that prisoners might have 3 kilograms per week, and control became so very strict that if a parcel weighed only 50 grams too much it never reached its destination. Nor were prisoners allowed to receive sharp articles, lest they have a way to take their lives! Knives, can openers, and so on, were ruled out. There was a time when it was foolish to send whole packages or tins of butter, because these were sure to be stolen by the S.S. when parcels were opened.

Strictly regulated were prohibited messages; if one of these was found, the prisoner to whom it was addressed was heavily punished. Even so, some women became very ingenious; they baked messages in loaves of bread, hid them in cases of packed provisions or in tubes, stuck them in little glass pipes, in jam jars, and so forth. Nevertheless, parcels were as a rule so thoroughly inspected and cakes and bread were sliced in such a way that many of these messages were discovered—with the usual consequences.

Various private individuals in Vught were of the utmost service also in sending small packages. Not every one, indeed, was in position to save enough for a parcel from his own short rations, especially in the cities and in households with grown children. Such persons could accordingly get in touch with the people in Vught above referred to, with the request that they be willing to take over the care of prisoners. Throughout the entire country, people got behind this work. Illegal organizations produced hundreds of

coupons with which contents for packages could be bought, while many manufacturers placed at their disposal large quantities of provisions, wrapping materials, and medicines. A portion of this work was done under the flag of the Red Cross, but much of it had to be kept completely secret. Various citizens of Vught worked for months from early in the morning till midnight in order to alleviate conditions among the prisoners.

Jewish prisoners at Westerbork also were allowed to receive parcels quite regularly, but the need there was not so great as at Amersfoort and Vught. At Amersfoort it was chiefly Red Cross parcels that reached the prisoners. Since the so-called "difficult cases" among the prisoners were not permitted to receive parcels, their diet generally was very bad. In this way the Germans sought to speed up the presentation of testimony at the trials or hearings and thus get prisoners to betray other underground fighters who were still at liberty.

By such means the Germans also tried to get more work out of the prisoners. In a women's camp in the Netherlands the women had to twist rope out of a kind of paper, and the normal daily assignment was forty meters per person. If, however, a woman turned out eighty meters, she was promised increased rations. Since the women well knew from experience that if they complied still higher demands would be made and the promises would never be kept, they did not react favorably to such promises—to the furious indignation of their overlords.

In general, life at the women's camp was more cruel than at the men's camp. This is traceable to several factors. The mood of the women was fiercer, and their audacity led them to take somewhat more liberty. Moreover, they were watched by female overseers,

who could frequently invent more malicious forms of vexation than the male guards. The so-called *Pakketsperre* (which prohibited the receipt of parcels) occurred frequently in the women's camp. Indeed, this punishment was often and quickly resorted to. For instance, if a prisoner escaped, the whole camp was given the parcel penalty, which sometimes lasted for months. How necessary these parcels were, became especially apparent when, as the Allies approached in the summer of 1944, most of the Dutch prisoners were transported to Germany and delivered over to the worst privations. Here they practically never received parcels, and thousands died of hunger and exhaustion.

CLOTHING

The clothing of prisoners consisted of a blue-and-white-striped suit; light linen in summer, shoddy in winter. The Jews were allowed to keep their own clothes. At the beginning of the war, when camps in the Netherlands began to spring up, there was no camp clothing on hand, and prisoners wore old Dutch army uniforms. Since sanitary conditions, especially at Amersfoort, were then exceedingly bad and there was no possibility of disinfecting these clothes, people fell into a state of complete squalor. As a result, a huge plague of lice raged in the camps. With the camp uniform was supplied a suit of underwear, which after the winter of 1943 was washed every six or eight weeks, though this condition was improved upon later. The wearing of one's own underclothes was not permitted in the first years, and warm slippers too were forbidden.

To end the plague of lice the Germans resorted to delousing on a grand scale. Clad in wedding ring (if it had not been removed) and wooden shoes, the prisoners had to submit to it in the

open air and to stand there for endless roll calls—frequently in very bad and very cold weather. Their barracks were then completely fumigated and clean clothes were laid out. After this had occurred a few times and clothing had been regularly washed and the prisoners had been sprayed now and then, the lice problem was very largely solved.

ROLL CALL

Days in the camps were long. The prisoners had to rise about 4 A.M. (4:45 in the winter) and they went to bed at 9:30 P.M. They had a 12-hour work-day and sometimes had to stand for hours at roll call. As a rule there were three roll calls a day. The prisoners all had to fall in line in the large court-yard of the camp, after which a check was made to see if all were present. If figures did not jibe, the prisoners had to stand and wait until the error (for which the administration was usually to blame) was found. Both sick and dead were included in the roll call. These roll calls also gave an opportunity to punish the prisoners collectively. Roll calls lasting hours in the cold and the rain occurred several times when prisoners all had to fall in and remain standing at attention. If one of them collapsed, he was not allowed the help of his companions but might be picked up afterwards and carried to the barracks.

WORK

The morning roll call usually lasted a half-hour, after which the prisoners went to work. Even these people had to be made productive. Their work might be of the most extraordinary variety. Grave digging and heavy lug-
ging, laying out roads, kitchen service, and administrative work were contributed by the prisoners. At Amersfoort this program was not organized to such

a fine point as at Vught. At Westerbork work consisted chiefly of camp maintenance and fatigue duty. Vught, on the other hand, had outside commandos, i.e., places outside the camp to which the prisoners were transported under strong guard and then put to work. Many women, too, were appointed to serve in a gas-mask factory. In this work they had to handle a poisonous liquid which could cause a variety of diseases. After a while, to combat these effects, the women were given milk while they worked. Prisoners were also assigned to the airports at Venlo and Gilze en Reijen. As a result of bombing, a good many lost their lives there.

For a while after construction began at Vught, prisoners had to carry rocks in a city located near by. Under a heavy guard of S.S.-ers and bloodhounds they had to walk to this place. In this way the citizens of Vught were enabled to see in what awful conditions these people lived. Many walked in wooden shoes that were too small and their hands bled as they luggered the stones. As soon as one of them stumbled, the guards struck him until he was up on his feet again and staggered forward or was carried along by his comrades. Because the city folks could testify as witnesses to all this, and tried to supply the prisoners with provisions and bandages, so that they got into difficulties with the S.S., the Germans abandoned this work and let the prisoners do it in camp.

Women too had to help in this work, with bare hands. Jewish women especially were selected, and from 7:00 in the morning until 9:30 in the evening they had to carry stones for a long distance—sometimes three at once.

In the spring of 1943 a branch of the Philips factory came to the camp at Vught and hundreds of prisoners were put to work in it at once. All sorts of

articles such as shaving materials, small dynamos, and radios were prepared here. Treatment was good, and work periods also were better regulated. Soon the Philips command was the most important in the camp, and the prisoners preferred most of all to be assigned to duty there. Philips allowed a special stew to be brought from Eindhoven. It consisted of substantial, nourishing, mashed food, and to the prisoners this meant an important improvement in the matter of diet. Besides, the prisoners received more money with which to buy fruit in the camp canteen. For extra heavy labor more bread was furnished, along with some "spread," and on special occasions such as Christmas the prisoners got parcels of food.

By working on radios the prisoners were able to listen to secret broadcasters, with the unique result that this camp was best informed on the progress of the war, while the civilian workers there spread war reports outside the camp. Many of the employees of the factory at Eindhoven also visited the camp daily. Among them were several who had close contact with underground organizations or were especially assigned to work in the camp by these organizations. Although they could not converse with the prisoners except about the work, they brought many messages out of the camp and could sometimes make contact with members of the families concerned. This, however, was very dangerous work and required the utmost caution.

Because prisoners were trained for special tasks, Philips could often prevent their being assigned to transport jobs by insisting that they were so badly needed in the field of production. At the same time it was of great importance to the prisoners to be assigned to this work, because they had to stay in good physical condition if they were

to be productive, and for that reason they were less harshly treated.

PUNISHMENTS

Except as described above, especially in the first years at Amersfoort and thereafter at Vught, prisoners were punished by flogging. They had to lie down on a block and be held fast by S.S.-ers, whereupon the strokes were administered with a stick. The penalty varied generally from ten to fifty strokes and was meted out in the courtyard in view of all the camp's inhabitants. The reason was oftentimes, for example, smoking when prohibited, wearing two suits of underclothes, offending a guard by not greeting him respectfully, stealing provisions from the kitchen, listening to a prohibited broadcast, smuggling notes, talking about the war situation, and so forth. In some camps there were dogs especially trained to attack the prisoners. These dogs usually accompanied the guards.

While at work, a prisoner was handed over to the Capo or S.S.-er who stood guard over the command. These men were often guilty of the most serious abuses. There was, for instance, a certain boundary beyond which the prisoners might not go. If the guard threw a prisoner's cap beyond the line, the prisoner was compelled to pick it up. In so doing he had to cross the line, whereupon he was immediately shot dead. The excuse in that event was, "Shot in flight." Numerous prisoners fell victims to these methods; and the S.S.-er who perpetrated such a deed got a bonus of extra gin and cigarettes, and three days duty free.

Another punishment of frequent occurrence was the long roll calls, during which the prisoners were forced to crawl, lie down on the ground (often in the mud), stand up again, and so forth. It happened also that a prisoner was

punished by confinement for a certain time in the guardhouse, where he was denied the receipt of parcels and the writing of letters (officially he was permitted one letter per month), he got less food, and he had to work with a unit at extra hard labor. Those more severely punished went to the bunker, a jail built inside the camp enclosure, where they were locked up in cells on bread and water and had no work at all.

In the bunker at Vught early in 1944 occurred an event which was one of the saddest in the history of the camps. In the women's quarters was a woman who stood in well with certain staff officers and reported to them serious charges against her fellow prisoners. She worked her way into their confidence and then threatened to divulge certain facts, such as keeping a hidden radio at home. Notwithstanding the very serious warning she received, she continued the practice. The women therefore got very excited, dragged her out of bed, threw water on her and her sheets, and cut off a portion of her hair.

In reprisal, the woman who had done the cutting was placed in the bunker. When the other women of the group heard of it, they all got behind their friend and begged the commandant to be allowed to share the blame. One evening shortly after that, the ninety-one implicated women were brought from the barracks, taken to the bunker, and shut up in two cells 3.80 by 2.30 meters (about 12.5 by 7.5 feet) in size. Seventeen women were forced into one and seventy-five into the other. The iron door was then closed and light and air were shut off. There was only one little window in the upper part of each cell, which they were able to open after a few hours; but in the suffocating atmosphere, the window could bring no relief. After some hours in the more crowded cell the women began to fall unconscious, while some went insane—

all this in the very cramped space into which they had been jammed standing. Prisoners in the camp heard the shrieks that penetrated the walls, but little could they guess what was going on inside. When after seventeen hours the door was opened, the women tumbled out; many appeared dead, others were unconscious or insane. Heart stimulants and injections were of no avail, and as a result of this night ten women passed away.

Immediately everything was done in camp to hush up the whole affair. On pain of the most severe penalties the women were ordered to say nothing about it, while they were separated and assigned various labor commands; one part of the S.S. was transferred; the corpses were secretly cremated at night. But despite all precautions the affair leaked out, and a short time later the commandant was removed after hangman Himmler had personally convinced himself of what had taken place.

TRANSFERS

Among those also who were transferred from the camps, frequent heart-rending tragedies occurred. Almost daily, prisoners were removed to other prisons or camps in Germany, especially from Amersfoort, which was Germany's transfer camp, and from Westerbork, through which the Jews passed. Small groups of transferees also went to the prisons to be heard and judged and after that to be executed by shooting. At Vught a few ladies co-operated by supplying the transferees with provisions and by learning their names, after which they notified members of their families. Often these ladies had the good fortune to be able to serve the prisoners by doing errands or delivering final messages to their wives. Since the Germans kept sharp watch, the utmost care always had to be exercised. During the last months preceding lib-

eration, when it was plain to the Germans themselves that they were going to lose the war, many German guards exerted every possible effort to be proficient watchmen in order to effect thereby a policy of "life insurance."

One of the worst happenings which I personally witnessed was the transfer of Jews in vast numbers from Vught in the summer of 1943. Large groups of Jewish prisoners were removed; families were torn apart; and during the days which were consumed in such a transfer one tried to do what one could to preserve natural ties as much as possible by adopting somebody else's identity. At the station one evening I saw an endless column of two thousand persons approaching: old men and women, mothers with nursing babies in their arms, some wrapped in blankets and others exposed, howling little girls, and others, unconscious of what was happening, merrily hop-skipping to death, men and women with sacks, trunks, pails, pans, and bottles. Among them ran nurses. All was hurry and haste. Sick and healthy, old and young—all stumbled, ran, hop-skipped, or were borne toward the well-planned gas chambers of the Polish camps. There were women with high fevers and serious lung afflictions who lay on the ground; children without parents, children with scarlet fever; there was a mother with a dying baby in her arms who kept saying over and over: "Why this when I have surely done nobody wrong?" These transferees started their journey with practically nothing to eat or drink and without medicines—many of them would die on the way.

This horrible annihilation evoked boundless sympathy in everyone who saw it; and one can understand why many Netherlanders tried to lessen this great injustice by concealing fellow citizens in their houses and thus risking their own lives and freedom. Toward

these transferees anti-Semitism was held in check, and even the most hardened Capo could not suppress his feelings.

EXECUTIONS

When in September 1944 the Allied armies approached the Dutch borders, speedy evacuation of the camps began. In the southernmost camp at Vught, where reports of the rapid approach had been received early in September 1944, great excitement prevailed and people eagerly awaited the liberation which might come at any moment. Unfortunately the Allied advance was delayed, and so the Germans got another chance to empty the camp while the Allies remained some tens of kilometers away. The Germans proceeded with the utmost haste and took occasion in these days to shoot to death at least 400 prisoners, that is to say the worst offenders. This was all done arbitrarily, without further formal procedure; and since the camp's administrative office was burned, not all the names of those who were then put to death have yet come to light. These were the best of Holland's men: they filled leading positions in the underground; they had aided Allied pilots, had procured weapons, and were accustomed to making surprise attacks on distribution centers. The remaining prisoners—4,000 men and 1,000 women—were loaded into livestock trucks and delivered at the German camps after a three days' journey.

At Amersfoort and Westerbork many prisoners were executed by shooting during the war years. The gallows set up at Vught was used in only twenty-one cases. After execution, bodies were usually cremated in the specially constructed crematories at the camps. At Amersfoort, however, the dead were buried; and just now we are

very busy preserving their bodies for identification.

AN UNBROKEN SPIRIT

Despite all the horrors of the camps, prisoners maintained a good disposition. The Germans could not have broken the spirit of our people, even if they had visited sorrow upon many more hundreds of thousands of prisoners in the camps, slave laborers in Germany, and the many who met death by execution or by bombing. They all kept hoping for speedy liberation and for an end to what was a dark period in their lives even though it could not ruin them spiritually.

Because the Germans have for the most part destroyed camp administrative records and the families concerned were never advised of the eventual death of prisoners, thousands of politi-

cal prisoners in the Netherlands are today still unaccounted for; so everything is being done to reconstruct the records and to discover what happened there. Even yet, thousands of mothers, men, women, and children live in constant uncertainty of the fate of those dear to them—they sit day and night looking for a sign of life or for an obituary, which they prefer to the uncertainty in which they live. Very many, however, will always remain missing, and it will never be known what happened or how, when or where they lost their lives.

I hope that I have given here a brief, popular account, which I know all too well is incomplete on many points, but which presents a picture of what the Netherlanders experienced in concentration camps during the German occupation.

Miss A. Timmenga is chief of the Bureau for the Liquidation of Concentration Camps in the Netherlands—a government institution of which she was one of the founders after the liberation of the country. During the war she was very active in the underground work, especially in aiding the prisoners in the Vught camp.

The Jews Under the Nazi Regime

By J. F. KROP

ON May 10, 1940, at 3:30 A.M., the Teutonic hordes attacked a small nation in its sleep. After four days of battle the invader had not yet succeeded in defeating the Dutch Army—a handful of brave men who furiously fought for their freedom. That is why the enemy laid waste to the central section of Rotterdam.

On May 14 at 1:30 P.M. the first bombs fell on the big hospital in Rotterdam. Before long the entire "old" town was blazing. Our kingdom in Europe had capitulated. For three days we helplessly saw the fire spread, ravaging our city and our belongings. Then we knew that the old order had passed and would not return. Rigorous curfew regulations were established—symbols that provoked anxiety. Many intellectuals committed suicide; life had lost its meaning for them. I heard a rabbi plaintively ask God why the crumbling ruins had not buried him. His congregation in Rotterdam had counted about eleven thousand souls on May 9, 1940, but after that May the number had dropped to nine thousand.

Modern anti-Semitic feelings are well known to all of us. If one takes a broad view, race pride is nothing specifically German, for it is strong in both France and America. The German doctrine of blood and soil led, however, to systematic torture of the Jewish people over a period of years, inevitably ending in horrible death. Such seemingly impossible conduct resulted from distortion and exaggeration of the stereotype of the Jew in order to heighten the German prestige, from sexual aberrations, from innate brutality, and above all from a great hatred against the Bible—"a book of pimps

and traitors" as the Nazis expressed it. They made a mockery of concepts such as justice, piety, conscience—in brief, everything that raises man above the level of witless beasts.

PERSECUTIONS IN 1941

Toward the end of 1940 all Jewish civil servants, state or local, were discharged and an order was issued that all persons of Jewish blood be reported. In February 1941 large raids began in Amsterdam. Hundreds of Jewish youths between 17 and 35 years of age were pulled from trolley cars, bathhouses, and cafés, carried to Mauthausen, near Linz in Austria, and butchered there in an inhuman manner. The trolley employees of Amsterdam reacted by launching a strike the same month which affected some other trades as well. After two days the strike was suppressed in a bloody manner. Later the pogroms spread over the entire country. The Dutch people tried to hide the Jews, but the attitude of the police, while anti-German, was extremely timid. The Jews were driven into ghettos that were closed off. They were forbidden to frequent picture theaters, bathhouses, hotels, restaurants, parks, zoos, theaters, athletic contests, reading rooms, or auctions. No Jew could any longer be a member of an association or have a non-Jew as a domestic servant.

Most terrible were the dark days when the German juggernaut stood before Moscow and when the U-boat danger was at its greatest and the United States was treacherously attacked by Japan. At night there could be heard muffled sounds—some victim probably

being pulled out from his bed. A fear of horror made the country tremble.

From the prison where people pined away in filth and sometimes in complete darkness in solitary cells where loneliness and the strain of hopeless waiting killed morale, no sounds penetrated to the outside world.

Life in the occupied area began with a morning paper in which formerly independent journalists smeared their Jewish compatriots, kissed the whip of Hitler, and disgustingly prattled about a Netherlands absorbed in a New Europe—a Europe of inhuman physiognomy and a brutal, stupid expression. In the railway train we heard of new rules against the Jews; of whole congregations of which every member had been removed to concentration camps. One could see the fire in people's eyes—eyes that were almost lost in wasted faces. In government bureaus and in the buildings of the Jewish Council, tired officials assembled figures and facts for the never-satisfied German beast. In the streets, raw, pornographic, anti-Semitic utterances were chalked everywhere, and soon the words "Forbidden to Jews" were placed everywhere. Synagogues were besmeared and wrecked. Finally 1942 and 1943 came—years which were to mark the end of the Jews of the Netherlands.

PERSECUTIONS IN 1942

The year 1942 began with the taking away of all means of transportation of the Jews, and later the use of public conveyances by them was forbidden. The Jews were deprived of telephones and of the right to have checking accounts and insurance policies. All art production had to be surrendered. A complete statement of the wealth of the bank, Lippmann and Rosenthal, at Amsterdam, was demanded. An inventory was made of all Jewish dwellings

and Jews were forbidden to enter barbershops, markets, or drug stores not especially set up for them. Shopping was permitted to Jews only between five and six o'clock in the afternoon, when the shops were sold out. Jews were forbidden to appear in the open (even on balconies or in gardens) between eight o'clock in the evening and six o'clock in the morning. Every Jew had to sleep in his own dwelling in order that he might not evade his turn to be "picked up." Merchants could no longer deliver packages, coal, or other commodities to the homes of Jews. Jews were not allowed to give lessons to non-Jews. Jewish lawyers and doctors could give no assistance to non-Jewish clients. Non-Jewish homes or properties could not be entered by Jews. Jewish merchandise could neither be bought nor taken away. Mixed marriages were prohibited overnight; where such marriages had already been entered into, the Jewish partner was taken away and deported. On April 29, 1942 the Jewish Star, analogous to the Jewish hat of the Middle Ages, was introduced. The Star of David had to be sewed on the clothing, both on overcoat and on suit or dress.

Then the Nazis found that they had prepared the ground satisfactorily. The Jews could always be identified—they had a special stamp (a "J") on their identity card. The neighborhoods into which the Jews had been driven were indicated by big yellow signs with the words "Jewish quarter" or "Jewish street." The cat-and-mouse game was ready to begin.

Herded for torture

On July 13, 1942 a few thousand Jews received a notice to gather at two o'clock in the morning at the central railway station at Amsterdam. They were to bring with them one blanket

and one change of underwear. In order to reach the train they were not allowed to use any means of transportation, and this rule applied to the blind, the crippled, and all others. A few days later the systematic raids began. The Jews were dragged out of their homes, children were thrown out the window or smashed to death on the edge of a table, women were abused. It happened that women were delivered of babies on the street. Even sick Jews and inmates of old people's homes and orphanages were collected. Even sucking babies of a few months of age were taken, the sick from the operating table, the old, the ill, and helpless people, and even the lame and the blind. The Boche took a satanic pleasure in keeping the Jews constantly in a state of tension, raising their fear and anxiety and depriving them in the most lawless manner of their last belongings and their means of livelihood. Members of families were torn away from one another, the older ones sent hither and the children thither, and the remnants of numerous families were left behind in deep misery until their turn came.

Everybody was sent to the transfer camps at Vught and Westerbork, where the Jews were "examined" medically. That is, even in extreme cold they had to undress completely and remain standing for hours in barracks where doors and windows were wide open, until all body hair had been removed and the guards convinced that most of the ones "examined" must have contracted severe grippe or pneumonia. Infants, small children, and even older ones failed to survive the consequences of this first selective process. It also happened that pregnant women or women who were still in childbirth were compelled to stand for hours immobile in the rain at night—barefoot and completely nude. Those who survived this first "selection" were

sent to the gas chambers at Oświęcim, Poland.

Shipment to death

Jews were transported in freight cars, sixty to one hundred persons and sometimes more packed into cattle cars. There was practically no light, no food for the sick. The pregnant women, the invalids, those who had tuberculosis, diphtheria, and measles—some of them runing temperatures of up to 104 degrees—children and old, all were shipped. All Netherlands still thinks with horror of the so-called "children shipment" from Vught in May 1943. Sixteen thousand children were loaded into the cars. Where children were under 4 years of age their mothers were sent along, and either the father or the mother with children of 4 to 16 years of age, but never both.

About 40,000 Jews joined the underground during the war, and of those, about 25,000 were caught either through carelessness or through stool pigeons. About 105,000 Jews were deported from the Netherlands, and of those, about 4,000 survived the war. We can still see in our dreams the limitless rows of bloody faces with martyred expressions and eyes mad with fear that endlessly trudged past us staringly.

We will not accompany the Jew in his death struggle. From casual conversations with Americans it seems to me that the perversities that occurred are almost impossible to conceive by a civilized person even when he closes his eyes and directs his thoughts there. We shall therefore pass by the pyres of thousands of children burnt alive, the death struggle of abducted women gassed to death, and the picture of Jews whose sexual organs were smashed and their skulls cracked for the single offense of having been born Jews. A number of official reports have already appeared about the vivisection rooms

where thousands of men and women were mutilated without anesthesia in the most horrible way, and where advanced medical science was, alas, put to use to inflict upon human beings the maximum of physical suffering. The smoke from the crematory which poisoned the air of the concentration camps and the moans of thousands of dying people form a stain which can never be washed away from the book in which is written the history of man.

THE JEWISH UNDERGROUND

After 1943 there was no longer any Jewish community in the Netherlands, officially speaking. In Rotterdam a former member of that community broke into the building sealed by the Huns and "robbed" the archives, took silver objects from the strong room, some office equipment, and various other things. This was the beginning of the "Jewish underground church," which grew more and more valuable and increasingly took care of Jewish members of the underground and later also of non-Jewish members. On holy days spiritual advice was supplied, and each year the Passover was celebrated in full observance of the old customs and with eating of the prescribed unleavened bread. The head of the Jewish underground church, A. Cohen, was registered under the alias of Aart Lekskes among the citizens of Rotterdam and moved freely within its borders. The Netherlands Israelite Church was referred to in correspondence as the "Chaprais" Dairy, and the Superior Rabbinate of Rotterdam as the dairy control bureau "Tikva" (that is, hope). From January 1945 to the liberation, the underground Jewish community supplied daily 225 portions of warm food, thus alleviating the worst need among the most needy. In cases of moral suffer-

ing, for instance where an engaged couple were by circumstances compelled to live in one room, a Jewish marriage was pronounced with the permission of the underground authorities, even though no civil marriage was entered into.

MENTAL AND SPIRITUAL EFFECTS

The influence of the war years on the mind of the average Dutch Jew cannot yet be estimated. There are some who have recovered after having completely lost balance and having been spiritually broken, and who, fearing a repetition of the catastrophe, are hastily seeking a solution in flight from Jewry. The larger number have retained a robust elasticity which seems to have been able to withstand the tempest, and from self-preservation have developed an inner resistance to grief and suffering.

The consequences were most dire for the Jewish children who had to live in a non-Jewish environment, disguised as "Aryans." In that spiritual climate some of them showed psychic disturbances such as stuttering, timidity, a marked nervousness, and a distant attitude toward strangers. When these children returned to their own early environment these disturbances of mental balance disappeared within a few weeks and the children became normal relatively soon. Most of them were unfortunately orphans.

In conclusion, one may say that, thanks to the moral support which the Dutch Jew fighting for his life found in the non-Jewish Dutch community, he succeeded in passing through these terrible years of repression without injury to his spirit or mind, although the opportunities for friction which were always present and the feelings of dependency which necessarily arose out of a life in hiding weighed heavily on

the mind of every Jew. The final effect of this very differentiated complex of feelings and experiences is a strong

will to reconstruction by the individual of his own social role as well as of the greatly crushed Jewish community.

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The Financial Situation

By F. A. G. KEESING

THE time has not yet come when a complete picture can be given of the influence of the war on the financial situation of the Netherlands. The war is over, yet its results are still at work and it will be some time before the situation becomes in some degree normalized. Nevertheless, it is possible to trace roughly the most important factors which led to the desolate situation in which the returning Government found the country's finances in May 1945. At the same time—and this is a more optimistic task—an impression can be given of the attempts which have been undertaken since that date to further the return to normal conditions. But the disorder of five years cannot be undone in five months. In the financial sphere also, the Netherlands finds herself still in the midst of a painful process of restoration, the completion of which in any case will still require much exertion and many headaches.

A DEPRESSION BACKGROUND

The outbreak of war in September 1939 occurred on about the tenth anniversary of the greatest economic crisis the world had ever seen. In general, this period was very difficult for the Netherlands, a period with few "ups" and many "downs," which had not failed to have an adverse influence on financial development. It may be recalled that the recovery experience in most countries after 1934 was hardly noticeable in the Netherlands—a circumstance with which the consistent deflation policy, a result of the stubborn clinging to the gold standard, had something to do.

The idea of using the budget deficit as a lever to raise the economic level was advocated in the Netherlands, but

it did not find favor with the Government. The effort was always directed at achieving a balanced budget—an objective which, alas, could never be achieved under the pressure of economic circumstances. It is an irony of fate that in the last great political struggle which took place before the war in the Netherlands, the issue was that of the balanced budget.

In August 1939 the Colijn government was replaced by the De Geer cabinet, which, in contrast to its predecessor, declared itself prepared to follow a less orthodox financial policy. But then the course in financial matters was no longer dictated by purely political considerations, but by circumstances beyond the control of the authorities. Now, after nearly six years, the Netherlands again is making an effort to take matters in hand. What has happened in the meanwhile?

On January 1, 1940 the funded national debt amounted to something more than 3 billion guilders,¹ the floating debt to something less than 1 billion; i.e., 4 billion all told. According to the latest available figures, the national debt must be estimated at between 20 and 25 billion. The funded national debt doubled in the course of the war and consequently rose to 6 billion. The floating debt rose to a peak of 9 billion. Besides, there is a claim against Germany of 4.5 billion which now appears formally on the books of the Netherlands Bank, but which will be taken over by the state, and a corresponding sum added to the national debt. In conclusion, there are also the claims on the Government in the form of compensation for war damages, the extent of which has not yet been estab-

¹ One guilder = about 40 cents.

lished, and the supplementing of certain funds, which bring the total national debt to the sum mentioned above.

In this summary there are already apparent the circumstances which led to the financial confusion. In the first place there was the budget deficit, caused mainly by the occupation costs imposed by the Germans. In the second place there was the fact that the Dutch-German balance of payments was highly activated, the only result for our country being an uncollectible and probably largely worthless claim against the occupation forces. In the third place there were the direct consequences of the fact that the war was fought out on Netherlands soil, and caused great damage to Dutch property.

THE BUDGET DEFICIT

The accumulated budget deficit during the five years from 1940 through 1944 amounted to about 9 billion guilders, including German occupation costs of nearly 8 billion. The fact that the taxes were drastically raised to 225 per cent of their prewar level could change this course but little. In 1942, the year in which the taxes brought in the greatest revenue, they furnished a total of 1,450 million guilders, as against something more than 600 million in 1939. But the yearly expenses of the Government rose during the course of the war from 1 billion to 4 billion. From a fiscal point of view there was no cure for this development.

The Dutch-German balance of payments was dominated by the exorbitantly great and constantly growing excess of exports and by the claims resulting from putting Dutch workmen to work in Germany. Before the war, in trading with Germany, a system of export licenses had existed in order to prevent uncollectible claims from piling up in blocked accounts in Germany. It need not be demonstrated that the re-

peal of this restriction was one of the first measures taken by the Germans. Export to Germany was carried on at a rapid pace, without corresponding exports from Germany to the Netherlands. To prevent misunderstanding, it must be expressly noted that in this connection we are speaking only of export via normal commercial channels, and not of the removal of war booty, requisitions, and such. Moreover, on May 1, 1941, the monetary boundary was removed between the two countries, giving Germany the unlimited ability to remove shares and other securities from Dutch possession. In spite of the fact that large Dutch claims were canceled from time to time, the Dutch-German balance of payments showed a credit of nearly 4.5 billion. The German money which was obtained by Netherlanders finally accumulated in the Netherlands Bank, which issued bank notes with this backing.

EXPANSION OF CIRCULATION

It is evident that the development described exercised a profound influence on the general situation in money and banking. Both the meeting of the budget deficit by the issue of government bonds (mostly absorbed by the banks) and the financing of the marks claims on Germany led to an expansion of circulation. It can be roughly estimated that the amount of money (bank notes and bank deposits) rose during the course of the war by the sum of the increase of the floating national debt, plus the sum of the marks claims, less the total credits made available by the savings banks and paid off by industries. In the course of the war the circulation of bank notes rose from 1 billion to 5.5 billion; the total amount of money, including the giro accounts,²

² The giro banks exist only for the transfer of funds through orders or checks drawn against cash deposits.

rose from 2.7 billion to about 12 billion.

While the amount of money steadily increased, the amount of available goods continually decreased. Without intervention by the authorities this development must certainly have led to a wild rise in prices, and probably to an unbridled general inflation. This threatened development was combated by a strict system of distribution and price control, resulting in the fact that while money circulation increased five times, prices rose not more than 50 or 75 per cent above the level of 1939. Naturally, this does not mean that the expansion of money in circulation should be looked upon with resignation.

Because the use of money was made dependent on the possession of ration coupons, great purchasing power in the hands of consumers and industries could no longer be employed in a normal way. With the decrease in the number of unrationed products, everyone was compelled to stop spending as soon as he had exhausted his ration coupons. In this way there grew up a reserve of so-called potential purchasing power—money which was actually out of circulation because of the prevailing restrictions.

This was the situation at the time of the liberation. The Netherlands was a poor and exhausted land, deprived of its means of production and supplies, where hunger and misery reigned, but where, nevertheless, countless numbers fancied themselves rich because of their greatly increased store of unexpended financial means. This situation was full of danger. The enormous gap between the supply of money and the supply of goods, in view of the artificially low prices, contributed an enormous strain on anti-inflation measures. If the government machinery were to give way under this strain, the feared outcome would strike with full force. If, on the other hand, the machinery

stood the strain, the use of money might fall into complete discredit. Experience during the war winter of 1944-45 had already shown that the possession of money no longer had the slightest significance, and that in order to satisfy one's most pressing needs, it was necessary to have recourse to a primitive system of barter. A return to normal monetary relations, therefore, had to be forcefully stimulated.

PLAN FOR RETURN TO NORMALCY

A plan had been made during the occupation to attain a sound monetary situation as rapidly as possible. One of the necessary prerequisites was to recall all money and replace it, according to definite standards, with new. At the moment of liberation it developed that the new bank notes were not ready. During the summer of 1945, it was therefore impossible to adopt a fundamentally new course by this means. It was only toward the end of September that it was technically feasible to undertake the necessary steps.

The overhauling of the monetary system is based on three considerations. In the first place, there is the moral argument. Those who became rich during the war years, sometimes through scandalous black-market deals or by lending their aid to the Germans or other such misconduct, must be traced down and their illegal profits must be taken from them.

Second, there is the fiscal argument. The enormous budget deficits during the war years must be caught up with, so to speak. A heavy tax rate is necessary to free the state, in part, from its unbearably augmented debt burden.

Third, there is the monetary argument. The general situation of the money and banking system must be so modified that an equilibrium is once more restored between the flow of money and the flow of goods; the ten-

sions created by the extremely large quantity of money must be relieved. Insofar as this demands a reduction of the quantity of money in circulation, fiscal and monetary measures have an identical aim. The purpose which must be realized in the monetary field, however, reaches considerably further. Under the present abnormal circumstances, the Government must also give direction to the money and capital market and see to it that savings and investments are properly adjusted to each other. If this does not take place, then disturbing phenomena threaten to arise from this source, with dire consequences.

BANK NOTES CALLED IN, ACCOUNTS BLOCKED

The first preliminary measure was taken during the early days of July 1945. As has already been explained, a definite reorganization could not be undertaken at that time. The Government, however, felt that it could no longer let the situation develop unchecked, and therefore decided to call in the 100-guilder bank notes, at that moment the largest notes in circulation. At the beginning of July the circulation of bank notes was exorbitantly large compared with the circulation in the giro banks. This was partly due to the fact that during the war many had preferred to keep a large amount of ready cash, either in anticipation of an unexpected evacuation, of going "underground," and so on, or because poor communications made connections with giro banks very difficult. This preference for ready cash was also connected with the fact that black marketeers preferred the anonymity of bank notes to bank accounts in their names.

The calling in of the 100-guilder notes came as a surprise. The bank notes could be turned in during five days; the corresponding sum was cred-

ited to blocked accounts. It is not possible to determine if the black market actually suffered by this measure, but the withdrawal of the 100-guilder notes proved that the Government was in earnest, and that to keep great amounts of bank notes offered no security. As a result there was a general inclination to reject bank notes, which caused the amount of money in circulation to diminish rapidly during subsequent weeks, to the benefit of the bank deposits. In some three months' time the circulation of bank notes diminished from 5.5 billion to less than 2 billion guilders.

In the meantime it appeared that there would be new bank paper ready toward the end of September in a quantity sufficient to carry out the reform in earnest. Under the circumstances there was no longer any need for secrecy. Everyone knew that the smaller bank notes would be called in too, so that there was no objection when the Minister for Finance announced, in a radio address on September 12, the details of the measures which would become effective fourteen days later.

As of September 26, all paper money in circulation (notes of 1 guilder and more) was declared worthless. During one week the notes could be turned in, according to a definite plan, at banks and post offices, and credited to blocked accounts. On September 26, all bank accounts were blocked until further notice. In order to prevent the difficulty produced by having no valid money during that week, everyone was allowed to exchange 10 guilders in old money for new money *before* September 26. Naturally, it was possible to meet only household expenses with this sum; in other respects there was a complete moratorium during this week. The possibilities of making payments during the week when money was called in were purposely very limited because

if old and new money circulated at the same time, black marketeers would try to get rid of their old tainted money. Experience in Belgium had demonstrated this sufficiently. During one week, all Netherlanders were equally rich—or rather equally poor.

This thoroughgoing measure was received, in general, with great tolerance on the part of the public. It was generally realized that some action was urgent in order to avoid a threatening inflation. What appealed to the imagination perhaps most strongly was the argument that in this way the hated black marketeer would be deprived of his gains. The inevitable hardships which accompanied the measure were accepted cheerfully. The actual delivery of the money progressed smoothly, and by October 2 the old money had found its way to the banks.

ACCOUNTS FREED

On October 3 the second phase began—the freeing of accounts. Naturally, the circulation of money had to be set in motion again as quickly as possible, in order to prevent stagnation in the economic life. Measures to accomplish this had already been taken. In the first place, all wages, salaries, and other compensation were paid in new money as soon as possible. Employers had previously been given the opportunity to order the necessary sums for this through their banks. In the second place, 25 per cent of the blocked accounts was freed for transfer to giro accounts. Then the Netherlands Bank was permitted to free funds for necessary spending; this was done either for specific classes of transactions or in individual instances, as the need arose. Finally, of the paper money turned in, a sum of 100 guilders per family was paid back in cash. In this way the sum of 600 million guilders was put

into circulation during one week's time. Since then this sum has increased, by 50 to 80 millions a week, to 1,100 million guilders.

It was required of each bank to report by September 30 the amount of each account (except for the smallest) to a specially formed Fiscal Information and Inquiry Service. These reports were to be assembled in individual folders containing all available data on a given taxpayer. In this way a basis is obtained for the capital levies which are being prepared. The sum which remains blocked in each account serves in the first place as security for future taxes. Conformable with this, it is stipulated that the blocked money may be used to pay future taxes. The tax authorities are given the right to specify accounts that cannot be freed.

After the freeing of the accounts had been going on for two months—from the beginning of October until the beginning of December—as described, a new course was set. The impression existed that, generally speaking, the freeing process had reached the desired level, so that the further reduction of blocked accounts should be limited. Therefore, it was ruled that anyone who needed more liquid assets must be given the opportunity to establish bank credit. At the same time the most important permissions to free accounts were withdrawn. In principle, then, aside from some unimportant exceptions, the remaining sums on deposit in blocked accounts will be held there.

This ends the second phase of the monetary reform. The first phase was a general blocking of accounts. The second witnessed a partial freeing of these deposits, the funds freed in the beginning being purposely less than necessary, in order to localize the rest of the process as far as possible by a system of corrections. In the third phase, the reform must be completed.

SPECIAL TAXES

This final step will be accomplished, first of all, by means of two special taxes—a tax on the growth of wealth, and a capital levy—both of which are in preparation. It is estimated that the proceeds from the first will be 4 billion guilders. In the second instance, the blocked deposits will be absorbed in a large government loan which the Minister for Finance has been authorized to issue. When these operations have been accomplished, the exorbitant floating debt will have been partly consolidated and partly paid off and the quantity of money will have been brought back to normal proportions.

THE REMAINING QUESTION

May we expect that all our monetary difficulties will then have been overcome? The answer must be a positive No. First, there still remains the question of control of the money and capital market, and this is a very complicated matter. After so many years of deprivation there is obviously an enormous consumer demand; but, if the Netherlands wants to escape from the present impasse, it will have to economize more than ever, in order to revive its crippled production in the shortest possible time. Whether the required savings can be brought about by public appeal or whether stronger methods will appear necessary is a question which cannot be answered at present. In any case, the control of the capital market, with respect to both savings and investments, will require much skill.

In the second place, it remains to be seen whether the authorities will be

able to bring about such a balanced budget that no future threat of an increase in purchasing power, such as has just been suffered, will appear. A strongly unbalanced budget would again lead to inflation or require a new reform in monetary policy shortly. The difficulties on this point a few months after liberation are by no means overcome, although the authorities are making every effort, in this respect also, to master the situation.

In the third place there is the question whether the Netherlands, in this most difficult period in which she finds herself, will receive sufficient help from abroad. In the absence of generous credits from abroad, which would put the country in a temporary position of importing goods without a corresponding export, every effort toward reconstruction is doomed to failure. The monetary reform which is in part designed to inspire the necessary confidence abroad cannot, on the other hand, be carried to a successful conclusion without help from abroad.

Surveying the situation as it appears in December 1945, there are certainly no reasons for a sunny optimism. The wounds inflicted by the occupation are too great and too deep to be completely healed in a few months' time. Neither is there any reason for black pessimism. A great deal has been accomplished in a short time. The Government knows the difficulties and it knows the means by which relief may be expected in the long run. The monetary reform has been begun and it will proceed. There is every reason to hope that this is the right way.

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Price Policies

By G. BROUWERS

SEPTEMBER 1939 TO MAY 1940

THE outbreak of war in September 1939 caused importation from overseas to come to a sudden halt. The supply of goods diminished, costs rose, and, as a result, prices climbed. There was a justifiable fear that this process would continue and eventually lead to inflation.

The Government had foreseen this course of events. It had armed itself against them with the Law Against Inflation and Hoarding, which was forthwith put into effect. This law prohibited the forcing up of prices. Besides that, it gave the Minister of Economic Affairs the authority to fix prices for goods and services. However, it was originally the assumption that this authority would be exercised only occasionally. A radical interference with price fixing had been until now in conflict with the fundamentally liberal Dutch mentality. To begin with, the legal weapon of forbidding inflation was tried.

Yet, what was inflation? It was clear that higher costs, increased because of higher market quotations, higher freight

rates, and higher insurance premiums, ought to be considered in fixing the sales price. But should prices that formerly were below cost now be raised to a profit-making level? Was a margin of profit to be made greater, or should too high a price be reduced? In short, what price could be called justified under the new conditions?

The courts were no match for this problem. The Government attempted to give some degree of direction to the movement of prices by announcing that before raising prices it would be necessary to consult the Department of Economic Affairs. This was done in some cases. But the force of events was too strong for the Government to be able to control the process by this means.

In Table 1, as an illustration, are the index figures for the cost of living and of wholesale prices during the war.

The courts were mainly occupied, in this first period, with the question whether it was permissible to sell the sometimes considerable old stock at the new prices. The Government originally rejected this idea in view of the uncontrollable nature of the movement of prices. The legal authorities were

TABLE 1—INDEX FIGURES

	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944*
Cost of Living (Average for 8 communities) 1938-39 = 100							
Total	100.8	101.7	114.9	132.3	141.1	146.5	150.3
Food	101.5	101.5	118.3	142.0	154.2	156.8	160.0
Wholesale Prices Jan. 1941 = 100							
Food products	78.2	77.5	91.8	105.8	118.5	119.8	119.4
Raw and other materials	59.2	64.3	93.4	101.5	100.5	99.5	102.0
Finished products	71.5	73.3	89.1	104.0	108.5	112.0	113.4
Total	70.9	72.7	90.5	103.8	108.8	110.9	112.4

* First half of year.

divided, and finally the High Council of the Netherlands decided that such procedure was permissible.

Fortunately, for the time being the price movement seemed to remain within bounds. After the first surge, the rise grew more moderate. But the danger had not passed. The development of the war situation plainly indicated that supplies would rapidly diminish. Moreover, the chance that the Netherlands would be drawn into the conflict was becoming greater. The Government therefore gave consideration to measures to resist further price increases which could quickly take serious forms. The general prohibition against forcing up prices was inadequate. The courts were incapable of controlling the rising prices by this means. The Government itself had to fix rules by means of which the movement of prices could be guided.

At first sight, there were two systems which could be applied. The first was a general price ceiling as applied in Germany since 1936; the second was a general ceiling on profits, applied as a rule in England during the first years of the war. There it was allowable to raise the prices on certain classes of goods as costs went up, while keeping profits at a prewar level. The application of the first system was understandable in a country which had been economically organized on a war basis for several years, had therefore stabilized prices at a suitably high level, and, moreover, had a preference for rigid regulations. The second was understandable in a country entirely dependent on imports, suddenly faced with higher costs, and preferring regulations based on confidence in the self-discipline of its subjects. Both systems, however, had a great drawback which soon appeared in practice. They both determined the prices of independent businesses.

Uniform maximum prices

During the war, as shifts in costs became more and more evident, the prices in independent businesses deviated more and more from one another. The poorly run businesses got the highest prices and sometimes also the highest profit when, as it happened, the percentage of profit was based on the cost price. This naturally drove up prices. It was understandable, of course, that the merchant based his sales price on his highest purchasing price. It was necessary that when free competition no longer secured uniform prices, the Government should intervene with its price policy. In the course of the war, in important fields of business, the system of price and profit ceilings broke down and was replaced by a system of uniform maximum prices.

The Netherlands Government was mindful of these difficulties. While it temporarily tolerated that business should establish its prices in accord with the new costs, actually thus applying the system of profit ceilings, it systematically developed contacts with industry and business in order to arrive at valid regulations for each branch of enterprise which would result in uniform prices, based in each case on a representative enterprise.

In many cases these regulations took the form of uniform maximum prices, that is, where the homogeneity of the product made this possible. Whenever the products varied too much, as for instance in the different branches of the textile industry and in the leather and shoe industry, computation tables replaced the uniform maximum prices. On the basis of these tables, the highest cost of the various specialized production processes could be figured in the cost price. The estimation of profits was determined by a similar table. Thus one arrived at a price based on

general rules, while taking into account the special requirements for the production of a given article.

Often, however, because of the poor administration of certain enterprises, it was difficult to determine precisely the costs of various processes of production, and then one could only specify, as well as possible, the various factors which determined the cost price. In such cases only the cost factors and not the actual sums expended could be established. But the percentage of profit was fixed. This was spoken of as an "open," instead of a closed, or "genuine," method of calculation.

However, as it finally appeared, this willingness to meet industry and business halfway often resulted in too high prices. It would have been better to experiment more with uniform maximum prices, as later appeared to a great degree possible in the field of utility production in England.

In general, thus, there was an effort, even during the war, to keep the rules of free competition fully in play as far as possible, until the Netherlands was unexpectedly attacked and occupied, and a new surge of prices took place.

MAY 1940 THROUGH 1942

The German occupation caused a fundamental change in the economic structure of the Netherlands. During the first phase of the war the country was still assured of a certain, though diminishing, import of raw materials, and was able to use these especially for its domestic needs. Now the importation ceased, and the available supplies were carried off. The forced export far exceeded the import. The Netherlands was forced to produce her own food, and industrial production for civil use was almost at once greatly reduced. This drove prices up. Another factor was added: the mark was revalued in

terms of the guilder, and brought up to 75 cents. The former official rate had been 60 cents, but in relation to the German export premiums, actually lower. As far as it was afterward possible to trade with other continental countries, such trade was conducted mostly through Germany. This also caused prices to go up.

Finally, there was the psychological factor: the scarcity of goods was no longer a threatening possibility—it had become a fact. The fear of trouble and misery caused people to lay in as much as possible of the still available supplies, and this greatly strengthened the upward tendency of prices. All this made it necessary to take stern measures immediately in order to control price movements and thus to prevent serious disturbances in the distribution of income. It was necessary to strive for an orderly adjustment in order to combat an uncontrolled movement. The object must be to stabilize prices at a level proportioned to the new costs.

Price ceiling on chattels and services

The first measure to this end was a price ceiling on chattels and services, the Price Order No. 1, 1940. The Netherlands Government had already decided to make this rule on May 10, 1940, the day of the invasion. After the first week of occupation this order, originally of a very general nature, was elaborated in greater detail. Industry was no longer allowed to set its prices independently according to the changes in its costs; it had to have special approval from the Department of Economic Affairs, and had to submit detailed data on its costs.

In order to achieve as much uniformity as possible in the formulation of these estimates, so-called directives for the price policy were published after some time. This indicated in great detail the various cost factors which

might be taken into account in setting the price. An important principle was that general costs as well as the net profit had to be calculated on the basis of a normal turnover. A normal turnover was ordinarily taken to be the yearly average sales for 1937 and 1939, with a minimum fixed at 80 per cent of a more carefully defined technical-economic capacity. The costs of a sub-normal turnover were thus not to be included in the price. As profit, 6 per cent of the normal investment was allowed, a relatively low percentage, though very efficient enterprises could make more.

However, considering the way costs evolved, the price ceiling could be no more than a point of departure. Most prices had to be changed very quickly. Circumstances alone made it necessary to do this under government direction. In addition, an effort was now made to apply a system of general price control in accord with the ideas reflected in the preceding paragraph. Thus not only was uniformity in price fixing encouraged as much as possible, but price adjustments were made very much easier in this way.

For this last-mentioned purpose a few general orders were issued besides the Price Order No. 1 of 1940: the Retail Price Order, the Transportation Costs Order, and the Import Price Order. The Retail Price Order allowed retailers to raise their sales prices in proportion to the rise in wholesale prices. The profit margin, expressed in money, was to remain the same. The Transportation Costs Order permitted the extra costs resulting from transportation difficulties in the first months after the invasion to be entered separately on the invoice. The Import Price Order permitted the importer, in setting his sales price, to add to his purchase price the general cost and profit which he had estimated during

the first quarter of 1940, on the average, in similar transactions.

Transportation and real estate

However, control of the prices of chattels and services was no longer found sufficient. Next in importance came transportation. Before the war there had existed a sharp rivalry between railway, highway, and water transportation. The requisitioning of much of the means of transportation brought a change in this situation. Therefore the Transportation Order of 1940 specified that the transportation rates could not be raised above the level of May 9, 1940. The changes in costs, to which communications were also liable, made it necessary for the various means of communication to set up new generally valid rate tables which were considerably higher than the pre-war ones.

Another problem was that of real estate. The construction of dwellings came to a standstill. War destruction diminished the supply of available houses; the demand, on the other hand, steadily rose. To prevent a major rise in rentals, the Rental Price Control Order of 1940 made it illegal to raise rentals above the level of May 9, 1940, without permission. To achieve this, Price Control Offices were established under the direction of the local Building and Housing Inspections. Proprietors of houses, of course, were forbidden to cancel leases. In order to prevent a too great disparity between rentals and real estate prices, changing the latter without permission was forbidden by the Transfer of Nonagricultural Lands Order of 1942. For unimproved land the base price was the price of May 1940; for improved land, a reasonable profit on invested capital. The above-mentioned price control bureaus were also given the task of administering this order.

Price Fixing Order of 1941

It had already appeared desirable to combat the rise of land rents and the price of land in connection with the rise in agrarian prices. Changes in the rents and transfers of agricultural lands depended on the approval of land offices established for the purpose (Rental Orders and Orders Governing the Transfer of Agricultural Lands).

Another order which must be mentioned here is the Price Fixing Order of 1941. This order contained three regulations which had no connection and which might better have been separated. First, it contained a regulation of the prices of new goods produced for the first time during the war, defined as goods which were so greatly different from those in use on May 9, 1940 that they could not be compared with them. The price for these might be set by the manufacturers in question, taking into consideration the permissible prices of raw and other materials, the permissible cost of wages, and the estimated general costs and profits as reckoned in similar transactions on May 9, 1940. The merchants had a similar authority, *mutatis mutandis*. Such an elastic definition unavoidably gave wide opportunities for misuse. It could be stipulated, it is true, that cost prices be submitted for approval before a certain article could be put on the market. But this provision was applied too rarely, so that the prices of ersatz articles were, in general, far too high.

In the second place, the Price Fixing Order contained a group of regulations having to do respectively with: prohibiting the hoarding of goods, which would cause speculation; the administration of price control; and the giving of information on these subjects.

In the third place, the order laid on business the obligation (and took its name from this obligation) to fix the

prices of goods and services so that they would meet the demands of the general welfare under war conditions. This was the official terminology. In this stipulation the hand of the Germans was evident. The alpha and omega of their price policy was originally the price ceiling. When, at the beginning of the war, they had been afraid of rising prices and had realized at the same time—and correctly—that many of the prices in their own price system were too high, they had imposed a similar obligation on their own industrial life. Such a rule naturally did not fit in a system of price policy which was principally directed to the establishment of general uniform price regulations. It disturbed the regular price system and robbed the efficient manufacturer of his extra profit. Finally this was realized, and the regulation was not applied with respect to uniform maximum prices. It could be of some value with reference to individual prices. When Germany also finally went over more and more to uniform maximum prices, the regulation for this sort of prices ceased operating there. Furthermore, the regulation was so very vague that it could hardly be applied without more detailed rules. Such rules were never made in the Netherlands, and so no one paid any attention to the regulation.

German interference

The interference of the Germans with the price measures was rather limited during the first half of the war. In this field they had difficulty in getting a grip on the Netherlands administration. Nor did they have any great interest in it so long as no clear-cut inflationist movement arose which would run counter to their stabilization policy in Germany. They did, however, promptly prescribe that exports to Germany must

take place at the Netherlands domestic prices, which were originally mostly lower, while the exports from Germany to the Netherlands, which still occurred during the first years, naturally would be figured at German prices. But this regulation had little practical effect because there was no effective control of export prices.

As little as in other fields, however, could the Germans refrain from interfering with these affairs more than the war circumstances inevitably required. From the beginning, therefore, they worked for the creation of an agency which might be compared with the *Preiskommissar* in Germany, who had the rank of Cabinet Minister and directed and administered the whole price control policy. They wanted to establish a tool, or dummy, of his in the Netherlands, in order to be able to exercise a more direct influence on Netherlands prices. This dummy was found in the ranks of the N.S.B., and at the end of 1940 he was made Deputy Price Controller.

Now that prices were being regulated in so many fields of economic life, it was necessary to co-ordinate the various aspects of price management. It was also necessary to take in hand the still poorly organized enforcement of price regulations, including adjudication of violations. By giving an N.S.B. jurisdiction in this matter, this objective, seen from the Dutch viewpoint, was prejudiced.

The Netherlands government agencies concerned avoided, as far as possible, the new Deputy Price Controller, and tried to bring order into their affairs themselves. For the time being the Germans did not dare to put the central administration into his hands, but had to validate price regulations in the departments. The investigation of violations was also soon placed under his direction. Since this control service

was full of N.S.B. members and therefore did not function too well, he got a bad reputation, from which his work suffered. Moreover, the adjudication of price violations was not entrusted to courts, but, following the German pattern, was put in the hands of a special section of the office of the Deputy Price Controller (Price Adjudication Order). Until about the end of 1942 the establishment of price control regulations proceeded with practically no influence from the Deputy Price Controller. Then, however, the duties in question were taken from the department heads and given to the Deputy Price Controller.

1943 TO MAY 1945

One may say that the rise in prices which was a direct consequence of the occupation stopped during 1942. This can be seen in the index figures here reproduced. What followed was a policy of stabilization at the level reached. A certain further rise, however, could not be avoided. Conditions favorable to production grew steadily worse. The quantities of raw materials were steadily decreasing. Besides, the Germans at this period were trying to transport workmen into Germany on a large scale. Many Hollanders "ducked under." A continual stiffening of the regulations and repeated raids on factories followed. The answer was a very high percentage of "sickness." The workers, with the knowledge of doctors and employers, stayed at home to avoid being sent to Germany. Naturally, this did not improve the production of the workers.

German price measures

In this connection official prices did not rise to any extent. In this period the Germans not only put a stop to the rise in prices over the average, but where possible they adopted a policy of lowering

prices, through their quisling-dummy. In the first place, their own price level experienced the pressure of a decline in production as a result of bombings and the drafting of increased numbers of workers for military service. Besides, the inflation in the Balkan countries, which were the source of many important products, brought danger with it. The strict maintenance of monetary standards threatened the spread of this inflation to German price levels. In the end, it was necessary to depart from the fiction of a fixed monetary standard.

By way of compensation it was attempted to lower prices wherever possible. In Germany, the individual ceiling prices were more and more replaced by uniform maximum prices closely calculated to be valid for whole branches of industry. Abroad, the attempt was made to lower all prices which were still above the German level. In general, it was attempted to apply German price regulations in the German form in the occupied territories. This sometimes, given the dogmatic spirit of the Germans, led to silly results. In Germany, for example, the system of group prices had been instituted. When conditions governing production and sales were too different to permit a uniform maximum price for the whole country, then special maximum prices were fixed for single, or perhaps for three or four, classes of enterprise. This was the case with iron from the Ruhr and Silesia. However, there was less sense in doing this in a country like the Netherlands, with its much shorter distances. Nevertheless, such a regulation was introduced. Naturally, it had no practical effect.

Another form of compensation was also attempted, namely, a system of price equalization. For this purpose a so-called Price Policy Fund was established. The object was to levy a tax

on prices which, considering all circumstances, were bringing in relatively high profits, in order thereby to subsidize other prices which were below costs. It was to be feared that this fund would be misused in order to finance drops in prices in the interest of the Germans. The Netherlands administration therefore opposed the creation and operation of the fund until 1944. Finally the Germans put it through with the help of their Nazi Deputy Price Controller; but it was too late to have any practical effect, for by 1944 one could no longer speak of a normal economic life in any sense of the word.

Breakdown of economic life

All these measures hardly touched the public. The production of goods for civilian use was steadily diminishing. The industries had to struggle with great shortages, but this was not allowed to become the occasion for raising prices. In theory, thus, prices remained stable. In practice, however, things began to look very different. While supplies decreased because of falling production and stoppage of importation from Germany, demand continually increased. The quantity of money sharply increased as a result of high occupation costs and the forced exports to Germany. The black market became more and more extensive. The prices of the few rationed articles were maintained, but the prices of many common articles were mostly well above the official prices. As a result, the masses found it difficult to procure what remained of these goods, especially since more and more money was required to buy food on the black market.

A just and systematic price control at the outset might have been useful here, but, as we have said, the political unreliability of the office did not improve its functioning.

On the one hand as a result of tech-

nical and organizational defects, and on the other as a result of lack of trust in the Nazi Deputy Price Controller, a process of disintegration took place in the Netherlands price control. It reached a high point in the winter months after September 1944. Transportation came to a standstill, food supplies dropped below the minimum, the price system fell apart. The only things which could still be obtained at official prices were the meager amounts of rationed bread and potatoes. Whatever was left was sold at fabulous prices in the black market. Price control in the Netherlands had come to an end, along with economic life itself.

AFTER THE LIBERATION

After the liberation the situation was ripe for inflation. There was a terrific demand for goods, stocks were at a minimum, there was much money in circulation, and there was no machinery for regulating prices. The Government, however, took a strong position. In the first place a new agency for controlling prices has been created, a new investigation service has been organized, and special judges for adjudicating violations have been appointed. A new price ceiling has been put into effect, based on that of September 4, 1944, and new maximum prices have been established, which take the new costs into consideration.

Besides this, measures have been taken to reduce the amount of money in circulation. Actually, all money in circulation must be turned in. It will be deposited in blocked accounts. The balances will be returned to their owners only in part and in the form of new money. A part will be confiscated as black-market earnings. A part will serve to pay a proposed levy on capital which increased during the war, and a general levy on capital.

The present situation

These are the technical means created to bring the movement of prices under control. At present this control already exists to a great degree. One cannot speak of inflation in the Netherlands.

It is clear, however, that the price level is not yet stabilized in comparison, for instance, with the price levels in the great Allied countries. The price level is still rising. This is primarily a result of wage increases in recent months. Wages rose very little, officially, during the war. Therefore at the outset the workers could not buy available goods, without increased wages, in spite of the fact that food prices were, as in England, partly subsidized. Thus, a fairly large increase had to be put through. There is reason to assume, however, that wages, on the average, will not rise above the English level, if the Government takes a strong stand.

A second factor which causes the Netherlands price level to rise is the prices of imported goods. These, in the nature of things, are higher because of the devaluation of the guilder in terms of the pound and the dollar. Even considering this, the prices which have to be paid abroad are in many cases very high.

These two factors must not be allowed to raise the price level above that permitted by the newly established guilder rate. This can be accomplished by a strong price policy. The Government is taking all necessary steps for this purpose. It is endeavoring to streamline the production of many articles which are necessary to clothe and house the Netherlands people decently, in order thereby to arrive at reasonable prices. It is estimated that the adjustment will be made in the course of the next year. It may be assumed that by that time the restoration of some competition, for instance in the raw

materials market, will provide greater elasticity. Various maximum price regulations can then be abandoned and the price policy directed toward achieving a long-term restoration of the industrial life of the Netherlands.

The Netherlands Government considers it possible to avoid inflation. It is already making every effort to win the battle for the stabilization of prices during this initial period of its resumption of international relations.

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The Agricultural Situation

By C. H. J. MALIEPAARD

THOUGH the Netherlands used armed force against the German armies for only five days, in May 1940, their resistance really lasted five years. Though there were no rifles, guns, bayonets, or hand grenades to support their fight, and though airplanes and cannon had been silenced within their borders, the struggle was soon resumed; and the more cruel and barbaric the invader became in attempting to impose his will upon this little nation, the more crafty, brave, fanatical, and inflexible the Dutch became in resisting their powerful oppressor.

Once, many centuries ago, the Spanish general, Alva, in the name of his king, played the part of the cruel tyrant over this liberty-loving people. He declared that he would knead the people like butter. This is exactly what the Germans tried to do; but, like Alva, they discovered that butter which is being kneaded squeezes through the fingers but does not change its substance. Everywhere, when they tried, through cunning and flattery, through praise and coaxing, or through force and terror, to win the masses of the Dutch over to their side, they met the stubborn resistance which even a vanquished people can still exert; and this was certainly true of the agrarian part of the population.

GERMAN "REFORMS"

Why the Germans should have chosen the farmers for experiments in Nazi indoctrination, meddling with their technique of agriculture, their laws of land ownership, their organizational life, and so forth, is a question the Germans themselves would be least able to answer. If they did not know it already, they soon discovered that the Dutch

farmer could obtain from one hectare (ha.)¹ a yield which seemed almost miraculous to the German farmer; that the Dutch cow yielded an average quantity of milk substantially higher than that of the German cow; that the Germans' garden produce could not hold a candle to that of the Dutch from any point of view.

The draining of the Zuider Zee had produced farmland so fertile as to astonish German agrarian experts. More Dutch peasants received an education in agricultural schools than did German peasants, even though the number of the latter was ten times greater.

In spite of all this, the Germans could not refrain from meddling in our affairs, assuring us that they wished only to change those things in which they were more advanced than we. When, however, they failed to find any points in which we were inferior, they began to "reform" us in earnest.

One of the first great wrongs they did us was to create an agrarian organization called "The Netherlands Land Class," which, the authorities assured us, would have nothing to do with politics or National Socialism. Yet the leadership of the organization fell into National Socialist hands. A baker who had failed in everything else and who knew absolutely nothing of agriculture, but who happened to be strong in the ideology of National Socialism, became the "leader" of the farmers.

The Dutch farmers had formerly had three large agricultural organizations consisting roughly of 150,000 members. This represented about 70 per cent of independent farmers and truck farm-

¹ Note of the translator: ha. means hectare (1 hectare = 2.47 acres).

ers. These organizations were exceptionally strong and active, and stood in high esteem not only among the farmers themselves but also among outsiders. In 1941, with one stroke these organizations were abolished and the farmers were urged by every possible means to join the new "Netherlands Land Class." However, hardly one of the farmers even considered answering this invitation, and before long the organization was being sabotaged and hindered to such an extent that German authorities had to confess to themselves that the experiment was a complete failure. The organization has at no time played any important role.

DIMINISHED PRODUCTION

Moreover, the farmers felt that they were the last sheet anchor of the Dutch ship of health. The blockade of Europe hit us very hard. The large imports of grain, necessary for the feeding of our huge stock of cattle, were cut off, and our "self-sufficiency" system inevitably almost completely eliminated our pigs and our chickens, and some of our cattle. And because of the difficulty of coal production, the amount of phosphates used in artificial fertilizers became less and less, resulting each year in smaller and smaller harvests.

Heretofore, Dutch agriculture had generally reached a high average of production. In 1938, which could be considered a normally good year, the average production of wheat per hectare was 3,500 kilograms,² while harvests of from 4,200 to 4,500 kilograms per ha. were by no means rare. In 1943, however, the wheat crop amounted to only 2,400 kilograms per ha., and in 1944 to still less. In 1943 the harvest of spring wheat yielded 1,800 kilograms per ha. In 1938 the crop of winter barley was

about 3,000 kilograms per ha.; in 1944, it was 2,400 kilograms per ha.

The Netherlands had always been a land of large potato crops. On fertile soil, a crop of 35,000 kg. per ha. was not exceptional. In 1938, the average yield per ha., all types of soil included, amounted to 22,000 kg.; in 1943, about 19,000 kg. The culture of potatoes intended for industry, which depended largely on artificial fertilization for its growth, yielded in 1938 a crop of 30,000 kg., and in 1943 a crop of only 22,000 kg.

In 1943 the soil still retained some reserve of plant food from former years. Every fertilizer that could still be obtained was spent mainly on tubers. In 1945, however, these reserves were pretty well exhausted, and the estimated production for 1945 showed alarmingly low figures. For wheat it was figured that there would be an average crop of 1,800 kg. per ha. (in normal times it was 3,000 kg.); for rye 1,000 kg. (normally 2,100 kg.); for rapeseed 700 kg. (normally 2,000 kg.); for potatoes 14,000 kg. (normally 22,000 kg.); for sugar beets 26,000 kg. (normally 40,000 kg.); and for peas 1,650 kg. (normally 2,600 kg.).

The production of cattle was not much better. During normal years, milk production was estimated as being five billion liters.³ During the last two years of war it fell to less than two billion liters. Egg production in normal years was 2,200 million eggs, which meant about 240 eggs per person per year. If from this an export of one billion eggs be deducted, there would still be left for consumption, 130 eggs per person per year. During the Easter season of 1944 it was possible to distribute only one egg per child, and this to only a small section of Dutch children. The Netherlands had, indeed,

² One kilogram (kg.) = 2.2046 pounds.

³ One liter = 1.0567 liquid quarts.

to pay dearly for its risky "intensive agriculture."

NAZI HINDRANCES

The Dutch farmer tried in every possible way to carry on his work. He well knew that the greedy German would again and again demand tribute from this ever diminishing production, but he also realized that if he undertook sabotage, the consequences would only, in the end, rest most heavily on his own people. Notwithstanding all the obstructions put in his way, the farmer succeeded for a long time in maintaining a level of production which made it possible to provide food sufficient for requirements.

Numerous new measures were taken by the Nazis which hindered the farmer in his work. To give them all in full and in their proper order would fill volumes. A few will suffice to give foreigners some idea of the difficulties which confronted our farmers.

The construction of airfields, fortresses, mine fields, and tank ditches deprived numerous farmers of their livelihood. These were the first measures which followed soon after the invasion, and they revealed only too clearly the indifference of the invader to the interests of those who suffered these losses. One often had the impression that these operations were purposely made worse than necessary.

INUNDATIONS

These events, however, were nothing as compared with measures taken in the spring of 1944 for the so-called "protection" of the western part of the country. The consequences of the extended inundations begun in the spring of 1944 were terrible. In the provinces of North Holland, South Holland, Zeeland, and North Brabant, stretches of land totaling an area of tens of thousands of hectares were engulfed. Whole islands

disappeared under brackish or salt water. In many cases the people were given only a few hours, or a couple of days at most, in which to put their cattle and belongings in safety as far as possible.

Altogether, about 85,000 ha. were submerged in salt water and about 95,000 ha. in brackish or fresh water; while 50,000 ha. were lost because of the installation of mine fields, airfields, fortresses, and so forth. Thus, a total of about 230,000 ha. were taken from production. This equals about 25 per cent of the total available farm land, about 20 per cent of the total available meadow land, and about 12 per cent of the total area of cultivation.

In cases where the farmer was unable to bring his property into safety soon enough, the Germans lent a hand, but with the result that the owner never again saw his belongings.

When the Netherlands finally became a battleground, the furious destruction carried on by the enemy was greatly intensified. And when the Germans retreated over the well-known dike which closes the Zuider Zee, they blew up the dike which enclosed Wieringermeer polder over a length of several hundred yards. Thus, the most beautiful farmland of the Netherlands, and perhaps even of all Europe, with its splendid farms spread over an area of 18,000 ha. of fertile land, became a prey of the waves. This destruction was as senseless as it was criminal, for it had not the slightest strategic significance. Many years of hard and diligent labor was thus destroyed by a single explosion.

Through warfare, also, the beautiful island of Walcheren, so full of interesting folklore, was almost completely inundated. Its people bore this sacrifice to the Allied cause with dignity and a complete conviction that the primary cause for this destruction lay with

those who in 1940 had so criminally plunged the Netherlands into this war.

REQUISITIONING OF FARM ANIMALS

In addition to suffering caused by inundations, the farmers also suffered throughout the war from the requisitioning of their horses. At first this was done according to some kind of plan; but very soon, when the Germans needed a large number of beasts to help them in their bloody work, these requisitions were carried out in a most arbitrary and brutal manner. Towards the end of the war, when fighting had been transferred to German soil, there was no longer any question of requisitioning; horses were simply seized and carried away by the thousands. Pedigreed mares and stallions were stolen, and famous horse breeders in Zeeland, North Brabant, and Limburg lost many of their noblest pedigreed stock.

The farmers did everything possible to retain these animals so necessary to their work. They built hiding places from numerous stacks of straw, and at the approach of a foraging party, warned by a special service of their own, could quickly hide their horses. Sometimes the horses were hidden in barns or sheds belonging to farm laborers or townspeople. It is known that in one case a pedigreed mare was stabled in the pantry of a village preacher.

Often so-called requisitions turned out to be nothing but attempts to squeeze food from the farmers. At first these men in green uniform would demand animals, but then, feigning compassion, would consent to receive gifts of food and money instead. Of course the farmer was a willing partner to such a bargain, though his heart was full of rage and hatred.

In those parts of Limburg where fighting took place, cattle and horses were driven across the frontier in large

numbers and there they can still be seen today, grazing on German soil, in full view of their former owners. Unfortunately there is no legal way of recovering these animals, and so the owners can only trust in the famous words of the old Transvaal Boer, Stephanus J. P. Kruger: "*sal rech kom*" ("justice will be done").

At present in some parts of the Netherlands, especially the areas between the great rivers, not only are there few horses left, but all work has had to be stopped on account of the grave danger from buried mines. Meadows and fields in this deadly region are overgrown with rushes, reeds, and other water plants, while orchards and woods are entirely transformed. In midsummer, blackened and dead trees lift their naked branches to heaven. Occasionally a cow may be seen grazing there. She will have no shelter for the coming winter, for all stables have been burned and lie in heaps of black ruins. And this was the land which tourists formerly sought in order to admire the orchards in bloom covering the land like a white spray, as lovely as the gardens of Kent or Surrey, as beautiful as a flowering coffee plantation under a tropical sun.

FARMER RESISTANCE

As is well known, farmers the world over are strongly individualistic. The indomitable spirit of liberty, which runs like a golden thread through all our history, is extremely strong among our farmers. All measures, therefore, which threatened personal liberty, beginning with those aimed against Dutch subjects of Jewish blood, were intensely repulsive to the farmers, who immediately placed themselves in the front rank of those struggling against the usurper. Thousands of persecuted people were able to save their lives by hiding in haystacks or between straw pack-

ing, and many a farmer had to pay for his altruism by death in a concentration camp.

When the Germans first noticed that their huge supply of war matériel was being rapidly surpassed by the rising industrial titan of America, they made desperate efforts to stay in the hopeless race. The measures taken to that end were announced in the notorious speech made by Goebbels on February 18, 1943. He proclaimed that as Germany would need every soldier to meet the advancing enemy, Europe henceforth would have to furnish all the workers for the war industry. Already numerous workmen had been lured by every possible means or deported to Germany. Now all bars were down and there began a man hunt carried out in a manner equaled only by the old slave hunts of darkest Africa.

Anyone who failed to report at the first call was threatened with the most severe punishment. And now began the infamous work of the network of labor bureaus with their German "vocational counselors" and "experts." Cities and countryside were searched high and low by green-uniformed men and stripped of their manpower. This became the most barbaric and oppressive period of the whole occupation. Hunted like wild animals, the endangered age groups fled from cities to the doubtful safety of the country, because there they could more easily evade search parties, and it was easier to feed them there.

It fell to the farmer's lot to provide enough food for those who had been driven from hearth and home—the Jews and those in hiding (the underground). Under the very noses of the oppressor, he managed to create and maintain an illegal organization which took care of the collection and distribution of this food. The organization had its own means of transportation—ships and

autos. It had warehouse facilities, which at times were used simultaneously by the official food commission; and it found ways of distributing this stored food.

FARMERS SEIZED

But farmers were also in danger of being drafted. If at first certain concessions were made to them because their work was necessary to Germany, it was not long before the Germans were breaking these promises too, and soon a man hunt among farmers and farm laborers began in earnest. When a raid took place, those who tried to escape by running over fields and jumping over ditches were fired upon. Many a young country lad or farm worker paid with his life, and green meadows and brown fields were dyed with his blood.

If before this the farmer had shown great ingenuity in hiding horses and cows, he displayed really fantastic cleverness now that it concerned his own life and the lives of those he had sworn to save from persecution. In case of nocturnal surprise raids on farms, special warning signals were given to those who were sleeping. Immediately the fugitives took refuge in mazes of strawstacks provided with peepholes. Sometimes they hid under ground or hastened by secret paths leading into high standing wheat where improvised shelters protected them for days and days. Everyone helped; the underground organization, the trusted village police, girls, women, and even children. Everyone helped where he could, for everyone knew what was at stake. As a result, the catch of these man hunts was often poor. Even then, many a young farmer or laborer paid for his love of freedom and duty to his country by imprisonment in that inferno of the Third Reich, the prison camps of the S.S.

RUTHLESS TERROR

Very few farmers escaped these terrors in the form of raids, house searches, requisitions, and thefts. There was still another terror which, though it came less regularly, always struck innocent persons. Members of the underground movement, who continually worked to injure the German war effort, could never be reached by the Germans, for these men worked in the most subtle way and with excellent preparation. This called for vengeance. In a locality where a rail had been removed or a road block had been made, farms in the neighborhood were set on fire.

One outstanding example was the destruction of the Veluwe village Putten, where a German had been murdered. The assassin could not be found. Nobody knew anything about him, and as for that, he might well have been a German. The whole village was punished by the deportation of hundreds of innocent men and boys, of whom nothing further has ever been heard. The mystery of this case may rest in still unrevealed mass graves.

Terror continued in full swing. When a renewed deportation with imprisonment of all members of the former Netherlands Army was proclaimed, a spontaneous strike broke out on April 30, 1943, involving the whole Dutch people. In town and country, but especially in the latter, the German S.S. reacted to the strike with ruthless cruelty. Farmers who failed to deliver their milk were murdered on the spot before the very eyes of their relatives, and often after being tortured. Sometimes all the male members of a family were killed.

Woe to anyone who was discovered to have given aid to downed Allied pilots! On August 14, five farmers and farm laborers were sentenced to death

for this offense. One victim who had found it quite natural to give food to the hungry, was proved guilty of giving bread to an English pilot. This act cost him his life, for he was placed before the firing squad one month later. This event, the first of its type, took place in the municipality of Westmaas on the island Beijerland.

DEVASTATED FARMS

Until the very last day of their occupation, German soldiers practiced their terrors. In regions abandoned because of the devastations of war, everything which had value was removed by them. Stolen horses were harnessed to stolen carriages in which stolen food and furniture were loaded, escorted by guards mounted on stolen bicycles. If a soldier happened to see a vehicle belonging to some fugitive, which seemed preferable to the one in which he rode, it was immediately seized with everything in it.

One can easily imagine the sense of bitterness and depression which filled the heart of a farmer, when, after the war, he returned to his home and found absolutely nothing left of his former possessions. Many who had hoped to be able to sow and plant in the spring of 1945 found that they had not a single tool, plow, or cart to enable them to go to work. They stood by the ruins of their homesteads, looking in vain for trees in blossom and fields of green; listening in vain for the crunching of grazing cattle, the cackling of hens, the rattling of chains in the stable, and the creaking wheels of the wagons.

The homestead had become uninhabitable; but even so, the farmers stayed and did what they could to make a new start. To their own comfort they were indifferent, being content to take refuge in a damaged hen coop or in a shed improvised from old lumber. Going out to explore possi-

bilities, they might discover here and there something of use to them—a hay-fork, a scythe, a spade, a rickety cart, or an old sled. A cow might suddenly appear from nowhere; a few hens might still be roosting among the rafters. And so there was something with which to start again. Some of these men have accomplished wonders with such small beginnings, but in the most devastated areas very little could be done. At present there are 150,000 hectares in damaged areas which cannot be cultivated at all, or only in part.

THE TASK OF RECOVERY

These farmers, who look upon their ruined homes, have suffered a setback of many years, but they are not too discouraged or despairing. Wherever possible, the Government and its services immediately set to work to improve conditions. Soon electric machines were turning again, Diesel engines and windmills pumped out water from inundated polders, and now, with the exception of the island Walcheren and the Wieringermeer polder, all the land is once more dry. Instructed by the Information Service and the Service for Agricultural Recovery, farmers are now preparing plowed fields and grazing meadows. Already various products are growing on much of the land that was under water.

Of course, much of the work done must be regarded as of temporary value. There still lies ahead a gigantic task in bringing areas back into shape so that they may be subjected to a

normal process of cultivation. Thus, the damaged dike of the Wieringermeer has already been repaired, and in a few weeks time giant mills will pump dry this land on which at present water stands 4 meters (more than 13 feet) deep over an area of about 20,000 hectares. But what then? Farms lie in ruin and houses have been destroyed by the pressure of the water and the gradual washing away of foundations.

If it is at all possible to accomplish this task of recovery, the Dutch farmer will certainly do it, for in the past five years he has shown his ability to keep at his work under the most difficult circumstances. But it requires more than will, to accomplish the work of man. At present, the greatest handicap to the Dutch farmer is the shortage of machinery for soil cultivation—tractors, plows, harrows, cultivators, mowing machines, binders, and so forth. All these either have been removed to Germany or are so dilapidated as to be in urgent need of replacement. Small tools in almost every trade are in a deplorable state. In some places, sprayers for garden culture and means of transportation are entirely lacking.

A regime of tyranny and terror always produces much suffering, but has almost never done permanent harm to a people. Just now, the ailing symptoms of Dutch agriculture are like those of a wounded man who still bleeds from many wounds, but who, thanks to his strong constitution, has every chance to recover, provided he is assisted by physicians interested in his case who are able to furnish the necessary medicines.

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Trade and Industry

By H. Vos

THE hurricane of war and occupation which, after only five days of fighting, swept the Netherlands for fully five years has heavily damaged this country. With the exception of a very small group which turned against the Dutch people in its struggle against suppression and enslavement, a conduct for which they have now to pay the penalty, the Dutch community has suffered deeply. The Germans inflicted smarting wounds on the Dutch body. They cared not what means they used, for they served only their own purpose—the German war effort, coupled with a sadistic desire for destruction, suppression, and humiliation.

To understand the problems which the Netherlands has to face in its economic restoration, it is necessary to survey the period of occupation and see the complete social dislocation wrought by the German measures.

Even before September 1939, the Netherlands had made economic preparations for a European war. It was realized that even if this country remained neutral, as in the war of 1914-18, the blockade unavoidably resulting from a war would considerably lower the level of prosperity. Ample stocks of foodstuffs and other goods were laid in, consideration being given to the possibility that the country might have to live on them for years. The government machinery for management of economic affairs was expanded, thus affording increased centralization in dealing with a war depression. Thus it was hoped to lead the country effectively and without coercion through the horrors of war.

Shortly after the occupation on May 15, 1940, the preparations for economic defense gave way to a rigidly organized

war economy. In those very first months, we still cherished the hope that Germany had only occupied the Netherlands for military and strategic reasons and that she did not intend to interfere with the Dutch economic organization more than was strictly necessary from that point of view. Very soon, however, it became clear that this hope was an illusion, and that the pose of protector and friend, adopted by the German as a disguise, was presently to be thrown off to show himself in all his brutality. Gradually, after the German intruder had comfortably nestled in the Netherlands and found out everything he wanted to know, the country was completely absorbed in the German war economy. This meant nothing else than a constant and systematic plundering and robbery of the country.

In many fields Dutch economic life underwent structural changes, all intended to serve German interests. The Germans tried, with all the means of propaganda at their disposal, to convince the Dutch people that German interests and Dutch interests were identical. Their words were sometimes sweet and coaxing, sometimes hard and threatening. But it was not difficult to see that the facts indicated a reality different from what the Germans would have the Dutch believe.

FOREIGN TRADE

In the matter of foreign trade, a change was soon effected in the relation between imports and exports which clearly showed what this incorporation of the Netherlands into the German *Lebensraum* really meant. In the imports, there was soon a noticeable shift from foodstuffs, raw materials, and semifinished products to finished in-

dustrial products. In the exports, finished consumers goods took an ever more important place. This export of finished consumers goods was not balanced by a proportional import of industrial raw materials. On the contrary, the latter decreased.

The result of the import of finished industrial products was that Dutch industry was much less active in providing for the needs of the Dutch economy, and worked chiefly for the satisfaction of foreign needs. The system of so-called "wage orders" was applied, according to which finished industrial products were sent to the Netherlands to be fashioned into finished consumers goods, which in turn were sent back to Germany. Thus Dutch production capacity was used for the supply of German needs and the enhancement of German prosperity.

Exports increased steadily. In 1937-38 the export equaled 72 per cent of the import. In 1941 this percentage rose to 95; in 1942 to 143; in 1943 to 170; and in 1944 to 200. The ever increasing export was not compensated by a corresponding import, and this contributed not a little to the impoverishment of the Netherlands.

ABSORPTION INTO GERMAN ECONOMY

The most striking example of the complete absorption of the Netherlands into the German economy is the abolition of the monetary boundary in April 1941, which completely obliterated the Dutch-German frontier in respect to trade and capital movements. Every remaining hindrance to the export of Dutch products to Germany was removed by this measure, thus paving the way for a still more thorough plunder of the Netherlands. The monetary boundary was restored on March 16, 1944 by a regulation requiring that German commissions for the Netherlands

be approved by a Central Committee for Commissions. However, the meshes of the net by which the Central Committee sifted the commissions were so open, and the system was so favorable to Germany, that this regulation had practically no effect.

In Dutch continental trade, Germany's position became more and more important. In 1937-38 the Netherlands had a monthly import balance of 13.9 million Dutch guilders.¹ In 1941 this was changed into an export balance of 4.6 million guilders, and in 1944 this export balance had risen to 23.6 million guilders.

In addition to these structural alterations, the usurper drastically changed the Netherlands price policy. He sought to raise the price level to that of Germany, which was higher, and this made it more difficult for the Netherlands to compete in other continental markets. The gradual exhaustion of the Dutch stocks of raw materials made manufacturing increasingly dependent on the orders placed by the occupation authorities. Thus Germany controlled the ability to compete, the production capacity, and the export capacity of the Netherlands.

Another factor in the dependence of the Netherlands was her limited ability to pay for imports. Poor in gold and in foreign bills, she had to guarantee to exporting countries that she would counterbalance her imports with exports of her own. Thus, such trade as the Netherlands was still able to carry on with countries other than Germany was restricted to a barter basis. The independent commercial country on the mouth of the Rhine had become a slave to the caprices of the Germans and thus made a miserable commercial partner for others.

Among the prewar measures for eco-

¹ One guilder (gulden or florin) = about 40 cents.

nomic defense, government bureaus for Trade and Industry were established, based on the Rationing Act of 1939. These government bureaus controlled the allocation of the raw materials to the agencies under their supervision. Under the pressure of the usurper, industrial life was organized after the pattern of the existing system in Germany, the outstanding feature of which was the "leadership principle." By the appointment of "Fuehrers" the Germans tried to control the industrial life, placing pro-Germans in key positions. However, the large majority of Netherlanders in the government bureaus and in this organization were loyal to their country, and through them it was often possible to hamper this internal penetration of the Germans, and sometimes to defend Dutch interests. As the Germans can hardly be accused of pliability, however, it will be clear that the results thus obtained should not be overrated.

SCARCITY AND ATTENDANT EVILS

Besides the rationing of raw materials, the rationing of consumer goods, introduced immediately after the outbreak of the war, was now extended. The quantity of the rations had to be steadily lowered because of the ever increasing impoverishment of the country. The Dutch people began to feel the pangs of hunger.

The very limited possibilities for the purchase of goods, the replenishing of stocks, and the necessary replacement of accessory parts also introduced into the Netherlands the phenomenon of floating purchasing power. The potential demand, which could not be made effective, was ever increasing, which meant a constant danger of inflation.

This danger was strengthened by the constantly expanding circulation of money, which the usurper manipulated as he pleased. To drain off the super-

fluous amount of money, which could not be converted into goods, a system of loans and taxes was introduced, entirely after the German model. In this system was included the already existing agency for price formation and price control, whose purpose was to prevent the impoverishment of the country from leading to an unlimited rise of the price level. It has already been mentioned that this price policy fostered German interests to a high degree.

In spite of the threat of heavy punishments, and in some cases capital punishment, the scarcity of goods led to an unbridled black market, and the pressure on the price level increased. This led to an increasingly rigid enforcement of price control, as is seen from the following figures: In 1942 there were 93,000 violations of price regulations dealt with, and fines totaling 13.4 million guilders were imposed on the offenders; in 1943 there were 119,000 cases, with total penalties of 27.3 million guilders.

INDUSTRY HAMPERED

The diminished industrial production considerably decreased employment opportunities, but the unemployment which began to appear was camouflaged by the gearing of Dutch industry to the German war effort and by the direct employment of Dutch laborers in Germany and France.

It was soon apparent that the German demand for labor could not be satisfied from the reservoir of Dutch unemployed workers, especially because the Germans wanted trained and skilled workers. A system of selection of tens of thousands of Dutch industrial workers was introduced, and about 500,000 men between ages 18 and 45 were forced to go to Germany to work in the factories there. In addition, many were forced to work in the Netherlands in

behalf of the Germans, building fortifications, and so forth.

A great shortage of labor was therefore soon felt in Dutch industry, even with the limited activities that were still carried on to supply the needs of the Netherlands.

The pressure of the war effort induced Germany increasingly to adopt measures that threatened the very existence of the Netherlands. By order of the *Rüstungsinspektion* (Ordnance Inspectors) an intensive curtailment of industries took place, and on March 15, 1943 an order was issued according to which only war industries or those essential for daily life were allowed to continue production. Only a very limited number of industries fell within this category. This measure, together with the shortage of raw materials and labor, paralyzed the activities of the Netherlands and cast a gloom over the country.

Those industries which were still permitted to operate suffered heavily from these measures. Even many of these concerns had to close down a portion of their plant, which greatly increased the costs. According to the prevailing price system it was not permissible to take into account this plant idleness, and this considerably lowered the margin of profit. The earning capacity was also curtailed by high taxes, by the shortage of labor, by the lack of skilled labor, by the precarious food situation, by the greater number of working hours, and by the increased industrial risks due to the impossibility of procuring necessary parts. The growing insecurity is shown by the fact that the number of industrial accidents registered with the National Insurance Bank, which in normal times is about 600 a day, rose in 1943, in spite of lowered activity, to more than double this number, or 1,300 a day.

Nor was this all. Industrial life was hampered in other ways as well. Transportation was becoming more and more

difficult. The motorcars in use at the beginning of the occupation were already out of date, owing to the economic crisis of 1930. At the outbreak of the war, 40 per cent of the motor trucks were 1 to 4 years old; 40 per cent were 4 to 6 years old; and the remaining 20 per cent were of an entirely old-fashioned type. Lack of gasoline soon forced 97 per cent of the trucks and 75 per cent of the private motorcars to substitute gas generators. This quickly reduced the speed of road traffic. The situation regarding tires for cars and bicycles became urgent. A great part of the telephone service was discontinued, which still further hampered transportation.

THE FINAL CHAOS

In their application of the measures above described, the Germans acted "systematically" and "scientifically." But on September 5, 1944—"Mad Tuesday"—the memorable day on which the battle for Arnhem began, even the German lost his system. In September 1944 a period of murder, robbery, and plunder opened in the Netherlands, the parallel of which is hardly to be found in history. Besides the most atrocious treatment of Dutch subjects, criminal executions and imprisonment of thousands of men and women, nearly all the remaining stocks were stolen and a great part of the industrial plants destroyed or taken to Germany. Conditions of chaos and misery developed with tremendous rapidity, so that it was difficult to exist, even for those who required little of life. The food situation became unbearable, the starvation rations being reduced to an absolute minimum. At times, for example, the ration of bread was only 400 grams (less than one pound) per week.

As the Netherlands was liberated piecemeal, connections with the Central

Government were severed, so that it was no longer possible to give the people the support they needed in their desperate struggle against the brutality of the usurper.

The parachuting of food in the first days of May and the defeat of the Germans on the fifth of that month saved the Dutch people from exhaustion and ruin.

ESTIMATED WAR DAMAGE

Since the liberation an attempt has been made to get an idea of the extent of the damage the Netherlands has suffered in the war, and plans have been made to effect a speedy restoration.

It is estimated that the direct material war damage since September 1939, expressed in money value, amounts to 10.5 billion Dutch guilders. This is nearly one-third of the national fortune of 1939, which was 33.1 billion guilders. This is the damage resulting from direct war activities, requisitions by the occupation authorities, lack of repairs, and so on. The estimated depreciation of the means of production during the war years is about 7.7 billion guilders, which is 29 per cent of its value on September 1, 1939 (26.6 billion guilders). Of this sum of 7.7 billion guilders, trade suffered a loss of 1.8 billion guilders, and industry 2 billions. The loss to trade is computed to be 61 per cent of the value in 1939, and that in the industrial plant, 40 per cent. A great part of these losses is due to the depreciation of stocks and inventory and the heavy damage done to buildings. Inundations have affected the agricultural value of the soil, and dwelling houses also have suffered a great deal.

In addition to this property damage, there is the loss in gold and foreign investments, estimated at 2.8 million guilders.

Furthermore, it is expected that further losses will accrue as a result of the

war. Labor productivity is at present about 40 per cent of the normal level and is expected to reach the prewar level gradually over a period of two and a half years. The loss from this decreased productivity is placed at 4.25 million guilders.

Some idea of the impoverishment of the Dutch people can be gained from the following figures: Of the families with a yearly income under 1,400 guilders, 24.6 per cent have less than one cup or plate per person; 32.3 per cent have no suit of clothes or dress fit for wear; 64.6 per cent have no set of underwear fit for use; 63 per cent have not a pair of shoes to walk on; and 66.2 per cent have no sheets or towels. Such conditions are not confined to the low income groups. Among families with a yearly income of 4,000 to 6,000 guilders, 28.5 per cent have no set of underwear fit for use; 28.5 per cent have no decent shoes; 42.9 per cent have no sheets or towels; and 50 per cent have a lack of blankets.

PLANNING FOR RECONSTRUCTION

It is clear that the damage and impoverishment resulting from five years of war and occupation cannot be repaired in four months after liberation. To supply the most essential food needs, considerable consignments from overseas have already been received. The war in the Far East, continuing to the middle of August 1945, made it impossible for other nations to send more than was absolutely necessary. This period of relief has hardly come to an end; there is now a period of rehabilitation; and large-scale reconstruction has not yet been begun. It is necessary first to make plans based on estimates of needs.

The actual accomplishment of the restoration of the Dutch economy presents problems of astronomic scope. It is difficult to direct modern economy

even in times of prosperity; in times of scarcity the difficulty is increased. The intense scarcity prevailing in the Netherlands creates the necessity for choice in its most acute form. The satisfaction of one need often bars the satisfaction of another; an assignment of certain goods to one group often means denial of such goods to another group.

It is necessary that measures to increase national prosperity should be planned as accurately as possible. It must be decided how much shall be invested for consumption and how much for production; the limitation of present consumption must be weighed against the advantages of greater future consumption resulting from greater capital investment now.

Economic planning, with a wide margin for improvisation, is a first requirement for this.

The element of choice is heightened by the existing vicious circle in the process of restoration. The prevailing shortages are so interdependent that by satisfying one need, possibilities of production may be created which can lead to further satisfactions of consumption needs. This, however, often involves a vicious circle, which may be illustrated by the following examples: To raise the production of coal, miners must be given a larger food ration than other consumers, while on the other hand more coal is needed to produce this ration. Or take the example of a waterway obstructed by the debris of a blown-up bridge. This obstruction can be cleared away only through the use of power plants, for which coal is needed. The shortage of means of communication hampers a rapid supply of fuel, and transportation itself is hampered by the blown-up bridge.

This "circle economy" can be broken by the importation of goods, preferably at more than one point of the circle. Importation of coal will permit food

production and other industries to be put in motion for the improvement of the mine plants and the supply of the miners' needs. Thus the coal production at Limburg will be increased, which will make it possible for many other industries to resume work, and will decrease the need for further importation of coal. Thus, importation of coal would contribute to a process of restoration greater in extent than the import itself. More such examples might be given.

A program has been outlined for the beginning of reconstruction, based on estimates of the most urgent needs of industry for the second half of 1945. For that period, there is imperative need for 231,800 tons of chemical products, 160,000 tons of paper and raw materials for paper, 500,000 tons of iron and steel, and over 2,000,000 tons of building materials.

PRESSING FORWARD

Now that the war against Japan has ended, the Dutch people cherish the hope that assignments will be made to provide for the most urgent needs and that the necessary shipping space will be placed at their disposal. By this means it will be possible to give the first impulse to the process of Dutch economic restoration and commence the reconstruction. New supplies of raw materials are needed for the resumption of industrial life after years of stagnation.

Dutch industrial life is sure to enter—though slowly at first—upon a new period of prosperity. National security and international co-operation will advance this process considerably. The important thing is that the Netherlands will soon be able to start its restoration and reconstruction.

It does not seem probable that the perseverance and diligence of the Dutch

people have suffered much from the war. Although labor productivity is far from normal just now, because of the recent period of exhaustion and plunder, it will rise as soon as conditions are favorable.

Germany has fleeced the Netherlands. Her diligent, active, and vital industrial life has been paralyzed. But in several places the factory chimneys are again smoking, and the first Dutch products are coming into the market again, though to a limited extent. The manufacturers are resuming their production often with very defective means, trusting that they will soon be able to raise both quantity and quality of their out-

put. With aid from abroad, the economic restoration of the Netherlands will soon be in full swing, gaining impetus as it proceeds.

The Netherlands is not a country of beggars. It is like a patient who, just arising from a sickbed, needs a support—a support with the aid of which he will soon be able to move about independently and take his place, freely and with renewed vigor, in the life of the healthy. This is what the Netherlands lays claim to—a strong support in this first period of its recovery, which will give it the strength to resume its former place in the community of the free peoples of the earth within a short time.

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Labor and Employer Organizations

By E. KUPERS

AFTER the conclusion of the armistice in the Netherlands, in May 1940, it was generally feared that a reign of terror would be inaugurated by the Nazis as had happened in Germany when Hitler rose to power. This fear, however, was not immediately realized. The initial behavior of the German military and civil authorities was irreproachable. During those first weeks there was no interference with either the trade unions or the employers' associations.

A single centralized trade union does not exist in the Netherlands as it does in Anglo-Saxon countries. Before the war, there were four large bodies of trade unions: The *Nederlands Verbond van Vakvereenigingen* (N.V.V.), i.e., the Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions, which had 320,000 members; the Roman Catholic Workmen's Union, with 200,000 members; the Christian National Trade Union, embracing the Protestant workers, having altogether 117,000 members; and the Netherlands Trade Center, or so-called "neutral trade union movement," consisting of 50,000 members.

On the side of employers there were: The League of Netherland Employers (liberal in spirit); the Roman Catholic Federation of Employers' Trade Unions; and the League of Protestant Employers in the Netherlands. The first of these was by far the strongest.

Before the war there was a fine spirit of co-operation among all these various organizations, which was not confined to the main offices but extended to all their affiliates. After fighting had ceased, this co-operation continued in connection with various social and economic problems.

SUAVE TACTICS

The fact that during the first weeks no aggressive measures were taken by the Germans against these organizations was probably due to the intense concentration of attention which the war in western Europe demanded at that time. Also, Berlin had sent out an order to refrain for the time being from promulgating civil laws, as a special High Commissioner would soon be sent to the Netherlands for that purpose. The first appearance of this High Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, in general quieted any apprehensions the people may have had.

Early in June 1940 the German Dr. Hellwig, the so-called *Dienststelle Hellwig*, was installed in The Hague as representative of the German Labor Front. Like Seyss-Inquart, this man aroused no uneasiness in the minds of the Dutch people. At a meeting with the leaders of the N.V.V., Dr. Hellwig said that the German Government did not intend to meddle with the internal relations of the trade organizations. These were to be allowed to continue their work, but must not engage in politics, must not order strikes, or do anything against the German Army. When any important decision had to be taken, he requested that they first discuss it with him. The same instructions were given when he met with the leaders of other trade organizations.

It developed later that these instructions had been received from Berlin. Dr. Ley, leader of the German Labor Front in Berlin, took the stand that changing Dutch trade unions into a labor front cast on the German model would require much time and patience, and that a peremptory attitude at this

time might easily result in a complete dislocation of these trade unions.

CHANGE OF METHODS

Suddenly the wind began to blow from another direction. The head office of the German National Socialist Party in Munich failed to agree with the tactics of Dr. Ley, and ordered Dr. Hellwig to confer with the "Fuehrer" of the Labor Front of the National Socialist Movement in the Netherlands, H. J. Woudenberg. This Labor Front had no prestige at all. At the most, it counted three or four thousand members. It was for this reason, apparently, that neither Ley nor Hellwig had much inclination to enter into relations with it. An order is an order, however. At first it looked as if Woudenberg would be appointed commissioner over all the trade organizations. Later, in order to meet the objections of Ley and Hellwig, Woudenberg was appointed head of the N.V.V. only.

These facts came to light only much later. The leaders themselves knew nothing of it at the time. On July 14, 1940 they received a communication from Dr. Hellwig that he wished to call a meeting of all the leaders and chairmen of the Federation of Trade Unions, but he failed to mention the subject to be discussed.

The meeting took place on July 16. Dr. Hellwig stated that the High Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, had decided to dismiss the leaders of the N.V.V. because their Marxist ideas did not promise enough co-operation with the German authorities. Mr. Woudenberg had been appointed commissioner instead, and from him the unions of the N.V.V. would henceforth receive their orders. No discussion was allowed in regard to this issue, and moreover, it was stressed that should any leader wish to resign because of this decision, such resignation would be considered an act

of hostility against the German Government and would be punished accordingly. And so the meeting, which had lasted not more than a quarter of an hour, was ended.

In a special discussion with the leaders of the N.V.V. which took place after this meeting, Dr. Hellwig said that the High Commissioner intended to release immediately both the chairman and the vice chairman and put them on inactive service. When the author of this article then said to Dr. Hellwig that he would at once call a general meeting of union chiefs to discuss the new issue, the answer was that this was forbidden by the High Commissioner. A few days later, the other leaders of the N.V.V. were also "given leaves."

WOUDENBERG AS A PUPPET

On the afternoon of July 16 Dr. Hellwig held a meeting of the chairmen of the three other big trade-union organizations. A German commissioner was assigned to them whose permission was required for everything they did. Woudenberg was invested with all the rights of the chief of the N.V.V. Over him were two German commissioners who had control over what he did and prescribed for him every line of conduct.

The reasons that Woudenberg was appointed commissioner of the N.V.V. only were: (1) the N.V.V. was not only the largest trade-union organization, but also the most dangerous opponent of National Socialism; (2) the Germans thought that with Woudenberg as puppet in the N.V.V., they would be able to direct the entire development of social-economic life into the paths they desired.

About one month later, the chiefs of the N.V.V. were called, one after the other, to the office of the N.V.V. and were asked by a German commissioner, a certain Dr. Voss, to take a position

on the following three points: (1) a stronger centralization of the trade-union movement; (2) no politics in the trade unions; (3) a closer social-economic (hence, nonpolitical) co-operation with Germany. As there was nothing dishonorable in these proposals, almost all the chiefs answered that they were ready to continue in their offices.

At the time of the dismissal of the N.V.V. leaders, Mr. Woudenberg had already written contracts for them to continue with their work, asking only that before taking any important decision, they would first consult with the commissioner. The same request had been made by Dr. Hellwig; as he expressed it, "because the applied rules would have little or no bearing on the practical affairs of the trade unions."

Meanwhile, the executives of the Netherlands Trade Center were put under pressure and the Center "voluntarily" joined the N.V.V.

By order of the High Commissioner, two smaller trade-union groups were abolished: the Revolutionary Socialist National Labor Secretariat, which had 10,000 members, and the Syndicalist Trade Union with about 3,000 members. These members could now, with the preservation of their former rights, become members of the corresponding trade unions in the N.V.V. In addition, there were a few unions which had never joined any trade-union federation, which now joined the N.V.V.

About the middle of August, Woudenberg dismissed fifteen prominent executives of trade unions belonging to the N.V.V., with the excuse that he had no assurance that these persons would carry out the principles and aims of the N.V.V. When, directly after this, a request came from several associates of the dismissed executives, that they also be allowed to resign, the answer came from Dr. Voss that resignation would be considered an act of enmity

against the German Government and would be punished by imprisonment in a concentration camp. The executives therefore withdrew their resignations.

Naturally, all these events caused a strong wave of feeling among members of the N.V.V. They resigned their memberships by the thousands.

The Germans kept none of their promises. All sorts of measures were gradually taken which resulted in the union leaders' losing more and more liberty of action. In some unions National Socialist executives and clerks were appointed. All union publications were censored. A new weekly paper came out, of which the issues were sent gratis to all members.

The aim of all these measures, of course, was to lessen more and more the influence of chief executives whom the Germans wished to make subordinate to the N.V.V.

THE NEW N.V.V.

This new N.V.V. was favored in every way. Both the press and the radio were at its service. Speeches of Woudenberg and his associates, all of whom were members of the National Socialist Movement (N.S.B.), were published in daily newspapers. Measures adopted by the Department of Social Affairs for unemployment relief or other social security were usually announced beforehand by Woudenberg, on the radio or in the press, as resulting from his own efforts.

A new institution was created called "Joy and Labor." It was modeled after the German *Kraft durch Freude*. Workers were now to be entertained with cheap movies, stage plays, cabaret and variety shows, music, and so forth.

Propaganda was organized on a large scale to induce workers to join the N.V.V. In many cases, men were forced to join by threats of dismissal. Of course this meant deportation to

Germany. In spite of this, however, membership decreased more and more.

In the fall of 1940 a secret report was made in obedience to orders from Germany, probably from the Department of Foreign Affairs in Berlin. In this report, a biting criticism was made of the leader, Woudenberg. It was asserted that the workers had no confidence in him; that he was absolutely incompetent; and, even worse, that he had gathered around him a staff of co-workers who, with a few exceptions, were even less competent than himself. To solve this difficulty it was suggested that the former leaders of the N.V.V. be recalled. This report was sent to the High Comissioner as well as to Berlin, but nothing further was ever heard from it.

On February 25, 1941, as a result of the spontaneous strikes which had broken out in Amsterdam and other places in protest against the persecution of Jews, the erstwhile executives of the trade unions were arrested in large numbers and imprisoned for many weeks because the Germans suspected them of instigating the strikes. These arrests caused deep bitterness among the workers.

WHY DID THE MEMBERS REMAIN?

One sometimes wonders why there was still a goodly number of members remaining in these organizations. This was probably due to a number of reasons. Many members believed that it was necessary for them to remain in order to keep the organization alive. They never doubted that the Allies would be victorious, but they feared that if once the structure of the organization was broken down, it would take years to strengthen it so that it could function properly. They knew that such an organization would be a vital need after the war. Also, in hundreds of places in the country there had been

no trouble at all either from the N.S.B. or from the Germans, and in such places one could feel perfectly at ease. The workmen thought that trade unions were necessary in wartime for defending their interests in the regulation of wages, hours of work, and other items. Then again, there was the question of benefits paid out by trade unions; for instance, unemployment benefits, sickness and death benefits, and old-age pensions for those having a long membership record. Such social provisions were extremely important to the poorly paid laborer.

EFFORTS TOWARD FUSION

As already mentioned, the Germans, from the very beginning, intended to centralize trade organizations. Leaders of both Roman Catholic and Protestant Christian movements were pressed more than once to unite with the N.V.V. In March 1941 this question reached a crisis. Through their connections in Berlin the Catholic clergy tried to frustrate these efforts for fusion, and at first their attempts seemed to be meeting with success, for word came back that the movement would be abandoned.

The Roman Catholic Workmen's Union then declared itself willing to cooperate to a certain degree with the N.V.V. This, however, did not satisfy the Germans, and shortly afterwards the German party demanded of Dr. Hellwig that a complete fusion be accomplished.

In July 1941 the executives of both the Roman Catholic and the Protestant Christian organizations were informed in a discussion with Dr. Hellwig that Mr. Woudenberg had been appointed commissioner for their organizations, and that they must merge with the N.V.V. Having been warned of this by a friendly connection a few days previously, the executives told Dr. Hellwig that they were not ready for this merger.

In a previous consultation with their chiefs, the executives had already decided that in case of strong pressure they would disband their organization. Members were now urged to give up membership in order to avoid having to unite with the N.V.V. By far the larger portion of members resigned. From the Christian National Trade Union, about 30,000 went over to the N.V.V.; from the Roman Catholic Workmen's Union, about 8,000. That so few of the latter union became members of the N.V.V. was doubtless due to the fact that the high clergy had declared the N.V.V. to be a prohibited organization to Catholics.

This attempt at compulsory unification resulted in nothing less than the destruction of a great work of social and cultural evolution.

That the Dutch workmen increasingly disliked the N.V.V. is shown by the fact that the number of workmen insured against unemployment fell from 600,933 on May 1, 1940 to 267,623 on October 6, 1941—a reduction of 333,310.

The Dutch system of voluntary unemployment insurance is taken care of by the trade unions. Therefore, when a worker withdraws his membership from the union, he loses his right to unemployment benefits.

WHY DID THE LEADERS SUBMIT?

Sometimes it has been asked why the executives of the N.V.V. did not disband their unions at once when they were dismissed in July 1940. To judge this question fairly, it is necessary to consider it from every point of view.

At the time of the first attack on the N.V.V., the German administration was still very considerate. Consequently, the anti-German spirit which later pervaded the N.V.V. did not exist at that time. The general feeling was, "It has not been so bad." Moreover, it had

been promised that the unions could continue as before. The two religious organizations, both of which had received German commissioners, were also promised this right. It was only later that the Germans failed to keep these promises.

In July 1940 the atmosphere was not favorable for a general acceptance of the decision to disband the N.V.V. and the unions. For a whole year, the executives of the Roman Catholic Workmen's Union and of the Christian National Trade Union watched the gathering storm clouds. A few months before the storm broke, they had the opportunity to instruct their staffs and entire body of members as to their course of future conduct. Moreover, nazification was already worming its way in everywhere: in the press, in the radio, in the appointment of N.S.B. mayors, police chiefs, commissioners for the provinces, Secretaries General of the Ministries, and so forth.

There was also the important factor that the executives and members of the two religious unions received financial support if they suffered any loss by giving up their membership. The N.V.V., however, was not financially strong enough to follow this procedure, and at that time there were no underground organizations for taking care of such cases.

Even so, several salaried executives, without counting the cost to themselves, resigned from their offices. These, as well as many other victims of the regime, were subsequently supported secretly in a frugal way.

UNION RESISTANCE

One should not get the impression from all this that during this period under Nazi control, union executives remained passive or co-operated with the new regime. Fortunately, such behavior was decidedly the exception. In

every possible way, most of the leaders tried to work against the new measures and to commit sabotage. The union of metalworkers received orders to co-operate in the selection of workers to be sent to Germany. In agreement with their employers they were able to ignore this order for a long time, and finally they flatly refused this co-operation. The builders' union refused to sign a contract to work with laborers who were voluntarily working for the German war machine, either in Germany or in Dutch aviation plants.

It was the railroad personnel who followed this antagonistic line of conduct with the greatest purpose and determination. In close co-operation with their leaders, they succeeded in keeping the railroads practically free from Nazi interference. Little by little, as the years passed, moral and material conditions were prepared for the great railway strike which began in September 1944, of which the events are generally known.

PRESSURE ON EMPLOYER ASSOCIATIONS

German pressure was not limited to trade unions, but extended to the employers' associations. Repeated reprimands were received from the Germans, who expressed great displeasure at the "dissensions on the subject of organizations" which pervaded the employers' associations. It has already been mentioned that for many years a fine spirit of co-operation had existed between organizations of workers and employers.

When Dr. Hellwig expressed a wish to be present at the discussions of these two parties they consented, but arranged among themselves to hold meetings in advance of those at which Dr. Hellwig was to appear. In this way they were able freely to exchange thoughts and ideas. After attending a few meetings, Dr. Hellwig declared:

"You have organized everything so well that I don't hear anything."

The employers met the demand for greater unity by creating an "Executive Council in Labor Matters," which became a kind of clearing house to which all three employers' organizations could refer. This council had existed for only a few months when the attack against the independence of both the Christian trade-union organizations occurred. The German tactics now became clear also to the employers. Through their Nazi leaders, the Germans intended to force a centralized union on the workers and then to unite this body with a similar unit of employers and thus obtain a Dutch labor front on the German model. Like so many of their measures in other fields, this was a preparation for making the final act easy, namely, the absorption of the Dutch people by the German race.

The employers, fully realizing the consequences of their action, refused to recognize Mr. Woudenberg, who was now the only remaining representative of the labor-union movement. Within twenty-four hours, the three employer associations were dissolved by order of the High Commissioner. This dissolution brought about the downfall of Dr. Hellwig and his entire service. This revealed not only the great discontent felt by the Germans in Berlin with Dr. Hellwig's management, but also how German calculations had come to nought.

Besides the employers' associations, there were a few large employers' unions which had refused to make collective contracts with any but those unions which belonged to the N.V.V.; these were also dissolved immediately.

A CLASH IN THE N.V.V.

It was apparent that there would soon be a clash in the N.V.V. The distaste for working with the new

N.V.V. grew constantly stronger among the executives and the members. In a secret conference, several trade-union leaders had already agreed that should a demand be made for their endorsement of a declaration of sympathy with the National Socialist Movement, or of the creation of a new labor front, this would be the signal for a general withdrawal, regardless of consequences.

Several salaried executives had already resigned, but this was not followed by a mass withdrawal of membership. To bring this about, some event was necessary which would appeal to the imagination of the masses. This at last occurred in April 1942, when Woudenberg announced the creation of the Netherlands Labor Front. More than 95 per cent of all salaried executives resigned immediately, and this example was followed by the clerical workers.

The Germans tried every means possible, from promises to threats, to get these experts in their fields into the service of the Labor Front. These efforts failed completely, although all who assumed this defiant attitude against the order of the High Commissioner knew that it could only end badly for themselves. Heads of the religious trade-union organizations decided to dissolve their organizations rather than yield their independence. Later, when unions belonging to the N.V.V. were threatened with loss of their independence, they too, without the least hesitation, sacrificed the organizations on which for so many years they had exerted their best efforts. This example was followed by all members. Within a few months, about 200,000 members had resigned, which certainly proves that the large majority of Dutch workers wished to have nothing to do with National Socialism.

On May 1, 1942, the Labor Front was organized with an unknown num-

ber of members. Its leader never dared to publish the figure. Millions of guilders, the stolen property of former trade-union organizations and their affiliated unions, were wasted. The administration was so hopelessly entangled and the finances were so badly mismanaged that finally the Department of Social Affairs was obliged to deny the Labor Front any further unemployment insurance.

LOOKING TOWARD LIBERATION

Immediately after the dissolution of the religious unions and the employers' associations, a special meeting was held by a few prominent executives of these trade-union organizations and the executives of the former N.V.V. who had been dismissed in July 1940. At this meeting some plans for the future were drawn up. Such meetings were not limited to the leaders of trade-union movements, but extended over the whole country. They occurred regularly even in the smallest places—little groups of members meeting to discuss what must be done for the revival of the movement after the hated yoke of the usurper had been shaken off. Threatening terrible punishment, the German authorities forbade such gatherings. Notwithstanding this, they took place regularly, though it was often difficult and sometimes impossible to evade the spying eye of the German police. Therefore many a good Dutchman landed in a prison or a concentration camp.

The N.V.V. brought out at these discussions the necessity for greater unity in dealing with questions concerning the trade-union movements among workers. More than once it was proposed to the representatives of both the religious trade-union bodies that they follow the example of the American, English, and Scandinavian unions, and establish one large Netherlands trade

union for the sole purpose of promoting the social-economic interests of the workers. The religious, cultural, educational, and adolescent problems could be cared for eventually by organizations created specially for that purpose.

The proposition was rejected by the religious unions, because for religious reasons they were unwilling to give up their independence. They were, however, willing to give a large measure of co-operation, and an agreement to that effect was made.

Even before liberation, the three trade-union organizations created a "Trade Union Council" which, as a body, makes decisions on various subjects and assumes several of the functions which formerly belonged to the separate unions. This co-operative plan includes all unions belonging to these trade-union organizations. Thus it has been possible to standardize and equalize contributions and payments in all unions. Perfect agreement has also been reached on a social-economic program. Although impossible at the present time, it is hoped that later a complete merger can be evolved from this joint program.

The conferences with representatives of employers led also to the development of certain regulations for this co-operative work. In March 1944 a program was agreed upon and forwarded to the Netherlands Government in London. Included was a petition that several urgent measures mentioned in the program be sanctioned—measures which had been prepared for future use when

the Germans should have left the Netherlands. In the same year, with the Netherlands still under occupation, the representatives of employers and employees decided to form a "Labor Foundation," which at first would work only on social problems (taken in the broadest sense of the word).

About the same time, many of those difficulties which were sure to arise after the liberation were discussed and tentatively solved by mutual agreement. For instance, the establishment of a "Public Works Administration" was planned. Its aim was to combat the great unemployment crisis which was expected to follow immediately after liberation, and to discuss the question of wages and salaries. Also, in relation to several special trades, rules were laid down in regard to wages and conditions of work during the postwar period.

POSTWAR PROGRESS

Thus, all the suffering caused by the war has had at least one good result—that in the vast field of employers' and workers' organizations co-operation has been evolved which may serve as a shining example for the whole Dutch nation.

Immediately after the Germans had left the Netherlands, the executives began to rebuild the trade-union movement. This had to be done from the ground up, but three months later the three trade-union organizations had already reached a total membership equal to half that of prewar days.

E. Kupers has been chairman of the Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions since 1927, having been connected with the association in other capacities since 1915. For many years he was vice president of the International Association of Trade Unions, and until the outbreak of the war he was a member of the Administrative Council of the International Labor Office in Geneva. In October 1945, when the World Association of Trade Unions was founded at Paris, he was appointed vice president. He has been a member of the Lower House of the Netherlands States-General since 1929.

The Transportation System

By K. VONK

PREWAR Netherlands had an excellent transportation system. Its railways could have been reckoned among the best in the world. Fast electric trains on its central system covered 500 kilometers¹ with great frequency, and with perfect fidelity to the timetable. A romantic individual was once heard to lament: "If only this regularity were broken one day a year, what a relief it would be!"

On the outer lines, the modern Diesel-electrics furnished rapid service. Although they ran less frequently, they were as accurately timed as their counterparts on the central system. They covered their 700 kilometers several times a day.

The steam trains, kept in good repair, also rendered rapid and dependable service. At the junctions they were met by small locals, which were gradually being replaced by buses.

The gay-colored, shining buses covered the country with a network of lines. They reached into every tiny hamlet, serving it several times a day, maintaining exact schedules.

There were also large excursion buses, attractive in appearance, which offered delightful sight-seeing trips at low cost. A government committee regulated these 4,500 vehicles, and official inspectors saw that they ran on time and complied with the safety requirements.

The tramcars, originally steam-driven, were being gradually replaced by buses except in the cities, and those that remained were electrified.

Private motorcars and motorcycles filled the roads in great numbers. This was to be expected in a country provided with an increasing number of

good roads—even excellent roads—built with the most modern engineering technique. Some of the bridges over the rivers and canals added beauty to the landscape, with their fine architecture, while others in their simplicity gave evidence of careful planning. The entire road system was the result of years of planning in order that the country might have a network of roads commensurate with its modern development. In many of the low-lying districts, with their soft peat moors, 100,000 guilders per kilometer was spent.

FREIGHT MOVEMENTS

The movement of goods is very important in a country of 9,000,000 population living on 34,000 square kilometers (about 13,000 square miles) of land. The Netherlands had reached a high degree of prosperity, to which heavy traffic contributed not a little. Good communications are necessary for the manufacture and distribution of both capital goods and consumers' goods. In addition, the geographic situation of the country and the excellent equipment of its ports attracted a heavy flow of goods through the country from abroad, destined to other countries. In 1938, Rotterdam with a shipping movement in and out of 27,600,000 gross register tons occupied second place, immediately behind London, among the ports of Europe. It was first on the Continent.

The inland navigation of the Netherlands was unique. More than 20,000 inland ships with a tonnage of more than 4,000,000 moved up and down the canals, rivers, streams, and the IJsselmeer (formerly the Zuider Zee). The larger vessels went far beyond the

¹ One kilometer = 3,280.8 feet, or nearly five-eighths of a mile.

borders of the country. The smaller ones, often with only a few tons capacity, served the internal markets, agriculture, and industry. This fleet, with its manifold variations in type, reflected the individualistic nature of the Dutchman. It was being increasingly motorized. It faced heavy competition from the road traffic; however, it still retained the major portion of inland transportation, with a turnover of about 30,000,000 tons a year, representing 2,602,000,000 ton-kilometers.

The Government tried to achieve an equitable distribution of internal freight shipments, by means of an exchange system which would regulate the rates and the use of ships. It required the registration of ships which served the industries and other commercial concerns, and established a system of freighters. The efforts of the Government were not wholly successful, because the motorized road traffic was not yet mature and so its relative importance in the transportation system could not be determined. However, it gradually gained ground through technical improvements on trucks and roads, so that the size of the fleet reached more than 50,000 motor lorries, including special cars, and a turnover of about 1,200,000,000 ton-kilometers in domestic shipments was achieved.

Railroads were competing for the goods, also. They made remarkable gains, reaching a total of 29,000 freight cars, with a turnover of more than 2,000,000,000 ton-kilometers.

This was the picture of Netherlands transportation before 1940—efficient, active, competitive. Although often of concern to the Government through its rapid expansion, it rendered great service because it encouraged the growth of industry and the improvement of agriculture. It symbolized a people giving no thought to war, but directing all its energy to national prosperity.

THE COMING OF THE GERMANS

This picture vanished on the morning of May 10, 1940, when swarms of chasers and bombers of the German usurper swooped down upon the Netherlands, threatening every living being. In a few days the entire transportation system came to a standstill and confusion crippled all effort at normal life.

Capitulation came on May 15. The country now turned to face a broken transportation system. The bridges across the Ijssel and the Meuse, across the eastern part of the Rhine and the Waal, had been destroyed. Railway and road connections had been broken. The waterway to the south and east had been obstructed.

The people did not suffer immediately. The country was well stocked. Shops, warehouses, and depots were well filled. Being quite occupied in France, German military officials paid little attention to immediate internal relations in the Netherlands. Owing to these conditions, inland traffic soon recovered to a certain extent. Since there were ample supplies of gasoline, the motorcars and trucks continued to run, and the distribution of essential foodstuffs was carried on regularly.

Soon, however, the Germans began to interfere and control the economic functions. A large staff of German officials took over the administration of the railways and tramways. Inland navigation became subject to supervision by the Reichscommissioner for Sea and Inland Navigation. All road traffic was placed under a commissioner, also.

The function of the transportation system underwent a severe change. Instead of being widespread and promoting free exchange of goods and services, it now concentrated solely on delivering the most needed supplies to the people. Since there were no longer any imports, the needs of the dense popula-

tion had to be met by internal production and by what the Germans chose to contribute. An efficient transportation system was therefore essential if the people were not to starve.

Repair work for connection between the south and the east was vigorously pushed. The material necessary for this was still available and there were sufficient laborers. That connections be made with the south was imperative because of its coal fields. Coal was essential to the principal utility industries. Gas, electricity, dairy produce, artificial manure, railway traffic, and, to a large extent, inland navigation could not be made available without coal. By September 1940 the coal transports were again in good order and navigation on the rivers had been resumed.

Unfortunately, such efficiency also aided the invader. Conflict soon arose (often underground but sometimes also in the open) because he wanted to use the system primarily for his own purposes. Sometimes he founded his demands on the "Regulations for War by Land." Often his demands had no foundation.

RESTRICTIONS ON ROAD TRAFFIC

Meanwhile, new measures had been taken in the transportation field. In June the Germans announced a drastic decrease in the consumption of gasoline. The Netherlands was not allowed more than 25 per cent of the normal consumption of 40,000,000 leaguers² used for road traffic. Such a measure caused grave consequences. Private cars could no longer be driven at will. Detailed classifications had to be made so that vital interests, such as the medical services, the food-supplying industries, and so forth, had as much gasoline as possible. The motor-truck industry had to make great cuts in its transportation services.

² One leaguer = 153.7 gallons.

A system of licenses was introduced for both private cars and motor trucks. Up to July 1940, such a system was unknown in the Netherlands. The surplus economy began to be replaced by an economy of scarcity.

Two measures of the Germans tended to promote this scarcity. The first was a demand for motor trucks. This frightened the people. When the hunt for the most modern and strongest trucks began, about one-fifth of the trucks disappeared. We may assume that the Germans secured most of these, since the tendency of later years to "dive" the trucks was not yet noticeable in 1940. "Diving" means the disappearance of trucks through dismantling and the separate hiding of parts, e.g. under haystacks or behind blind walls in out-of-the-way warehouses.

In 1940 these methods were not yet practiced because the people were still trying to carry on their peacetime occupations. Unacquainted with war since 1815, and accustomed to a well-regulated civil life, the people were unable to grasp the situation. With a certain naïveté, they relied on the "Regulations for War by Land," which prohibit the violation of the resources of an occupied country, and they therefore believed the German assurances that the economic interest of the country would be upheld. Experience taught them to the contrary.

RESTRICTIONS ON INLAND NAVIGATION

It was in August of 1940 that the first real pressure was felt. The German campaign against France had come to an end, and plans for invasion of England were underway. Hundreds of inland vessels of medium size, i.e. from 350 to 600 tons, were confiscated. That these boats would be used for invasion became quite clear when it was noted that their bows had been replaced by broad sally ports and the holds had

been provided with a layer of concrete, and that they were being towed to the North Sea and Channel ports. The Dutch retaliated by hiding their vessels as best they could in out-of-the-way streams. This cost the Germans much time to find these ships, but many of them were found.

A restriction which every part of the inland fleet felt was the compulsory decrease in the consumption of fuel oil.

Only 17.5 per cent of the vessels with about 7 per cent of the tonnage were sailing vessels. In the past twenty years, about 40 per cent of the ships had been motorized. Although they comprised only 20 per cent of the total tonnage, they occupied a much more important place than these figures indicate, because of their speed. The barges, which made up 37 per cent of the fleet with about 70 per cent of the tonnage, represented the backbone of the fleet for bulk cargo. They were entirely dependent upon the steam and motor tugs. These facts show why the normal consumption of fuel was about 9,000,000 leaguers per month. Since 1933, the distribution of the fuel oil had been accomplished effectively by chartering commissions which also distributed all available cargo over the inland fleet.

The Germans restricted consumption to 6,000,000 leaguers a month. This of course called forth protests in an effort to convince the Germans that the inland transportation, which was necessary to the economy of the country, was endangered by the new ruling. This, however, had no effect.

The scarcity was not acutely felt at first because the exports dwindled to a negligible point during the occupation, and therefore fuel was not needed for the seagoing vessels; because there had been a surplus of transport facilities before the war; and because of the decrease in domestic trade. A counteracting factor, however, was that new need

was felt due to the greatly stimulated agricultural production within the country and the consequent use of the long transport routes. The luxuries of peacetime transportation facilities were first realized during the years of occupation!

ESTIMATING NEEDS AND FACILITIES

By the fall of 1940 the Dutch were forced to take stock of what they did have. The volume of traffic is not constant throughout the year. In the months of October and November, when the cereals, potatoes, sugar beets, and other farm products are harvested and shipped to market and to processing plants, the strain on the transportation system is heaviest. The shipment of fuel during these months is also a consideration. The departments of food and fuel worked closely together in the fall of 1940 and tried to estimate beforehand the transportation needs and facilities.

After all, the difficulties at that time were child's play compared with what lay before us in the following years. True, we only began in September to store fuel supplies for the winter, especially for dwellings, while normally this takes place in June. But on the other hand, the delivery of coal for domestic use was restricted. This indeed meant added difficulties for the masses of the people, but less trouble for the transportation authorities.

The method of preliminary estimation of transportation needs and facilities was used more and more, and by this means and a judicious use of available facilities we succeeded in maintaining an almost constant flow of essential goods up to September 1944. When the scarcity of materials became more pressing, a distribution system was established to allocate repair materials, tires, and other necessary commodities to the various transportation facilities in the order of their importance.

ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES

The first measure following the introduction of the above-mentioned system of licenses for motorcars was to make a survey of the motor trucks. The railroads belonged to one company and therefore formed a surveyable and easily controllable system; the inland navigation could be dealt with by means of the freight committees already existing; but the motor trucks were not supervised.

A central planning system was necessary for the control of trucks. For that reason the truck-freight resolution was passed in the beginning of 1941. The country was divided into sections, and all the motor trucks had to report to their respective agencies when they were empty. The shipments were grouped at these points; and for certain large, regular shipments for short distances and for special purposes, facilities were allowed.

Another measure lay in the field of inland navigation. Owing to the increasing motorization, there was a surplus of towing capacity before the war. After the decrease in allotments of fuel oil, we had to avail ourselves more and more of the steam tugs, for which a reasonable quantity of coal was available. This led to the promulgation of certain tug regulations in the spring of 1941. Tug committees were formed to which tugs and vessels to be towed had to report and by which a grouping of these was formed. These committees also fixed the towage.

Thus a complete system of price control was established. A tendency toward rising prices was manifest, and inflation would have been inevitable without control. By steam tug and freight committees, by motor-truck freight services and official inspectors for traffic, all important groups of people connected with the transportation

system were brought to submit their freight rates for control. The railway company, due to its form of management, held strictly to the freight rates.

SUBSTITUTE FUELS

Substitutes were needed to offset the scarcity of gasoline. In road transport, light gas could be used in press cylinders to 180 atmospheric pressure. Gas generators could also be used. Wood, anthracite coal, and peat cakes served as fuel for the carburation process.

A special institute engaged in technical and scientific research regarding these substitutes. There was much involved, for the generator is a capricious consumer, making high demands on the quality of the product by which it is fed.

The use of the generator was promoted by the lack of interest which the Germans showed in generator trucks. One of the tricks was to build in a generator and then continue driving on gasoline. Classic is the story of the motorcar driving on although it had lost its generator. In the generator, however, was found a secretly killed pig.

The use of the generator involved difficulties. It demanded careful treatment. In spite of any system of cleaning applied, it led to extra wear and tear on the motor because of the particles of dust in the gas. The absolutely effective system of gas cleaning—the electric system—could not be applied because of lack of electric material.

In navigation also, the gas generator was used, and almost exclusively the anthracite type. As ships are almost always equipped with Diesel engines of slow revolution, there were many problems. At first only a system of mixed Diesel and generator gas was possible—the so-called pilot-injection system. Later, good results were obtained through the use of generator gas alone.

From a technical point of view, these systems, developed from sheer necessity, are interesting; but that they will be important for peacetime use is unlikely.

Because of the technical difficulties, there never was a large number of generators used in our shipping. By August 1944, the number in use in cargo vessels was 339; in tugs it was 129; on small barges it was only about 30.

MATERIALS FOR MAINTENANCE

The administrative committees regulated not only the use of the transportation facilities and their provision with fuel, but also the essential materials for their upkeep. Iron and steel products were divided into quotas of a certain number of tons. The railroads received their quotas as a unit; but the other branches of transportation were given their assignments according to the most urgent demands. Committees of experts under the transportation department decided the main lines of distribution. Each tramway was free to use its quota as it saw fit; the thousands of accessories of the trucking industry were allotted by the government traffic inspectors; and the organization of ship-builders had charge of the use of the inland navigation quota. Other government officials distributed the tires under the supervision of the transportation department.

THE UNDERLYING STRUGGLE

All of the aforementioned machinery of control was set up in 1941. The description of it seems to indicate merely a logical provision for the economic life of the country; but in actual practice, it involved a world of care. The structure was designed to save our own people from disaster, but the Germans were only too ready to use it for their own purposes. Daily there was the fatiguing struggle for the retention of

transportation facilities, for priority for our own important shipments, for fuel quotas, for repair materials, a struggle reaching into all branches of the various undertakings, a struggle to subordinate the interests of the enemy and aid the underground organizations, a struggle aided by falsified statistics and falsified card-index systems while at the same time it was essential for our own people to prevent chaos, a struggle carried on with all the human doubts as to the tactics to be used, a struggle involving a thousand small defeats but still with objectives tenaciously pursued and finally attained, a struggle continued until the final collapse in September 1944.

The Germans continually tried to permeate the system with a whole network of their own appointments in official posts. This greatly endangered the freedom of the services, but it had a drawback also for the occupying force. Up to 1944 it was primarily the task of the German officials to prevent disorder and to enforce restrictions. The fear of disorder caused the German officials to accept the urgent arguments, proved by not always correct figures, advanced by hundreds of faithful Dutch officials and experts. Thus the Germans were often prevented from enforcing certain measures.

In this way the period of occupation was spent. The severe winter of 1942 brought extra problems. The waterways were frozen over and the generators functioned poorly because of the extreme cold. For weeks the supply of food from the north and of coal from the south depended on the restricted railway service. Necessity taught us that by careful concentration of shipments at designated points, it was possible to transport the same quantity of goods from farmer to processing plant with 40 per cent of the mileage used before the war.

SEIZURE FOR WAR PURPOSES

The campaign against Russia brought new demands from the Germans. The seizures of trucks, especially of the latest types, rose in number. But the Dutch trucks, which had been built for the network of roads in a flat country, proved to be inadequate on the rough Russian battlefield. During the first months of 1942 a number of trucks were restored to civilian use. But the strain of the war effort soon led to a renewed search for trucks, aided by the administrative data which the Dutch managers were compelled to surrender. This method seemed not to satisfy the Germans, and on December 31 they published a proclamation requiring that all Dutch motorcars should be registered at a German office. Failure to comply would be considered sabotage. However, this method also failed to produce the desired results. Highhanded seizure was more and more resorted to, and the hiding of vehicles was increasingly practiced.

Of course this situation endangered the food supply. In mid-1944 only 18,000 trucks were registered, and only about half of these functioned at a time. There was the fuel shortage, and besides, the administration was less efficient because of the difficulties already outlined.

Inland navigation also was affected. The fleet was assaulted in August 1940, and in 1942 a number of ships were seized on behalf of the East Company, a Nazi undertaking for the exploitation of Russian territories. Also a number of ships were seized for the "Organization Speer" in Norway. Barges were taken for incidental purposes in France. Dutch ships had always predominated in navigation on the Rhine, so it is not surprising that the Germans eagerly exploited their position. With all sorts of excuses, Dutch ships were sent to Ger-

many and kept there. At the moment that these lines are being written Dutch barges are reported as being registered all the way from Norway to Italy. They are even reported to be in the Russian occupation zone.

Problems of transport were further increased when the Allies began bombing the Germans and—not being able to distinguish between civilian transport and military transport—bombed the life lines of the Netherlands. When the real offensive against the waterways and the northeast, which is the storehouse of the country, began late in 1943, the destruction was tremendous.

At this time the Germans increased their demands for ships and tugs to be used for army transport. It was weeks before the air offensive stopped and the Germans no longer pushed their demands.

DIFFICULTIES OF 1943-44

While it was possible to keep the transportation situation fairly well in hand during 1943, the difficulties rapidly increased in 1944. The fuel oil allotments for inland navigation dropped to 7 or 8 per cent of the normal consumption; the gasoline allotments, to a few per cent. Bombings occurred more frequently.

The railways also had to suffer increasingly. Since the railways in Germany comprise almost 80 per cent of total transportation facilities, it was natural that the Germans paid special attention to the Dutch railways. The Dutch railway management may be credited with superlative achievement, but it was under the strictest type of surveillance by the Germans. After the losses suffered in May 1940, the Germans ordered portions of track broken up. In all, there were 400 kilometers of track destroyed. Some engines had to be surrendered (most of

the Dutch engines were not adapted for use in Germany), and a number of freight cars and trucks disappeared behind the frontiers. The Diesel-electrics were soon withdrawn from service but remained in the country. Steam express trains were slowed down and finally became locals. The fast freight service was gradually stopped.

Passenger service, however, increased greatly. Since private cars and buses had to a great extent disappeared from the roads, the demand on the railroads and tramways was enormous. In 1943 there were 209,000,000 passengers carried, as compared with 40,000,000 in 1938. Although the decrease in commercial life lessened the traffic pressure, passenger travel was stimulated by the need for personal contacts, by underground activity, and by the necessity for townspeople to go to the country for food.

The tramways also suffered more in 1943 and especially in 1944. Their supplies were seized by the Germans to replace losses in German towns due to bombardments. However, the tramways managed to maintain a valuable organization.

In September of 1944, the bombing of railroads and tramways, of inland navigation, and of road traffic increased. Montgomery was making rapid advances in the south. The daring attack on Arnhem began, and failed. At the same time the Dutch Government in London ordered a general railroad strike in order to hinder the German army movements. The Germans retaliated by seizing all trucks and barges and by placing an embargo on food transportation. Transportation was at a standstill. Not more than a thousand trucks were on the roads. The Germans became drastic and stated that unless the strike was terminated no shipments of any type would be permitted. The threat was: "We will

starve the population." But the strike continued.

Finally, in December, the Germans permitted some movement of food supplies. At first they stipulated that the inland ships must convey away the goods which they had confiscated. This was refused, and by some miracle the Germans gave in. Potatoes were shipped to the densely populated west. Butter and cheese, however, were held up. The winter weather made navigation impossible. Starvation, which had already begun, grew worse. The roads, formerly alive with well-built trucks, shining motorcars and buses, were now packed with a silent, pale mass of people searching for food, succumbing in large numbers. The men were hunted by soldiers, arrested, and transported to Germany. Those who rode the few remaining bicycles had them taken away.

The Germans carried away the railroad equipment and electric wirings, broke up the rails, and destroyed quays and cranes in the ports.

LIBERATION AND AFTER

It was during March and April of 1945 that hope for liberation began to grow. In the latter part of April the Dutch learned of a new type of transportation: hundreds of English and American giant bombers came to throw down packets of foodstuffs. Silent tears welled up, the people shouted for joy, they climbed on the roof-tops, flags were unfurled—while the Germans were still in the streets. The liberation!

With liberation, the Netherlands looks at her transportation system and finds only ruins. The biggest traffic bridges are completely destroyed. The waterways are blocked up. Out of 865 locomotives only 380 are left and these are severely damaged. Of the 510 electric and Diesel-motor trains only 116 are found and the majority of these

are not in working condition. Of the coaches, only 230 of the 1,900 are to be found. Of the 30,000 railway trucks only 1,000 are still available. Forty per cent of the motor trucks appear again. But even here the old types are seen, the newer ones having disappeared. Of approximately 4,500 buses used before the war, only about 500 remain; perhaps another 500 can be repaired.

The inland navigation system cannot be surveyed as yet. The ships are scattered everywhere, and many of the

larger ships have been sunk. It is unlikely that more than half of the former tonnage of 4,000,000 will be found.

In spite of the handicaps, progress is being made. The Allies are aiding with imports of trucks and materials for building up the railways. The ports are already able to handle more goods than are available for shipment. The people are energetically building up continental trade. The Netherlands wants to resume her former transportation activities, so necessary to her economic prosperity.

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Living Standards

By W. F. DE GAAY FORTMAN

WHEN Germany involved the Netherlands in the war by her treacherous attack on May 10, 1940, the total cost of living had already increased 10 per cent over that of the last month of peace in Europe—August 1939—and the cost of food had increased 15.8 per cent.

As a direct result, certain disturbances arose in the wage situation. As is well known, the average income in the Netherlands was not high. The Statistics of Income and Wealth for the year 1939-40 show that in the tax year 1938 there were 1,409,176 persons who paid an income tax, indicating that each of these persons had a taxable income of at least 800 guilders¹ per year. Thus, the earnings of about three-eighths of the people were too low for taxation. Of those who had to pay an income tax, 47.25 per cent were rated as having an annual income ranging from 800 to 1,400 guilders; while 27.21 per cent were rated as having an annual income ranging from 1,400 to 2,000 guilders.

It is obvious that with such a distribution of incomes and where many had hardly more than a minimum amount for subsistence, every considerable rise in prices must inevitably lead to a demand for an increase in wages. For this reason, in a number of collective wage agreements drawn up in the early part of 1940, a sliding wage scale was included. Increments would be payable in a specified amount when the cost-of-living index of the Amsterdam Municipal Bureau of Statistics showed a specified rise.

ATTITUDE OF THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT

At first, the Dutch Government as-

¹ One guilder = about 40 cents.

sumed a waiting attitude in regard to the movement of prices and wages. There existed a vague prohibition against boosting prices. The duty of enforcing this law rested in the hands of the magistrates; but the figures quoted above show the law to have been rather ineffective.

The Government had no direct power to control wages. A law of 1937 gave to the Minister of Social Affairs power only to regulate collective labor agreements at the request of those involved. Hence, by granting or refusing such requests the Government could, in certain cases, make known its opinion on the movement of wages.

A few days before the German invasion the Government expressed its opinion that it should be allowed more freedom in the control of prices and wages. This opinion was voiced in the Government's Memorandum in reply to the Lower Chamber on the subject of a proposed law for the creation of a fund for economic defense. Concerning the prices of essential commodities, the Government declared that in the face of circumstances which tended to increase prices, the best policy would be to take counter measures which would have a dampening effect on that increase.

As one of these counter measures, the Government asserted that too great an increase in wages should be prevented. The Government objected especially to the system of the so-called sliding wage scale, in which wages are adjusted at regular intervals to changes in the cost-of-living index. It was contended that this sliding wage scale has a tendency to produce a dreaded spiral movement of prices and wages, and, moreover, does not take into account the existing

situation in the production field, which is very important for the determination of wages.

The Government also expressed the objection that cost-of-living index figures, unless continuously corrected, constitute an imperfect basis for determining wages, inasmuch as they fail to reveal the trend taken by actual consumption as that consumption is affected by price increases.

UNDER ENEMY CONTROL

The measures contemplated by the Dutch Government and described above were never put into effect, because of the subsequent events of war. The enemy immediately froze prices and wages. The execution of this order and the granting of permits for exemptions from it were entrusted to a Commissioner of Prices. The order to freeze wages was accompanied by a decree prohibiting strikes and lockouts.

This last decree immediately made necessary a further measure of great social importance. Many enterprises had suffered from the war; some had even been entirely destroyed. In addition, it was obvious to many entrepreneurs that the loss of imports of raw materials or other products would sooner or later curtail or put a stop to their operations. Consequently, in many enterprises there were drastic cuts in wages during the first days of the occupation.

As workmen no longer had the right to strike, there had to be new ways of arresting unreasonable declines in wages. For this purpose, a decree was issued by the Commander in Chief of the Netherlands Army and Navy, who, by order of the German military authorities, had also been appointed commander over civilians until a German civil government could replace him. This decree stated that a workman

whose wages had been unreasonably lowered after May 9, 1940, or whose working conditions had deteriorated in other ways since that date, could ask redress from a government agency consisting of five persons, namely, the State Board of Arbitration. If arbitration was unsuccessful, the Board had the power to make an award binding the parties concerned.

This decree of the Commander in Chief was soon superseded by a decree of the High Commissioner of the occupied Netherlands, which required that every wage cut not agreed to by employer and workers should be made only after a permit had been obtained. The issue of these permits rested with the State Board of Arbitration.

MORE DETAILED REGULATIONS

The continuing rise in the cost of living (from August 1939 to October 1940 this rise was fully 28 per cent for food alone) made it necessary to issue much more detailed regulations than the simple one concerning the freezing of wages. These rules took form in a decree from the High Commissioner issued on November 28, 1940, dealing with the establishment of rules in the matter of wages, salaries, and other working conditions.

Quite evidently, this decree was intended primarily for economic purposes. By close co-operation with the price-control authorities, it now became possible for the Government to set up a policy to control the wage scale. In the first place, it prohibited, in collective wage agreements, the incorporation of rules which made a change in wages dependent on circumstances not directly touching the relations between employer and employee. Thus, the adoption of a sliding wage scale was made impossible.

In addition to this, the decree re-

quired prior approval of new collective labor contracts, or of changes in already existing contracts, if wage increases were involved. In general, prior approval was required for any increase of wages. Such approval could be granted only by the before-mentioned Board of Arbitration.

Aside from its economic significance, the decree of November 28, 1940 had a social significance. By making it possible to obtain a permit for a wage increase, a way was opened for lessening, in special cases, the gradually growing, and here and there dangerous, tension between prices and wages.

The Board of Arbitration was also required to draw up "for the protection of the workmen" binding regulations for wages and other working conditions in cases where such regulations had not been made effective although they were incorporated in collective labor contracts.

In the execution of this decree it was important at first to maintain the wage freeze as strictly as possible. The Board of Arbitration had to work closely with the Commissioner of Prices, who, being unable to control various other factors contributing to a rise in prices, at first opposed every wage increase which might lead to such a rise. Only for agriculture was a wage increase of about 20 per cent allowed during the season of 1941-42, and this only in connection with the raised base prices established for farm products. Because of the great importance of agriculture for the production of food, it was considered wise to permit some leniency in regard to the price of agrarian products as well as the wage of agrarian laborers. Such an attitude was defensible because of the unwarranted discrepancy between the rewards of employer and employee in agriculture when compared with those in industry.

DISCREPANCY BETWEEN PRICES AND WAGES

About September 1941 the Board of Arbitration abandoned its passive attitude with regard to the fixing of wages. Cost of living at the time had increased 28 per cent as compared with the cost in August 1939, and for food alone the increase was 43 per cent. Among the causes for this increase were: the failure of the agencies in charge of price control; the attempt of the occupation forces to adjust the Dutch price level to the higher price level of Germany; the necessity of substituting for imported overseas raw materials and other products, materials which were more expensive, yet of much poorer quality; and the higher transportation costs due to the war.

On the other hand, there had been an increase in wages of only about 5 per cent. With such a discrepancy between wages and prices, it was evident that measures which would at least enable the worker to exchange his ration coupons for goods could not be delayed much longer. To declare a general increase of wages, however, was out of the question, because of the danger of inflation. The need for maintaining public health as far as possible made it imperative to correct the wage scale in certain industries. An emergency plan was prepared for making adjustments in those trades which, considering their economic situation, were paying far too low wages and where working conditions could not be called very good.

WAGE STANDARDS ADOPTED

First of all, standards had to be found for the income required by a worker's family to enable it to spend all its ration coupons. A family consisting of husband, wife, and two children was taken as a basis. The number of

children was limited to two because in the Netherlands supplementary grants are provided by law for three or more children, thus furnishing some compensation for the increased costs. This standard is also applicable in the case of the unmarried man or the childless married worker, as the necessary correction in the total of his weekly income is introduced more or less automatically through the progressive wage tax.

The following standards were finally agreed upon: For Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague, the required weekly income was 26 guilders. For other cities and towns with over 100,000 population, 25 guilders; 50,000 to 100,000 population, 23 guilders; 20,000 to 50,000 population, 22 guilders; under 20,000 population, 20 guilders. It must be borne in mind that these standards were for untrained workers. In fixing wages for skilled and trained workers, the Board of Arbitration allowed a higher figure depending on the existing wage relationships in the Netherlands.

It is obvious that wages could not be adapted willy-nilly to these minima. They were, however, a guide to the Board in its endeavor to fix a socially defensible minimum wage scale in the various branches of industry. But in some trades the wages were so small that it was not possible to raise them even to the fixed minimum level.

The Board of Arbitration put the above-mentioned emergency plan into speedy execution. As a result, partially before and partially during the fierce winter of 1941-42, numerous industries which had been socially backward were put in order with respect to wages and other working conditions. Among these industries may be mentioned: the fruit and vegetable processing industry, the textile industry, the garment industry, the candy industry, the baking industry,

the meat-packing and meat-canning industry, the sugar industry, the laundry industry, the soap industry, the hotel industry, the inland navigation industry, and the clerical personnel in the bond and banking business and in life insurance.

The work of the Board was admirable considering that little or nothing had been previously accomplished through mutual deliberation and that the Board itself had to devise wage standards adapted to the peculiarities of each separate industry.

BOARD OF ARBITRATION DISSOLVED

The endeavors of the Board of Arbitration to carry out a socially progressive wage policy in spite of war conditions and the increasing efforts on the part of the invader to nazify the Netherlands led to a conflict between the Board and the German Government in which, of course, the former had to yield. On November 1, 1942 the wage decree of November 28, 1940 was superseded by a new decree which applied to the Netherlands the same labor regulations that existed in Germany. The Board of Arbitration was replaced by a Commissioner of Labor whose duty it was to handle the freezing of wages and the fixing of wages and other working conditions. He was to co-operate closely with the Netherlands Labor Front, that Nazi organization through which the invader was unsuccessfully trying to unite the Dutch workers.

Though the workers were told that important social improvements would be brought about through the co-operation of the Commissioner of Labor with the Netherlands Labor Front, the German Government after the first of November 1942 practically returned to the principle of simply freezing wages. Some benefits were granted to large families, however. Beginning October

1, 1942, supplementary grants for children were considerably increased, and the upper age limit for such grants was raised from 15 to 18 years, and in some special cases, even to 21 years. But in regard to wages proper, practically no further improvement was allowed.

However, the Commissioner did review the earlier standards fixed for the minimum weekly income of a workman's family, and raised them in view of the further increase of prices to 30; 28.75; 27.50; 25.75; and 22 guilders, respectively; but he was never able to make any considerable application of these standards. Only in the field of agriculture did the Commissioner, on order from the German Government, carry through any important wage increases, so that during the occupation wage increases in agriculture reached almost 50 per cent, as compared with a general average increase of about 25 per cent.

PREWAR FOOD ESTIMATES

It is understandable that important shifts in consumption would occur because of war conditions. Before the war, the Central Statistical Bureau, in its budget studies, used an imaginary "market basket"—a list which included the various food items which a normal family might need. In the case of many articles during the war, it was not necessary to examine the propriety of including them in the "basket" because an increasing number of these items were rationed. Three-fourths of the "market basket" consisted of fixed items whose inclusion was not debatable because their rations were far below both real and justifiable requirements. The least obtainable of these, especially in the line of comestibles, fulfilled very well the condition that the rationed package must be cheap enough to enable the people to buy it.

Before the war, many families of wage earners and of small independent workingmen existed on the very margin, or even below the margin, of the minimum standard of living. They were rarely, if ever, able to obtain certain foods of high nutritive value. Considering that all kinds of food then were obtainable in practically unlimited quantities, the social cost in this situation was not so apparent. It was very evident, however, that during the war the food ration was, in the long run, quite inadequate to sustain the physical strength of a workingman. Health requirements demanded that he be able to buy at least this food ration; the social need for measures to ensure this was no longer debatable.

CHANGES IN CONSUMPTION

As a result of the greatly changed conditions, the Bureau of Municipal Statistics in Amsterdam began a new investigation in the spring of 1941. At the beginning of the war, this Bureau had based its cost-of-living index on the results of an investigation of the budgets of a large number of families for the period of March 1, 1934 to February 28, 1935. In the new investigation, during April, July, and October of 1941 and January of 1942, records were kept, for periods of four weeks, of the total expenses of a certain number of families.

The results obtained in this way indicated that of the total family budget in 1934-35 the expenditure for food was 35.6 per cent, while in 1941-42 it was as high as 45.2 per cent. This rise was due not only to the increase of prices, but also to shifts in consumption. In 1941-42 the possibility of buying clothing, shoes, and furniture was already very restricted. To meet the needs of bare existence, it was necessary to reserve available money for food.

The consumption of sugar, meat, eggs, and fats had dropped considerably. As to fats, however, it should be noted that the expenditures for this item had increased because the cheaper beef fat and margarine had been almost entirely replaced by the more expensive butter. A considerable percentage increase in expenditures was shown in the line of groceries, milk, cheese, potatoes, and green vegetables. The increase for vegetables was due principally to the rise in prices, which in turn resulted from the high prices being realized through the constantly increasing exports to Germany.

The consumption of cheese and milk increased, rationing notwithstanding, which indicates that prior to the war a considerable part of our population made too little use of these foods, probably because of too small an income. It must be noted that in 1941-42, children were receiving a sufficient amount of standard milk, and that skimmed milk was unrated for adults. It was only during the last part of the war that milk distribution became drastically restricted.

In 1941-42 the expenditures for clothing, furniture, dues to organizations, newspapers, and entertainment formed a considerably lower percentage of total expenditures than in 1934-35. During the occupation the opportunities for entertainment decreased more and more and entertainments were patronized less and less because music, the theater, and especially motion pictures were made to serve Nazi propaganda. This explains also the drop in the items of "dues" and newspapers. The dissolution of the old trade-union organizations undoubtedly had a great influence on the drop in "dues." Most of the Dutch workers refused to join the National Socialist Labor Front. As a result, dues to trade unions and the contributions to their unemployment bene-

fit funds disappeared from the budgets of most workers.

The expenditures for house rentals remained approximately unchanged. They represent the only area in which price control had a perfect success, as they were maintained at the prewar level.

Notwithstanding drastic rationing rules governing the use of gas and electricity, the percentage of the family budget expended for these items remained pretty much the same as in 1934-35. This shows that for reasons of economy the poorer classes were using as little as possible of these commodities even before the war. It indicates also the low standard of living which then existed among a considerable portion of the population.

SUFFERING AND CHAOS

There was real distress during the war due to a lack of clothing, blankets, and shoes. Even during the first years of the war, textiles and shoes were available only in very small quantities. From the middle of 1943 on, the possibility of obtaining anything in these lines had practically disappeared except for the victims of the war. In addition to the impossibility of renewing or replacing these commodities, many a family was, during the last winter of the war, the victim of plain robbery by the Germans, or of destruction due to the violence of war.

Suffering was greatest among those families which, during the critical years of 1930-40, had passed through long periods of unemployment (between 1934 and 1936 there were 350,000 totally unemployed men in a population of about 8,000,000). These families had been unable to replenish their wardrobes before 1940, and consequently were already lacking in these things when the war began. Next to the victims of war violence, they form a class which is in most urgent need of help.

The Amsterdam Municipal Bureau of Statistics has calculated cost-of-living index numbers to October 1944. Compared with the figures of August 1939, there was an increase by October 1944 of 50 per cent in the total cost of living, and of 62.5 per cent in food alone.

From May 1940 to October 1942 the increase in wages was about 15 per cent, and from November 1942 to the end of the war, about 17 per cent. Thus, the increase in wages fell considerably behind the increase in prices, causing a great drop in the standard of living. It is remarkable that in the years 1942 and 1943, prices were almost stationary. It is evident that by that time the machinery for price control had been sufficiently developed to be effective. It was easier by that time to control price movements, because the price level of the Netherlands had been adjusted to that of Germany. But as a result of the increasing demoralization and disorganization due to the occupation, all control was lost after 1943 in the struggle against the growing pressure on prices.

Up to October 31, 1942, wages had been increased in an orderly manner. The control of wages and the granting of exceptions had rested with the Board of Arbitration, a body in which industry had confidence because of the standing of its individual members. Owing to conflict with the invader, this body was finally dissolved and a Commissioner of Labor appointed, who was a member of the National Socialist Movement in the Netherlands. The majority in industry did not want to co-operate with him. Therefore many real, though camouflaged, wage increases were brought about without previous authorization.

During the winter of 1944-45, a winter of terrible hunger for which the cost-of-living index has not yet been published, the Dutch standard of living fell to an unimaginably low level. Gas

and electricity were no longer available; coal was practically unobtainable; wood could be secured only at fantastic prices; during March and April of 1945, in the western part of the country, the food ration per person per week dropped to one loaf of bread of 400 grams (less than a pound), with 400 grams of so-called Red Cross bread, and one kilogram² of potatoes. Industry had practically ceased for lack of power. Provisions were made for putting on the dole those who were unable to work on account of this situation, or later because of the lack of transportation facilities or because of the inhuman roundups of the Germans, whose aim was to drag away all physically fit men for forced labor on their war work.

According to a prominent Dutch manufacturer, almost all the liquid funds of Dutch industry were used up during the period of September 1944 to May 1945. Before September 1944 Dutch industry still had 800,000,000 guilders at its disposal. After that date almost all industry was at a standstill, while fixed charges, such as wages and doles, continued. According to this manufacturer, these fixed charges could be estimated at 1,300,000,000 guilders per year.

THE TASK AHEAD

To guarantee a modest but just standard of living for everybody who wants to work is the task to which the Dutch people have dedicated themselves. In a land where many hectares of farmland have been maliciously inundated, where cities and villages have been ruined by violent warfare, where railroads have been submerged and waterways obstructed, where factories have been plundered and destroyed, and where people have to depend on imports for the satisfaction of their simplest needs,

² One kilogram = 2.2046 pounds.

this is quite a task. The Dutch are stubborn in their determination not to fail in this task, and in achieving it, they count—in peacetime as they did in wartime—on the cordial support of their courageous allies.

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The Food Supply

By J. BREUNIS

ON that tragic day in European history, the 10th of May, 1940, when the modern Huns of Hitler's Third Reich set in motion their motorized and mechanized legions in an effort to overwhelm western Europe, the four horses of the Apocalypse were riding in their wake. The Netherlands, which is the most densely populated country in the world except Belgium, was suddenly cut off by the German armies from communication with the rest of the world. The blockade against Germany and German-occupied countries meant that henceforth all imports would be cut off, and the millions living in this relatively small area would have to depend upon what could be produced there with the resources at hand.

Those of the Dutch who sensed the real situation knew that this would mean privation and soon hunger, because neither production nor distribution could be scientifically organized.

Distress seemed the more probable because it was feared and expected that the occupation force would demand tribute from the large supply of nutritious provisions which in that early day was still available; and also because the ideal which held that the productivity of the "European living space" should be available to all Germanic peoples alike had to be viewed from the first as nothing but empty propaganda for the Nazi doctrine, which had not found fertile ground in this little country. In reality, this notion served only as an excuse for stealing commodities and means of production, which were "exported" to Germany in return for worthless securities. This, of course, had repercussions on farming and on the problem of feeding.

POPULATION DENSITY

Since the First World War the Dutch population has increased about 40 per cent, bringing it to about nine million. As against this great increase of population there has been only a small increase of land area, which has been recovered by drainage. Therefore population density has increased to 274 persons per square kilometer.¹ More important, however, is the density per hectare² of arable land. Every hectare of arable land has to provide food for four persons, while every hectare of plowed land has to provide for as many as twelve persons! This is three times as many as is the case in France.

Because of this population density, the Netherlands is, in normal times, an importing country. Enormous imports of grain, oilseeds, and feed for cattle are transformed into large production of milk, butter, cheese, meat, and eggs. Without these imports, our products would be insufficient for the needs of the people, especially during the war, when Dutch agriculture was handicapped in so many ways. The enforced self-sufficiency demanded extreme effort from the farmer and also from the distribution system.

A THREEFOLD STRUGGLE

During the five years of occupation, the burden of feeding the Dutch people was one great struggle which had to be fought on three fronts by the Dutch organization for food distribution. According to good Dutch tradition, this struggle was carried on with resolution and perseverance, even when the food

¹ One square kilometer = 247.104 acres.

² One hectare = 2.471 acres.

situation was such that it seemed hardly worth while to maintain a regular organization.

In the first place, there was the inevitable drop in agricultural production due to lack of fertilizers and other necessary ingredients and materials, lack of farm machinery and implements, diminishing manpower, and the small number of horses and other farm animals. This struggle, which in the end might have become desperate, was carried on for a long time with considerable success through a system of strictly controlled production and obligatory delivery of agricultural products to organizations under central authority. Until the catastrophic food situation in September 1944, a fair level of wartime food production was maintained.

The second front was directed against German greed and robbery in the shape of demands from the army of occupation and especially from Berlin. The powers in Berlin were constantly making fresh demands, although the total food production did not offer an adequate supply for the Dutch people alone. No wonder, then, that the constant conflict in regard to the reserve for home consumption and the part to be yielded to the German demands often assumed serious aspects, the more so because it was often necessary to deceive the Germans in regard to the true situation; but our resistance helped to save considerable quantities of food for our own people.

And the third front? Strange as it may seem, the third front was the struggle against the Dutch people themselves; in other words, the struggle against clandestine trade which appeared in two forms: the real "black" market and the so-called "white" market. The aim of the latter was not exorbitant gain, but help for groups of people living near farms. The situation was further aggravated by the

fact that this market supported, with the knowledge of some officials, members of the underground and other fugitives from the Nazis. The struggle against the black market, which became increasingly difficult as the demoralization of the people progressed, soon became especially difficult because this antisocial traffic was carried on with a semblance of justification, and with the slogan: "Otherwise it will go to the hated Germans." At the same time, those who favored and worked for an orderly way of providing food, and who believed that the interests of the Netherlands were best served by a regular and honest policy of distribution, had to contend against the reproach that they were working in the interest of the Germans. This might have caused chaos in that little country whose dense population was feeling the sharp pangs of hunger and the serious results of hunger among a great mass of people who could not afford the high prices of the black market. The period of hunger during the winter of 1944 certainly revealed what heart-rending situations may occur when an organized food center has little or nothing left for distribution.

FROM PLENTY TO FAMINE

The war did not catch the Netherlands totally unprepared. Measures had been devised for considerable provisioning; of grain, for instance, to the maximum capacity of storage room, and of fats to a quantity which immediately incited the envy of the Germans. Also, an organization for the assembling of food had been formed according to the provisions of the agricultural crisis law, and was ready to function. Thus, both from a legal and an administrative viewpoint our country was ready for the change to so-called self-sufficiency.

This, however, necessitated a complete change in food habits. In pre-

war days the people enjoyed a high level of diet. They consumed an abundance of organic foods of high caloric value and containing a large percentage of fat and protein. Their consumption of potatoes was small—2 kilograms³ per head—which proves the high level of their diet.

Now this had to be reduced to a diet of carbohydrates consisting mainly of bread and potatoes. At first the bread was of fair quality, thanks to provisions still on hand, but later it was of insufficient caloric content and weight. The lack of fodder compelled a reduction of 75 per cent in the stock of cattle, the slaughter of 20 per cent of the pigs, and the killing of 8 per cent of the domestic fowl; this led to a sharp drop in meat, milk, butter, cheese, and egg production.

It became necessary to increase the production of potatoes, wheat, and oil-seeds, and to accomplish this, meadows had to be changed on a large scale into plowed fields. By 1943, for the first time in the history of Dutch agriculture, the total area of plowed land was larger than the total area of meadowland. Notwithstanding all this, the wheat production was insufficient, which is not surprising when one considers that in prewar time the importation of wheat alone was more than double the amount produced in the Netherlands. As a result, in addition to wheat, rye, and barley, other products such as potatoes and even peas had to be used for bread in order to maintain the ration of 1,800 grams⁴ for any length of time.

The drop in agricultural production caused by the above factors was further aggravated by the use of some of the arable land for the so-called "defense works" of the Germans: tank ditches, obstructions, mine fields, and, worst of all, inundations, which be-

came extensive in the spring of 1944 and, during the period of 1944 to May 1945, caused the loss of 500,000 acres of arable land.

It is easy to understand that under these circumstances the food supply of the Dutch people dropped lower and lower. The food ration shrank slowly until the developments of September 1944 finally produced the sharp contraction that led to terrible famine in the western parts of the Netherlands.

THE RATIONING SYSTEM

According to what rules were the rationing and distribution of food carried out? The leaders of the food distribution system always tried to protect the youth and always took into consideration the needs of special groups—needs arising from age, from the nature of a person's work, or from other special circumstances. Thus, when the ration system was started, the following classes were set up at once:

Group I: Children 0 to 3 years

Group II: Children 4 to 13 years

Group III: Youths 14 to 20 years (early in 1944 this upper limit was changed to 18 years, but now it is again 20 years)

Group IV: Normal consumers 20 years or older

Group V: Workers doing night work for long periods

Group VI: Workers doing heavy labor

Group VII: Workers doing very heavy labor

Group VIII: Miners

There were also special rations for the sick, especially diabetics, and for young or expectant mothers, and extra rations were allowed to certain classes, such as physicians and workers handling poisons. To farmers there was issued a so-called "self-help provision" which allowed them, within limits, to supply their needs from their own produce.

A normal person above the age of 20

³ One kilogram = 2.2046 pounds.

⁴ One gram = .0022 pound.

(later, 18) doing no heavy work was at first allowed about 3,000 calories per day. As early as 1940 this level dropped lower and lower but became stable during the years 1941-43 at about 1,700 calories, which was supplemented by the low caloric value of fresh vegetables and the ration-free additional food dispensed by central kitchens to business, office, and school personnel. Children up to 14 years received a lower ration because of their different physiological needs, while young people and workingmen doing hard labor received a higher ration. In 1944 the average allowance was lowered to 1,450 calories, an average maintained with difficulty during three-fourths of the year.

Table 1 shows the number of calories per day which were available from May 1941. At that time all food was rationed except green vegetables, and these were rationed much later.

THE CRISIS AND THE UPTURN

In September 1944 Field Marshal Montgomery began his great offensive which cut off the southern part of the Netherlands and made communication between the west and the northeast very difficult. This was very serious for the dense population of the west, and it became catastrophic when the High Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, declared an embargo on all food transpor-


tation from the productive regions in the northeast to the western parts of the country. He did this in reprisal for the railroad strike which took place in support of the Allied offensive. Through this embargo the mass of the western population became entirely dependent on the very limited supplies and production facilities which existed in the west.

Even the most thrifty management could not prevent famine. After seven weeks the Germans lifted this criminal embargo, but the organization for the transportation of wheat and potatoes, thwarted as it was by the Germans and paralyzed by a period of freezing weather, was unable to gather a sufficient amount of food.

When in addition to this the liberation of Northeast Holland severed all connection with the western part, one million people were threatened with death from starvation. Toward the end of February 1945 the food ration dropped to 450 calories per day. Food brought over from Sweden relieved the situation somewhat, but even these transports could not prevent the number of calories from dropping as low as 390 per day on April 28, 1945. On that day the last kilogram of potatoes was distributed in South and North Holland together with 800 grams of bread per person, and this was done with the knowledge that on the fifth of

TABLE 1—NUMBER OF CALORIES PER DAY, MAY 1941 TO SEPTEMBER 1944

Week of	0-3 years	4-13 years	14-20 years	Normal Consumers
May 11-18, 1941.....	1,627	1,974	2,010	1,842
November 9-15, 1941.....	1,611	1,929	1,992	1,638
May 10-16, 1942.....	1,566	1,820	1,827	1,538
November 8-14, 1942.....	1,520	1,931	2,098	1,687
April 25-May 1, 1943.....	1,672	1,960	2,171	1,788
November 7-13, 1943.....	1,543	1,908	2,096	1,637
May 7-12, 1944.....	1,474	1,795	1,948	1,545
August 27-September 2, 1944.....	1,464	1,748	1,834	1,480



May the last 400 grams of bread would be distributed.

Terrible distress filled the whole country and thousands died from starvation. The strangest dishes were eaten, consisting of items which were never intended for human consumption; for instance, sugar beets and fodder beets, tulip bulbs and the tubers of flowering plants, spinach seed and other vegetable seeds. Thousands of people left their homes and offered a moving spectacle of hunger processions. There was no longer light or heat in the homes, and in many cities there was difficulty about the water supply. And all this in the formerly rich Netherlands with its high level of civilization!

The favorable progress of the war brought a turn in the situation. Even before liberation, the Germans had to make some agreements with the Allies that made it possible to organize help for the starving population. On April 29 the Allies began dropping food from airplanes and soon food was being transported by road and water. This made possible a slowly increasing ration until a reasonable level was reached. The

graph which accompanies this article represents the total number of calories of food distributed to different groups of the population during famine and after liberation, and shows the level of rations and the rate at which they were increased.

THE PRESENT

Now are circumstances better? The rations have reached a value of somewhat over 2,000 calories for the average person. The ultimate aim is to supply the people again with a daily ration equal to 3,000 calories. The immediate aim, however, is 2,500 calories, with administration of the available food supply so as to improve the physical condition of children and youth and make it possible for those doing heavy labor to work. The latter are given a physiological minimum of 3,700 calories, and those who do very heavy work receive 4,800 calories.

The Netherlands cannot reach this level by her own effort alone. Her agriculture cannot recover in a short time, and the stocks of cattle have to be built up again. Our country de-

pends for her production of food upon imports from overseas of grain, fats, and protein foods; she has to struggle with problems of coal supply and transportation; she is burdened with financial cares, for importation demands tre-

mendous sacrifices which may become too heavy for our stricken country. The Netherlands has faith, however, that she may trust her great allies and that she may claim some help from them.

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Food Shortage and Public Health, First Half of 1945

By C. BANNING

AT the outbreak of the war the Netherlands was in many respects in a very favorable position in the social and health spheres. The organization for the care of public health, the executive branch of which was mainly entrusted to voluntary private initiative—the so-called Cross Associations—with financial government support and under the direction of the State Medical Supervision of Public Health, had led to satisfactory results.

In the year 1939, for this country the last before the war, the general mortality in the Netherlands amounted to 8.7 per 1,000 inhabitants, the mortality of children under one year to 33.7 per 1,000 live births, and the tuberculosis mortality to 4.11 per 10,000 inhabitants—a rate more favorable than any other country probably could show.

Then came the war and with it the difficulties in the matter of food supply, which increased steadily due to the stoppage of imports and the systematic removal of large quantities of cattle and foodstuffs by the Germans. The shortage of fats was especially strongly felt, and as the war continued, other rations also decreased steadily.

The situation became more and more unbearable for the population and, from the point of view of public health, almost a catastrophe. The serious shortage of fuel caused a gradual decrease and finally a complete shutting down of the production of gas and electricity, and in several places even the water supply had to be cut off, while the authorities were unable to provide fuel for stoves and furnaces in homes. Throughout the winter of 1944-45 the population sat without light, without gas, without heat; laundries ceased operating; soap for personal use was un-

obtainable; shoes, textiles, and adequate clothing were lacking in innumerable families. In hospitals and sanatoriums, many of which had been evacuated by the Germans to be confiscated for their own use or pulled down for military reasons, there was serious overcrowding as well as a lack of medicines. Hunger dominated all this misery.

LOWERED RATIONS

The rations that could be made available for the population of the western provinces, the so-called B-2 area, with a population of about 4.5 million persons, became even smaller in quantity and food value. Butter and animal fats were no longer supplied after October 1944; of other fats, altogether 1.3 liters¹ of edible oil per person were allotted from September 1944 to the end of March 1945, i.e. in seven months, or less than 0.2 liter per month; in the beginning, 100 grams² of ill-nourishing cheese were allotted every other week; the meat coupons could not be honored as a rule when they became valid.

The bread ration became steadily smaller. In the course of the war it had already dropped from 2,200 to 1,800 and then to 1,400 grams per week. After that it was 1,000 grams, but declined by the end of November to 800 grams and in April 1945 even to 400 grams a week. Together with one kilogram³ of potatoes, this then formed the entire weekly ration. Potatoes were almost unobtainable. From September 1944 onward no more than one kilogram per person per week was allotted, and frequently one had to wait weeks for delivery. On the black market prices

¹ One liter = 1.0567 liquid quarts.

² One gram = .0022 pound.

³ One kilogram (kg.) = 2.2046 pounds.

of 700 to 1,000 guilders⁴ were asked and actually paid for 70 kg. This was more than a hundred times the official price, which was 7 guilders per 70 kg.

For innumerable people, the only way to get anything hot to eat was to make use of the central kitchens; the allotted potato coupon had to be surrendered in return for half a liter of thin soup a day. Often the food could not be transported promptly from the central kitchen to the distribution posts on account of transportation difficulties, and people sometimes had to stand in queues for hours. The allotted rations were wholly inadequate not only quantitatively but especially as regards the caloric value; some addition was obtained by eating sugar beets which were occasionally furnished instead of or as supplement to the potatoes, or tulip bulbs which were not rationed and were bought at high prices.

ORGANIZATIONAL HELP

In the worst period, we were saved by the International Red Cross—the Swiss and especially the Swedish—through whose aid 400 grams in addition to the usual weekly bread ration could be distributed in the cities beginning in February 1945. Through the Red Cross also a quantity of 125 grams of margarine per head was twice distributed; for children, leguminous vegetables and rice were available; and the larders of the hospitals could be replenished a little.

Excellent work, that saved the lives of many, also was accomplished during this period by the Inter-Church Council (I.K.O.), which had grown out of the collaboration of the various church associations to provide hot meals to starving children and to send undernourished children to districts where the food situation was better than in western Netherlands. In the cities and

* One guilder = about 40 cents.

in certain districts, local and provincial bureaus were established for the division and distribution of the supplies received.

The food was fetched especially from the northern provinces, where large quantities were collected for the starving west through the co-operation of the food authorities and the population; yet this was only sufficient to help the most necessitous cases. Tickets to the meals of the Inter-Church Bureau were therefore given exclusively for medical-social reasons, and therefore a medical department was connected with every local bureau for the examination of prospective guests.

In the beginning, help was rendered only to undernourished children between 5 and 16 years of age; but soon also children 3 to 5 years old, the so-called "tots," were included. With the steady reduction in rations, the need for feeding adults came to the fore. Here too a system of medical examination was devised whereby adults who were in a critical condition or threatened to be so in a little while due to malnutrition received attention, such as overt or latent cases of hunger edema and hunger cachexia. Patients in the last-named class could be considered for the meals only if their weight was more than 30 per cent below the average for sex, age, and height, and real cachexia existed. Cases where tuberculosis was medically indicated, and expectant mothers in the last months before confinement, could also be considered.

Adults received a meal of $\frac{3}{4}$ liter six times a week. Children were separated at the examination into urgency groups. Those in Group I (more than 20 per cent undernourished) received a meal of half a liter six times a week; those in Group II (15 to 20 per cent undernourished), three times a week.

The activities of the local Inter-Church Bureau at The Hague began at

the first of the year 1945. Of 38,000 children examined in the first quarter of the year, 8,000 were considered for sending away and 30,000 for feeding. Among these, 29.2 per cent were more than 20 per cent undernourished; 31.5 per cent were from 15 to 20 per cent undernourished; 27.3 per cent were from 7 to 15 per cent undernourished; and 12 per cent were less than 7 per cent undernourished.

As early as the beginning of January 1945 it was possible to furnish 6,000 children with a hot meal three times a week; some weeks later, 12,000 children were being supplied at 55 distribution posts. By the end of February this number had risen to 30,000 children of 6 to 15 years and 15,000 tots of 3 to 5 years. Besides this, 2,200 children in institutions and nursing homes were reached and 2,700 invalids and 1,550 old people were provided with emergency food with the help of a personnel of 3,000.

Food in the form of raw materials was also supplied to hospitals. By the end of April more than 30,000 adult malnutrition cases were provided with emergency food and several institutions and hospitals were given extra supplies. Altogether, between 50,000 and 60,000 portions of emergency food were distributed per day during April, which means that about 10 per cent of the population of this area profited by it.

A CRITICAL SITUATION

From the above exposition it is sufficiently clear how extremely precarious the food situation was in the western provinces. In the last period of the war the official rations contained between 500 and 600 calories, which is barely a third of the number generally considered by experts as necessary to maintain life. This inevitably led in a short time to catastrophic consequences to public health.

At first many of the townspeople could still eke out a sufficiency with little stocks carefully stored for hard times or bought on the black market. Others went out, often in snow, rain, or frost, often several days' journey, to try to get a little food for their families from the farmers—attempts during which many lost their lives along the road from sheer exhaustion. Still others found a welcome supplement in what relatives or friends sent them from elsewhere.

But as gradually less could be drawn from these reserves, the situation became more critical. Even for very seriously sick people, only in exceptional cases and in very small quantities could any extra food be made available. The number of cases of tuberculosis diagnosed at the consultation bureaus increased tremendously in the last year; infant mortality showed a great increase; hunger edema, which until then not a single doctor in the Netherlands had known from his own observation, now became a daily occurrence in the practice of the physician. Increasing mental strain also contributed to the decline in the people's power of resistance, and ultimately the complex of unfavorable factors was expressed in a greatly increased death rate. Malnutrition as a cause of death came to the fore in a sharply rising line.

By the end of April the food situation in the west of the country was hopeless. The ration stocks available were sufficient for only a few more days, without any prospect of new supplies. Tens of thousands lived on the brink of complete physical and mental exhaustion, and a serious catastrophe seemed inevitable.

ALLIED HELP

In this utmost distress the Allies began, on Sunday, April 29 and the




Fig. 1.—The Caloric Value of Food Rations

subsequent days, to drop food on air-fields in the neighborhood of large towns. Despite the presence of the Germans, hundreds of low-flying bombers were greeted by the population with loud cheers. A few days later, on May 5, 1945, the Germans capitulated, and relief organizations that had long been prepared, especially to aid the western provinces, began without delay to bring large quantities of food and to send medical relief columns to the starvation areas.

As it could be foreseen in the fall of 1944 that the liberation of the territory above the rivers might still take months, resulting in a catastrophic situation in the west, the Netherlands Government in London consulted in detail with the British war and food departments and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, with the result that the Allied Supreme Command drew up a special plan for the relief of western Netherlands. The SHAEF charged the 21st British Army with the execution of this emergency plan. The western

Holland District, later called Netherlands District, was established, and a special staff for this purpose was connected with the Netherlands Military Authority or Netherlands Military Administration; the Red Cross Relief Corps, formed by the Central Administration of the Netherlands Red Cross in North Brabant, was incorporated with its fifty medical feeding groups, forty relief teams, and fifteen social liaison groups, as well as its family relief columns.

Right in the vanguard of the liberation troops there were columns of the said Brabant Red Cross Relief Corps carrying food packages collected in the south of the country under the motto "South helps North," and food presented by the International, Belgian, Swiss, American, British, Canadian, and Hungarian Red Cross and by various foreign relief organizations. The permanent factor was the "Emergency Commissariat" that transported the supplies which were made available by the SHAEF.

TABLE 1—CALORIES PER DAY PER PERSON CONTAINED IN OFFICIAL RATIONS

	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	Utrecht	Delft
October 1944	1,283	910	1,090	1,010
February 1945	479	550	466	390
April 1945	659	690	620	750

To combat the frequently very serious consequences of malnutrition, very special work in the medical and social spheres was done by the Medical Special Feeding Teams, Relief Teams, Queens Messengers, etc., formed in the south of the country on an Allied model.

Until October 1944 the food situation was bearable; after that, conditions deteriorated rapidly, as is shown in Table 1. The figures were gathered by Allied medical teams which made an investigation shortly after the liberation.

In the period of January through April 1945 a quantity of 45 to 90 calories per day was added from the food which the central kitchens furnished. The increase in the number of calories in the month of April was the result of the relief meanwhile rendered by the Red Cross. By the end of May the number of calories of the official rations had been increased to approximately 2,000.

GENERAL MORTALITY

From Table 2 it can be seen that between 1939 and 1944 the mortality in-

creased only moderately in comparison with the very great difference between 1944 and 1945. It can also be seen that the mortality per 1,000 inhabitants did not vary greatly as among the large cities. The highest rate was reached in The Hague.

This is partly due to war violence, particularly air bombardments. There were 475 killed in the first quarter and 54 in the second quarter, besides 23 shot by the Germans.

Also, The Hague is disadvantageously located in relation to the domestic food production and supply area. Therefore, it was more difficult than in other places to bring in the official food supplies, and also it was more difficult for the people themselves to procure food from the farmers than it was, for instance, for the people of Amsterdam. Until approximately March 1945, the latter were able to maintain fairly regular communication by ship with the food province Friesland and could utilize the nearer production areas at the tip of North Holland.

The mortality was highest in the

TABLE 2—MORTALITY OF THE FOUR LARGEST CITIES IN THE WEST

City	Number of Deaths First Half of Year			Comparative Index Figures			Deaths per 1,000 Population		
	1939	1944	1945	1939	1944	1945	1939	1944	1945
Amsterdam	3,655	4,393	9,735	100	120.2	266.3	4.60	5.69	12.61
Rotterdam	2,616	3,260	7,827	100	124.6	299.2	4.25	5.39	12.94
The Hague	2,419	2,940	6,458 ^a	100	121.5	267.0	4.86	6.50	14.38 ^b
Utrecht	776	1,112	2,065	100	143.2	266.1	4.67	6.54	12.15

^a Including 552 victims of war activity.

^b Exclusive of victims of war violence, 13.15.

months of February and March, after the end of the frost period, when the food rations were lowest because of the interruption of transportation by snow and frost.

In the smaller towns the mortality rose almost to the same extent as in the larger cities.

Mortality according to sex

The number of men and women in the population was approximately equal, and in normal years there was little difference in the death rate between men and women; but during the starvation period of 1945 the mortality of men increased to a far greater extent than that of women, especially in the larger cities. This is shown in Table 3.

The cause of this greater mortality among men is not clear. It is not probable that heavier work by the men

played an important part, for in general, at least as much effort was demanded of the women as of the men, if not more. Very many factories and offices were at a standstill or worked greatly reduced hours. Besides, the phenomenon presented itself in all age groups, especially among infants and those above 50 years. A large number of men were carried off to Germany; many others went underground in the country districts; otherwise the mortality ratio would perhaps have been still more unfavorable for the men.

Mortality from malnutrition

It is difficult to say how many persons in the west of the Netherlands died from malnutrition. Besides those for whom malnutrition was officially reported as the cause of death, there was

TABLE 3—MORTALITY FOR SELECTED CITIES, BY SEX

Month	Rotterdam						Comparative Index Figures (1944 = 100)		
	Men		Women		Total		Men	Women	Total
	1944	1945	1944	1945	1944	1945	1945	1945	1945
January	260	755	258	423	518	1,178	290	164	227
February ^a	276	1,020	291	393	567	1,413	370	135	249
March	338	1,229	309	532	647	1,761	364	172	272
April	285	1,028	276	572	561	1,600	361	207	285
May	283	762	255	511	538	1,273	269	200	237
June	227	368	202	234	429	602	162	116	140
Totals for Rotterdam	1,669	5,162	1,591	2,665	3,260	7,827	309	167	234
Amsterdam		5,881		3,808					
The Hague		3,988		2,470					
Hilversum	250	860	261	511					
Schiedam	198	448	188	308					
Vlaardingen	102	214	100	162					

^a February 1944 had 29 days.

Source: Municipal Bureau of Statistics of The Hague.

perhaps a still greater number for whom the poor food situation, the cold, and privations so weakened their resistance that their illnesses proved fatal. This applies not only to tuberculosis, diabetes, and other diseases in which feeding plays an important part, but really to every disease. Many are inclined to attribute the increase in mortality in 1945 compared with 1944 almost entirely to malnutrition.

Considering only the deaths officially reported as due to malnutrition, in the first half of 1945, we find that 2,316 occurred in Amsterdam, 2,095 in The Hague, 138 in Leiden, and 145 in Vlaardingen. Statistics are not yet available for all the towns, but in seven towns totaling 1,696,920 inhabitants, 4,961 people died from malnutrition. There are twenty municipalities with more than 35,000 inhabitants situated in the three western provinces, totaling a population of 2,940,000. Taking the above-mentioned seven towns as a gauge for the remaining thirteen, one arrives at a total of 8,500 deaths from malnutrition in all towns of over 35,000 population. Estimating that the remaining 1,500,000 inhabitants of the western provinces lived in the country

where much hunger was suffered, especially among the older people, though less than in the large towns, and estimating the mortality from malnutrition at even approximately one-third of that in the towns, we reach a figure of 1,500 cases for this group, or altogether for the western provinces, 10,000 obvious cases of death from malnutrition. In my opinion such an estimate is certainly not too high.

Here, too, one is struck by the great difference between the death rates of men and women. Of the 2,316 who died of malnutrition in Amsterdam, more than 75 per cent were men.

Another striking factor is that the vast majority of deaths from malnutrition were elderly people. In The Hague, for instance, no fewer than 84 per cent were people over 50, and 56 per cent were even over 65 years old. In the ages between 5 and 35 there were very few deaths from malnutrition; in The Hague, only 3.14 per cent of the total.

Table 4 gives further details for The Hague, and Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the general mortality in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague in 1944 and 1945.

TABLE 4—MORTALITY IN THE HAGUE

	Number of Deaths			Deaths per 1,000 Population			Comparative Index Figures		
	1939	1944	1945	1939	1944	1945	1939	1944	1945
January	493	490	979	11.7	12.8	25.7	100	109	220
February*	388	472	1,291	10.2	13.7	37.5	100	134	368
March	441	610	1,728	10.5	16.0	45.3	100	152	431
1st quarter	1,322	1,572	3,998	10.7	14.04	36.1	100	131	337
2d quarter	1,097	1,368	2,460	8.8	12.2	21.97	100	139	238

* In 1944 February had 29 days.




Fig. 2.—Deaths in Amsterdam During the First Half of 1944 and 1945.

The first week of 1944 ended on January 8 and of 1945 on January 6. See table on which this figure is based.

TABLE ON WHICH FIG. 2 IS BASED

Weeks	Total Deaths in 1944	Total Deaths in 1945	Deaths from Malnutrition in 1945
1st	180	276	5
2d	189	320	25
3d	193	344	36
4th	183	466	70
5th	157	601	141
6th	155	464	112
7th	165	491	134
8th	185	463	134
9th	214	455	137
10th	204	516	141
11th	192	483	139
12th	195	511	144
13th	198	404	120
14th	209	389	111
15th	158	444	138
16th	151	325	94
17th	164	321	81
18th	174	401	133
19th	133	435	134
20th	142	256	90
21st	168	288	72
22d	156	225	46
23d	138	251	36
24th	137	194	26
25th	124	197	10
26th	129	212	14




Fig. 3.—Deaths in Rotterdam During the First Half of 1944 and 1945 by Sex

TABLE 5—REPORTED DEATHS PER WEEK IN THE HAGUE

Week Ending	1944	1945		Causes of Death, 1945			Per Cent Increase 1945 over 1944	
	Total Deaths	Total Deaths	Men	Women	Malnutrition	War Activity		
1st, Jan. 6	124	168	99	69	27	32	109	35.5
2d, Jan. 13	95	183	109	74	34	4	145	92.6
3d, Jan. 20	113	239	165	74	52	0	187	111.5
4th, Jan. 27	106	245	164	81	60	1	184	131.1
5th, Feb. 3 ^a	104	288	187	101	108	7	173	176.9
6th, Feb. 10 ^a	115	324	213	111	116	10	198	181.0
7th, Feb. 17 ^a	126	320	221	99	131	17	172	154.0
8th, Feb. 24 ^a	114	347	231	116	147	18	182	204.4
9th, March 3 ^a	130	389	246	143	141	80	168	200.0
10th, March 10	129	416	266	150	120	139	157	222.5
11th, March 17	158	378	244	134	121	71	186	139.2
12th, March 24 ^a	119	389	242	147	135	65+11 ^b	178	226.5
13th, March 31	139	312	196	116	127	31	154	124.5
14th, April 7	119	298	182	116	118	6+10 ^b	164	150.4
15th, April 14	134	281	170	111	146	7+2 ^b	126	109.7
16th, April 21	133	250	140	110	98	4	148	88.0
17th, April 28	91	239	147	92	80	5	154	162.5
18th, May 5	94	231	123	108	73	7	151	145.7
19th, May 12	115	254	140	114	84	0	170	120.7
20th, May 19	102	205	124	81	54	2	149	101.0
21st, May 26	107	145	75	70	33	3	109	35.5
22d, June 2	107	110	57	53	21	1	88	2.8
23d, June 9	102	138	70	68	28	4	106	35.3
24th, June 16	91	111	61	50	23	5	83	22.0
25th, June 23	88	99	63	36	11	2	86	12.5
26th, June 30	85	99	53	46	7	8	84	16.5
Total Half Year	2,940	6,458	3,988	2,470	2,095	529+2 ^b	3,811	119.7
Total First Quarter	1,572	3,998	2,583	1,415	1,319	475+11 ^b	2,193	154.3
Total Second Quarter	1,368	2,460	1,405	1,055	776	54+12 ^b	1,618	80.0

^a In this week, the mortality from malnutrition in 1945 was higher than the total mortality in the corresponding week in 1944.

^b Plus signifies shot.

MORTALITY FOR THE HAGUE

The population of The Hague was 504,355 in March 1940, just before the occupation, but had dropped to 448,993 by March 1, 1944, four years later, on account of evacuation and other causes.

It will be seen from Table 4 that the mortality per 1,000 population in March 1945 was more than 4.3 times as high as in the corresponding month in 1939

and 2.83 times as high as in March 1944.

Table 5 gives a survey of the number of cases of death in each week according to sex and cause of death.

According to the data in Table 5 the ratio of the mortality of men to that of women in the first quarter was 183:100 and in the second quarter 133:100, although in The Hague there are more women than men.




Fig. 4.—Deaths at The Hague During the First Half of 1944 and 1945

The mortality from malnutrition and the large number of victims from war violence contributed considerably to the higher mortality, but also the "other causes" show an important increase, namely, 30 per cent for the first half-year and 46 per cent for the first quarter. Probably this includes many in which malnutrition played a great part.

The gravity of the situation can be seen from the fact that from February 17 to March 24, 1945 the mortality was more than three times as high as in the corresponding month of 1944, while during the entire month of February as well as in the first and fourth weeks of March more people died from hunger than the total mortality amounted to in the same period of 1944.

The Municipal Bureau of Statistics of The Hague has also furnished a statement of the mortality divided according to economic status, namely: working class, middle class, and upper class. For the first quarter of 1945, this is shown in Table 6.

In connection with Table 6 it should be mentioned that the absolute number of deaths occurring in it cannot serve as a gauge whether and in how far the mortality in the one economic group was relatively greater than in another. For this one would have to know the number of those present in each group.

Mortality according to sex

It is different in the case of mortality according to sex. Here, in the first quarter of 1945 the ratio between the mortality of women and the mortality of men was 100:217.5 for the working-class group; 100:148.6 for the middle-class group; and 100:113.7 for the upper-class group. The ratio for the men is thus decidedly the most unfavorable in the working class. In certain age groups also the ratio for the men is much worse. For example, in the working class for the age group 45 to 55, it is even 100:500, or five men to one woman. With the improved food situation after the liberation there

TABLE 6—MORTALITY IN THE HAGUE BY SEX AND CAUSE OF DEATH, IN VARIOUS ECONOMIC GROUPS, FIRST QUARTER 1945

Week Ending	Absolute Number of Deaths								Cause of Death				Mortality from Malnutrition in Percentage of Total Mortality			
	Working Class		Middle Class		Prosperous		Working Class		Middle Class		Prosperous		Total All Groups			
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Malnutrition	Other Causes	Malnutrition	Other Causes				
Jan. 6	63	40	34	28	2	1	16	87	11	51	—	3	15.5	17.7	—	16.1
" 13	78	32	30	42	1	—	25	85	9	63	—	1	22.7	12.5	—	18.6
" 20	109	44	53	29	3	1	40	113	12	70	—	4	26.1	14.6	—	21.8
" 27	126	35	35	45	3	1	46	115	14	66	—	4	28.6	17.5	—	24.5
Feb. 3	125	60	61	39	1	2	76	109	32	68	—	3	40.1	32.0	—	37.5
" 10	136	63	68	47	9	1	78	121	37	78	1	9	39.2	32.2	10.0	35.8
" 17	105	35	103	45	13	19	63	77	65	83	3	29	45.0	43.9	9.4	40.9
" 24	163	63	49	28	19	25	100	126	35	42	12	32	44.2	45.5	27.3	42.4
Mar. 3	175	79	63	52	8	12	103	151	34	81	4	16	40.6	29.6	20.0	36.2
" 10	115	62	139	88	12	—	76	101	44	183	—	12	42.9	19.4	—	28.9
" 17	152	81	82	47	10	6	95	138	25	104	1	15	40.8	19.3	6.3	32.0
" 24	149	84	87	56	6	7	99	134	33	110	3	10	42.7	23.1	24.6	34.7
" 31	111	61	80	49	5	6	92	80	35	94	—	11	52.3	27.1	—	40.7
Total First Quarter	1,607	739	884	595	92	81	909	1,437	386	1,093	24	149	38.7	26.1	13.8	33.0
	2,346	1,479			173		2,346		1,479	173						




Fig. 5.—Percentage of Deaths Each Week Due to Malnutrition in Different Economic Classes at The Hague During the First Half of 1945

TABLE ON WHICH FIG. 5 IS BASED

Weeks	Workers		Middle Class		Prosperous	Total of All Groups	
	Absolute	Per Cent	Absolute	Per Cent	Absolute	Absolute	Per Cent
1st	16	15.6	11	17.7	0	27	16.1
2d	25	22.7	9	12.5	0	34	18.6
3d	40	26.1	12	14.6	0	52	21.8
4th	46	28.6	14	17.5	0	60	24.5
5th	76	40.1	32	32.0	0	108	37.5
6th	78	39.2	37	32.2	1	116	35.8
7th	63	45.0	65	43.9	3	131	40.9
8th	100	44.2	35	45.5	12	147	42.4
9th	103	40.6	34	29.6	4	141	36.2
10th	76	42.9	44	19.4	0	120	28.9
11th	95	40.8	25	19.3	1	121	32.0
12th	99	42.7	33	23.1	3	135	34.7
13th	92	52.3	35	27.1	0	127	40.7
14th	85	47.5	30	28.9	3	118	39.6
15th	103	60.6	41	41.0	2	146	52.0
16th	74	49.0	19	25.0	5	98	39.2
17th	61	37.7	18	27.5	1	80	33.5
18th	52	36.9	20	26.7	1	73	31.6
19th	62	39.0	19	23.7	3	84	33.7
20th	43	27.7	11	23.9	0	54	26.3
21st	23	24.2	9	19.1	1	33	22.8
22d	13	20.3	8	20.0	0	21	19.1
23d	15	20.0	11	19.6	2	28	20.3
24th	15	21.1	8	20.0	0	23	20.7
25th	8	13.3	3	7.9	0	11	11.1
26th	6	8.7	1	3.5	0	7	7.7
Average Percentage		37.7		25.7			32.4

TABLE 7—MORTALITY IN THE HAGUE FROM MALNUTRITION, BY AGE GROUPS, 1945

Age Groups	Absolute Number of Deaths			Percentage of Total Mortality from Malnutrition		
	First Quarter	Second Quarter	Half Year	First Quarter	Second Quarter	Half Year
Under 1 year	28	24	52	2.12	3.09	2.48
1-4	14	11	25	1.06	1.41	1.19
5-9	5	0	5	0.38	—	0.24
10-14	0	2	2	—	0.26	0.10
15-19	3	1	4	0.23	0.13	0.19
20-24	10	4	14	0.76	0.51	0.67
25-29	12	7	19	0.91	0.90	0.90
30-34	13	9	22	0.98	1.16	1.05
35-39	16	10	26	1.21	1.28	1.24
40-44	43	20	63	3.26	2.57	3.00
45-49	62	29	91	4.70	3.74	4.35
50-54	90	36	126	6.83	4.63	6.01
55-59	153	62	215	11.60	8.00	10.26
60-64	154	93	247	11.67	12.00	11.80
65-79	586	375	961	44.43	48.32	45.87
Over 80	130	93	223	9.86	12.00	10.65
Total	1,319	776	2,095	100.00	100.00	100.00




Fig. 6.—Deaths from Malnutrition According to Age Groups in Percents of All Deaths from Malnutrition at The Hague During the First Half of 1945

Age Groups	Per Cent	Age Groups	Per Cent
Under 5.....	3.67	50 to 64.....	28.07
5 to 19.....	0.52	65 to 79.....	45.87
20 to 34.....	2.62	80 and over.....	10.65
35 to 49.....	8.60		




Fig. 7.—Deaths by Age, Sex, and Economic Class at The Hague During the First Half of 1945

The combined groups include working-class, middle-class, and prosperous-class percentages, but the numbers in the group "prosperous class" are too small to be expressed in percentages.

was immediately a far more favorable ratio between the mortality of men and that of women.

Mortality according to malnutrition

The percentage of cases of death from malnutrition rose alarmingly both for the workers and for the middle-class group especially after January, a clear proof of the rapid decline in the power of resistance. In the last week of March the mortality from malnutrition for the workers' group amounted to more than half the total mortality; in the second week of April this percentage even rose to 60.6 (see Figure 5).

If one studies the age of the persons who died from malnutrition, one is struck by the fact that the vast majority of these cases of death occurred in the age group above 50 years, as can be seen from Table 7.

More than 84 per cent of those who died from malnutrition were over 50 years old, and 56 per cent were over 65 years. It is remarkable that between 5 and 19 years, the growing period, only 11 cases of death from malnutrition occurred, or 0.51 per cent of the total; while for the infant group the percentage is fairly high.

For the working-class group the ratio was no different from that for the others. Here also, 84 per cent of those who died from malnutrition were over 50 years, and 55.3 per cent were over 64 years old.

INFANT MORTALITY

The great rise in the mortality of children under one year old, despite the fact that extra food rations were made available for these children and for the young mothers, also deserves attention.

During the war years the infant mortality had risen, but not considerably. In 1945, however, this mortality rose by leaps and bounds, as can be seen from Table 8.

TABLE 8—INFANT MORTALITY

	First half year	
	1944	1945
Amsterdam	316	816
Rotterdam	199	521
Utrecht	101	213
Hilversum	31	96
Schiedam	32	80
Vlaardingen	8	46

The chief of the medical department of the Inter-Church Council (I.K.O.), the institution that maintained close contact with the starvation patients in the starvation period, writes in his report:

Now, six weeks after the liberation, the situation is considerably better. The real hunger has disappeared but the consequences of the hunger that was suffered have not yet disappeared. In the most vulnerable strata of the population (old people and the underprivileged) there are still many who are seriously ill and many deaths that are more or less directly caused by starvation. The children, on the other hand, seem to recover fairly quickly. The rest of the population are regaining weight, look better, but are still very weak and have little endurance. At heavier work a number of apparently healthy people seem still to be developing starvation symptoms, so

that this latent disease must be taken into consideration. The lack of zest for work can probably be attributed partly to physical, partly to psychic, factors. To get our so heavily hit society going again, a long, very complete feeding (in respect to calories and vitamin content) is probably the only solution.

INFECTIOUS DISEASES

Diphtheria spread in our country to a terrible extent during the war years, and there was a gradual shift to higher age groups. I have reason to believe that there is a considerable discrepancy between the number of cases reported and the number that actually occurred. The number of cases of the disease was probably much higher than is given in Table 9.

The enormous rise in typhoid fever is also remarkable, especially in the first half of 1945. This is probably due to the unhealthful conditions in which many families lived: the compulsory evacuation; the lack of fuel, soap, disinfectants, and water; and so forth.

I want to emphasize the latest official typhus figures that have been received. In the first 16 weeks of 1945, 323 cases were reported (exclusive of the southern provinces); while from the 17th to the 26th week, inclusive, 1,112 cases were reported. Thus for the first half of 1945 there were 1,435 cases.

TABLE 9—REPORTED CASES OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES

Year	Diphtheria		Scarlet Fever		Typhoid Fever	
	Illnesses	Deaths	Illnesses	Deaths	Illnesses	Deaths
1939	1,273	75	10,257	24	172	25
1940	1,730	103	8,841	34	108	21
1941	5,437	213	7,197	35	161	27
1942	19,407	873	12,694	23	521	50
1943	56,790	2,515	28,566	128	531	“
1944 to Sept.	56,527	“	19,619	“	190	“

“ Figures not available.

TABLE 10—PATIENTS TREATED FOR VENEREAL DISEASES

	1939	1940	1941	1942
Gonorrhea	1,288	1,571	2,745	5,047
Syphilis, primary	80	82	95	334
Syphilis, secondary	56	63	119	248
Syphilis, tertiary	384	387	426	564
Syphilis, congenital	17	15	19	17
Soft chancre	23	29	31	42
Lymphogranuloma inguinale	5	4	4	6

The anxiety concerning spotted fever has until now been exaggerated. At the eastern frontier almost eighty cases have been found among repatriated people; within the country, only a few cases.

As can be seen from Table 10, the war period has had a disastrous influence on the spreading of venereal diseases. We can assume that there are now from five to ten times as many cases as before the war.

Seven thousand doctors were questioned concerning the number of patients treated in the years 1939 through 1942. Answers from 2,183 doctors yielded results as shown in Table 10.

At the Bureaus for Combating Venereal Diseases, the number of voluntary applications was:

	1941	1942
	2,938	4,014
Of these, examination showed:		
Gonorrhea	1,560	2,363
Syphilis	381	637
Syphilis and gonorrhea	—	34
Soft chancre	15	6
Other sexual diseases	—	74
No sexual diseases found	—	900

Presumable sources of infection examined as a result of the regulation of October 1, 1940:

1940 (Oct. through Dec.)	390
1941	2,217
1942	2,631
1943	3,989
1944	5,326

Of these presumable sources of infection, on the average one-third proved to be negative upon examination. What is serious is the great increase in the number of cases of syphilis, the disease that is so disastrous for the public health.

Tuberculosis

Concerning tuberculosis, no complete data for 1944 and 1945 are yet compiled. In 1943 the mortality from this cause had risen above the 1939 figure, by 78 per cent for tuberculosis of the respiratory organs and by 70 per cent for all forms of tuberculosis.

The number of new applications at the Consultation Bureaus for Combating Tuberculosis rose from 60,377 in 1939 to 83,107 in 1941; 122,795 in 1942; and 157,844 in 1943.

The number of new cases of active tuberculosis established among these amounted in 1939 to 8,840; in 1941 to 11,838; in 1942 to 15,633; in 1943 to 18,571. It remains to be seen how the situation in this respect developed during the starvation period.

INSULIN SUPPLY

The lack of proper medical supplies can be seen from the fact that there was practically no more insulin for diabetics. From February 23, 1945 the pharmacists were allowed to deliver to the patients only one-third of the quantity of insulin furnished until then. To patients to whom less than fifteen

units had been allotted, no more was furnished except to patients under 20 years of age, whose allotment was reduced to three-fifths of the former quantity. And even these rations would have been impossible to maintain if courageous men and women had not succeeded at the risk of their lives in bringing 8 million units from the south of the country through the lines to the

west. Thanks to them, it was not necessary to carry out the intended rigorous measure to exclude diabetic patients of over 60 years entirely from the provision of insulin. Some time later, thanks to the assistance of the Swedish Red Cross, it was possible to import a quantity of 25 million units and consequently to resume the normal consumption.

C. Banning, M.D., has been Chief Medical Inspector of the Public Health Service of the Netherlands since 1939. He was previously a general medical practitioner in Zaandam and from 1924 to 1939 he was chairman of the Sanitary and Housing Commission of the Zaan District. He was a nutrition expert at the League of Nations Nutrition Conference in Rome in 1933. His doctoral thesis was The Nutrition in Zaandam in 1929-1930, and he is author of various other publications in the field of nutrition, including Free and Regulated Nutrition in Zaandam; Nutrition of the Country People in North Holland; and Nutrition in Holland's Prisons.

Dutch Culture

By W. J. M. A. ASSELBERGS

WHETHER or not the Germans immediately after the invasion of the Netherlands undertook to subject the art and the culture of our conquered people to National Socialist regulations is difficult to say in retrospect. That they placed the daily press under their influence in order to make propaganda for the German Army was not a direct sign of any desire to acquire control over the entire culture; but it promptly gave rise to minor conflicts out of which grew directly a great cultural battle.

EFFORTS TO CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS

The reorganization of the existing organizations of newspapermen which occurred shortly after May 1940 might appear to be quite an innocent undertaking, but in reality it was an effort to force Nazi principles on the leaders of public opinion. Where they were advanced with comparative calmness or did not appear, to begin with, to be vicious, these efforts did not entirely fail. Big dailies continued publication, kept part of their editorial staff, and did not entirely abandon their character or appearance; but they were, nevertheless, gradually infused with the world outlook of National Socialism.

It was more difficult for the invader to convert in the same manner those periodicals which appeared weekly or monthly. The editors and contributors of such journals were not always members of any association. Pretty much the entire periodical press of the Netherlands is guided by democratic and humanistic concepts against every tenet of the totalitarian conception of the state. It was quite natural that the most influential writers on historical, political,

and economic problems had to oppose the invader. That the Germans were conscious of this, is obvious from the fact that in October 1940 they arrested a number of hostages in what was claimed to be a reprisal for the imprisonment of German citizens in Dutch possessions overseas. Among these hostages who were sent to Buchenwald were a number of publicists who had nothing whatsoever to do with the Indies, but whose influence the Germans feared. The philosopher, Professor H. J. Pos; the economist, Professor J. Boeke; P. H. Ritter, man of letters; and the popular orator, H. de Greeve, found themselves deprived of their liberty without any reasons being given.

In the meanwhile, the Germans put Dutch tools in different government departments and created a special Department of Popular Education. Now all kinds of regulations suddenly materialized and led to conflict. In 1941 the performance of French, English, and American musical works was forbidden, and the stage was subjected to similar rules. It was amusing to see that, in connection with the performance of classical Dutch dramas, the new department required the suppression of lines alluding to crudities of conduct, ill breeding, lust for power, cruelty, and brutality—obviously characteristics which the invader feared might be recognized as pertaining to himself.

Toward the end of 1941 book publication was purged. This meant that a number of the works of prominent Dutch artists and scholars could no longer be displayed or sold. Among those affected by this provision was the famous historian, Professor J. Huizinga.

SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE

These were nothing but skirmishes. They indicated that a fierce battle was approaching. This battle flared up early in 1942 when the Dutch department, at the suggestion of the German authorities, placed before all Dutch artists the choice of either becoming members of the Chamber of Culture or being excluded from the pursuit of their livelihood. A large number of actors, painters, sculptors, poets, and musicians absolutely refused to join the Chamber of Culture, with the result that the intentions of the enemy completely miscarried, and the public cultural life was noticeably impoverished. But the clandestine cultural life blossomed from that moment on.

The artists who were prevented from exercising their profession and were thus threatened with the loss of livelihood had support for their resistance in all levels of Dutch society. With the little provincial communities like Hoorn, Bilthoven, Hattem, and Helmond as central points, there developed widespread organizations of art lovers who organized in their own homes musical soirees, lectures, exhibitions, and even dramatic performances, attended by friends and acquaintances who knew the purpose of these events. Through such means the funds for the support of artists in the resistance movement were maintained.

Even larger returns resulted when the writers, on the initiative of two young academicians, organized a clandestine co-operative press entitled the "Busy

Bee," which stealthily put on the market small collections of poems, excellent anthologies from, for instance, the works of Yeats, Emily Brontë, and Emily Dickinson, and novels of well-known writers, all in excellent typographical dress. Exhibitions of such clandestine literary products, held after the liberation of Amsterdam, brought to light about seven hundred items of this character. Of course the Germans took measures on this score. The organizers were taken prisoner, and one of them, Mr. Van Royen, succumbed in a concentration camp.

It is remarkable that the clandestine musical soirees and lectures were seldom disturbed, although at times they were even held in houses where German officers were quartered. It appears almost as if the invader felt himself powerless against the underground flowering of the stubborn Dutch culture, which refused to abandon its most characteristic traits, namely, humanism, tolerance, and a need for friendly intimacy.

THE OUTLOOK

In 1943 and 1944, then, there existed two cultural systems: one official, sponsored by the invader and of little interest; the other underground, directed by the resistance movement and in many respects surprising. Whether or not it will be possible to unite these two streams in a single channel, there are satisfactory indications that the underground cultural activity will be of great influence on the public cultural life of a liberated Netherlands.

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The Legitimate Press

By D. HANS

IT IS obvious that during the occupation the Dutch press was unable to maintain its independence. In normal times the press of our country enjoys the greatest possible freedom. It is limited only by the provision in the Constitution which states that the press is free "except that everyone is responsible in the eyes of the law." This means the common law which applies to every person. A special press law does not exist in the Netherlands. There, the press is completely free, and the "legal responsibility" of the journalist is like that of any other citizen. One of our ablest experts on constitutional law, the late Professor Buys, remarked in his standard work on our Constitution that the provision cited above is superfluous because it is self-evident.

However, in times of mobilization and war this freedom of the press was restricted by our laws. Can it really be restricted in that manner? The military authorities thus had the power to depart from the constitutional guarantee which maintained the freedom of the press. "The military authorities are empowered to prohibit the printing or the announcements by any other means of notices and comments regarding military regulations," and "to establish rules restricting the printing, publication, distribution, posting, or sale of printed matter or drawings, or to prohibit them entirely." Consequently, when the state is at war or is occupied, the freedom of the press may be limited or abrogated.

LIBERTY SUPPRESSED

The Dutch journalists never imagined, therefore, that they would remain completely independent during the German occupation, nor did this happen. The

press was maltreated and suppressed in the most drastic manner. At first, it looked now and then as if matters might turn out well. The German High Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, Hitler's tool, declared in a speech that he made when he took over his duties, as well as in occasional addresses delivered afterwards, that there was no intention of suppressing liberty, that National Socialism was not to be forced upon our people, and that our nation could form its attitudes freely. Since these intentions appeared to be honest, this meant a free press within a certain limit. At any rate, a freely formed public opinion is hardly possible without the free guidance of the press.

It soon became obvious that the pretty promises of the Germans were only soap bubbles that burst in contact with realities. As for the promise that National Socialism would not be imposed, it soon proved to be an idle one, that is, a convenient lie. All political parties were dissolved, and the N.S.B. (National Socialist Movement) was alone entrusted with political education.

Consistent with this trend in German politics, only writings of a National Socialist or pro-German character were permitted. This was a death blow to the freedom of the press, and Dutch journalists were completely deprived of their freedom and of their livelihood. The Netherlands Society of Journalists, an organization which shortly before the war had taken an outspoken position in defense of the freedom of the press as being the first and most important principle of true journalism, was dissolved and replaced by the Union of Dutch Journalists, which was administered in a dictatorial, National Social-

ist, pro-German spirit. Every journalist was compelled to become a member of this organization or lose his job. Thus, journalists became civil servants who would later fall under the newly created Department of Popular Education; and the press section of this department issued many instructions and orders, undertook the task of controlling the press, and applied various disciplinary measures, from mere reprimands to dismissal, to journalists whose politics could not be trusted. Consequently, during the occupation the Dutch press was completely muzzled.

MANIPULATION OF THE PRESS

As director of the new department's press section and dictator for journalism and journalists, there was named one Mr. Max Blokzijl, who until shortly before the war was the Berlin correspondent of the Amsterdam *Algemeen Handelsblad*. Blokzijl had become converted to National Socialism while in Germany. We had known him as a strong anti-Nazi. When I was chairman of the Netherlands Society of Journalists, the following incident occurred. The society was a member of the International Press Organization, to which belonged also the German Union of Journalists. When Hitler came into power and the freedom of the press was abrogated in Germany, a motion was made to the Congress of the International Press Organization to deprive the German Union of its membership, since we could not tolerate in our midst an association from a country where freedom of the press no longer existed. Max Blokzijl, who was president of the International Press Organization, as representative of the Dutch journalists in Germany, defended this motion in an enthusiastic and much applauded speech, and it was with his cooperation, therefore, that the German

Union was expelled from the International Press Organization.

Now this same man was appointed by the Germans as the dictator of the press in the Netherlands during the occupation period. As director of the press section of the Department of Public Education, he was to place the press of his country under the yoke in the most radical manner. This he did by various means: directly, by making certain that what was published was expressed from the National Socialist and pro-German standpoint and was not in the least antagonistic; indirectly, by making the actually existing paper shortage an excuse to discontinue a large number of dailies, weeklies, and journals which refused to co-operate in a positive manner with the "New Europe." No doubt, prewar Netherlands had supported too many newspapers for its population of about nine millions; but with extreme injustice, those concerns which, by force or willingly, accepted the regulations governing the biased presentation of news were permitted to publish *all* their journals (though limited in size), while others suffered the prohibition of all their publications.

At the same time, daily press conferences were set up. At specified hours every day conferences were held (particularly at The Hague) to which the press bureaus and newspapers must send their representatives, who at that time received their instructions as to what and how they should write. The press had become a German propaganda organ and the journalist a public servant of the forces of occupation, subject to penalty if all was not to the liking of the authorities. Many a newspaper had large fines imposed on it because it had published news or editorials which were displeasing to those in power.

At least once did both journalists and papers collectively refuse to comply.

The Queen had given some airplanes as a gift to the RAF. Shortly thereafter some English bombs fell on a certain district of Haarlem. At a press conference the German press gave out a photograph of the district in Haarlem and the newspapers were ordered to place a notice under this photograph stating that it was the Queen's airplanes that had bombarded Haarlem. This the press refused to do. Other instances could probably be cited.

ATTITUDE OF JOURNALISTS

During the occupation this manipulated press, robbed of its freedom and greatly reduced in its extent, constituted the legitimate press. What was the reaction of the journalists? The very great majority of them were and remained anti-National Socialists; some of them dropped journalism to enter other occupations. The rest of them, who stuck to their work, had to become members of the new Union of Dutch Journalists. They joined it automatically, collectively, and permitted the new organization to absorb them in order to safeguard their economic existence; but toward their newspapers they adopted a negativistic and indifferent attitude which often aroused the leaders of the union to anger, despair, and threats. The threats were also really carried out if one could judge from the number of journalists who lost their press cards. One must realize, of course, that the large majority of the journalists had no direct influence on the daily leadership of the newspapers. As journalists they had their own departments, but did not by any means determine the political opinions of their papers.

The editors in chief did that. Of those, a very small number turned out to be National Socialists or pro-Germans, and they were, of course, greedily seized upon. A few (very few) others,

weak characters, yielded and complied with the commands of the authorities and the Department of Public Education. Those who did not do so were relieved of their function and replaced by National Socialists, sometimes with very odd results. For instance, the editor in chief of one of our largest dailies was removed and taken hostage, being replaced by the farm editor of the paper, who was a National Socialist. The strangest individuals were inflated into leading journalists and placed in influential positions on the newspapers.

Yes, the department even distributed prizes and awards. In December of each year during the occupation bonuses were given to journalists who during the year had distinguished themselves. Perhaps there is no need to mention that these persons were exclusively National Socialists. But again the large majority did not nibble at the bait. None of them could do much if anything in a positive way—not much more than to adopt an indifferent attitude, so that the dictator of the press union would bark at them now and then.

WEAKENING OF THE PRESS

The legitimate press was therefore in a position of spiritual slavery. It had become nothing but a propaganda institution for the Germans, even though of a milder character than desired by the latter. Everything the Germans did was reported, but positive co-operation initiated by the journalists themselves was on the whole weak. The result was that the Dutch people promptly understood the situation. Before the war a large part of the reading public showed a somewhat naïve trust in the press. Whenever anybody wanted to persuade a doubting Thomas concerning the truth of this or that, one might hear the remark, "I read it in the newspa-

pers"—a complete antonym to another common expression in our country, namely, "to tell a lie as if it were printed." But during the war years this faith in the press completely disappeared, even in the least intelligent circles. People knew the newspapers were *forced* to write and report as they did; and when this reporting was done voluntarily people had even less confidence in it, since it came from the National Socialist side of the fence.

Gradually the size of the legitimate papers became smaller and smaller as a necessary result of the paper shortage, while at the same time paper was granted with a free hand to the official National Socialist press (one daily and various weeklies). When it was a matter of direct propaganda in favor of the Germans, the argument of the paper shortage lost all meaning. This was also true for the publication of books and magazines. The daily papers were not only reduced in size and altered in format, but also restricted in the size of the edition. For instance, at a given moment the order was issued that they could not have more than a specified number of subscribers; no new subscriber could be accepted, but had to go on a waiting list and be given service only when an old subscriber dropped out.

I have already stated that the newspapers which published reports or opinions which did not meet with the German specifications were promptly punished by a fine, or simply by an order forbidding further publication. An Orthodox Christian weekly which was very well known throughout the country had to discontinue because the editors refused to remove from the head of the sheet the notice "Honored with a subscription by Her Majesty the Queen," and also because they showed no enthusiasm for printing a portrait of Seyss-Inquart.

DEFIANT WORKERS

One remarkable case occurred in the fall of 1944. In September of that year the great railroad strike broke out in the Netherlands which shut down all trains and interurban trolley services as a result of the advice and wishes of the Netherlands Government in London. At that time it was thought that the liberation of our country was near. It was at that time that the Allied push occurred at Nijmegen and Arnhem, and parachutes dropped near the latter. With complete solidarity the railroad workers high and low obeyed the strike order, and maintained the strike from the time the attack at Arnhem failed until the end of the war.

The Germans raged, but were powerless. A few weeks after the strike broke out they sent an article to the press appealing to the railroad workers to go back to work. In the capital of our country a national newspaper, the *Haagsche Courant*, was published in a very large edition. The editor in chief of this paper, an obedient listener to the German commands, gave the article to the typesetting room but the typesetters refused to put it in type, for they did not want the railroad workers to give up their fight. The Germans learned of this, and their famous "green police" came to the office of the newspaper in order to force the typesetters to comply. Hardly had the German automobile appeared before the building when the typesetters and printers, who had been warned, and all of the skilled personnel disappeared and went into hiding. From that day on, this newspaper could no longer appear; and shortly afterwards the Germans returned and put all the printing presses out of commission.

UNDER THE RESTORED GOVERNMENT

At the present writing, the end of August 1945, four months after the

liberation of the Netherlands, this paper has not yet resumed publication. Why is that? It is because of a royal decree issued by the Government in London at the beginning of 1944. The Government at that time seemed to take the stand that the newspapers which at the beginning of 1943 were not yet forbidden should have closed up on their own accord rather than be used as propaganda organs by the Germans. Therefore notice was given that newspapers which were still appearing after January 1, 1943 would be

prohibited after the liberation of the Netherlands.

This has indeed occurred. All the papers which were shut down by the Germans or their Dutch tools were permitted to appear again after the liberation, temporarily in very small form because of the lack of paper. But the papers which continued publication after the beginning of 1943 had to close down and cannot appear again without special permission and after a careful investigation. At this writing, this investigation is still proceeding.

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The Dutch Universities Under Nazi Domination

By R. D. KOLLEWIJN

THE Dutch universities, taken separately, have not yet written their history under the German occupation or even collected the material for it; therefore, in any description of their common history, the one university with which the writer was connected during those bitter years will necessarily receive undue prominence. Academic resistance in the Netherlands was, alas, only to a very small extent a united stand of all the universities. In spite of the contacts established, it was chiefly a battle fought by each university alone, and for each university, therefore, only fully to be understood and described by those who took part in it. May this, in addition to the generally recognized fact that the University of Leiden was in the front line of the defense, serve as an explanation why it is chiefly the name of Leiden that appears in this article, for it was in the resistance of Leiden that the writer was a fellow fighter in the unequal struggle against the German oppressor.

DUTCH NAÏVETÉ

The occupation of our country by the Germans in May 1940 found the academic community just as unprepared mentally and morally as other groups in the Dutch nation. Was it the memory of the First World War of 1914, when in the conflagration the Netherlands was able to remain neutral, that made so many after the attack on Austria, on Czechoslovakia, on Poland, yes, even after Denmark and Norway, still believe that the Netherlands could stay out of the universal conflict? Was a deeply rooted sense of propriety the cause of the conviction that Hitler

would not without motive invade a country like the Netherlands, whose conduct toward Germany had always been so perfectly correct? It is hard to say; but it is certain that among professors only a very few had a lively realization that our turn would also come. Therefore when the unexpected and shameful attack on our country took place without even a declaration of war, it struck almost all of them as a bolt from the blue.

It may be said to be even more strange that when in the beginning the German Army seemed to behave correctly, when Jews were not immediately arrested and ill treated, and when the High Commissioner Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his speech of May 29, 1940 gave assurance that he would respect the institutions and basic rights of the Dutch people, many people in this country, including teachers at the universities, held the naïve opinion that the Germans, contrary to their way elsewhere and in their own country, would in the Netherlands really act like gentlemen.

In this superficial innocence lay the danger of slipping into co-operation with the German occupation, and it was for this reason that a number of professors in Leiden, realizing the devilish cunning of the opponents with whom their people had to deal, resolved to unite in a "Little Group" which would consult on the methods of opposition at all points where resistance must be offered and would try to persuade their colleagues to adopt them. Later a second similar group was formed. During the whole period of the occupation, but particularly in the early years, the continual watchfulness and activity of the "Little Group" were of no small importance.

PROTEST AGAINST ANTI-SEMITISM

Soon enough it appeared that, in spite of the fine promises of the High Commissioner, our land was not to be spared anti-Jewish measures. In September 1940 the German authorities prepared measures to prevent the appointment of Jewish officials, according to German ideas of Jewish blood or Jewish faith. It was then that a few professors in several university towns, with Paul Scholten of Amsterdam and Telders of Leiden in the forefront, took the initiative in a general protest of the universities and colleges in the Netherlands¹ against the proposed breach of one of our most sacred rights. This petition to the High Commissioner, still known as the Scholten Petition, read partially as follows:

The people of the Netherlands have never known a Jewish problem. Because of its geographic location and highly developed commercial spirit this nation has for centuries been in friendly contact with many other nations, and since the achievement of its independence has been able to display its love of freedom by extending to the Jews a residence in the capital. Conflicts between this part of the population and other Dutchmen have never been known in its history.

As there is on the whole, in view of the good understanding between the different elements of the population, no reason, as far as we can see, for making a distinction between Jewish and other Dutchmen, its introduction in the pursuit of science would not solve a problem but on the con-

trary it would create one: these measures not occasioned by conditions in the Netherlands would actually run directly counter to the traditions and freedoms whose maintenance was promised to us by Your Excellency. Surely among these traditions and freedoms belongs the conviction that to the pursuit of science at the universities and colleges all those who are capable should be admitted without distinction.

The number of signatories of the petition varied greatly at the different universities; in Groningen and in Leiden, 80 per cent signed. With a covering letter from two Amsterdam and two Leiden professors, and accompanied by a list of the 229 signatories, the petition was sent to Seyss-Inquart on October 13, 1940.

"ANCESTRY FORMS"

The petition was of no avail. The order against the appointment of Jewish officials was published, and it soon became evident that the ruler would not stop here but would also dismiss the Jewish officials already functioning. In order to be able to do this, however, he must know which officials were Jewish; and for this purpose, in the same month of October, the so-called "ancestry forms" were sent to all officials, also to professors and other teachers at the universities, to be filled in.

This measure, from which the forthcoming dismissal of Jewish teachers could be forecast, provoked a great commotion. The reaction of the students was the quickest. Petitions signed by thousands of students were sent to The Hague. In the professors' world, however, divergence of opinion prevailed. One small group wanted to return the blank forms, since filling in meant assistance in the selection and subsequent dismissal of Jewish colleagues. The majority, however, wished to fill in the forms, though under protest; while, finally, a very small number wished to leave out the protest.

¹ In the Netherlands there are the following universities and colleges: the State Universities at Leiden, Utrecht, and Groningen; the Municipal University at Amsterdam; the Free (Orthodox Calvinistic) University at Amsterdam and the Roman Catholic University at Nijmegen; the Technical School at Delft; the Agricultural School at Wageningen; the Netherlands School of Economics at Rotterdam; and the Roman Catholic School of Economics at Tilburg.

After many meetings and discussions in Leiden it was decided to return the filled-in forms with a protest drafted by the above-named Professor Telders. The intention was to have this protest approved by a general meeting of the five faculties; but the German authorities, probably warned by one of the few National Socialist members of the university, were able to prevent it by forbidding the meeting. The protest was therefore submitted to all the faculty members individually, with the request that on sending in the ancestry forms they would state that the protest had their support. From this protest the following is quoted:

One of the most precious traditions of our people of the Netherlands in general and of our science in particular is that between different races and between the followers of different religions as regards the holding of public offices as well as the appraisal of their scientific achievements no distinction is made. With us it obtains expressly that every person capable of being either a teacher or a student is admitted to the universities. It is this tradition which today is formulated in Articles 5 and 176 of the Constitution, which read:

Article 5: "Every Netherlander may be appointed to any public office."

Article 176: "The followers of the different religions all enjoy the same civil and citizenship rights and have the same claim to the exercise of dignities, offices and functions."

Further:

"It is one of the fundamental principles of the international law for occupied countries that the occupant is obliged to respect the laws of the country excepting in the case of its being completely impossible to do so in wartime. . . .

"The case of complete impossibility . . . exists when the necessities of war, or public life and public order in the occupied territory compel a deviation from existing laws. Of this there can be no question as regards this matter.

"The occupant is expressly *not* allowed to interfere with conditions and conceptions

in the occupied territory which are in no wise connected with the conduct of war or the maintenance of public order. Exhaustive testimony on this point is superfluous where the correctness of these statements has been abundantly recognized by so many German experts in international law." (Verdross and Heyland were quoted.)

In particular as regards professors, the fact must be noted that in the declaration on the ancestry form the sentence occurs:

"It is known to the undersigned that in case the above statements appear to be false he is liable to immediate dismissal."

Now the dismissal of professors is according to Article 39 of the Higher Education Law reserved for the Crown. The occupant may under certain circumstances be empowered to suspend a professor, but a measure such as dismissal which extends beyond the period of the occupation is in the competency of the Crown alone. It is not suitable that Leiden professors should give their approval and co-operation to an unlawful derogation of the rights and prerogatives of the Crown.

But neither was this protest able to make the German Jew-baiters alter their plans. It was plain that the dismissal of Jewish officials was soon to follow.

INTERACADEMIC CONFERENCES

In the meantime, through the initiative of Professor Scholten of Amsterdam, interacademic conferences had started and were in later years continued by an opposition group of professors of all the public and private universities and colleges in the country, under the leadership of Professor Oranje of the Free University. The common bond was, however, not strong enough to lead to a united front of concerted action, though a few protesting letters to the German authorities resulted from it.

Strong and effective was the mutual contact maintained between the students. They—and also the professors!

—were moreover kept informed most efficiently and strengthened in their attitude of opposition by the excellently edited paper *The Gueux Among Students*, issued by Leiden students, the Drion brothers. It appeared in 1940 shortly after the German invasion, as one of the first underground papers in the Netherlands.

DISMISSAL OF PROFESSOR MEYERS

At the end of November 1940 the blow fell. In Amsterdam the largest number of Jewish professors were dismissed. In Leiden only one regular professor was dismissed, but he, Professor Meyers of the law faculty, was one of the most respected professors at the university, besides being a scholar of European reputation.

The morning mail of November 26 brought Professor Meyers his letter of dismissal, and like wildfire the news spread through Leiden. As though drawn by a magnet, the students flocked to the old university building on the Rapenburg. At ten o'clock that morning Professor Meyers was to have taught a class, but long before that time his lecture room was filled not only with law students but with men from all the faculties. As the room seemed too small they moved to the large auditorium, the venerable aula, where once Hugo Grotius had been. At a quarter past ten Professor Cleveringa, dean of the law faculty, accompanied by other professors, entered the hall and made his historic speech:

I appear here before you at an hour when you were accustomed to see another: your and my master and teacher Meyers. The reason for this is a letter received by him this morning directly from the Department of Education, Arts and Sciences with the following contents . . .

and Professor Cleveringa read aloud the dismissal received two hours earlier by

Professor Meyers. Thereupon he said that he was unable to express the painful, bitter sentiments which this missive had stirred up in him and in his colleagues. He continued:

Neither shall I attempt by my words to draw your attention to those from whom the message whose contents I have just reported to you, emanated. Their action qualifies itself.

The only thing I desire is to put them out of our sight beneath us and direct your gaze to the heights where stands the shining figure for whose sake we are gathered here; for it seems right to me that we should at this moment try once more to realize clearly who it is that, here after thirty years of service, a power resting on nothing but itself carelessly shoves aside.

The speaker then gave an excellent delineation of Professor Meyers, his work, and his great significance for jurisprudence, and continued:

It is this Netherlander, this noble and true son of our people, this man, this father to students, this scholar whom the foreigner now malevolently dominating us relieves of his function! I said I would not speak to you of my feelings; I shall not, even though they threaten like boiling lava to burst through all the crevices which it seems to me their pressure will cleave in my head and heart.

But in the faculty according to its purpose consecrated to the pursuit of justice this remark cannot be withheld: In accordance with Dutch traditions the Constitution declares that any Netherlander may be appointed to every public office and the exercise of every dignity and function, and permits him regardless of his religion to enjoy the same civil and citizenship rights. In Article 43 of the "Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land" the occupant is required to respect the laws in force in the country "*sauf empêchement absolu*" (unless absolutely prevented). We cannot judge otherwise than that there is not the least impediment to our occupant to leave Meyers

where he was. This implies that his ousting from his position in the way I have reported to you can only be felt by us to be an injustice. We believed we might and were to be spared this. It could not be. All we can do, unless we are to descend to useless folly from which I must earnestly dissuade you, is to bend before superior power.

And the speaker ended:

And in the meantime then we shall wait and trust and hope and keep always in our minds and hearts the image and the figure and the personality of him who we shall not cease to believe ought to stand here and God willing shall return.

Professor Cleveringa's speech made a tremendous impression, not only on those present in the aula and those who in the neighboring hall had followed it by means of loud-speakers and when it was finished spontaneously struck up the national anthem which made passers-by in the street stand still to listen in secret gladness, but over the whole country where thousands of copies of it were spread to the remotest corners. At last the occupant had been told publicly to his face that what he did was unjust.

UNIVERSITY CLOSED

The students, mindful of the concluding words of the speech that they must not descend to useless folly, remained calm, but decided as a protest against the dismissal of their beloved teacher not to attend classes for a week. No irregularities, no violence, occurred, but the classrooms and the laboratories were abandoned. "*Nichts ist hier organisiert, doch alles stimmt*" ("Nothing is organized here, yet everything is in order"), the Germans wonderingly admitted. The next day Professor Cleveringa was arrested and the university closed.

At all the other universities also there were protests against the dismissal of

Jewish teachers, and almost everywhere it took this form: the professors before starting their classes expressed in a few words their indignation at the measure. In Delft alone it went as far as a more vigorous protest on the part of the students, resulting in the order of the High Commissioner to close the Technical School.

In the following month, December 1940, in Delft as well as in Leiden, the students' associations and other clubs were disbanded. Measures were taken against the students' associations in other university towns also; the Amsterdam and the Groningen corps disbanded themselves, when less than a year later it was ruled that no Jewish students might be admitted to membership.

On the pretext that he had incited the students to rebellion, Professor Telders of Leiden was arrested. He was a redoubtable opponent of National Socialism. In one of the leading Dutch magazines, the *Gids* ("Guide"), he had before the war exposed the treason of Seyss-Inquart toward Austria; in the *Liberal Weekly* he repeatedly pointed out to the occupant the limits imposed on his authority by international law. It was plain that once the Germans had taken such a man, they would not let him go again. With admirable moral strength, always a great comfort to his fellow prisoners, he endured captivity for more than four years, until shortly before the liberation, in April 1945, in the infamous concentration camp of Bergen-Belsen he contracted spotted fever and for lack of sufficient medical attention lost his life.

PARTIAL REOPENING

Several times it was signified by the occupation authorities that if the closed University of Leiden and Technical School would *ask* to be reopened, they would be. But we had learned to know

the Nazis! The professors and the board took the stand that the closing by the Germans was entirely illegal, and that therefore it was up to them to recall of their own accord this unlawful order. We realized that if a request to this effect were made, unacceptable conditions would be laid down for its granting. It came to be February, and the measures against Jewish students became ever sharper, which noticeably cooled the desire on the part of professors and students for a reopening.

But now this was insisted upon more and more—by the Germans! They apparently wanted to see the Technical School opened because they expected to get some advantage from the graduated technical experts; Leiden University, because it was their intention, as it later appeared, to create there a National Socialist center. Therefore, Delft was reopened before the Easter holidays of 1941 (in April), and after the holidays Leiden was permitted to give examinations but not to hold classes.

NAZIFICATION ATTEMPTED

In the meantime there were rumors that the nazification of Leiden University was being prepared. The President of the Governing Board was replaced by a member of the National Socialist Party. Shortly after, practically all the powers of the board were placed in his hands; the members of the board thereupon resigned. All over the country the few students who belonged to the National Socialist Party began to agitate.

In August 1941 it became known that various Leiden professors were to be dismissed and members of the Dutch National Socialist Movement (N.S.B.) put in their places. But the storm blew over, only to start up again more violently at the end of September. Thereupon the "Little Group" advised that

the German authorities should be warned that if the appointment of National Socialist professors were put through, the present incumbents would resign in a body. In October the President of the Board of the University and the occupation authorities were informed of this plan. This seemed to make some impression, as just a few days later the President of the Board notified the Acting Rector that the intention to nazify the university would be abandoned.

At the beginning of the new year (1942) serious trouble occurred in Amsterdam. On January 22 a time bomb exploded in the house where the Amsterdam National Socialist student front was quartered. As reprisal, the Germans threatened to dismiss and arrest ten specifically named professors. However, when it became evident that if this were done the work of the university would cease, they changed their tactics, and as a punishment a fine was imposed on the *city*, while a number of prominent citizens, among whom were five professors of well-known anti-National Socialist and anti-German persuasion, were made prisoners. Among them were Professor Borst and Professor Heringa, who were playing a leading part in the resistance of the medical profession. They were all transported to the ill-famed concentration camp at Amersfoort, where they were detained for half a year.

These five and the five other professors named were dismissed from their positions. Many other professors in Amsterdam and elsewhere sooner or later shared their fate, and the Germans did not even scruple to imprison the wife and two small children of an Amsterdam instructor whom they could not lay hands on. The Municipal University of Amsterdam alone was deprived of more than thirty teachers; the faculty of economics there was robbed of its whole staff. Several de-

mands for change of personnel were addressed by the occupant to the Free University, a private institution, and refused by it.

In the meantime, the resolution of the Germans to (temporarily) abandon the nazification of Leiden University caused a storm of indignation in N.S.B. circles. The Flemish activist Van Genechten, who in the First World War had betrayed his country, Belgium, and subsequently fled to the Netherlands, had in July 1941, with the support of the German occupation, secured an appointment as special professor of political economy. He now thought it was about time to start classes! He was very influential with the N.S.B., and first he succeeded in having Leiden University completely closed, even for taking examinations, since the National Socialist reforms had not been put through. He then continued to agitate, and succeeded in obtaining a revival of the plans for the nazification of the Netherlands' oldest university, to be taken up in November 1941.

The reform was to start with the already greatly impoverished law faculty, and here Professor Kranenburg, professor of constitutional law, was picked out as the first victim to be replaced by an instructor professing National Socialism. This dismissal came in March, but for fear of the reaction in Leiden it was only published in April by the weak and pro-German Secretary General of Education.

As a reason for the dismissal it was stated that in his new book on administrative law, Professor Kranenburg had passed over in silence the ordinances of the High Commissioner. The writer had already been examined on this point and had replied to the accusation "that ordinances which of their nature were only temporary and would naturally only be in force during the time of the German occupation were not subject to

inclusion in his book." But besides this reason for dismissal, it was expressly stated by the chief of the Department of Higher Education in The Hague, a notorious traitor, that this move marked the beginning of the National Socialist reform of the law faculty and thus of Leiden University.

ACTION TAKEN

Now we could no longer hesitate. To accept this dismissal and continue to function would mean that we were retiring step by step before the rising tide of National Socialism until the whole university would be overwhelmed by it. Was not that how it had happened in Germany? There they had hesitated at each advance of the opposing party and continually asked themselves: Has the time *now* come for us to leave? cannot we still save a great deal by remaining? until they had waited so long that leaving was no longer possible and they saw themselves incorporated in the National Socialist movement. That could not and should not happen to Leiden University. Rather than let it come to even a partial nazification of the university with all its consequences of violation of the spirit, of abolition of the freedom of education, of propaganda, of race hatred, of contempt of religion, humanism, and democracy, it must be made impossible, by all the teachers' unanimously abandoning their work, for our *Praesidium libertatis* to be degraded to a stronghold of nazidom.

At the memorable meeting of the "Little Group" on April 28, 1942, held at the home of the writer, where the words of the well-known historian Huizinga carried great weight, it was unanimously agreed that those present would in any case go "on strike" and that an attempt would be made to persuade as many as possible of the other professors to do the same. A second

group of professors voted the same way the next day, so that at the beginning of May more than 80 per cent of the professors had resigned their chairs. The scientific staff were not enjoined by the professors to remain at their posts for the preservation of instruments and collections, so most of them were ready to follow the example of the professors at once. Therefore, after the middle of May Leiden had merely a topographical significance for the Germans, and could no longer be called a university. Feeble efforts on the part of the Germans and Hague quislings to get at least one faculty going again were a failure because the scientific personnel for it could not be found. The nazification of Leiden University had been prevented by the united resistance of her professors.

The reaction of the German occupation to the resistance in Leiden was not so violent as its Dutch collaborators in the Department of Education had predicted. These had given us to understand that a strike would undoubtedly be construed by the Germans as sabotage, that victims would fall and others be confined in concentration camps, that the buildings would be emptied and the instruments and books transferred to Germany. None of these things happened. It is true that later, in 1944, instruments were stolen from laboratories, among others the famous Kamerlingh-Onnes Laboratory, but this was not an immediate consequence of the resistance of 1942. What did actually happen was that about twenty professors were confined in a hostage camp. Long before the end of the occupation they were released one after another, but were forbidden to settle again in Leiden.

Delft was more seriously injured. Quite early in the war the Delft professors and students were busy collecting and manufacturing arms and am-

munition. This was discovered, and two professors and many students were arrested. At the end of April 1942 the case against them was drawing to a close: at the beginning of May the two professors and more than seventy collaborators were executed. The courageous behavior of these alumni, who by acts of reprisal sought to counter the unjust actions of the Germans, made a great impression in university circles and undoubtedly was an inspiration to many of the hundreds of students serving their country by underground resistance.

LABOR CONSCRIPTION OF STUDENTS

In the meantime, things began to go less well for the Germans in the field of war, and more and more laborers were forcibly deported or driven by the most violent threats to Germany to work there for the enemy. It became obvious that male students would not escape this modern slave drive. After various threats toward the end of 1942, the German police struck their blow on February 6, 1943: in Amsterdam, Utrecht, Delft, and Wageningen the students were dragged from classrooms and laboratories, from hospitals where they were working, and from libraries by the "green police." About six hundred were arrested and deported to be set to work in Germany.

For the purpose of giving quasi legality to this wild conscription of students for Germany, which moreover had not produced the required number, the High Commissioner published an ordinance on March 11, 1943 covering special measures relative to higher education to which a resolution signed the day before by the Dutch quisling running the Department of Education was appended. According to these regulations, most craftily drawn up, those who signed a declaration of loyalty might continue their studies—provided a fixed

number to be determined by the needs of the German labor market was not exceeded. Those who refused to sign would be regarded as unemployed, and on that ground would be called up—i.e. conscripted for work in Germany.

This ordinance caused the greatest disturbance in the academic world. Unfortunately the infamous character of such a declaration, signed by persons not in duty bound as officials to co-operate with the occupant to a certain extent in the interests of their own people, was not immediately perceived by everyone. Moreover, signing implied a readiness to work for the enemy on termination of studies.

Many students did not consider themselves bound by a declaration made to the lawbreaking German authorities, and thought for this reason that they could just as well sign. Others, who were already deeply engaged in underground work, wanted above all to keep their liberty of action, for the sake of which they also were ready to sign this declaration. Thus it was possible for most of the professors at the Technical School at Delft to underestimate the immoral significance of signing a declaration of loyalty toward the occupant, and the bad influence it would have not only on the signers themselves but on the whole people of the Netherlands, and to urge their students to sign. Even then, the majority of the Delft students refused to do so, and in the whole country not more than 15 per cent signed.

It was to be expected that the occupant would not let matters rest here, and indeed at the beginning of May 1943 the order came for all students who had not signed to present themselves the next day at various assembly camps for deportation to Germany. Merely reading this, it seems incomprehensible that this summons (for that is all it was; the students were not

fetched individually from their homes) was obeyed by hundreds and still more hundreds of students whose conduct had been so excellent. And yet that is what happened. To understand it we must first recall the circumstances under which this summons came.

Just in the last days of April and the first days of May strikes had started all over the country, whereupon the Germans, in order to crush this resistance by terror, had proclaimed so-called martial law. Everywhere—in the striking factories, among the striking farmers who refused to deliver their milk, among the citizens who were found on the street after nine o'clock or gathered in groups of more than two—hundreds were shot dead. Many who saw this were intimidated, and while under this pressure the students were ordered to report the next day. By the short time allowed, careful reflection was made impossible. Moreover, the Germans, in their usual perfidious manner, threatened not only the students themselves but also their parents with punishment if this order was not complied with.

Under these circumstances many students, confronted with the unsparing and perfectly unreasonable terror of the German occupation and torn between their love for their country and their love for their parents, took the painful road to Germany. But most of them—two-thirds—refused to obey the command of the occupant and awaited results.

THE STUDENTS IN GERMANY

To the students who went to Germany the High Commissioner offered the prospect of being given work according to the training they had had. Nothing came of this, however, except insofar as it was to the advantage of Germany herself, as in the case of medical and pharmaceutical students.

Otherwise they were treated in the same manner as all Dutch and other foreign laborers dragged to Germany.

In a collective letter of March 15, 1944 the rectors of the universities and colleges at Utrecht, Amsterdam, Delft, Rotterdam, Nijmegen, Tilburg, and the Free (Calvinistic) University of Amsterdam protested against the scandalous treatment of students. Lodgings and food almost everywhere left much to be desired, and labor conditions prevailed, so the letter explained, which were a mockery of all the demands of the most elementary social welfare. The letter continued:

What numerous students are undergoing in this respect will become clear if we try to realize what it means for young men accustomed to intellectual work to be often during 12 hours a day, or even 80 or 90 hours a week sometimes in shifts of 24 to 36 hours on a stretch, obliged to perform manual labor.

Twenty-five students whose names were given had already died.

That the rectors were so precisely informed of these matters was due to a local investigation personally conducted by the rector of the Free University of Amsterdam, Professor J. Oranje. On some pretext he had succeeded in procuring a pass for Germany, and then behind the Germans' backs he himself had visited the principal places where students had been put to work and got in touch with them. The organization of a whole system for the escape of students from Germany was achieved, so that even before the end of the war, by far the greater number of Dutch students had already returned to their country.

UNDAUNTED BY PERSECUTION

After the students refused to sign the declaration of loyalty, and were therefore excluded from the classrooms where

only quislings and weaklings might parade, it was obvious to the "good" professors that the activities of the universities must be stopped. After April 1943 there were very few classes given in the Netherlands, and their number continually decreased. The Free University in Amsterdam and the Roman Catholic University in Nijmegen closed their doors of their own accord; the first with a courageous protest against the required declaration of loyalty. The law faculty in Groningen also refused, on principle, to give examinations. The majority of the remaining professors in Amsterdam (Municipal University) sent in their resignations, but were personally threatened with death if they did not recall them, by Rauter, the chief German hangman. Thereupon they resorted to sabotage, which also took place at other universities and colleges.

The loyal, patriotic students were on the other hand helped on as much as possible by their professors and were given the opportunity to take clandestine preliminary examinations, all of which were officially recognized after the liberation.

How many persons connected with the universities and colleges—professors, instructors, students, and members of the scientific staff—were arrested, sent to concentration camps, banished, shot, and murdered is not yet known; but there were a great many. The Student Association of Delft alone lost more than 10 per cent of its members by death.

Materially, Nijmegen and Wageningen suffered most. In September 1944 the main building, the psychotechnical institute and a large part of the library of the Roman Catholic University at Nijmegen (university and Catholic and therefore doubly hated by the Germans), was set fire to and destroyed by the German Army without the least

military necessity. At the same period, during the fight for Arnhem the chemical laboratory among other buildings of the Agricultural School at Wageningen suffered several direct hits from bombers, while after the evacuation of the civil population of Wageningen a great deal was looted from the laboratories.

So ended the struggle of the German occupant against the universities of the Netherlands, with its material victory but with its moral defeat. What could

be done by force and violence, he accomplished. He could drive out, imprison, and kill students and professors. But he did not succeed in enslaving the free Dutch universities or in turning them into centers for the preaching of his own abject National Socialist ideas.

With a resurrected Netherlands the universities and colleges, independent of earthly powers, take up once more in concert their historic task of searching for truth and fighting for justice.

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The Education of the Youth

By C. VAN EDEN

IT has been impossible to make even a rough survey of the wide province of the education of the youth. Documentation was almost entirely lacking at the time of writing, while contacts with experts were extremely difficult or impossible in the disrupted society which the Germans left behind after the capitulation. Besides, a number of persons had dropped out and many changes had been made. Consequently, the following article must inevitably bear the character of a provisional orientation and preliminary examination of the domain in question.

THE GENERAL SITUATION

For the Netherlands the education of the youth in wartime was education during years of tyranny. It is self-evident that there is an essential difference between this and the situation of the nations who could openly engage in total war. These nations could educate their youth freely in a national spirit of efficiency and self-sacrifice which the war situation demanded. Netherlands educators, on the other hand, knew that the youth for which they considered themselves responsible was waylaid by an enemy who was bent on a permanent subjection of the Low Countries and would certainly try to nazify the Netherlands youth.

Considering the profound difference in mentality, it was certain that every German effort in this direction was doomed to failure. For on the one hand stood the people of the Netherlands, bearers of an ancient and characteristic culture with its democratic tendencies, its love of liberty, its individualism, its sobriety and moderation. On the other hand were the German

people, socially and culturally barely emerged from a feudal stage, with its tendency toward extremes; physical discipline, an imperious attitude toward those in inferior positions coupled with servility toward superiors, sentimentality and fanaticism. This difference was probably mainly responsible for the disdain the Netherlands people felt for the mighty nation on its eastern frontier even before 1940.

In the spontaneous resistance that was inevitable, adults and younger people stood side by side, even though there were striking differences between their choice of means. Almost immediately it was seen that adolescents and youths, critically minded and sharply discerning, rejected the foreign element despite its imposing military might, and defended and protected themselves spontaneously.

Lacking any understanding of the mentality of the Netherlands people, the Germans realized too late that this nation had only appeared to meet them with trust and loyalty. They did not at first see its mistrust and the resolve to offer the most obstinate resistance to any attack on its way of life. They purposefully put into operation Dutch agencies that sometimes had been specifically created in order to bring about a gradual and unobtrusive nazification. By the time the Germans became aware that the Netherlanders had seen through them and would not stand for being abused, their hands were full with Russia and they lacked manpower in the Low Countries to rectify their mistake. The Netherlands National Socialists were too few in number and counted too few capable members in their ranks to make it possible with their help alone to introduce the so-called new order.

DEMORALIZATION OF YOUTH

That the youth was less able to resist the demoralizing influences of war can be seen distinctly in the weakening of its moral consciousness, in the increase in its criminality and other misbehavior in the years that have just passed. Numerous voices from the world of education and child care expressed serious anxiety concerning this, the more so as mischief and misconduct affected groups that had formerly been untouched.

One phenomenon that had occurred only sporadically in the years before the war was the formation of juvenile gangs. This phenomenon, probably a natural symptom of rapidly increasing juvenile delinquency, can be explained by the herd instinct and the desire for romantic adventure that characterize adolescence. The sensational case of the "Ace of Spades," a juvenile gang numbering fifteen members in one of the provincial towns, that made away with over 2,000 guilders in cash and thousands of guilders in goods, was probably typical.

Another phenomenon of corruption that threatened to lead especially the girls to ruin was the excessive running around and the moral misconduct associated with it. How extremely difficult it is to put a stop to such a manifestation of social disorganization by mere prohibitions can be seen from the result of measures that were taken in this connection in the course of 1942. These measures denied a juvenile, unless accompanied by one of his parents, admission to cafés, restaurants, cabarets, and variety theaters. The juvenile police at The Hague reported that youngsters under 18 years did indeed disappear from such places of amusement, but complaints of misconduct increased in seriousness and number. The same report noted a shift in the

locale of delinquency from the public gathering which probably imposed some restraints to the intimacy of an empty house or an air raid shelter. The report mentions cases in which girls hid in empty houses for nights, sometimes for weeks. Their friends provided them with the necessities of life. They were usually picked up by the police, dirty, and demoralized by their exciting adventure.

Within the scope of this article it is impossible to go into details concerning the direct causes of the above-mentioned phenomena. The circumstances of war and the disruption of social life connected therewith already have been mentioned. Family control, to which we shall revert later, often failed. School and youth organizations, as will be seen below, were less and less able to perform their educational task; the once numerous possibilities for leisure-time activities were more and more curtailed; work was no longer as available to young people nor could it give as much satisfaction as in prewar years. In the light of these circumstances one can understand such psychic reactions as lack of balance, laziness, a craving for sweets, love of pleasure, and lawlessness. It is comprehensible that many young people in this frame of mind drifted into the black market where they often acquired profits in amounts that were denied manual or white-collar workers. In this way they acquired the means to indulge their desires. Often encouraged in these practices by shortsighted parents, eager for their own profit, many of these young people lost any sense of the objectionable character of their way of life.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY STATISTICS

It has been made quite clear that criminal statistics are able to reflect the increase in juvenile delinquency only up to a certain point. True, according

to government statistics, the number of criminal convictions of juveniles in 1941 rose to 60 per cent and in 1942 even to 136 per cent above that of 1940. However, according to statements by the juvenile police in the three largest cities of the country, a decline in the figures of the later war years was bound to come. Amsterdam reported a decrease by about 50 per cent in the number of police warrants issued against juveniles, in Rotterdam the decrease was almost 45 per cent and in The Hague more than 30 per cent, from 1942 to 1943.

The decline in juvenile delinquency which would seem to be indicated by these figures is most improbable, at least to the degree shown, in view of the causative factors mentioned above. Without doubt the deportation of youth and the restriction of their freedom of movement exerted a favorable influence on the figures of youthful crime in the Netherlands. The same applies to the possibility of acquiring, via the black market, what could formerly be obtained only by theft.

Moreover, the figures refer to recorded criminality. According to insiders, such information about crime is based mainly on complaints. Now, complaints became less frequent. On the one hand the general demoralization led to a weakening of moral norms, which made people less inclined to report crimes to the police, and during the occupation the police also lost much of the people's confidence. On the other hand, the police, which rightly felt itself menaced, reduced its activity.

All in all, the decline of the figures cannot be considered as reflecting an improvement in morality.

THE PROGNOSIS

The question now arises, is the situation so alarming that a pessimistic prognosis is justified? This is certainly not

the case. Let us look back for a moment at the figures on youthful criminality at the time of the First World War. The Netherlands remained out of it, but the country was not spared economic and social distress at that time, either. The increase in youthful criminality was alarming. It reached its climax in 1919, when the figures were more than three times as high as in 1914. In 1922—and this is of tremendous importance—they again fell to the prewar level.

Therefore, let us conclude this consideration of the morality of youth with a general opinion concerning it expressed by the juvenile judge in The Hague, with which the author of this article fully agrees. According to his data, about 2.5 per cent instead of the normal 1 per cent of the juveniles were brought before him in the peak year 1942. It is not to be assumed, says the juvenile judge, that no fault was to be found with the remaining 97.5 per cent; but even if one leaves a wide margin for those not caught and not prosecuted, it is still a fact that the major part of the Netherlands youth is unaffected. The social pathological phenomena which are attracting so much attention can be explained by the circumstances. These circumstances and the phenomena they have provoked will mostly disappear together. "We Netherlanders know," he quotes the famous Netherlands historian J. Huizinga, "that now and in times to come nothing has been lost of the best that made our State and our Nation great in the seventeenth century: strength, a will to deeds, a sense of right and honesty, compassion, piety and trust in God."

EDUCATION

It is now time to direct the attention of the reader to the positive factors in the education of the youth. An at-

tempt will be made to show successively how and in how far the family, the school, and youth movements functioned.

THE FAMILY

In the individualistic Netherlands, with its strongly developed family life, the family is recognized almost generally as pre-eminently the best environment and center for education. In accordance with this conception, the duty of educating their children rests above all with the parents. Among other things, let it be mentioned incidentally here, this means that they have the right to choose their children's education in agreement with their convictions. It is in the family that the greater part of the child's life is spent and its social character begins to be formed.

Now, family life was in many cases disrupted to such an extent by the war that it failed to perform fully its educational task. Just think of the disturbance caused by compulsory evacuation, the compulsory crowding together of families, or the sojourn abroad of fathers or other members of the family. Think of the pressure of poverty, which rapidly increased and soon fully occupied the thoughts, especially of the parents. Think of the shortage of food and petty luxuries culminating in the famine of the last winter of the war, of the shortage of clothing and shoes, of the constant dwindling of simple comforts until heat, gas, electricity, and even drinking water often completely vanished.

True, there were circumstances that intensified family life. Think of the curfew (with local variations this gradually changed in the course of the years from twelve to eight), the disappearance of street lighting, and the impoverishment of amusement life.

In general, such varied circumstances,

in each individual case in varying combinations, were detrimental to education. It is not astonishing, therefore, that social workers, among others, noted that education in many a family was in a sorry plight.

THE SCHOOL

As has already been mentioned, the influence of the school also declined. When the Germans invaded the Netherlands they found a school system that had developed in the course of centuries into a richly differentiated whole with a character completely its own. It met the social requirements of universal elementary, secondary, and collegiate education, commercial and trade training, and finally graduate study, in a manner that had until then secured for the Netherlands people, from a cultural standpoint, a place among the Western civilized nations.

In 1940, of the 2,500,000 youth from 6 to 21 years, 53 per cent enjoyed elementary education, 4 per cent secondary and collegiate education, and 6 per cent industrial, agricultural, and horticultural training. These figures, which exclude those concerning graduate education, underwent no change whatsoever in the course of the war years.

What applies to the different branches of education according to their perceptible content also applies in general to the spirit which animated the instruction. The Nazi German was unable, despite (more accurately perhaps thanks to) his fundamentally contrary conceptions, to bring about much change in this. The Netherlands education was in the hands of boards and teachers who had, in years of struggle for the complete equalization of private and public schools, become aware in both camps of the value of Dutch educational principles. Internally it was to prove unassailable by educational principles based on the naturalistic phi-

losophy of life that sees in *Blut und Boden* (Race and Soil) the foundation for a National Socialist community irreconcilable with a democratic state such as the Netherlands.

If one studies the handicaps which education experienced in the war years, one is first struck by the serious extent to which the school buildings were turned to other uses. The Wehrmacht appropriated these institutions throughout the country to quarter troops and establish emergency hospitals. It is not astonishing that the large boarding schools in the Roman Catholic south of the country were particularly in demand in this connection. Civilian authorities all too easily picked out school buildings too for the housing of their ration boards or other municipal services. Besides this, an ever growing number of schools became depopulated as a result of the evacuation of densely populated areas, particularly coastal districts. And yet, as already mentioned, the school population did not decrease in number; in other words, remaining schools became overcrowded, improvised branch and emergency schools were used to relieve the situation, and sometimes one building had to be used for two schools at different times of the day.

By 1943 the school buildings often no longer satisfied even the most elementary requirements. In that year there were schools that had already had to move ten times during the war years. The schools had to seek refuge in vestry rooms, stables, garages, lofts, and cellars—even in chicken coops—if they wanted to continue functioning. There were a number of schools that had once been single units and that after a few years of war were spread over five, six, or even seven different buildings. Besides, during the cold season of the year the shortage of fuel that grew more and more pinching from

year to year made itself felt. This frequently led to the closing of the schools for months at a time.

Through these circumstances alone, the regularity of the schooling of children and young people was seriously hampered; teaching and its influence fell into the background more than was desirable, especially in view of the need of the times for strong and reliable guidance for youth.

THE TEACHERS

In the light of the above it is obvious that the teaching staff was also debated, threatened, and dispersed.

In 1940 the Educators' Guild, a body that was to include all those who advocated the education of youth in the National Socialist spirit, was established. The guild proved to have no hold on the educational world. The same applies to the many meetings which the teachers were obliged to attend in order to hear the gospel of the new doctrine of salvation. These meetings brought about the contrary of what was aimed at. United, as the teachers were, in their aversion to compulsion, united in their confidence in their own people, these meetings became demonstrations against the new doctrine, but even more so against the traitor who had the insolence to bring the National Socialist message in the service of the enemy.

And yet, the National Socialists wrote, there would be no lack of efforts to break the resistance, to put an end to the evil of having Jewish, democratic, royalist, and anti-National Socialist elements spew their venom in the classroom and thus poison the children's souls.

Consequently, in January 1942 a decree was proclaimed making the dismissal of teachers and inspectors of education possible if these stood in the way of the "successful development of

the Netherlands educational system." As appears from the accompanying directives, the aim was to orient the instruction in the National Socialist and pro-German spirit. Leading officials and thousands of teachers threatened to resign, thousands of parents would have kept their children at home; the decree remained a dead letter.

Still more violent agitation was roused by the so-called appointment decree, which among other things attacked the constitutional right of the boards of private schools to the free appointment of teachers. According to this decree the authorities had to approve the appointment. That school boards eluded the regulation as much as possible is self-evident; hundreds of independent appointments were made.

How dogged the resistance sometimes was can be seen from the following case. The board of a school refused, against the express wish of the authorities, to appoint one of the teachers, a National Socialist, as head of the school. The board was imprisoned and the National Socialist entrusted with the principalship of the school. The parents kept the children at home and the teachers, despite threats, stopped their lessons. The result was that the board was released, the school was reopened, and the National Socialist relieved of his function.

Considering this attitude, it was not to be expected that the invader would show much consideration for the educators when he began to call up citizens to construct and guard defense works, and finally to deport them and put them to work in his own country. Repeatedly the smooth progress of education was disturbed by the assignment of principals and teachers to farming or other work, or, as also happened, by their arrest as hostages to ensure the appearance of summoned pupils. For there were innumerable cases where

the receipt of a summons to Wehrmacht labor led to conflicts of conscience and was the signal to go underground.

Still worse was the agitation when the enemy, as a last resort, unchained a veritable man hunt by means of dragnet raids. The regulated recruitment of labor, which had been tried in many different ways, never scored the success that Berlin expected of it. In 1943 it was decreed that at least 20 per cent of all male teachers should be assigned for deportation. According to estimates, only 2 per cent failed to elude it. The raids yielded somewhat better results. Whole streets and neighborhoods were surrounded by the Germans and men of 17 to 40 dragged out of their houses. There were, for instance, communities where practically all male teachers were taken away; others where they escaped the grip of the slave hunter but were no longer able to perform their function. That was the situation in the last year of the war, especially in the towns. Women had to replace their male colleagues.

FORMS OF ORGANIZATION

Let us mention a few of the efforts to model education on the German pattern. One can imagine the result, when after a year and a half of occupation the Dutch National Socialists still complained passionately about being misled and derided by departmental officials who continued to deceive them "unscrupulously."

The training of teachers naturally holds a key position in a school system. If this training could be pervaded with the spirit of National Socialism, elementary education would succumb to its influence in the long run. Less than a year after the German invasion it became imperative to study detailed plans for a National Socialist normal school for teachers and youth leaders. Heavy reclamation work—no less than 24

hours a week—the National Socialist philosophy of life, and marching were conspicuous subjects in the proposed curriculum. The course was to last six months and would have to be attended by young teachers before they could be admitted to the practice of teaching. The plans—well, they remained plans.

One of the most radical educational reforms under German pressure was the establishment of independent schools and departments for elementary instruction covering the seventh and eighth school years. They were attached to the six-year elementary schools and were to offer their pupils a terminal education along practical lines and strengthen the natural attachment to their native region, to country and people.

The occupation authorities wanted to see these institutions set up according to the ideas of the German pedagogue, Kerschensteiner. Despite the difficulty of the circumstances, they would hear of no postponement. There were no schoolrooms available, no trained teachers, and the core subjects, namely, manual work for boys and simple domestic science for girls, could not be taught because of the shortage of materials.

The parents, partly out of aversion against the new institution, sent their children after the sixth school year in greater numbers than ever before to the previously existing institutions for continued education or kept their children from school for days and even months. Therefore the institution may be justly considered a complete failure.

The attitude of the parents was again shown when a flourishing kindergarten with more than 250 pupils in one of the thickly populated districts of The Hague was placed, due to German pressure, under a National Socialist school board. The parents, who were in destitute circumstances, were

stuffed with promises of food and clothing. Nevertheless, a few days later the school had not a pupil left. The same thing happened in rural areas to about 55 schools for agriculture, horticulture, and domestic science, with a total of 5,000 pupils, when the agricultural associations charged with their direction were abolished and the institutions taken over by a National Socialist agency. The teachers went on strike, student teachers boycotted the schools, and parents kept their children at home.

The fact that the National Socialist directors more often than not used the equipment of the deserted schools for the benefit of themselves or their partisans is a detail that should not remain unrecorded.

EDUCATIONAL TOOLS

Another starting point for educational reform naturally lay in educational tools. For instance, the textbooks were subjected to control. The number of textbooks that were dropped was small, for Netherlands education before the war was not anti-German. Of the 5,000 books that had to be surveyed in secondary education, only 150 were put on the "index"; the greater number could be used unchanged, while the rest could serve after slight changes; naturally, pictures of the members of the royal family had to disappear from the books!

That a more positive influence was not to be entirely discounted is shown, for example, by the compulsory introduction of a booklet entitled *Our Forebears* in the public continuation schools. The booklet, contrary to the literature hitherto used, described the Germans as ancestors who had reached a rather high level of culture, so that the book might have promoted the development of race consciousness—provided it had indeed been used. For elementary education the Department of Education

also was on the lookout for a history book that would describe the Netherlands people as an outgrowth of the Germanic world, as well as show its relationship with the German Reich.

More energetic was the enemy's effort, as early as the beginning of 1941, to introduce German educational films into the whole Dutch educational program. Obviously, this effort was made to combat the too intellectual character of the instruction. According to the conceptions of National Socialism, this very opposition promoted the nazification of youth. The latter purpose could best be fulfilled by a careful choice of films. On the one hand, it is true, the Germans tried to put across ordinary factual educational films, which Dutch teachers acknowledged to be pretty good. On the other hand, however, there were films dripping with Nazi glorification; for example, the film of a Party day in Nuremberg and of the encampment of Hitler Youth.

In the Foundation for Netherlands Educational Films distinguished educators carried out their salutary—and successful—work of laboriously sabotaging the German aims. The purpose of the foundation was to produce and distribute educational films for school use and to make it possible to exhibit them "to the exclusion of all others." At any rate, German educational films were also excluded, and not a single one, however pedagogically valuable it may have been, was shown. In the opinion of the board of the foundation, the youth should continue to be safeguarded against admiring German achievements in the sphere of film technique. In this connection let it be noted that the foundation produced 62 purely Dutch educational films.

The previously mentioned Educators' Guild found in the school radio another educational tool that could be used to introduce National Socialist principles

into the schools. In the proposals concerning this which were submitted to the Department of Education, the following subjects were mentioned among others: "Attachment to race and soil"; "Feats of arms in the struggle of the Germanic nations against Communism." The political aim of the institution was clearly revealed by these titles. The school radio, disqualified even before its birth by the Netherlands inspectors of education, was never to see the light of day.

In connection with the above let it be noted that the more the war advanced, the more pinched did the educational tool situation become and this was naturally a special handicap to the steady progress of education. The shortage of paper and power caused rigorous cuts in the production of textbooks. The schools finally found it necessary to permit the pupils to use old and dissimilar editions. Copybooks were of inferior quality and so scarce that they had to be rationed and partly replaced by slates. Needlework and manual training, physics and chemistry could hardly be taught because of the shortage of materials, electric current, and gas. For the same reason, adequate attention could not be given to practical instruction in vocational subjects.

THE SUBJECTS

As regards the subjects taught, the curricula underwent two characteristic changes during the years of the occupation: physical exercises and German language study were introduced all along the line.

Prior to 1910 physical education was greatly neglected in the Netherlands. Although introduced by law in 1920 as a compulsory subject in the elementary schools, the effective date did not come until 1940. The definitive organization of this aspect of public education—which would certainly have been taken

in hand even without the German occupation—had therefore to be settled during the occupation. Naturally, the occupation authorities were strongly in favor of the new subject. It decreased the intellectual aspect of the school and fitted in with the naturalistic ideas of National Socialism. Consequently, it became possible for this subject to acquire a central position in the educational scheme.

But also with regard to this subject, the enemy, despite repeated attempts, did not succeed in replacing the basic principles adopted by the Netherlands experts with the German system with its fundamentally military conception, with its drill and its limited place for personal initiative. The Dutch principles aimed at well-integrated social and individual training. A few months after the German invasion, teachers were given the opportunity to attend gratis a course in Germany to familiarize them with the German system. A number of them did so, but when the Netherlands experts introduced physical education, those who had attended the course were passed by.

The introduction of German language study in the seventh and eighth years of the lower schools was done by direct order from Berlin. This, certainly did not guarantee its success. Only one-third of the teachers to whom German instruction was entrusted had the required qualifications. Half of them had never had a course in German. It is self-evident that particularly this last group were unable to teach the subject according to the specified method, in which conversation with the pupils in the foreign language was fundamental. Furthermore, parents of course refused that co-operation which is essential for the successful teaching of a subject.

Let us here make a comparison with the grades in which German had always been part of the curriculum.

Many teachers of German in the secondary schools had to force themselves to teach the tyrant's language, once the language of their choice. With the pupils, the subject became more and more discredited. Despite lower standards, the number of pupils who failed in the subject increased. The German administrators reported "Results satisfactory" to Berlin.

The attempts to reform the teaching of history, which were mentioned above, were essentially in agreement with the efforts to focus education on home problems. In this orientation one again recognizes the naturalistic tendency, which has already been discussed in connection with the addition of a seventh and an eighth school year, for, according to the conceptions of National Socialism, the study of the different aspects of home life makes man conscious of his physical and spiritual attachment to his environment. Realizing its strong intellectualistic character, Dutch education was by no means averse to promoting much realistic instruction. In many schools it acquired an assured position during the years of occupation, but it developed according to the Dutch pattern. Extreme National Socialist conceptions remained alien to it; nowhere did it culminate in a Dutch *Blut und Boden* (Race and Soil) theory.

Finally, we must mention the attempt of the National Socialist administration of one of the largest secondary technical schools to introduce the subject "Nationalist Socialist Education." When the press reported this, the pupils went on strike. Some members of the "strike committee" were arrested, but the introduction of the new subject never occurred.

THE PUPILS

As evidence of the pupils' spirit of opposition, partly roused in them by

their parents, we have already mentioned that they left schools that had been taken over by National Socialist authorities and that they shunned any new, and for this reason alone distrusted, type of school. Naturally it was impossible to prevent this spirit of adolescent youth from spontaneous eruption, at times. Typical, for example, was the reaction of the school where the leader of the Dutch National Socialists, Anton Mussert, had as a boy obtained his secondary education. Upon the news that Hitler had raised Mussert to be the Fuehrer of the Dutch people, the pupils immediately went on strike, thinking that only in this way could the school be cleansed of its shame.

Repeatedly Dutch teachers felt compelled to exercise their authority over the pupils in order to prevent anti-German demonstrations. Every year this happened on the anniversary of the German invasion and on the anniversaries of the royal house.

To the circumstances which injured educational efficiency we must add the grave increase in absences, and the subordinate place in the consciousness of youth which education was gradually forced to assume.

As regards absences, let us first take the elementary schools. The latest country-wide figures on this score are for 1943 and show that excused absences had not yet reached double the figure for 1939. Truancy figures were six times as high. On the one hand, sickness and lack of shoes and clothing caused absences; that the shortage of shoes and clothing was very great can be seen from the fact that numerous children attended school barefoot and that in the cold of winter many children wore only their threadbare smocks and frocks over their naked bodies. On the other hand, there was truancy. The shortage of labor made child labor

well paid. Many parents therefore exploited their children of school age. Other parents took their children tramping in search of food. Finally, truancy was partly due to indifference to education generally as well as to the already mentioned inclination to sabotage the newly introduced eighth school year. During this school year alone, 70 per cent of the pupils frequently played truant.

After the summer vacation of 1944 the authorities had generally to resign themselves to the complete breakdown of education. The increased intensity of war activity—bombardments, shelling of roads, the danger of the German V-bombs—also led to reduced school attendance.

Not only in the elementary schools but also in continuation schools, absences increased rapidly. Here too the above-mentioned difficulties made themselves felt. Added to these, especially as regards schools that were attended by pupils from outside the community, were the shortage of bicycle tires and the lack of most other means of transportation.

Finally, the number of absences was forced up, first in 1943 but especially in 1944, when boys were picked up in many places and detained without cause. So many pupils went underground that education was disrupted. In the beginning those seized were put to work at constructing fortifications; later they were also deported.

Nevertheless, the school offered an asylum, as a rule respected by the Germans, against the National Socialist Netherlands Labor Service as well as against deportation to Germany. And naturally it was frequently abused as a refuge, with the knowledge of those educational authorities that were inclined to sabotage. Many pupils were pupils merely on paper. One of the most striking exceptions was probably

the position of the pupils of the navigation schools. The German attempts to compel them to enter service on German ships led to the complete depopulation of these educational institutions.

THE LABOR SERVICE

What has been said above concerning other new schemes also applies to the Netherlands Labor Service. Soon after the German invasion, a German Commissioner General of Labor came to the Netherlands to set up the Labor Service. Unsuspecting Dutchmen who had not failed to see the seriousness of the problem of juvenile unemployment in preceding years took up the work and were successful. A Netherlands Labor Service of good size was created, based on sound pedagogical principles, on voluntary enlistment and on the moral duty to serve the nation. For months the leaders carried on a secret struggle against the plan of the occupation authorities to make the Labor Service serve their interests. By the middle of 1941 about four thousand Labor Service men, to a great part former unemployed of 18 to 23, stood "by the shovel." They received a training that fully met Dutch interests.

When in the fall of 1941 the inevitable crisis set in, the nazification of the Labor Service was accompanied by a wholesale resignation of its members. The organization had practically to be started anew, and that at a time when there was practically no chance to enlarge the number of work camps on account of the scarcity of materials. There were, so to say, no Dutch National Socialist officers, and there were no longer enough German officers available. And so the Labor Service continued to number many officers who ignored the National Socialist training lessons, because they inwardly rejected their teachings.

In 1942 compulsory labor service

was introduced. Nevertheless, the institution remained anemic. The young people already working in agriculture or in war industries were exempt; besides, dispensation was given, with certain restrictions, to pupils of the various day schools for continued education. Thus these institutions became places of refuge for the many who shunned the Labor Service as being within the immediate grasp of the enemy. They had not forgotten that in 1942 about 450 men had immediately been sent to the east front to construct bridges and airfields.

DEPORTATION TO GERMANY

The sending of labor to Germany, which was begun five weeks after the invasion, assumed an increasingly grave character. It started with putting unemployed to work. Two years later the Germans shut down part of the industries and screened the rest. Those who evaded deportation and nevertheless fell into the hands of the slave hunters landed in one of the notorious prison camps. The measures culminated in 1944 in large-scale raids. Most victims—estimated at 50,000 men between 18 and 40 years—of this man hunt came from Rotterdam, which was first on the list and consequently had been unable to take any precautionary measures. Toward the end of the war probably about 400,000 Dutchmen were in Germany.

The more mature youth became the focus of attention during the summer of 1943. Almost all 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds were marked for deportation. Many went underground. And yet in June and July no fewer than 41,000 of the 65,000 who were deported were under 21 years. By the end of the war their number is said to have been approximately 80,000. The conditions under which these young people had to live abroad varied greatly, but in

general they exerted a demoralizing influence. Think of the forced labor, mostly in war industry, and of the life as outcasts coupled with it; think of the life in the labor camps with the poor food and beds that fell to the share of most of them; think of the example of many older fellow countrymen who, torn from their moorings, often misbehaved; think finally of the psychological influence of the Allied air raids on towns like Cologne, Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen where many of the Dutch were.

The institution of continuation schools succeeded in protecting the pupils for a long time even against being set to work in Germany. It was therefore certainly with adequate reason that the occupation authorities informed the schools in the middle of 1943 that they would not put up with candidates' failing in the final examinations with the obvious intention of escaping forced labor in Germany.

FARM LABOR AND RESISTANCE

As has already been mentioned, the special circumstances of the time forced education to take a back seat in the consciousness of the youth. Here we must touch on farm work and illegal activity. In themselves of inestimable pedagogic importance, they nevertheless helped to divert attention from formal education.

As regards farm labor, one must differentiate between, on the one hand, the regular harvest help for which the authority appealed to the schools in connection with the food emergency and the great shortage of manpower, and, on the other hand, the labor of many different kinds that was delegated directly to the country youth by farmers and horticulturists. As part of the harvest help which—despite the distrust harbored against official appeals—absorbed thousands of pupils annually,

five hundred children under the direction of their teachers did harvest work in the fields of The Hague municipality in 1943, and school children dug potatoes in one of the rural communities when a crop failure threatened as a result of the deportation of a thousand young men.

The other work mentioned, which monopolized the time of a considerably greater part of the school youth than did the harvest help, frequently caused such serious school absences that it prevented the normal progress of education. We have already mentioned the cases of children being exploited. Frequently it was the children who planted the cabbages, dug the potatoes, picked the peas and beans, and harvested the fruit. Without their help the food situation, which reached its lowest point in the last winter of the war, would have become hopeless even earlier.

The more mature youth, who knew the dangers but hardly counted them in the fight for freedom, had an important share in the underground resistance. The more the boys became handicapped in their activity on account of the danger of deportation, the more the girls came forward. Numerous boys participated in the gangs that perpetrated raids on parish registry and ration offices. They carried off the parish registers in order to hinder deportation, and packs of ration books in order to procure rations for those who had gone underground. Often it was they who skillfully accomplished dangerous sabotage work—for example, the replacing of dynamite—and it was they who, trained in secluded places in the use of arms, helped to remove traitors. Boys and girls secretly occupied observation posts on roads, railway lines, and canals, where they concentrated their attention mainly on traffic. Elsewhere they mapped German fortifications or carried on espionage in other ways. Their

reports reached Allied headquarters by way of their central posts. The girls rendered services as couriers. It was the girls, too, who took upon themselves the distribution of the underground newspapers. The fact that many young people sacrificed their lives in the resistance movement did not diminish the activities of the youth.

THE YOUTH MOVEMENT

We assume that it is generally known that before the war the Netherlands had a richly varied youth movement which offered the young people satisfactions in accord with the religious and political conceptions of their particular circle. No fewer than 225 national, sometimes regional, organizations—Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Socialist, Communist, or neutral—had a total membership of 750,000, or about 50 per cent of the adolescent and postadolescent youth.

After a few months of occupation the Germans announced that they considered the youth organizations unacceptable. They advocated the introduction of a single youth organization with compulsory membership. In this connection, they naturally showed preference for the organization of the Dutch National Socialist young people, the National Youth Storm. And here too the Dutch showed insight. They drafted plans for a national concentration of the youth organizations in which (and how could it have been otherwise in the Netherlands!) the old basic principles were retained. The plan failed; the voluntary organizations of the youth seemed doomed to disappear. At the end of 1941 the organ of the National Youth Storm stated that the Youth Storm had ripped through 1941 like a refreshing life-bringing hurricane, sweeping away all that kept the youth divided, uniting the entire youth of the Netherlands!

Was then the former youth movement dead and buried? Had the Youth Storm, that was once shunned, suddenly become the only organization that embraced all youth?

Figures which are self-evident in the light of the numbers mentioned above can answer this! The Youth Storm, which numbered 1,500 members before the war, comprised 13,000 members in the middle of 1941, this growth having been promoted under the influence of the German victories and the enrollment of traitorous elements in the Netherlands National Socialist Movement. In 1943 this number reached its maximum with an estimated 18,000 members—only a fraction of the membership of the old vigorous youth organizations.

CONTINUED IN SECRET

What had happened to these organizations?

From various quarters we are now receiving data from which it can be seen that the suppression of the organizations and the confiscation of their property by no means paralyzed their activities. The suppression order was not unexpected. Locally, all kinds of obstructions were promptly put in the way of the youth associations. Camping and organized outdoor games, in particular, were often made impossible for the associations. Previously the Germans had attempted to get the most important organizations to amalgamate with the National Youth Storm.

The ultimate reason for the dissolution lay, as the Germans had already shown, in the basic principles which were unacceptable to National Socialism. Besides, the Germans scented danger in the unselfish idealism of the Dutch youth leaders, which they admittedly did not find in their own circle to the same degree. The political youth organizations were swept away with the

slogan: "No political organizations for youngsters." In other cases the reason was sought in a charge of espionage which the Boy Scouts were supposed to have carried on in behalf of the English, in lectures hostile to the Germans at religious youth meetings, and so forth. In these cases the suppression was accompanied by the arrest of the leaders.

The property was frequently destined for transfer to the National Youth Storm; for instance, the famous Gilwell Training Center for Scout leaders was transferred to this organization. However, it was possible to save some of the property from confiscation, and to recover some of it even afterwards. Often the financial accounts disappeared or were falsified and moneys and valuable papers were placed in safety in time. In a number of cases the contents of troop meeting rooms were carried elsewhere through the window after they had been sealed up, which involved no small risk for the perpetrators. One case was reported in which Boy Scouts in a surprise attack snatched from the claws of the police tent material that had been confiscated. Nevertheless, tons of stuff were lost in the way of money, buildings, tents and other material, libraries, etc.

The purely religious organizations were spared; the work of the rest of the religious organizations was to a great extent taken over by church clubs for youth, Bible classes, boys choirs, theatrical and sports clubs, etc. Other political and neutral organizations continued their activities in secret, however dangerous this was. Meetings in small groups were attended regularly in different places and at different times. Here and there new and secret locals were established. The Boy Scouts remained true to their ritual; as far as it lay in their power they commemorated St. George's Day every year, lit their

campfires, conducted their induction ceremonies, and played, though not always unhindered, their game of scouting.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the youth movement, though it proved its vitality, and with its secret societies was still attractive to a number of young people, lost much of its influence. More and more difficulties were experienced due to the lack of central co-ordinating organs, the weakening and final disappearance of a central leadership, and the deportation or going underground of officers and members. While the older youths outgrew the organization, the younger ones frequently no longer felt drawn to it. According to estimates, about half the members remained true to the secret organizations.

THE YOUNG PEOPLE'S REVEILLE

We shall conclude this discussion with a detailed account of the story of the illegal Netherlands Young People's Reveille that was founded in the west of the country in 1942. This story throws light on the mentality that revealed itself in the best of Netherlands sons and daughters. It furthermore shows the dangers that threatened them.

This secret society did not try, like the previously discussed organizations, to continue prewar activities. It aimed to offer active resistance to the enemy and his tools. Everywhere in the country the leaders, at small meetings of young people that belonged, like themselves, to the menaced age groups, called on them to join the movement. After a year thirty units were at work, scattered all over the country and consisting of young people of different philosophies of life. They discussed current problems of youth and country, they studied the background of the resistance, and gave the necessary training to engage in it. One of the peak achievements was the great Princess

Margaret appeal in January 1943 on the occasion of the birth of the youngest offspring of the royal house. One hundred and eighty young people lived, as they expressed it, in free Netherlands for one evening and were imbued with the heavy duty that rested on their shoulders.

When the work developed and could be switched from the preparatory to what was called the campaign stage, the cunning of the enemy once again came to light. In October 1943 one of the leaders was unmasked as one of the smartest provocateurs of the Gestapo, who had performed his traitorous work for but .300 guilders a month. The traitor was condemned to death by a secret popular tribunal in The Hague, and there executed; but the movement broke up. In later months many members were to become victims of the betrayal.

In November 1943 the work was started afresh. Now special attention was paid to the demands that the transition to a free Netherlands would make on young people. For instance, plans were prepared for a great civilian relief organization. On the eve of the

setting up of the second organization, which was to have 45 locals, it appeared again that the Gestapo had a hand in the game and was well informed. A surprise raid was made and the leaders arrested. The second attempt had failed. That was in February 1944.

After three months' imprisonment the brains of the organization escaped as by a miracle. He immediately resumed his work, was again arrested after a month, but succeeded in escaping at the peril of his life. Still undiscouraged, he began again after a month—at the end of July 1944—and after three weeks barely escaped arrest. The establishment of a number of locals was planned again. The movement now concentrated on making contacts with prominent members of the prewar youth movement in order to revive the movement in the coming years.

Now the war is over; the Nazi terror in the Netherlands is at an end. The Netherlands Young People's Reveille has now been recognized by the Government and will perhaps prove to be the shock troop of the Netherlands youth of today.

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The Resistance

By J. A. H. I. S. BRUINS SLOT

THE resistance of the Netherlands against the National Socialist German usurper may be characterized in one phrase—it was a spiritual conflict. We thought that the period of religious wars lay centuries behind us, but this was a mistake. From 1940 to 1945 we waged an essentially religious war. The nature of the circumstances caused this resistance to have only a slightly military character.

Because of its geographical location and the nature of its population, the Netherlands was destined by the Germans to be swallowed up in the Pan-German (*Gross-Deutschland*) realm. It was to be annexed. A process of spiritual and national assimilation was to precede this. Consequently the Netherlands people had to support the full pressure of National Socialist might and propaganda.

Assimilation meant denationalization, the destruction of the spiritual and cultural originality of the Netherlands people, the breaking of Netherlands traditions, detaching the people from their established pattern of living. It meant that instead of a national community, the Netherlands must be made into a stupid, amorphous mass, only fit to react to the stimuli transmitted from the psychic laboratory of Dr. Goebbels.

In former times a denationalization meant primarily a language conflict. Now the methods were more refined. A direct attack on the spiritual root of our people's existence had to be endured. We did not expect this. We were not prepared for it. The combat had to be improvised, and it was. In it we suffered many defeats, but victory was finally won.

When Allied armor freed the Low Countries by the sea, they freed no

mass of slaves, no masses without hope, without ideals, without their own national principles. They found there a people who had resisted the pressure, who had remained true to themselves through all the failures and successes in their fight for existence. The resistance of our people, the fight of our people without weapons or powerful means, with nothing more than their spiritual power and the will to vindicate themselves, forms an epic which compares well with the most noble pages from our history.

RESISTANCE DEVELOPED SLOWLY

The Germans began their efforts at denationalization carefully. When they marched in, in May 1940, and after five days of fighting were in control, the myth of their "correctness" was established. "The Germans weren't so bad after all." "We have not come here to impose a philosophy," declared Seyss-Inquart on "mounting the throne."

Thus, spiritual resistance was not the direct result of the military conflict. It came into being for the first time when the true intentions of the Nazis became known. And that took some time. At first the spiritual-cultural life was left free, then controlled, hindered, limited, and finally destroyed. This was also the case with the political parties, the press, the independent radio, the trade unions, the youth movement, societies, and the universities.

Because this process took place gradually, the people at first retained the old cultural life, though in a diminishing degree, and resistance developed slowly. At the outset the political parties vegetated, while at the same time an attempt was made to organize the Netherlands people in a new politi-

cal movement, the Netherlands Union, which the Germans permitted.

At the same time, however, the leading members of some of the political parties understood that they must use underground means for disseminating information if they were to circulate the truth about the Germans and the situation in the Netherlands. The two parties at opposite extremes—the Communist and the Anti-Revolutionary—joined in the most spirited underground activity. Soon after this, the underground papers began to appear. *Vrij Nederland*, *Het Parool*, and *de Waarheid* were among the first.

RESISTANCE STIFFENED

The first great crisis that stirred our people as a whole was the distinction of Jews from non-Jews, which was introduced into the civil administration by the Germans. In every way and on all occasions so-called "Jew declarations" had to be made—declarations that one did not belong to the Jewish race. A "J" was put on the identity cards of Jews.

The co-operation of the Dutch people was necessary to achieve all this. This co-operation was given. People did not suspect the grandiose plans for nazifying our people. Nor were people ripe for resistance. Each German regulation was seen "by itself," and as such, each separate event was not so frightful. We did not see through them—perhaps we did not dare to see through them. We did not see that events did not stand alone but had a devilish connection with one another. The "Jew declaration" was the first link in a chain which ended in the gas chamber of a concentration camp.

One may safely say that the conscience of the Dutch people was not at rest in co-operating with the Jewish registration. In those days appeared the little pamphlet (to mention but one

of many good ones) "Almost Too Late," which, it was learned later, was written by an Amsterdam preacher. (He lost his life toward the end of the war as the result of a stray German bullet.) Here, in the clearest possible way, the Dutch people was shown to be on the brink of a spiritual precipice. A better way was urged by the author mentioned and many others—the way of radical resistance on the basis of a principle. This became the path our people trod more and more. It soon became apparent in the resistance of the physicians (described elsewhere in this volume) and also in the resistance in university circles, where Leiden lived up to her former glory. The students' resistance, which also is described elsewhere, may here be noted.

The resistance of the Protestant private schools deserves special attention. These schools, organized by voluntary associations, have, with respect to the authority of the state, a freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. So long as they meet legal requirements governing the quality of their work, they are free to organize their schools, prepare their curricula, and appoint their teachers.

By means of a regulation for appointments the Germans sought to limit this freedom. They tried to exercise influence in the choice of teachers.

As one man, more than a thousand principals of the various schools swore a formal oath of disobedience. More than that: it was not left a matter of words. Indeed, the appointment regulation was ignored, and, in opposition to it, teachers were appointed and dismissed by the directors. It was recognized that the Christian education of youth and the Christian character of the nation were here at stake. Neither financial pressure—the withdrawal of subsidies—nor intimidation and imprisonment were able to break this solid resistance, for behind the directors were

tens of thousands of parents of children of school age. Disobedience was a Christian duty. Thus the appointment regulation remained a dead letter. United, radical resistance based on principle kept the Germans out of the Christian school. This resistance was led by an underground contact organization.

UNDERGROUND ACTIVITY

Dutch resistance first took on a total character in the spring of 1943 when Hitler proclaimed total war, which included the total drafting of labor. This was the beginning of mass activity both in the field of propaganda and in that of sheltering, caring for, and financing the countless "divers" (underground members).

To escape the journey to Germany, thousands upon thousands had to leave their homes and jobs and look for good and well-concealed hiding places. These people had to be provided with shelter, they frequently had to have false identity papers, they had to have ration cards, and financial assistance had to be given to their families. Financial assistance had also to be given to surviving relatives of those who were the victims of German punishment or vengeance—prisoners, sailors, and others.

Many organizations worked at this. Without wishing to neglect a number of smaller and scattered groups, we name the *Landelijke Organisatie voor Hulp aan Onderduikers* (L.O.), the "National Organization to Aid Divers." This organization, which had its contacts by thousands in many places in the Netherlands, arranged the sheltering and care of the "divers." The *Knokploegen* (K.P.), or "Knuckles Gangs," small but well-chosen teams of men, worked in close contact with the L.O., their job being to attack the rationing offices in order to get possession of the necessary ration cards.

More than one counterfeiting group collaborated with them, making false documents. An important subdivision was formed by the co-operation between the assistance groups and the "good" officials in the rationing offices through whom, clandestinely, genuine ration cards could be furnished to deserving people who had been deprived of their rights by the Germans.

The *Nationaal Steunfonds* (N.S.F.), or National Support Committee, played a very important role in this resistance. It had to provide the money by which the underground work of many organizations was made possible, and a living for those whose rights had been lost. During the German occupation, the N.S.F. distributed tens of millions. Besides voluntary gifts, the capital of this fund consisted of loans which were guaranteed by the Netherlands Government in London and which were furnished by banks and other financial institutions. That this was possible under the Argus-eyes of the penetrating German economic control system shows the ability and the alertness of the organizers of the N.S.F.

To make all this work a success, to keep the Dutch people out of the German labor draft, and to make them feel the importance of "diving," an extensive propaganda was necessary. Besides the groups already named, we must here mention a number of others who engaged in dissemination of information and in the negotiation and establishment of contacts. Among these were the *Nationaal Comité* (N.C.) and the *Raad van Verzet* (R.V.V.), the "Council of Resistance."

A great part of the propaganda was up to the press. The number of pamphlets and brochures which appeared created a very extensive underground periodical press. Besides the papers previously mentioned, there were the "great" papers *Je Maintiendrai*, *Trouw*,

Ons Volk, and *Ons Vrije Nederland*. These were later supplemented by many local mimeographed newsheets. Most of the common newspapers were printed. Before September 1944 very large editions of some of them had already been printed. In a few cases the circulation reached 150,000 copies. We do not need to emphasize what this meant in terms of printing and distribution in a country where the Gestapo was in control.

It is self-evident that with such widespread practical resistance, German countermeasures soon followed. The Gestapo had the task of crushing the resistance. Espionage and provocation were largely employed in this. Protection against these measures was ordered. The K.P. and the R.V.V. took up arms against dangerous S.D. agents, spies, and *provocateurs*. A *Centrale Inlichtingen Dienst* (C.I.D.), "Central Information Service," was formed to supply facts. This service had the use of a secret telephone network, set up by telephone employees who were members of the C.I.D., by means of which the resistance movement could telephone freely throughout the whole country.

NEARING LIBERATION

In the summer of 1944 the K.P., the R.V.V., and the O.D. (an Order Service established to maintain order whenever the Germans would have to withdraw) took joint measures as a civilian army (N.B.S.) to help the Allies in the liberation. The result was a great rush of men armed by the Allies, who, during the liberation, played a significant role at times, especially in the field of sabotage. The work of various espionage groups is also noteworthy. According to Allied testimony, the Netherlands, of all the occupied countries, did the best work in this line. The march of events, the collapse and capitulation of Ger-

many, made unnecessary a spectacular appearance of the N.B.S., of which Prince Bernhard had been appointed the leader.

In the summer of 1944, also, the various resistance groups were co-ordinated under the *Groot Advies Commissie der Illegaliteit* (G.A.C.), or Great Advisory Commission for Illegality. This G.A.C. served to attain a united front during the occupation, and at the same time stood ready to place itself at the service of the legal government after the liberation, which it did. During the occupation, the G.A.C., which was too large for all its members to meet together at once, worked by means of a Contact Committee (C.C.) of five persons.

OUTSTANDING POINTS OF RESISTANCE

The picture we have sketched of the Netherlands resistance would not be at all complete without mentioning four outstanding events.

The first is the spontaneous strike in the spring of 1942 at Amsterdam, occasioned by the first raids on Jews. These raids were felt to be a deadly insult to the best traditions of our people. Amsterdam stopped working. The Germans, at first confused by what had never occurred to them might happen, drowned the strike in blood.

The second is the great strike in May 1943, when, on the occasion of the order to send the Netherlands Army back as war prisoners, work stopped in the greater part of the country. Whole provinces laid down their work. No one worked—officials, workmen, farmers. A sense of freedom spread over the land, only because of this expression of united power. But this strike also, unpremeditated though it was, ended in a frightful massacre.

The third is the railway strike ordered by the Government in London in September 1944. The railroad work-

ers, who had not struck in 1943, now laid aside their work as one man. The strike was well prepared. It was well financed by the N.S.F. After that time almost no Netherlands train ran under German control with Dutch personnel. This strike, ordered as part of the Allied prosecution of the war, was also costly in personal sacrifice of blood and property. Moreover, it brought about the destruction of our modern, quantitatively and qualitatively superior railroad equipment, which the Netherlands has not yet been able to restore.

The fourth important item is our success in thwarting the German plan to deport a large portion of our male population in the winter of 1944-45. This success was the result of the united resistance of all Netherlands underground organizations, and of the fact that our people accepted and complied with their advice. This is the crowning work of the resistance movement. In a city like Amsterdam, practically no starving soul presented himself. And against this resistance the German was powerless.

The great difficulty in the management of the resistance was the tendency on the part of some of our people to lose sight of our general direction and objective. Small but occasionally momentous interests were frequently important factors in the decision to resist or not to resist.

The German capitalized on this. He tried to sow disunity; for instance, by furnishing exemptions, or *Ausweise*, whereby small groups might escape the labor draft. These exemptions often proved worthless. The fight against them was a bitter one. The Dutch peo-

ple did not always understand the danger which these exemptions represented. They crippled the possibility for united, mass resistance.

The exemption evil was conquered, at least within the confines of the Netherlands, in the winter of 1944-45 with the last large-scale deportation. Thus the Netherlands resistance movement reached a fortunate climax.

THE VALUE OF THE CONFLICT

Looking back on the conflict, we must say that it was an important one—not because it was a success in every respect; on the contrary, the defeats were more numerous than the victories. And it had no great importance from a military standpoint. The Dutch people are too temperate not to see it in its true proportions.

The conflict was important because it proved that our people were willing to sacrifice life and property for moral values, freedom, and justice. It was important because it demonstrated the stamina of our people. It was important, finally, because the question at issue was whether our people would go down into modern paganism or remain true to the banner of the Cross and stand on the side of the cause of the Kingdom of God.

Thank God, this was the intrinsic value of our resistance battle. "Yet I have left Me seven thousand in Israel, all the knees which have not bowed unto Baal, and every mouth which hath not kissed him" (I Kings 19:18). Not the success but the fight itself was the victory—because it was the *good* fight.

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The Resistance of the Netherlands Churches

By H. C. Touw

THE Dutch resistance against National Socialism cannot be described or understood unless special attention be given to the resistance carried on by the Dutch churches. Most of the time as a single body, and from the beginning to the end of the German occupation, the churches openly testified and protested on every occasion that there was special reason for doing so. They protested against the persecution and the sterilization of Jews; against depriving the people of all rights and liberties; against the terror and the raids; against immorality; and most of all they protested against the introduction of National Socialism in the press and in the schools, in the Labor Service, and in propaganda directed at the people.

The churches did not remain silent nor did they wait passively until they themselves were attacked. For the sake of the mission entrusted to them and for the sake of the communal life for which they were responsible, they themselves made the attack. The record of their resistance forms a moving chapter of history full of grave tensions and threats, which sometimes passed through a period of calm, again suddenly flared up, but ended only with the liberation of the Netherlands.

To see clearly this struggle for the liberation of the Dutch people, one must understand the motives, the situation, and the history of this struggle by the churches.

THE AWAKENING OF THE CHURCHES

The struggle is especially remarkable for two reasons: first, because Dutch churches had never been accustomed to addressing themselves openly to any government. The largest of the Protes-

tant churches, the Dutch Reformed Church, was at the time of the Reformation the backbone of Dutch resistance against Spain. The development of the national life was very closely connected with this church. But during the last centuries it had suffered from great weakness and a growing indifference, and had always remained silent on public questions. From principle, the smaller denominations generally had refrained from making public accusations, though occasionally, in exceptional cases, this was done. After 1940 this was suddenly changed. To the amazement of the people and the irritation of the Germans, these denominations now suddenly and repeatedly spoke out.

Still more surprising is the fact that the denominations have been in very close communion during the war years. The Christian community in the Netherlands had been divided into many different denominations which had seldom worked together. Common distress now brought a change in all this. As by some miracle, these widely separated denominations found each other, for instance, in the joint sessions of the so-called Inter-Church Discussion Group. This group was the general staff, who developed by mutual consent the strategy and the plans for a common attack. Since 1942 the Roman Catholic Church, which had always gone her own way, has worked with the Protestant churches in planning a united front against the common enemy. Thus it became possible for the churches to speak as one body in protest against the German invader and jointly to address the Dutch people.

This co-operation was a source of constant irritation to the Germans.

They constantly tried to drive a wedge between the churches, especially between the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches. But this effort resulted only in bringing these churches closer together than they had ever been before, and in bringing church leaders into such intimate contact that, when possible, they could act as one body during each successive crisis.

NAZI EFFORT TO WIN THE CHURCHES

We may ask, What was the attitude of National Socialism toward the churches? The tactics of the German regime can be understood only by starting with their racial policy. According to this policy there exists a hierarchy of races: some peoples must be converted to co-operation with National Socialism; others must fit into the new order as inferior peoples. Related races, especially those of Germanic origin, must be won over to this idea. Hence it can be understood that in the Netherlands and in Norway, more than in any other countries, the most energetic efforts were made to win the people over to National Socialism. The aim was to do this by an internal reformation of the people through propaganda, education, and reading matter, and thus slowly to deprive the churches of any significance. For this reason the Nazis tried at first to avoid any fight with the church, and refrained from directly attacking it. Churches were required only to remain silent, make no trouble, and in no way meddle in things concerning public life, but confine their influence to the limited sphere of personal life.

Therefore, this struggle of National Socialism against the churches was primarily a determined effort to deprive them of all influence on public life and to win them over to Nazism.

Thus, constant efforts were made in one way or another to bring social and

charitable work into line with National Socialistic education. This began (at the end of 1940) with an attempt to gain control of all church collections. This attempt failed through the unanimous refusal of the churches. A special collection (the Easter collection) taken up later in the Reformed Church amounted to more than the entire street collection taken up by the Nazis for "Winter Relief." In the Roman Catholic churches, enormous collections were taken up for assistance to the underground. All collections and contributions outside of churches were forbidden. No social gatherings, no youth clubs, were allowed to make any public collections.

Attempts were made later to achieve control over all institutions having any social character. All noneconomic organizations were registered and brought under control. All Jewish directors and officials were removed. Efforts were made to incorporate all charitable work with the Nazi welfare campaigns, such as "Winter Relief" and "People's Service." Numerous evangelical organizations were dissolved or forbidden (for a while the Bible Society was crushed). Other organizations were forced to cease work as they found it impossible to carry out Nazi rules. From every side, all work of any social, cultural, charitable, or diaconal character was exposed to terrible pressure.

YOUTH WORK AND EDUCATION

Most of the youth organizations, Roman Catholic as well as Protestant, were disbanded and forbidden. Propagandists from the S.S. even entered Christian youth institutions to recruit minors for the domestic service of the S.S. The churches were unable to prevent this, but they were able to do two things. First, they tried to carry on all kinds of youth work, either in connection with the church work (as congre-

gations or as Bible study circles), or sub rosa, with all the risks which this involved. Second, they could prevent the enrollment of youth in Nazi youth organizations, ridiculous and unimportant groups planned wholly after the German model. Repeatedly the churches gave warning against the "Labor Service," a Nazi educational plan. Thus young people were aware that the churches were watching over their welfare.

The same thing was true of the parish schools. In the Netherlands a large part of elementary as well as higher education is undertaken by voluntary associations, approved by the authorities, which are of a religious or ecclesiastical character. This Christian education was also a thorn in the flesh of the authorities. All Jewish directors and personnel were eliminated. Only those teachers could be appointed who had been approved by the National Socialist government. Many schoolbooks (reading and history books) were forbidden. Some schools yielded to such rules, but others resisted. Complete nazification of education was never attained by the regime.

THE PRESS AND RADIO

In the denominational press there was also continual conflict between the church and National Socialism. The printed word was a highly important means of promoting the work of the denominations, and innumerable papers and magazines were at their service. In the Nazi system for educating the people, however, it was necessary that all propaganda by the press should be entirely in the hands of the Nazis. The latter tried to press the church papers into the service of Nazi popular education. When this failed, the church press, sooner or later, was forbidden to continue. During the last war years the scarcity of paper was used as a pre-

text for the Nazis to prohibit all sorts of unwanted printed matter. Every time this happened the churches protested against the abolition of their press, but not for one moment did they yield to the temptation of linking themselves with the National Socialist information service for the sake of retaining their own press. They thought, better no press at all than a National Socialist press.

The church was also deprived of the radio for influencing the life of the people. It was precisely in the radio that the German regime saw a powerful means of obtaining influence over the people and imbuing them with National Socialism. Religious broadcasting was severely censored. Only life in its private aspects could be touched upon, and even then much had to be undisclosed. This was true also of both the hymns sung and the prayers offered.

THE CHURCH CHAMPIONS THE PEOPLE

The aim of the Nazis was to keep the churches silent about everything relating to public life. And so the churches were confronted with a terrible alternative. They could either be silent and passive and thus left at peace for the time being, or they could speak out and attack the regime, thus exposing themselves to grave dangers. Throughout the years, and especially at first, voices were heard arguing for avoiding conflict and limiting attention to the individual's spiritual life.

It is extraordinarily significant that the churches repelled this advice as a great temptation. They realized that the gospel of Jesus Christ contains directives for public life as well as for one's private life, and that a separation of the two is not permissible. In the face of the demoniac power of modern heathenism, the church understood that

Jesus Christ had to be recognized as Master in every domain of life. Consciously, and like the prophets of old, the Dutch Church chose to attack a regime which wittingly and willingly had broken the commands of God, and through this choice it has been revealed that there is still—or rather, that there is again—a church in the Netherlands. And through this, also, all enemies of the Church have been made to realize that in these old churches the dynamite of God's Word is still powerful.

The struggle was not only defensive but deliberately offensive. Unasked, the churches attacked. Authorities who deprived the people of all rights, who went to work systematically to destroy the Jewish race, who wanted to force a heathen morality on the people, were denounced. A regime which trod underfoot all the commandments of God for righteousness, mercy, humanity, was shown these eternal truths of God.

For this reason, this struggle of the church in the Netherlands reveals a quite different aspect and march of events from, for instance, the struggle in Germany or even in Norway. In both these countries the churches defended their independence and the rights of the church. But in the Netherlands the churches fought for the state and the people in order to uphold the commandments of God. They were not concerned primarily with their own life and freedom, but with the people in whose midst they lived. This is especially evident, for instance, in their intense activity on behalf of the Jews. It was not a question here of rescuing only a certain group of baptized Jews (members of churches), but of coming to the defense of all the Jewish people and fighting this shameful, anti-Christian anti-Semitism. Thus these churches proved that they were here not for saving themselves but for serving the people.

THE CONVICTION OF THE CHURCH

Why did the churches fight this dangerous battle? Because of their obedience to the Lord of the Church. Not primarily because of a national consciousness, but above all because of a religious call. Their "no" in answer to National Socialism was the reverse side of their "yes" in answer to Jesus Christ. They exposed and fought false gods because they wished to be obedient to the one and only God. They rejected heathen commandments and practices because they knew themselves bound by the commandments of Jesus Christ. They could not remain silent about unrighteousness and terror because they knew that the Bible, when speaking about right and justice, spoke the will of God. Their negative protest found its basis in their positive belief in Jesus Christ, Lord of the Church, Lord of the people. They had to speak out every time the theories and practices of the heathen Nazis were forced upon the people. They felt themselves to be consciously bound to the gospel of Jesus Christ.

OPPOSING VIEWS

Often there were differences of opinion among the churches as to how these things were best done. Each time different considerations came to the fore.

The German regime still had plenty of room in its prisons and its concentration camps for all who opposed it. Already the churches had lost many of their leaders. Would it not be better, therefore, if before everything else they were prudent and limited themselves to general, harmless utterances? Would not others, especially the Jews, run much greater danger if the churches took their part vigorously? For reasons like these, many pleaded that it would be better to say as little as possible and thus run as little danger as possible.

Many excuses were advanced in defense of this point of view.

Others pleaded, to the contrary, that the most outspoken protest would be the most practical one. They were convinced that an uncompromising, clear, frank attitude was part of the very existence of the church and that it would gain much more from the enemy. They wanted the church to utter a firm "no" against the whole Nazi propaganda system and the entire Nazi regime, and in no case whatsoever, be guided by fear of the consequences.

Thus, in the leadership of the church, two factions faced each other—the "prudents" and the "radicals." The former wished to avoid conflict as long as possible and to keep the church out of the battle as far as possible. The latter wished to continue the struggle to the very end, and if need be, sacrifice all church work. During the entire struggle, now one and then the other of these convictions governed the church. It cannot be said that either was displaced by the other or convinced the other. In the government of the church there were continuously periods when the "prudents" prevailed and others when the "radicals" prevailed. Written records of the struggle offer proof that there were constant ups and downs, but it never came to a break between the two factions.

In the Dutch Reformed Church, that great church of the people, it was generally the opinion of the radicals that came to the fore, while in the smaller Protestant churches it was more often that of the prudents. Without doubt, the most dangerous and daring messages were those uttered by the more radical spokesmen of the Dutch Reformed Church. Yet there were periods when this church also was guided by the prudents.

In the Roman Catholic Church, which is governed in the episcopal way,

there could naturally be no question of two conflicting groups. Yet here also the course followed was at times dictated by great prudence, at other times by a strong and decided refusal to yield, and sometimes the most radical protests were voiced from this pulpit.

RESISTANCE THROUGH SERMONS

In what ways did the churches counsel resistance? They could fight only with spiritual weapons, the primary weapon being the sermon. During these years preaching revealed itself as a spiritual power of the highest value. During the most tense periods people unfailingly came to listen to sermons preached by clergy and pastors who fearlessly and clearly denounced the evil doings of National Socialism. In those days, naturally, pastors had to exert the greatest self-control in order not to expose themselves to the danger of needless arrest. At the same time, it could be expected that they would show enough courage to speak openly about the fact that National Socialism was incompatible with Christian beliefs.

Naturally, there were some preachers who discussed this subject more openly and more firmly than did others, thus exposing themselves to greater dangers. Therefore, numerous preachers were arrested and tried because of their utterances and were held in prisons or concentration camps for longer or shorter periods. Roman Catholic priests and Protestant ministers alike died in concentration camps and through death confirmed the truth of their teaching. The gospel silently penetrated into many prisons and camps in the midst of terrible suffering and shameful cruelty. Letters and testimonials from many people have brought this fact to light. And in the prisoners-of-war camps, emergency churches were established where Christians of various de-

nominations gathered to pray and preach, to be baptized and take communion.

During these years, the influence of sermons was very great. It was possible to speak frankly only in churches, even though every sermon and every prayer might bring its author a summons from the Gestapo. Thus during these years, preaching strengthened courage, sharpened the conscience, clarified the understanding, and steeled the resistance of the people.

RESISTANCE THROUGH PROTESTS

There was another form of resistance. It was not only the preachers but the church as a whole that, through the years, openly and unitedly, declared its opposition to National Socialism. Written protests were continually sent out, such as: the ones sent to the High Commissioner, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, in connection with the anti-Jewish measures, in October 1940, and the one about the Labor Service, in October 1942; the one to the German Security Police in connection with the dissolution of the Bible Society, in 1942; the one to Seyss-Inquart on December 31, 1942 about condemning prisoners to death the week after Christmas; the one about the deportation of thousands of young people, in February 1943; the one about the interference with the hospitals, in April 1943; the one about the deportation to Germany of students in May 1943; the one about the sterilization of Jews, in May 1943; the one about the deportation of Christian Jews to Germany in September 1943; the one about the introduction by the Labor Service of the Nazi salute, in November 1943; the one about the spiritual care of prisoners, in July 1944.

Besides all this there were many times when in conferences with the High Commissioner, various S.S. leaders, and Secretaries of Departments, the

opinion and the objections of the church with respect to this or that measure were made known. The most conspicuous of these cases was the great audience before the High Commissioner in February 1942. At this audience, two representatives from the Protestant churches and one from the Roman Catholic Church protested in a detailed argument against the situation in the Netherlands—against injustices, cruelties, measures against the Jews; against forcing National Socialism upon the people.

Did such protests bring positive results? It is difficult to give a clear answer to this question. In many cases the protests had very definite effects. We will cite only two examples. In 1940 it was announced that church collections would henceforth be under supervision and that all charitable work carried on by the church would be incorporated in the National Socialist system of popular education. The churches protested vigorously against these measures, with the result that the whole plan was abandoned and church collections remained absolutely free.

Another case occurred when the churches protested against the deportation of the Dutch Jews, in July 1942, the result being that baptized Jews were, for the time being, not deported to foreign countries, and this actually saved hundreds of lives.

In many other cases, however, protests brought about no perceptible results. Yet the churches were aware that for the sake of their gospel and their rulers, it was their duty to make these protests. They had to speak even though they were not heard.

RESISTANCE THROUGH PASTORAL LETTERS

There was still a third way of carrying on the struggle. The churches reached their congregations and the

people through special messages or pastoral letters proclaimed or read from the pulpit. These messages were heard with the greatest tension and spread among the people with great speed. The Germans especially hated and feared these proclamations. Letters of protest sent to the invader could be thrown into the wastebasket, but the effect of these public proclamations could not be stopped. There were cases when the Germans could be approached through private—and secret—conversations, but public proclamations that brought about convulsions in the public mind—these must be prevented. Therefore the circulation of such proclamations was exposed to the greatest danger; to send them by mail was not safe, and finally they had to be distributed by church messengers.

In these proclamations from the pulpit, the resistance of the churches was revealed most sharply and clearly. It is true that according to some people, not enough was said. Nevertheless, what was said constituted a great deal. In the first place, the people were kept informed about the nature of accusations and protests which the churches made against the invader. But in addition, the people were entreated to remain faithful to God's commandments and to resist the temptations of National Socialism. A clear insight was given into the faults and sins of this anti-Christian ideology. At times such a pulpit proclamation might be merely a short and simple elementary declaration uttered in clear language at just the right moment. Again it might be a detailed, broad, and deep instruction which taught and guided the congregation at times of difficult conflicts.

Together with pastoral letters, these messages formed the very marrow of church resistance. They are a series of documents which reveal how the church spoke, and give proof that Dutch

churches did not succumb to temptations offered by National Socialism but that they resisted, using the weapon with which these modern heathen could best be attacked, the gospel of Jesus Christ.

FREEDOM OF THE CHURCH MAINTAINED

We will now attempt to make a résumé of the history of Dutch church resistance.

In May 1940 the Netherlands was attacked and occupied by Germany. In June 1940, in the historic Hall of the Knights, the High Commissioner, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, took over the government with a declaration in which he guaranteed, with fine promises, the freedom and rights of the people. Everyone who knew the value of promises given by the German regime viewed the future with deep anxiety, but at that time there seemed to be no direct reason for the churches to speak out immediately.

However, the Dutch Reformed Church spoke forthwith on one important point—the church's prayer for Her Majesty, the Queen. The church insisted that this prayer be given a lasting place in its liturgy and that it should be used openly; that the church must not yield to pressure brought by some to omit it. It was not a question of making a demonstration of our love for the royal house, but of using this prayer for the Queen because she was considered to be the legal head of the church, even though she could not, for the time being, exercise her sovereignty. It was, after all, a question of the freedom of the church. Owing a great deal, no doubt, to the firm, united attitude of the churches about this question, the Germans, in general, allowed the prayer to be used. Whenever some preacher was interrogated or arrested in connec-

tion with this matter, he could always refer to the sacred words of the Synod: "It is my duty." This argument never failed to have the desired result.

PROTEST AGAINST FIRST ANTI-JEWISH MEASURES

A new period began in the struggle of the churches when, in September 1940, the first anti-Jewish measures were taken. The introduction of the so-called Aryan clause in Germany had opened the eyes of many people there to the devilish, inhuman character of the regime. This happened in the Netherlands too. All persons of Jewish ancestry were forbidden to occupy government positions. It was evident that this was the first step in entirely banning Jews from public life and in finally eliminating them altogether as a people.

Not everyone saw immediately how much was at stake in this question, but those of wider vision realized that the moment had come to speak out. Those who deny liberty to the Jews fight against a people who may be called God's people—a people for whom God has certain plans. In the Holy Scriptures the people of Israel are represented as being a called and chosen people. Therefore we should not despise them or consider them inferior. Moreover, from the standpoint of charity and humanity alone, it is not permissible to segregate citizens of Jewish blood from the people as a whole.

For these reasons, six Protestant churches sent a letter to the High Commissioner, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, on October 24, 1940. A brief résumé of this letter was communicated to the people in a proclamation from the pulpit. The text was as follows:

Excellency: The undersigned who represent the following Protestant Churches of the Netherlands in matters pertaining to

their relations with the Government, namely:

1. The Dutch Reformed Church
2. The Reformed Churches in The Netherlands
3. The Christian Reformed Church
4. The Reunited Reformed Churches in the Netherlands
5. The Remonstrant Church
6. The Baptist Union of Holland

feel obliged to address themselves to Your Excellency because of the recently proclaimed laws under which the appointment and promotion of officials and other persons of Jewish blood has been forbidden in the Netherlands.

The purpose of these laws, in which important spiritual interests are closely involved, is considered by them to be contrary to Christian compassion. Moreover, these measures affect members of the churches themselves, in cases when these members, in the last generation, have embraced Christianity and, with perfect justification, have been accepted by the churches, as required in the Holy Scriptures (Rom. 10:12, Gal. 3:28).

But the Churches are moved most of all because this touches a people from whom the Saviour of the world was born and for whom Christianity prays that they may learn to recognize their Master and King!

For these reasons, they address Your Excellency with the fervent request and petition for the cancellation of the above measures. They rest on the promise given by Your Excellency in a solemn hour, to respect our national character and to refrain from forcing on our country an ideology which is foreign to us.

The form and wording of these addresses became much more outspoken and stern later on. In this first proclamation, the tone is still very cautious. It is a request, not a protest or an accusation. It is written as to one who has erred somewhat but not too seriously. How different this was from the protest sent later, in May 1943, in regard to sterilization laws! Its signifi-

cance, however, lies in the fact that as soon as these anti-Jewish measures had been announced, and at a time when nobody dared to protest openly, the churches did not remain silent but revolted openly against them.

PROTESTS AGAINST GENERAL CONDITIONS

Resistance entered a new phase now that the Nazi regime was revealing its true nature more and more in increasing terror on the streets, violation of laws concerning public life, attack on personal liberty, arbitrary arrests and imprisonments, the continuous oppression of the Jews. In the execution of these orders members of the Netherlands Government incurred grave responsibility. It was especially strange that the leaders of the ministries, the Secretaries General of the Departments, lent their support to the execution of these measures. Because of this, the Protestant churches sent a letter to the Secretaries General on March 5, 1941, in which they declared themselves for right and justice, truth and charity. They wrote that according to their deepest convictions, the state of affairs in public life was contrary to the requirements of the Word of God. Therefore, they demanded that in the conduct of the Government, justice, truth, and charity be recognized as guides. The Archbishop of the Catholic Church expressed himself at the same time in a similar way.

The intention was to read this letter to congregations from the pulpit on March 23. The Gestapo wished to prevent this at any cost. The secretary of the Synod, who was considered responsible for this step, was suddenly arrested. He was accused of having intended this proclamation as a signal for a general revolt. Later the secretary was freed, but of course the proclamation could not be made. This

gives some idea of the tremendous tension connected with such proclamations. The invaders as well as the people began to understand the true meaning of the church. The Germans understood that in the church they had a powerful opponent, while the people understood that the church was their defender and helper.

The renewal of regulations concerning prostitution constituted an entirely new cause for public protest. This time, only the Dutch Reformed Church protested. The protest was followed up by a proclamation from the pulpit on October 12, 1941. In this proclamation the church gave warning about the grave dangers of moral and social degeneration, the disruption of marriage and sex life, the selfishness of parents, and the dissoluteness of the youth. The church protested especially against the regulation of immorality which was so entirely opposed to Christian charity.

Meanwhile, in public life, terror, persecution of the Jews, and compulsory National Socialism continued intolerably. It became increasingly difficult to live a Christian life. The regime felt its power more and more, and tried more and more to destroy systematically the Jewish people and to poison everybody with propaganda for National Socialism. In the deep distress of the people, the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches at last found each other. The thing which had never happened since the Reformation, now occurred: Catholic bishops and Protestant churchmen now spoke in perfect accord in the name of Dutch Christianity. For the first time, they now entered into direct conversations with the High Commissioner, Dr. Seyss-Inquart.

A FRUITLESS AUDIENCE

On February 17, 1942, a strange audience took place. Two spokesmen

of Protestant churches and one of the Roman Catholic Church handed to the High Commissioner an address in which they expressed grave objections. The address was further explained orally. The High Commissioner was told frankly the opinions of the churches.

Limiting themselves to specific observations about questions in which the church was especially concerned, they mentioned first the prevailing unlimited lawlessness.

Every individual is without protection exposed to arrest without definite accusation, detention without hearing, and to imprisonment in camps or elsewhere, for indefinite periods and without due process.

Further, we must mention the treatment of those of Jewish ancestry. The churches are not here expressing their judgment of anti-Semitism which, for that matter, they reject in principle for Christian reasons; neither do they wish to express themselves about the general political measures taken against the Jews. They wish only to speak about the fact that during the year numerous Jews have been made prisoners and have been transported to other places and that since then, official news has been received telling of the frightfully large number of deaths among those deported. The churches would indeed be negligent of their duty if they did not demand of the authorities that a complete stop be put to these measures. This is a claim based on Christian charity.

The churches ask further that you give attention to the fact that the National Socialist ideology and philosophy, which is accepted by but a small part of our people, is being forced upon all our people by the authorities. Because of their belief in Christ the churches reject this ideology, in principle. But neither have they come to discuss this problem. They only wish to oppose the *forcing* of this ideology upon the people. To mention only a few ways, this is being done in the form of government decrees concerning justice and education, associational life and the press. It becomes more and more difficult for Christians to live according to their beliefs;

every moment brings one into conflict with his conscience when, along with others, he must do things which he is unable to do with a clear conscience, but cannot refuse without exposing his family and himself to the most dire consequences.

The churches feel keenly about this situation, but it is not primarily for this reason that they are addressing you. No, it is because three of the basic principles of our social life are being threatened: justice, charity, and freedom of thought, which after all are anchored in our religion. When these higher values are threatened, it is the duty of the churches to bear witness thereof against those responsible and even against those in power.

The answer of the High Commissioner showed clearly that he entirely failed to understand the concept of the church. Among other things, he argued that in regard to the Jews there could be no question of mercy, at the most of justice; that conflict between the churches and National Socialism could be avoided if the former would mind their own business. His argument ended with an appeal to fight against bolshevism.

This conversation was symbolic of the whole struggle between the church and National Socialism. Two worlds which were entirely foreign to each other and which could not understand or convince each other had collided.

PROTEST AGAINST DEPORTATION OF JEWS

Meanwhile, the terrors of National Socialism continued. The opposing parties were at swords' points. In July 1942 the Nazis began to deport Jews to eastern Europe. Every day six hundred Jews were placed on transports of unknown destination under indescribable conditions. Immediately the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches sent in a sharp telegraphic message of protest. It was increasingly evident that the Nazis were beginning in earn-

est their attempt to kill off the entire people of Israel. A hatred of God was revealed in this hatred of Israel, a hatred of that God whom both Jews and Christians worship. The church saw in this hatred that the devilish, extreme, and inhuman character of National Socialism was being uncovered. Thus the struggle inevitably grew more and more into a struggle for the Jewish people.

When in 1942 the churches made a fresh protest, the Gestapo started a new method of intimidation. At the time when the churches had decided to communicate their protest to the people from the pulpit, an S.S. officer suddenly appeared before the Synod with the following communication: "If the telegram is read to the people, all non-Aryan Christians will be deported; if the message is not read, they may stay." The Synod would not accept responsibility for the death of non-Aryan Christians, and decided not to read the message. It was read, however, in the Catholic Church, with the result that Catholic non-Aryan Christians were placed on the deportation list while the Protestant ones were not. In this way an attempt was made to confuse the churches by bringing them into conflict with their conscience. Was it wise to continue protestation if by doing so Christians of Jewish origin were brought into serious danger? Should this public protestation be dropped if by doing so human lives could be saved?

In the following years protests from the united churches were made, such as one against Labor Service as a National Socialist educational instrument (1942); one against the deportation of workers (February 1943); one after the May rebellion which was smothered in blood (May 1943). A pastoral letter sent by the Roman Catholic bishops spoke in very plain language. During a conflict which involved the deepest hu-

miliation and oppression, and at a time when the Nazis were driving innumerable people to despair, the message of the bishops resounded:

Notwithstanding all the oppression we have suffered from a people of another ideology, and notwithstanding that people's promise of all kinds of material advantages, our people will never yield to National Socialism if only they will remain true to the faith of our fathers: *estate fortis in fide!* (Be strong in the faith!)

In September 1943 came the order for the deportation to Germany of the last Christian Jews remaining in the Netherlands at Camp Westerbork. And this in the face of the solemn and definite promise that these baptized Jews would be safe! The Nazis even tried to get the churches to co-operate in this plan. Orally and in writing, the churches resolutely and repeatedly protested. In spite of this the deportation took place and the Jews were sent to Theresienstadt, the center where those Jews who still received some protection were gathered.

A DOCTRINAL EXEGESIS

Of the numerous church messages during these years, there are still two which should be mentioned because they proved to be of special importance and bearing. One of these was a detailed Pastoral Letter of the Dutch Reformed Church (November 1943) on "Church and National Socialism." This was not only an accusation, an admonition, a protest, but a profound lesson, and an analytical study of the complete antagonism of these two concepts. It was shown in this letter that National Socialism is a religion which worships another god, offers another redemption, and teaches other commandments than those known to Christianity. Anti-Semitism was analyzed as being the

haughty philosophy of the natural man. Biblical and National Socialist conceptions of people, blood, land, and state were contrasted. It was proved, on this basis, that it is impossible to reconcile Christian beliefs with those of National Socialism and that no compromise between the two is possible. The request that the church co-operate with National Socialism must be viewed and rejected as a dangerous temptation.

In the struggle against the teaching of National Socialism, this pastoral letter was seen to be a valuable weapon which will undoubtedly so remain for the future.

PROTEST AGAINST STERILIZATION

As an outstanding expression of the church we mention finally the letter of May 21, 1943, sent by the united churches to the High Commissioner as a protest against measures for the sterilization of Jews married to non-Jews. When heathen immorality sank to this lowest level, it was denounced with the most profound indignation through this Christian protest, which called the people and the authorities to rally to Christian commandments.

Now in these last weeks they have begun the sterilization of those of so-called mixed marriages. But God, who created heaven and earth, and whose commandments are for every human being, and before whom Your Excellency will also have to appear for a final reckoning, has said: "Be fruitful and multiply" (Gen. 1:28). Sterilization means a mutilation of the body and the soul and is absolutely contrary to God's commandments not to dishonor our neighbors, nor to hate them or harm or kill them. Sterilization is not only a violation of these godly commands but also of human rights. It is the logical end result of an anti-Christian racial doctrine which supports human extermination. It is the result of a boundless self-glorification and an outlook on the world and life which renders impossible a Christian and humane life.

For these reasons, the Christian churches in the Netherlands, as commissioned by God and on the ground of His Word, say to Your Excellency: It is the duty of Your Excellency to prevent those who wish to employ sterilization from carrying on this shameful practice.

We entertain no illusions. We realize that we can hardly expect that Your Excellency will heed the voice of the church, the voice of the gospel, the voice of God. But what we cannot humanly expect we may still hope for as Christians. The living God has the power to incline the heart of Your Excellency to conversion and obedience. Therefore, we pray to God for this, for the good of Your Excellency and for the good of our suffering people.

RESISTANCE STRENGTHENED BY OPPOSITION

When one compares the prophetic tone of this dignified protest with the timid request of October 1940, a great difference in form and tone is evident. The difference is characteristic of the development of the resistance of the churches. Resistance began with a clear but prudent request which held some hope of consideration; but as the enemy revealed its anti-Christian character more and more, resistance grew into a flaming protest against a tyranny which was absolutely opposed to the commandments of God.

It is true that there were periods and moments of weakness. One may certainly ask whether it would not have been better if from the very beginning the churches had been more outspoken. Yet it is an undeniable fact that over and over again, the churches in the Netherlands spoke an absolute "No" against National Socialism. The churches made a prophetic attack on a regime which trod on all laws of God and man. It is of the greatest significance for the future that the churches did not fight this struggle for themselves, but for the people for whom they felt themselves responsible. Through this struggle the

churches themselves have learned that their calling is to bear witness to God's commandments to the people and to the authorities. These terrible and difficult years will therefore be a future blessing and responsibility.

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The Resistance of the Medical Profession

By W. F. NOORDHOEK HEET

IN AN atmosphere of liberty it is almost impossible to recall those horrible years of the occupation. It is almost impossible to explain to a nation that has not experienced an occupation how it was here in those terrible years that haunt us like a nightmare and that have left our country impoverished, weary, and wounded.

It is difficult to tell about those years because we would prefer to forget them. We must progress. We must reconstruct. We want to restore a feeling of confidence, security, joy, and zest for work. The period of lies, deceit, extortion, blackmail, and violence lies behind. At first our people did not quite realize the situation. How was it possible? Our country trampled under foot in five days! Belgium and France beaten in a few weeks! No help from England forthcoming! It could not be true. Fearfully, hesitatingly, people looked for solid ground under their feet. But England held out, and later help came from the United States.

And in the beginning the Germans pretended to be kind. They promised everything. Those who knew the history of National Socialism and saw through the tactics continued to be on the alert and warned. They feared that the Huns would deceive public opinion step by step, and that must be prevented. But pretty soon the Germans showed their face more clearly, and by means of blackmail, force, or violence they tried to penetrate all organizations and associations in order to put across their National Socialist ideology.

THE SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF MEDICINE

In the case of the Netherlands Society for the Advancement of Medicine

this was done by making the Board of Directors choose between a commission appointed to manage the society and acceptance of the leader of the Medical Front (the pro-German physicians in the Dutch National Socialist Movement) as advisory member of the Board of Directors. At the same time a dozen proposals were summarized as a guide to this advisory member: among others, expulsion of Jewish physicians from the society, aid in setting Netherlands doctors to work in Germany, influence of the society on appointments to medical offices and teaching positions, and the planning of a Chamber of Medicine.

The Board of Directors resolved, after long hesitation and some opposition, to accept the second alternative.

The majority of the doctors did not like this, and throughout the country there was a movement to leave the society. This involved great risks; for in our country the majority of the doctors get the greater part of their income from fees in connection with health insurance, and to be able to carry on a health insurance practice one must be a member of the Society for the Advancement of Medicine. Aside from reprisals by the Germans, there was thus the risk that if the health insurance funds formally stood by their contract, most of the doctors, not having a relatively large private practice, would be thrown out of employment.

The doctors, however, understood the situation. If one accepted any interference from the National Socialist Movement (N.S.B.), one stood at the entrance of a trap. The end would inevitably mean the nazification of the profession, with all its wretched conse-

quences for doctor and patient, such as the denial of professional secrecy, and large-scale sterilization. This is an operation for which it would be difficult to find scientific and ethical justification, and it involves a mortality rate of 3 to 5 per cent, according to some German writers. In the course of four years an estimated 200,000 people had already been sterilized in Germany. Even the medical ethics of National Socialism held that the individual was nothing, the nation everything.

The majority of the doctors took the risk and withdrew from membership in the society. The Board of Directors resigned on September 27, 1941.

"MEDICAL CONTACT"

The doctors who had resigned realized that for the struggle that would undoubtedly come, they would have to offer a solid front and act in common. Very soon the nucleus of the secret organization of physicians, "Medical Contact," was formed. Its structure was extremely simple. At the head was a Central Committee consisting, in the beginning, of seven members, later of eleven members. A few of them, together with some other doctors, became district leaders, one for each of the eleven provinces. Under each one there were various divisional leaders in charge of groups of doctors varying from about twenty to five hundred. The bigger divisions were further subdivided into sections, each with a leader.

By means of this organization with indirect vote the doctors on the periphery could be reached. Most of the reports of the Central Committee were sent out in writing. The district leaders transmitted the reports to the divisional leaders, who attended to the multigraphing for their divisions and took care of the distribution through the section leaders. The reverse procedure was used for reports from the

doctors to the Central Committee. In this way the committee learned what was going on in the various parts of our country. It could then warn other groups and suggest the line of conduct to be followed.

During the struggle it was often necessary for various leading persons to get in touch with groups of doctors or with individuals. Several doctors consequently knew the names of one or more members of the Central Committee; but never did one of those who were taken prisoner divulge these names. The Central Committee met each time at a different place, and took other precautions as much as possible. Almost all members of the committee spent short or long periods in a prison or concentration camp; sometimes on account of "Medical Contact," sometimes for other underground work. But the Germans were never able to prove what their functions were in the medical world, nor did the activity of the Central Committee stop; places that became vacant were always temporarily filled by others.

RESISTANCE TO CHAMBER OF MEDICINE

The first act of "Medical Contact" was to present a letter signed by 4,500 doctors to a representative of the High Commissioner and to a representative of the military commander on December 5, 1941. It had become known that the Germans had planned to set up a Chamber of Medicine. They hoped, by making every practicing physician automatically a member, to force the doctors into the strait jacket of National Socialism. In this letter we wrote among other things:

The Netherlands doctors have heard of your intention to issue a decree governing physicians and to establish a Chamber of Medicine. It will not have escaped you that when we doctors left our Society for the Advancement of Medicine, our pur-

pose was to express a conviction, namely, that the office of physician, governed by its own moral and intellectual standards, should remain free of political interference. However much has changed in the conception of societies and nations in the course of time, the physician has remained, undisputedly, the guardian of a sacred trust: respect for life, compassion for the sick. We anticipate the publication of your decree with great anxiety. We know that you represent a very definite philosophy of life. According to your definition of the task of the physician, the care of race and nation is placed before that of the individual. We recognize the duty of caring for the nation's health only in so far as it derives from, and is not in conflict with, the first and most sacred precept of the physician: respect for life and the bodily well-being of the patient who entrusts himself to his care. We consider it our duty to declare that we shall remain true to the high standards on which our profession has been based as long as man can remember and that in the exercise of our profession we can let no other considerations count than such as are acceptable to our conscience, our idea of duty and our science.

Naturally, on December 19 the decree governing physicians was nevertheless published. Immediately the quisling who was appointed President of the Chamber of Medicine issued his first orders. Promptly almost all the doctors (3,500) to whom these orders could apply informed him that they would not obey them.

The enemy remained silent. No reprisals took place. But the fight had only just begun. Afterwards, both individually and jointly, we had constantly to resist attacks by the National Socialists.

Jointly we resisted the announcement of the Chamber of Medicine in the sense that we refused in large numbers to fill in the application blank that the Chamber of Medicine sent us. Of the approximately 7,000 doctors, probably

only about 1,500 (including 250 N.S.B.-ers and 600 Jewish doctors whom we always advised not to participate in the resistance) returned the blanks. As a result, the quisling of the Chamber of Medicine imposed large fines after a few months.

The danger that this would ruin us financially was so great that we eluded his power by making use of an opportunity created by the decree itself. One of the articles of the decree stated that a physician could renounce the right to carry on the medical profession. In so doing he also lost the right to carry the title "doctor." On March 24, 1943, approximately 6,000 doctors sent a letter to the President of the Chamber of Medicine informing him that they renounced the right to carry on their profession. This also lost them membership in the Chamber of Medicine. Throughout the country the next day name plates were removed or the word "doctor" covered up. The patients continued to be treated as usual.

The Germans considered this action a demonstration against the occupying power. They therefore intervened. The cover strips had to be removed, the name plates hung up. There were threats of serious reprisals.

The doctors conceded this demand, as our action was not aimed directly against the occupying power, but was a means of eluding the grasp of the Chamber of Medicine. But it was essential that there should be no misunderstanding on the part of the Germans regarding our attitude. For this purpose a letter was sent to the Deputy Minister of Social Affairs, who had been the bearer of the German demands, in which it was stated, among other things, that the doctors no longer considered themselves members of the Chamber of Medicine, and that if the occupying power was of opinion that on account of their declaration they

could no longer exercise their profession, they were prepared to accept this consequence.

Peace returned. The fines were withdrawn; the prestige of the Chamber of Medicine had received a hard blow.

HEALTH INSURANCE FUNDS

Together we continued to resist the interference of the N.S.B. in the health insurance. This was done partly by means of a letter from 3,500 of us to the executives of the insurance funds in which we participated, informing them that in the event the administration got into N.S.B. hands, we would cease our work with these insurance funds.

After this action the N.S.B. again and again cunningly tried to get the insurance funds into its hands. But it did not succeed. They did not risk another public conflict.

RESISTANCE TO FORCED LABOR

At the end of 1942 Chief Medical Councilor Reuter, the German "warden" of the Netherlands physicians, summoned a few dozen doctors to work in Germany. A contract submitted to them contained among other things: "For military reasons Mr. _____ receives a uniform-like suit."

When this became known there quickly followed a letter to Reuter, signed by 4,300 doctors, in which we expressed our indignation at the fact that Netherlands workers were taken to Germany against their will and that now several doctors had been called up also. Furthermore, we declared that we considered this measure a violation of the war regulations of the country, that it represented a menace to national health in the Netherlands, and that it furthermore ran counter to our patriotism and national honor—"spiritual possessions that are so highly valued in your fatherland and of which so very

little account is taken with regard to the Netherlands people. . . . No Netherlands doctor with self-respect will voluntarily submit to this measure." All the doctors who were called up went underground. The step taken had complete success. Only N.S.B. doctors worked in Germany.

In order for "Medical Contact" to be able to support doctors who had to go underground for such actions, a fund was started, each doctor participating in the resistance making monthly payments to it; in this way approximately 400,000 guilders a year were collected.

CHAMBER OF MEDICINE SILENCED

In the first half of 1943 a letter in the name of the doctors was written to the High Commissioner in which attention was called to the disquieting phenomenon of the deterioration of the food situation. At that time the daily ration amounted to approximately 1,600 calories. Furthermore, we protested against the fact that the supply of extra food for sick people was inadequate for their recovery and that a considerable part of our food was carried off to Germany against the provisions of The Hague Convention of 1907 in which it was explicitly laid down that requisitions could be made only for the army of occupation. This letter also dealt with conditions in the concentration camps, "where so many healthy young Netherlands perish miserably in a short time."

Our letters were always distributed widely by us and by all kinds of groups of underground workers or by the underground papers, and in this way our action also stimulated resistance among our people.

The High Commissioner was so irritated, partly by our action, that he issued a decree on May 18, 1943 in which the doctors' declarations of March 1943 were declared null and void and

which formally reinstated them in the Chamber of Medicine.

To this the doctors replied on June 23 with a letter to the High Commissioner in which they informed him, among other things, that they protested against the fact that efforts were again and again being made to force the doctors into accepting an ideology that was not theirs. Speaking of the Chamber of Medicine, we wrote:

It must have been clear to you that we doctors dislike this imported institution which has been forced upon us. . . . During the period that the Chamber of Medicine has existed, it has again and again encountered the doctors' spontaneous resistance and has achieved nothing.

Thirty-five hundred letters reached the High Commissioner. He took them as an insult, and the consequences were serious. The Security Service (*Sicherheitsdienst*) took drastic measures. Three hundred and sixty doctors were carried off to a concentration camp. A far larger number went underground. The consultation rooms of many were sealed up. Big fines were to be imposed and there were threats of confiscation of houses and household goods.

But it very soon turned out that the Germans did not like the situation they had created. After many devious consultations, six doctors had an interview with a representative of the S.D. (Security Service). A declaration was drawn up that obtained the approval of the High Commissioner. The signing of this declaration was to exempt the doctors from further prosecution. The declaration merely said that the contents of the letter of June 23 were not intended to offend the High Commissioner. Nothing of the contents of the letter was withdrawn.

It was important that after this event the Chamber of Medicine remained entirely silent. Even its organ, the *Doc-*

tors' Journal, did not appear after August. The imprisoned colleagues were released after six weeks.

PROTESTS FROM DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS

At the end of 1944 we again wrote a letter in the name of the doctors to the High Commissioner. In this we sharply protested, among other things, against the infringement on the independence and the properties of the association "The Netherlands Red Cross," whose administration had been dismissed by the Nazis and replaced by an N.S.B. management; against the situation created in our fatherland by the Germans, such as the serious shortage of essential foodstuffs (the daily rations had declined to a food value of approximately 500 calories); and against the deportation and the forcing of Dutchmen to work for the enemy. By tens of thousands our men were being dragged out of their houses at that time or seized in the street to work on the fortifications of the Germans in our country. The transports were beastly. The starving fellows had to march for days or were removed like animals in overcrowded freight trains. This letter ended thus:

We protest against the enemy's abuse of his power over the Netherlands people and we point out that this manner of acting is a reproach to the pronouncement of the German Fuehrer, according to which his nation is the bearer of a high culture! Finally, we point out that the German occupation authority, by the continuation of such ill treatment of the Netherlands people, is abandoning all claim to the respect of humanity.

Besides the above-mentioned act, the managing boards of hospitals, especially of many denominational hospitals, became very active when there was a risk that the N.S.B. might get a voice in the affairs of the hospitals.

They wrote a letter to the High Commissioner in April 1943 in which they informed him that they and the staff would no longer be able to take the responsibility for the work of the hospitals under their management if the occupation authority were to requisition and deport nurses and perhaps doctors; if the hospitals were placed under National Socialist management; if the doctors were generally compelled, as had occurred in some places, to lay down their work; or if the care of the health in the hospitals were placed in National Socialist hands.

Not we, but those who want to force a philosophy of life on us which conflicts in principle with the essence of our work or want to force us to do things in conflict with our consciences as Christians and as Netherlanders, would have to bear the responsibility for the serious consequences which would surely be inevitable.

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS UPHELD

Besides the joint action by the doctors, a great many of us fought individually. Again and again it was made difficult for us to fulfill the obligation which our profession imposes upon us to protect the interests of our patients.

Take, for example, the decree regarding the reporting of patients with bullet or stab wounds. This meant a violation of a professional secret and our incorporation into the German political machine. It was disobeyed by the doctors en bloc, as was the order requiring us to furnish information about patients to the German or Dutch police. When the Germans dragged away the Jewish patients from mental and other hospitals, they demanded that doctors should make the identifications. The doctors who refused this were in most cases taken along. Yet most of them refused any collaboration whatsoever.

New coercive measures were constantly being introduced. There was

the order to examine children who were sent by N.S.B. organizations to Germany, ostensibly for their health; in reality, of course, to poison them still more thoroughly with National Socialist propaganda. The Germans did not succeed in finding any "Netherlands" doctors to do this.

There was another order, one to participate in the German Military Medical Service in Holland. The doctors again refused. They were, however, prepared to render first aid to a German soldier in an emergency. But in no case would they allow themselves to become part of the German war machine. Still another order required them to examine workmen who had to work for the German war industry or on the fortifications in our country. This too was refused by all the associated doctors. I could give a number of other examples of the German system of coercion, but that would make my discourse too long.

A UNITED FRONT

The doctors in the Netherlands were able to fight only because the vast majority of them presented a solid front and followed the instructions of the Central Committee. The committee itself, which met on one or more days a week, soon grew into a real team. After careful weighing of pros and cons, often after consultation with the peripheral sections, joint action was begun. In this we were constantly supported by the sympathy that we found among our colleagues and by the courage that so many demonstrated.

If a doctor was asked how it happened that he had written literally the same letter as his colleagues, he gave the stereotyped answer that he had found the model of this letter in his mailbox and that he so fully agreed with the contents that he had complied with the request appended to the model

to copy the letter and to mail it on a given date. Never did one of the Germans suspect whence these models came! They always suspected that there was communistic propaganda behind it!

A NOBLE FIGHT

Again and again we doctors were faced with the task of fulfilling our professional or national duty with the possibility, more often than not with the certainty, of being punished; frequently even the death penalty threatened.

Of course there were doctors who allowed their fear to carry them away, and who yielded when they were personally threatened; but fortunately there were very many who had the courage and strength of mind to stick to their guns. They were and are for us shining examples, the mighty nobles of our profession.

Many—hundreds—spent some time in the notorious prisons and concentration camps; scores, perhaps even hun-

dreds, died in the struggle during their incarceration or facing a firing squad. They had the courage to throw themselves into the fight against the enemy with their whole personality, with their life at stake. They are the symbol of our fundamental thinking, of our readiness to make sacrifices, of our patriotism. They fought out of the conviction that the ethical standards of medicine must be defended at all cost. They were the pillars of the resistance. They kept the conscience of our people alive. It is with a strong and warm feeling of gratitude to the fighters in the resistance movement that I conclude this article.

On us rests the duty to do justice to the fight these men fought, with the understanding that in our social life and in our medical profession we must hold high the principles of purity, righteousness, and love of humanity that guided them, and that for us these sentiments must prove the most important motive forces of our conduct.

W. F. Noordhoek Hegt, M.D., a practicing physician, was a member of the Central Committee of Medical Contact during the occupation.

The Spirit of the Dutch People During the Occupation

By J. M. ROMEIN

IT would be improper to engage in any survey of public opinion in the Netherlands during the war without stating that such a study at the moment, and at best, could hardly be more than—as it is in this case—the personal impressions of someone who spent the entire period of occupation in the Netherlands, moving about in all circles, except the Nazi and the pro-German, of course, and who from beginning to end gave his attention to this question to the best of his ability.

There are, of course, practically no statistics. The Netherlands was not acquainted with Gallup polls. Indeed, an "Institute of Public Opinion" would have been unable to function freely. However, the "Netherlands Statistical Foundation" has formulated a number of questions in co-operation with the "Association for Opinion Study" which was organized shortly after the liberation. But because of the lack of means of communication, replies were received only from the three western provinces of North Holland, South Holland, and Utrecht; and because retrospective polls, furthermore, are of only relative interest, we shall have to use these findings with the greatest of caution.¹

To secure a clear picture of our task is particularly difficult, since the character of the Dutch people, largely as a result of its history, is such that it is powerfully impelled in a variety of directions. Therefore greatly divergent views are common, making it impractical to say about any question that the people of the Netherlands ever had or has this or that opinion concerning it.

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the statistics in the following pages have been drawn from the sources mentioned.

POLITICAL VARIETY

Nothing can serve better to illustrate this variety of personal opinions than the very sentiment which, superficially viewed, united the people during the years of occupation more than any other could have done then or in the past. Not more than 4 per cent of the Netherlands joined the N.S.B. (the Dutch Nazi party), and this percentage probably fluctuated greatly during the war years, increasing while Germany seemed to be winning and decreasing when it became more and more clear that she would lose the war. Except for this small minority, the Dutch people were of one mind in rejecting Nazi principles. But if we were to inquire into the motives for the rejection, a closer analysis would show the existence of no fewer than eight classes, as follows: 21 per cent condemned the Nazis among us because of their treason; 18 per cent because of their slavish imitation of the German system; in the case of 18 per cent the dictatorship and the terror seemed to be the stumbling block; 7 per cent had religious scruples; for 6 per cent the main objection was the anti-Semitism and racial theories of the Nazis; 8 per cent objected to their principles without giving any specific reason; 15 per cent objected to their behavior, or rather misbehavior; finally, 7 per cent either could give no particular motive for their instinctive objections or mentioned other reasons than those listed above.

The attachment to old tradition on the one hand, the desire to form one's own opinion on the other, and finally, a multitude of interests and attitudes caused the political picture of the Netherlands to become immensely com-

plicated, and not to the American observer alone. In this connection, too, the pressures of the occupation led to at least a temporary simplification. All existing political parties with the exception of the N.S.B. were forbidden. The desire to have a voice in the assembly, or at least to have one in the future, led, in the early years of the occupation, to the organization of the "Netherlands Union" in which a number of political groups joined, burying their differences. But the union, which as a formal political party had to be legally recognized, was compelled to make too many concessions to the victorious enemy, and yet could not meet his exacting demands, and was finally outlawed. Many of the members later found their way into the underground movement.

This experiment in unity during the war seems, nevertheless, to have been too brief. After the war the old parties came back, even though hesitantly. The replies to three retrospective questions recently addressed to a sample of the people of the Netherlands reflect more or less clearly the multicolored political situation. To the question: Do you hold the German people or only the Nazis responsible for the suffering endured by our people? 57 per cent of the replies held the Nazis alone responsible, while 38 per cent blamed the entire German people. However, if we separate the replies according to political party sympathies, the results are as given in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Political sympathy	Responsibility placed on German people (Per cent)	Responsibility placed on Nazis alone (Per cent)
Communist	29.0	66.0
Socialist	36.0	61.0
Roman Catholic	36.0	60.0
None	38.0	56.0
Orthodox-Protestant	41.5	55.0
Liberal	44.0	51.0

Equally scattered were the replies to the question: For what great power do you have the greatest liking? The replies as a whole showed that 48 per cent liked America best, 22 per cent England, and 9 per cent Russia; the rest named other countries or had no preference. A division according to political party sympathies yielded the results shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2

Political sympathy	Country preferred		
	America (Per cent)	England (Per cent)	U.S.S.R. (Per cent)
Orthodox-Protestant	56.0	24.5	2.0
Roman Catholic	53.0	25.0	3.0
Liberal	52.0	26.5	4.5
Socialist	46.0	18.0	17.0
None	44.0	19.0	9.0
Communist	6.0	6.0	82.0

A classification of the replies according to social classes gives an entirely different picture. In connection with the question last mentioned, the farmers showed the greatest liking for America (57 per cent), while persons in leading official positions showed a preference for England (36 per cent).

A social classification of the answers to the question concerning responsibility for our sufferings is shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3

Social class	Responsibility placed on German people (Per cent)	Responsibility placed on Nazis alone (Per cent)
Workingmen	32	63
Farmers	35	60
Middle class	39	57
Administrative personnel	44	53
Leading officials	50	46

Now, since the war is over, more such questions should probably be posed; and yet one could not secure a

correct picture of the public opinion during the war, since no grouping of all replies could give an adequate understanding of the shifts that occurred during the occupation period, both in the attitudes of the people as a whole and within the different social classes.

For instance, the attitude toward the House of Orange clearly underwent a change. While the removal of the Queen and the Government was looked upon at first as a more or less cowardly flight, no one later entertained the slightest doubt about the Queen, nor was the event regarded as so very strange. People were even willing to risk their lives for the honor of the Queen. The writer knows well a person in whose house, toward the end of the war, a search was made for a radio installation. Noticing the portrait of the Queen which was defiantly hung on the wall, one of the policemen insultingly remarked: "Communist Minnie." Hearing this, the owner, who found the remark offensive, openly declared that he had served his Queen faithfully for forty years and that he hoped soon to do it again. From my window I can now see the ruins of his house, which was burned to the ground. The owner was allowed to go free only because at the time the occupation authorities did not know what to do with their prisoners.

FLUID ATTITUDES WITHIN CLASSES

To illustrate the shift of opinion within a single social class, a large portion of the working class was at first "neutral," so to speak, and was prepared to wait and see if all the pretty promises of the victors would be followed by corresponding deeds. Soon it appeared that this was not to happen. As a matter of fact, when it became increasingly clear that the enemy was only interested in making slaves of the

workers, the latter grew hostile. Even then, the working class did not react as one. One part, no one knows exactly how large or small, hopefully looked for personal preferences and raked in, not without some pleasure, the high wages which the Germans could so easily pay with the paper money which flowed from the presses. The largest part showed their enmity by a considerable slow-down at work, encouraged by the urgent suggestions coming out of London and particularly induced by lack of food, which inclined them to take it easy. A small part joined the active resistance movement.

Similar changes occurred *mutatis mutandis* within other classes. The honest and devoted Dutch public servant was compelled to learn how to sabotage and cheat. Many did learn, but others, fearful of discovery, took refuge to the very end behind bureaucratic principles. The farmers, who in the beginning made the most of the situation considering the prices they charged, changed their minds as the demands of the enemy became more exacting and as compulsory regulations and prohibitions were increasingly proclaimed and more rigidly enforced.

One might also attempt to distinguish among attitudes and opinions according to age or sex. When we say that older people, generally speaking, were more consistent in their rejection of the moral irregularities of the occupation forces—having lived in a normal world for a longer time—and that younger people found an outlet for their spirit of adventure in the resistance movement, it must be remembered that these are observations that are valid only to the extent that one has confidence in the observer. The same is true of the impression that there were no real differences between men and women in their attitudes toward the occupation forces, in their dislikes, fears, bravery,

or cunning, or in their perseverance and pluck in resisting the enemy.

CHARACTER THE BASIC FACTOR

The circumstance that in the last analysis the individual's character determined his opinion makes any effort to generalize about public opinion extremely difficult. There were many workers who without protest, if not of their own free will, went to Germany to work in war industries; others, representing a smaller proportion, refused from the very beginning to co-operate, and suffered the consequences. Many farmers took the profits from the increase in prices which resulted from increasing shortages; others, and they were in the minority, offered their produce to the townspeople at decent prices or at least differentiated in the manner in which they secured payments for their rye, their butter, and their eggs. The same was true of shopkeepers and public servants. It may be only an impression, but a reasonable one, that in the end the percentage of the leading functionaries that failed in one way or another was relatively high. This was to be expected because the resistance movement demanded more of them, although they were in no way better prepared. We shall probably not be far from the truth if we estimate that the percentage of collaborators was higher among industrialists and merchants than in other groups, and that the largest percentage was found among the great manufacturers and merchants. It has been established that, generally speaking, students behaved themselves better than their professors.

As an illustration of the extremes within a group, the following two anecdotes may serve: Control officials stopped a man with a pushcart on which a sack of rye rested. When they

wanted to confiscate his goods, the man walked up to them and said: "You had better shoot me, for I cannot stand this any longer." When he was asked the reason for his stubbornness he confessed that he had traded his last pair of shoes for the rye. He told the whole story, and when an investigation was made, it was found that the farmer who had demanded his shoes for a sack of rye already had a collection of some eighty pairs of shoes which he had no doubt expected to sell for much more than he had charged for his rye.

Another farmer—quite a different person indeed—hid about forty Jewish children on his farm. In order to keep them alive he secretly slaughtered his last cow; but the unfortunate day arrived when the S.D. (*Sicherheitsdienst*) made a raid on Jews in the neighborhood, and also came to his farm. He hid himself and his protégés in a ditch where they remained for two hours with only their heads above water. When the bullies had gone he borrowed dry clothing from his neighbors and did not rest until he had brought the children one by one to Amsterdam in safety.

INDIVIDUAL FLUCTUATIONS

Probably the greatest difficulty is that even a given individual did not react in the same manner during the entire period of occupation. It was not rare to find workers who had at first willingly gone to Germany but who, when they came back on furlough, did not permit themselves to be caught a second time. We know a family which, when all copper had to be turned in, in 1942, delivered up their copper utensils the day before the official date because they were going on a vacation the following day; but the same family in 1944 did not think of complying with the blanket and clothing regulations, and during the entire war kept their

radio although the death penalty threatened such ownership. This is certainly not an isolated instance.

These individual fluctuations in attitudes were not haphazard. They reflect a social law which we have had the opportunity to verify and which we might state in the following terms, paraphrasing Lincoln's words: "You can bully all of the people some of the time and some of the people all the time, but you cannot bully all the people all the time." Paradoxical as it may seem, to the degree that objective pressure increased, the subjective pressure decreased. Finally it was not the daredevils, not even the brave alone, that committed violations for which they might have had to pay with their lives had they been discovered. Many did it simply because one gradually became too tired to give enough thought to the danger involved.

From the above, one must not draw the conclusion that the entire people participated in the resistance movement or even that the majority did so. There were half-conscious violations, for instance, of decrees which were technically issued by Dutch authorities, such as the rule requiring that one should report the names of one's lodgers within 24 hours, or the rule prohibiting a person from visiting certain sections of the country unless one was a resident there. The terror rather successfully fulfilled its purpose of making wholesale and open resistance impossible; the fear of the "Green Police" was deeply ingrained. At times one had the impression that the oppressors had almost mesmerized the oppressed, as a snake does a rabbit. Those who nevertheless resisted, no matter how mildly, always formed a minority, although perhaps a rather large minority. Nowhere in the world has there existed a people made up entirely of heroes, and no emotion is more common than fear.

DEGREES OF RESISTANCE

In order to secure a just appreciation of the resistance, it is necessary to differentiate its degrees. We shall do so by classifying it into "petty resistance," "resistance," and "great resistance." Under "petty resistance" we include listening to the English radio, forbidden even when the possession of a radio was permitted; the reading of illegal newspapers or transmission of them to a neighbor; sneaking out of the house after the curfew; social intercourse with Jews, who after November 1940 were greatly discriminated against by the occupation forces; and so forth. Under "resistance" we would put public expression of opinion which one had reason to expect to be not only disliked by the occupation forces but productive of consequences such as the loss of one's job or, worse, a sojourn in a concentration camp; consultations about or planning for the postwar Netherlands; participation in the publishing of illegal newspapers, whether as author, editor, or distributor; the hiding of Jews; and so forth. Under "great resistance" we would put participation in any form in the falsification of personal identity documents, of distribution records, or of other official records; raids on distribution centers or population registry offices; the hiding of English fliers; the retention of arms; the installation or operation of secret sending stations; sabotage in any form; and finally espionage.

If one were to make a graphic representation of resistance as a whole, one would put the "great resistance" in a very small circle at the center; in a wider but nevertheless rather small circle would be the "resistance"; and in a very large circle the "petty resistance." It is, alas, impossible to give any statistics. Even an approximation would be difficult to make, for the sta-

tistics would probably vary considerably from one period to another during the war. It is possible to say, however, that, although toward the end resistance became too dangerous and the danger was always increasing, all kinds of resistance increased as it became more and more obvious that the Germans must lose the war. After the invasion in June 1944 (D-day), and especially after the battle of Arnhem in September of the same year, there was a quite noticeable "inflation" of the spirit of resistance. Many of those who earlier had found safety in co-operating with the Germans suddenly climbed onto the resistance wagon. In both cases, the fear of an aroused public opinion determined their conduct.

It is clear, then, that it was not the measure of danger that determined the degree of resistance, even though that was naturally not without some influence. In the last analysis it was the hope for the future; and those who from the beginning took their stand in the ranks of the resistance movement were surely those who constantly, and at first with no good reason, had faith in an Allied victory even when defeat seemed unavoidable.

WAS RESISTANCE WORTH ITS PRICE?

One doubts at times that the injury inflicted on the oppressor was always commensurate with the sacrifices made by the members of the resistance movement. Those especially who took no part in the resistance, or a very insignificant part, used to answer this question in the negative in justification of their own aloofness. It is unnecessary to say that in most instances this was a rationalization of a quite comprehensible fear. But even from the mouths of the members of the resistance groups the question could sometimes be heard, especially after the fresh impressions of the horrible deaths

of comrades with whom they had perhaps foregathered the day before. In proportion as the dangers which people faced together became more frequent and greater, the friendship among these comrades who had deliberately chosen the same lot frequently assumed a permanent character and often possessed an element of the sublime.

The question can probably not be objectively answered. The number of victims was great; how great no one knows, although it is most probable that the sum should be written with five figures. How can one ever estimate the injury inflicted by the resistance on the German war machine or on German morale? Not even a guess would be advisable.

Although we are inclined to believe that direct injuries were not very great in relation to the sacrifices made, we do not hesitate for a moment to give a specific answer to the above question from a subjective point of view. There is no doubt that the spirit of resistance was of incalculably great value, if not for the conduct of the war, at least for the future welfare of the Dutch people. Only through resistance in all its forms have the Dutch people in spite of everything been able to retain their true character, keeping their self-confidence and, with their self-confidence, their hope for the future. Every mimeographed little newspaper helped to buttress this confidence, not so much perhaps by what it contained, but by the knowledge that it was being edited, printed, and distributed by cold, miserable, hungry fellow humans in fear of their lives.

And how much more forcibly did not the heroic deaths before the firing squads speak to the imagination of irresolute minds? The author himself in 1942 saw the death march of the "72" in a camp at Amersfoort—seventy-two persons sentenced to death. Although they knew what fate awaited

them, only one, still a child, hung his head while two others supported him under his arms. The destruction of these precious lives was transformed into energy in those who had escaped their fate and had to continue the battle.

Even without counting this gain, which cannot be too highly prized, one must mention the number of victims within the resistance movement—and they too ran into tens of thousands—whose lives were saved by the movement. According to the latest information about the organizations involved, there were no fewer than four hundred thousand "divers" (people in hiding) who were being fed and clothed by these organizations. One would probably not be too far from the truth if one were to estimate that without this aid at least half that number would have died from hunger and disease, or would have had to surrender to the occupation forces by and by, which in most cases would probably have meant death.

UNNECESSARY VICTIMIZATION

An entirely different question is whether the number of victims in the resistance movement may have been unnecessarily high. That is no doubt the case. Three factors contributed to this even more than did the perfidious methods of the Nazi police. First, betrayal, which is likely to stalk whenever there is anything to betray; second, the inexperience of the participants in the illegal opposition, especially in the early years; and third, the fact that for most people it proved more difficult to keep their mouths shut all the time and everywhere than they themselves imagined.

Again no percentages are available, but it is certain that a great many fell victim to their own or someone else's talkativeness. In more cases than one would suspect, a contributing motive

was the thought that other people should learn that they were "in the movement." Some became actually heroes, simply because they wanted to be admired as such. Some time ago an artist cleverly depicted this very human weakness on paper. A man is seen in bed sleeping, and nearby is a statue of the same man being approached by a delegation bearing tributes of flowers. Underneath is the legend: "The dream of the man who lent his typewriter to the underground." Would it be strange if the "dreamer" also told others about his deed, even though in great secret? Or that someone who heard him spoke of it with a wink to his wife or friend and that the *Sicherheitsdienst* soon got wind of it, arrested the man, and forced him to give the name of the person to whom he had lent his typewriter? As a result, the whole organization was discovered and would have been seized had its members not been warned in time and gone underground.

VARIANCE WITHIN THE RESISTANCE

On the other hand, the spirit of the resistance was no more a homogeneous entity than was public opinion generally during the occupation. Originally, the resistance, in accordance with Dutch tradition, was open and aboveboard, as seen in the strike of February 1941 in protest against the persecution of the Jews, and early in 1943 when the army was again sent into captivity. The former demonstration was limited to Amsterdam, because the rest of the country, where the Jews were not found in any great number, had not seen the merciless actions of the enemy. The second strike was country-wide and would have paralyzed the entire railway system if all had stood fast. The first strike had its martyrs by the hundreds, but after the second they were to be counted by the thousands; and af-

terwards the oppressor no longer suffered from open resistance.

Even deeper than these differences were those that existed in the spirit animating various resistance groups. However, the will to unity was fairly strong because of the pressure of the enemy—strong enough to prevent conflicts and promote co-operation, until finally, spurred by the Netherlands Government in London, the heads of the groups joined in one organization. The variants within the underground movement ranged from the extreme rightist nationalist groups, such as the *Ordedienst* (the Vigilance Service) which in reality was a middle-class guard organization designed to quell the revolution which was expected after the war, to the extreme leftist group, which from a sociopolitical point of view may be said to have been fighting National Socialism rather than the German people, even though this does not signify that such groups felt in any sense unpatriotic. The latter group was the largest, not in the Netherlands alone but in all Europe. Indeed, if the restoration and the reformation of the Netherlands is to be achieved, it will be thanks to the spirit that arose and was nourished in the left-wing resistance groups—a spirit of pluck and tenacity, of imagination and insight, of a willingness to sacrifice and a sense of responsibility, a spirit molded by years of battling a both shrewd and powerful enemy.

DEMORALIZING EFFECTS

However, there is no gain in this world without some accompanying loss. The campaign of the illegal resistance movement in which the people of the Netherlands gave the best they had to offer had also its dark side. Without mentioning such by-products as plain craving for the romantic or a merely simulated heroism, the resistance move-

ment by its reversal of values inevitably fostered a spirit which might charitably be called one of loose standards. From the dodging of legal regulations, the falsification of records, and the risking of one's life, there is but a short step to contempt for law, disdain for honesty, and disrespect for the lives of others. Indeed, it is remarkable that these phenomena are so relatively rare among former members of resistance groups. Here, apparently, the regard for higher aims mostly nullified the moral consequences of the reprehensible means.

Quite differently and in an unquestionably more disastrous manner did such means operate on the minds of those whose intrigues and machinations had no other motives than selfish interest. Moreover, in such cases the pattern of unscrupulousness and immorality set by the occupation probably had a more deeply felt influence than among those who had entered the lists against the enemy.

As elsewhere in all Europe, this degeneration was most obviously seen in the black market. The primary cause, as usual, was the gradually increasing scarcity which made prices gradually rise, so one got accustomed to them. But, in addition to this primary cause, there were a number of other factors. Both buyer and seller shut their eyes to moral objections, assuming that they had any to begin with, and considered that everything in the black market had, so to speak, been snatched from under the nose of the Germans. For many poor people, or people in hiding, the black market moreover became in the long run an indispensable source of income. Usually one began by selling ration stamps that were not absolutely necessary for one's livelihood. A little later, when men from age 17 to 40, and in some localities up to 50, were mobilized for work in Germany but failed to show up—only a small minority did so

—thereby running the danger of being picked up in a raid and being deported, many of them had no other choice than to give up their passive resistance or else engage in the black market in order to live. After September 1944, when on the one hand there was no more work to be had in the Netherlands, and on the other hand hunger began to spread throughout the entire population, every buyer and seller became a black marketer, for otherwise both the one and the other would have perished from hunger.

But even here, one must discriminate. There were black markets and black markets. Between the farmer who bartered a certain amount of rye for something from the townsman's linen closet and the man who sold a jug of gin for an exorbitant price, the buyer afterwards finding that there were barely two glassfuls while the rest of the jug had been filled up with cement, there is the same difference as between the merchant who profited by his dominant position and the swindler.

On the whole, the social consequences of the black market could not but be disastrous. Whenever the normal market is again in a position to deliver goods in normal amounts and at normal prices, the black market will die a natural death. But for many people who were mixed up in it—and among them may be found young men, old women, and children—the road to a normal life has probably been barred forever. Accustomed as they have been to a relatively good income, it will be natural for them to hunt for means of maintaining that income, although in most cases they will not be able to maintain it by honest means. Gangster methods, formerly unknown in the Netherlands, will presumably make their appearance as a result of strong repression, and may remain ineradicable for a generation.

FUSED IN THE FURNACE OF AFFLICITION

While there is in the whole world no gain without loss, there is also no loss without a gain. The wretched life which the Dutch people had to support, especially during the last six months before the liberation, has—it is true—on the one hand laid bare the egotistic instinct of self-preservation in all its brutal nakedness; but on the other hand there was seen a spirit of enterprise and perseverance and mutual assistance which no one had expected and which one can surely hope will continue to exist after the war.

Here we have in mind the so-called "hunger marches." By chance the author saw them when they were at their peak. It was in the beginning of March 1945, when he had gone to Veluwe on a borrowed bicycle to fetch some food. The worst cold was past but there was a snowstorm blowing. Because the passage of the river IJssel would be impossible in a few days the procession had trekked eastward for the last time, and the entire pitiable expedition was now returning. Over a distance of 50 to 60 kilometers² there was a close file of the most dilapidated little carts, baby carriages, and bicycles piled high with bags of rye or potatoes, with the sick piled in between, pushed or pulled by men, women, and children in rags, at best protected from snow and rain by a sack on their heads, by run-down shoes or clogs or pieces of boards fastened with bits of string, or walking barefooted in the icy water. Only here and there, made more painful by the contrast, could be seen a couple of sporty young ladies behind a baker's cart, dressed in winter sport clothes, their scarves reflecting the sunlight which broke through the clouds now

² One kilometer equals nearly five-eighths of a mile.

and then, illuminating the drab grayness of the endless miserable cortege. It was touching to see how, whenever and wherever (and it was a common occurrence) a wheel broke and the potatoes rolled all over the road, helpers ran up from all around to repair the damage as well and as quickly as possible. Above the procession droned the planes of the RAF, for the road was the great artery towards the east, along which the German Army convoys were moving at the time, day and night, under the fire of border batteries.

CONDUCT TOWARD THE INVADER

It is difficult to express any judgment based merely on one's own experiences. Nevertheless, it seems to me that a reasonably accurate judgment may be obtained if we compare our own opinion with that of others. This we can do, thanks to the previously mentioned Association for Opinion Study. In an investigation which this organization carried out in the three western provinces, only 5 per cent of those questioned would not or could not express any opinion at all about the conduct of the Dutch people toward the invader during the war period. This question, of course, does not completely cover the various matters we have been discussing in this article, but the replies are sufficiently useful in giving us a typology of the Dutch spirit to merit attention here. Forty-one per cent of those questioned considered the conduct "good," 49 per cent judged it as "fair," while 10 per cent found it "bad."

When the question was raised as to the conduct of people of different classes, the opinions were as presented in Table 4.

These collective judgments, with which the writer is in agreement, show conversely that his fellow countrymen agree with him when he concludes that one cannot speak of a public opinion.

TABLE 4

Classes rated	Conduct rating (Percentage)		
	Good	Fair	Bad
Doctors	96	3	1
Priests and preachers	92	7	1
Students	87	12	1
Public servants	35	46	19
Workers	30	48	22
Judiciary	20	40	40
Manufacturers	12	44	44
Contractors	3	19	78

Roughly speaking, we can say that about half reacted moderately well and that of the other half, four-fifths reacted well and one-fifth definitely in a "bad" manner. When certain groups showed "good" conduct almost en bloc, while others showed "bad" conduct in equally high degree, peculiar causes were at work which lack of space does not permit us to deal with in more detail. Generally speaking, the "good" and the "bad" were pretty well distributed according to the character of the population.

IMPORTANT WARTIME FACTORS

Any sketch of the spirit of the people during the occupation would be incomplete without some comments on its possible influence on the public mind in the future. We shall offer some suggestions here to the best of our knowledge.

It is perhaps easiest to classify the influence of the occupation on the public mind as "good" or "bad," but the same event may be judged either good or bad according to the character of the person who has to make the choice. This is no new idea to the sociologists among my readers.

If we look closely, the following three wartime factors are important not only because all other factors were depend-

ent on them but also because they have put their stamp on the Dutch people for some time to come. They are isolation, the resistance movement, and want, all united by bonds of mutual dependence.

The Dutch people has become more conscious of its own character. This may be seen, for instance, in the increase in literature in the historical field during the early years of the war, when books could still be bought. This heightened the national self-awareness, and, coupled with the fact that the Dutch East Indies had shared the same fate, increased the awareness of the empire and even, in a certain sense, created such an awareness. More than ever did the Crown serve as a symbol of this sentiment. Even among Communists and Indonesian nationalists, the republican idea took a back seat.

Community feeling was strengthened, and its effect could be seen in the relationships among social classes, between the sexes, and among political groups. All class differences did not disappear, but their attitude towards each other changed when worker and employer stood side by side fighting for the same cause. Whatever differences there may have been, husbands and wives certainly were drawn closer together when they were forced to trade occupations. The men under age 40, at least, had to keep off the streets for fear of raiding parties, especially during the last winter of the war. Therefore they had to take care of the house and the children, and leave the foraging to their wives. Nor did all political differences vanish; but political opponents could begin to discuss politics, at least, since the Communists learned to think in national terms, and the clerical party members found their distrust of the Soviet Union suddenly transformed into admiration. On the other hand, political hatreds were in-

tensified. Political assassinations became a relatively common phenomenon, although in our country the last earlier political murder had occurred in 1672.

The isolation from the rest of the world was complete. Certain sources of spiritual life dried up. As compensation, intellectual life sprouted in circles where previously sport and the radio had been the chief interests. And the intellectuals who had turned a cold shoulder to politics vied with one another in their plans for a better future, longing to know what was being thought in the outer world but no longer helpless when thrown on their own resources.

Want proved a good teacher. Almost everyone found that he could stand work and bear things that everybody else and he himself first of all would have declared impossible before. And want taught us to pray, as in olden days. As in the First World War, but more powerfully since we were this time direct victims of the conflict, there was a religious revival, strengthened by the patriotic stand of the church denominations as such. But want did more than all this. It strengthened mutual helpfulness, which was never more openhearted than during the war years. But it also stimulated the instinct of self-preservation. Thievery, swindling, bribery, and fraud were everyday occurrences.

WHAT WILL THE HARVEST BE?

Some people look for a turn for the better as a result of the positive gains which isolation, resistance, and want brought to the spirit of the people in spite of everything. Others fear that the evils, which the above factors have let penetrate into the public mind, have taken root there forever. Both are mistaken. Like nature, of which it is a part, history tends to be very prodi-

gal. She retains everything, no doubt, but in closed compartments, or in diluted amounts. No one knows whether the influence of the past years will be bad or good. We only know that, in the last instance, it will depend upon our own will whether the good or the bad seeds take root. The isolation will

vanish and want will be relieved, and then the spirit they nourished will pass away. Only the resistance has a permanent significance, for therein were manifest the craving for rehabilitation, the will to renewal, and the spirit of progress which, by the very nature of man, are immortal.

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Book Department

REVES, EMERY. *The Anatomy of Peace*. Pp. 175. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945. \$2.00.

It should be abundantly clear from the arid climate of world politics that the organization of the United Nations—had it not been formed during a period of loyal great-power collaboration against common enemies—could not be created now. This circumstance alone should cause well-intentioned critics to pause and reflect not only upon the flaws of the Charter but also upon the miraculous compromise wrung from a uniquely favorable moment in human history, which fathered the new league.

Usually, political compromise begets imperfect institutions. The Charter of San Francisco is not vastly superior to the Covenant of the League of Nations. This fact might have been accepted more calmly by the general public had not several influential groups, encouraged by official silence, endeavored to "sell" the new league to publicity-conscious multitudes as a government of the world. U.N. is obviously no such thing. *The Anatomy of Peace* puts matters straight, dispels the illusions about U.N., and delivers a passionate and brilliant plea for the creation, *hic et nunc*, of a world state. The crisis of Big Three relations and the explosion of atomic bombs—the book was written before either event—vividly underscored some of the author's conclusions arrived at by inductive reasoning.

An introductory chapter reviews world politics from 1919 to 1939 as seen from the vantage points of the most powerful among the contending nations, and argues acidly that a good case can be made for the behavior, however absurd, of each country—provided one assumes in each instance a consistently national point of view. "Within such a contorted system of assumed fixed points, it is easy to demonstrate that a view taken from each point corresponds to reality." In other words, international law purports to bridge mutually exclusive *national* moral standards—plainly an absurd proposition.

Mr. Reves, a forceful polemicist in the Hobbesian manner, blames the nation-state for the disintegration of modern society. The road to fascism is paved with the failures of universal movements. The nation-state has bent capitalism, socialism, and religion to its purpose, perverting each in the process. In this narrow world, the mere anticipation of war impels the state to impose total controls for the sake of mere survival. The mounting tension transforms all governments into so many national-socialist states, and institutional differences between them narrow down to ones of degree rather than of kind. The forces driving nation-states into the strait jacket of totalitarianism and military controls are inexorable and impersonal; no nation, however civilized, can for long remain impervious to the attrition of international anarchy. As Mr. Reves sees it, "peace-loving nation" as well as "freedom-loving nation" is a *contradictio in adjecto*.

Mr. Reves has the remedy ready at hand. "Whenever and wherever social units in any field, regardless of size and character, have come into a conflict . . . , we have learned that these conflicts have always ceased after some part of the sovereignty of warring units was transferred to a higher social unit able to create legal order . . . , within which conflicts between groups could be controlled . . . by legal means without the use of force." Mr. Reves assures us that the trend of history has always been toward the creation of larger units. Princes imposed a higher order upon feudal lords who had spent their lives fighting each other over their sovereign prerogatives, and many modern nation-states represent a merger of formerly sovereign principalities. Industrialism has so reinforced this trend that one world state has become the logical unit of government under law. "Only a world-wide legal order can insure freedom from fear"

Mr. Reves's analytical chapters are masterpieces of compression and unobtrusive scholarship. His formula, world government under law, is not startlingly original.

Moreover, to reason, as Mr. Reves does, that the answer to the problems of nationalism and imperialist rivalry, is the transfer of power and loyalties to a federal world government is reasoning in a circle. Peoples do not cling to obsolescent sovereignties because they fail to comprehend the calamitous implications of a multistate system or lack the imagination for designing a perfect world constitution. A desirable order under law evolves from voluntary agreement and the common practice of self-restraint. If all men could agree on how to solve such problems as, for example, the free world-wide movement of men and goods, if they could agree on the exact nature of political institutions as, for example, democracy, then the making of a world constitution could be entrusted to a few reasonably competent lawyers.

As matters stand in the real world, Mr. Reves will find the U.S.S.R. exasperatingly slow in relaxing its grip on the veto power, India desperately anxious to acquire national independence (and nothing but old-fashioned national independence), and China intensely conscious of limitations imposed upon the exercise of her national sovereignty in Manchuria. It may be that Russians, Indians, and Chinese are not fully alive to the implications of the atom bomb, which, it is said, will abolish them and us if all of us do not abolish war. It may be also that they believe, mistakenly perhaps, that only under the umbrella of unfettered national sovereignty can they solve those political and economic problems which have baffled all peoples since the epoch of free trade and unrestricted migration came to an end. If Mr. Reves hardly touches upon these issues—the basic ones and not the secondary ones related to what kind of constitution will safeguard forty-six million Englishmen from being outvoted by seventy million Indonesians—he entirely ignores those spiritual values which ennoble peace and permeate the good society under law. Happiness is not simply the absence of pain; peace is more than simply the absence of war.

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HUTCHISON, KEITH. *Rival Partners: America and Britain in the Postwar World.* Pp. viii, 262. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946. \$2.00.

Probably sometime a historian will write with wonder on the thesis that, unlike Greece or Rome or Great Britain or any other power in its expansive years, the American people has no zest for, and takes no creative pleasure in, its accumulated expansion of power and responsibility. If true, it may be because many persons cannot get through the trees of Bretton Woods, loans, and export and import.

Keith Hutchison, with a British background that includes a knowledge of the British Labor Party, and an American career that embraces much journalistic experience, does a candid, competent job of analysis of the financial and trade problems which confront the United States and Great Britain. Sir John Clapham once said, "When America has been bright Britain has seldom remained thoroughly gloomy." Mr. Hutchison goes further. The peace and prosperity of the entire world depend primarily on the successful settlement of these problems. Little is said here about Russia. This does not mean that the author pleads for any separate action by the two powers outside the framework of the United Nations.

Between the delivery of the manuscript and the first galley proofs, the abrupt end of lend-lease caused "drastic revisions." For one thing, strained Anglo-American economic relations, which had been foreseen, "had become an actuality."

Part 2 concerns "Postwar America," wherein it is said that the past will not return because of the stresses and strains attendant on our recent industrial expansion. Two chapters emphasize two questions: "To Plan or Not to Plan?" "Can America Export Unemployment?" "We have long been accustomed to emphasis on the importance of 'business confidence,' but 'consumer confidence' has been neglected as an economic factor" (p. 46). "To end planning for special interests there must be planning in the interests of the whole community . . ." (p. 52). The author concludes that foreign trade in itself cannot solve our employment problem, but full

employment is the key to the problem of America's foreign trade.

Part 3 explains why Britain must plan and is planning, with chapters centered on the challenge "Export or Die!" and the rubric "Monopoly and Efficiency." This is a convenient introduction to Britain's prospects. Part 4 evaluates the areas of conflict, and Part 5 stresses the implications of full employment and spreading prosperity for One Economic World.

Mr. Hutchison believes Mr. Churchill spoke for all parties when he said in his election manifesto, June 1945, "We cannot give up the right to safeguard our balance of payments by whatever means are necessary." The author concludes that any Anglo-American understanding must allow for this fact or it will not prove lasting.

Readers will wish to compare this book with Soule's *America's Stake in Britain's Future* and Brinton's *The United States and Britain*.

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LASERSON, MAX M. *Russia and the Western World*. Pp. x, 275. New York: Macmillan Co., 1945. \$2.50.

SHOTWELL, JAMES T., and MAX M. LASERSON. *Poland and Russia, 1919-1945*. Pp. vi, 114. New York: King's Crown Press, 1945. \$2.25.

The author of *Russia and the Western World* defines the basic problems to which his study is addressed as: "What are the points of similarity and of difference between the Soviet Union and the United Nations of the West? What are the factors, if any, making for closer relations between the Soviet Union and the Western world?"

Professor Laserson believes that the participation of the Soviet Union in World War II on the side of democratic powers "must logically have swung" Soviet Russia's evolution "back toward universal standards." This, he concludes, "must, of necessity, have brought the Soviet Union nearer to the rest of the anti-Axis democratic world."

The book comprises (apart from the In-

troduction) seven chapters. These deal with factors of rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the West; some constitutional aspects of the U.S.S.R.; the trend from centralism to federalism; the rehabilitation of law and national history in Soviet Russia; and the Soviet foreign policy in the West. The closing chapter sounds the note that the Soviet Union "cannot and does not intend to change the general trend of international relations, which has become clear in the last phase of the Second World War," and that Russia moved westward not merely geographically.

Chapters dealing with the rehabilitation of law and of national history impress this reviewer as more carefully developed and based on deeper study than the others. They are well worth reading. The chapter concerned with the constitutional aspects of the U.S.S.R. does not begin to compare with the trenchant analysis made by Sir John Maynard.

One leaves the book with the impression that at least parts of it were hastily written. Perhaps this may account for the number of factual errors it contains. To mention a few: the well-known "Peace to the huts, war to the palaces" was not the "slogan of medieval *Jacqueries*" but was coined by Nicolas Chamfort in 1790. "Jealousy of regional units" continued until 1939 when it was abolished by Voroshilov. The author asserts that this "jealousy" existed only in the early period of the Soviet regime. Naval officers' epaulets were removed under the Provisional Government, not after the November 1917 revolution.

Let us hope that the author's hopes may come true. The contents of the book do relatively little to dispel the fear that events may move in a different direction.

Poland and Russia examines the Russo-Polish problem during the last quarter of a century. It analyzes the so-called Curzon line issue and the Polish view of it, together with such matters as the treatment of minorities in Poland, Polish political parties, Polish armed forces in Russia, the formation of the Polish Patriots, the Polish undergrounds, and the changes in the makeup of the Polish Government in Exile.

The Ukrainian question and that of White Russia are treated in separate chapters. The Soviet-Polish relations during the crucial year of 1944 are analyzed in some detail. The rest of the book is devoted to the Polish aspects of the Yalta Conference and the new Polish Provisional Government of National Union.

The key to the viewpoint of the co-authors may be seen in the last paragraphs of the book: "Russia and Poland are linked to each other by geography. . . . A hostile Poland awakens memories of the *cordon sanitaire* of the Treaty of Riga, and adds to the potential menace of Germany"; *ergo*, "from the very nature of things, Russia has had and will continue to have a strong interest in the way Poland solves her problems. But this interest will be equally shared by Germany in years to come." The conclusion which follows is somewhat of a surprise: "In this difficult situation Poland's future will depend to a greater and greater degree upon the development of its own internal strength by measures of economic and social betterment for all people living within its new frontier." Will it not largely depend on Russia's "strong interest" in the manner in which Poland's future will be shaped?

On the other hand, there is the view advanced in the Introduction, that the ultimate settlement of the Polish question will have to be found in the elimination of hate and fear between Poland and Russia; also that security can no longer be sought in power politics, and that the Polish question, therefore, is to a large extent the first great test of the plans of the United Nations to make good their adherence to the fundamental principles adopted at San Francisco. This is an admirable blueprint. However, it is difficult to dismiss the thought that the future of Poland for generations to come may be prejudged before the U.N. becomes vigorous enough to assume responsibility for it.

The co-authors have a way of avoiding probing "dangerous" controversies; e.g., the matter of relations between the Soviet Army and the local Polish undergrounds. The naïve acceptance of the explanation of the liquidation of Polish administration in the U.S.S.R. is another instance of this.

More careful editing would have helped to eliminate some of the factual errors, such as that Poland's independence was recognized "by Russia, under Kerensky" on March 30, 1917; reference to N. Baltiiski as "obviously a pseudonym" (when it is known that there was a general of the old army of this name). Finally, the statement that "the unyielding temper of the Soviet Government" with respect to its claims on its European frontier was shared "in full by all Russians, everywhere, including refugees from Bolshevism," needs toning down; e.g., the group of the *Socialist Courier* does not share it.

Despite these shortcomings, the volume is a useful introduction to the study of the intricacies of the Polish-Russian problem.

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LAMONT, CORLISS. *The Peoples of the Soviet Union*. Pp. x, 229. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946. \$3.00.

The author, who is the chairman of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, states in his preface that, besides his long-standing interest in Soviet affairs, he was prompted to write his book by his conviction that "interracial and international prejudices are one of the worst evils in our present-day world and are a prime factor in causing wars." He abhors race prejudice and believes that "a study of how the diverse peoples of the Soviet Union work and live together can cast considerable light on the problem of minorities in the United States" and elsewhere.

Mr. Lamont summarizes the Soviet position regarding minorities in calling it "*racial* or *ethnic democracy*." He states that the Soviet system rests upon a profound belief in the general educability of human nature; also that a cardinal point in the minorities policy of the U.S.S.R. is to "deny the existence of fixed and unalterable national traits, and to affirm the tremendous influence of education and environment in molding the character of both individuals and groups." The author foresees the possibility that the cultural pluralism of the Soviet Union will be superseded, in a distant future, by one in

which the different national cultures will merge into "a single common culture with a single common language." This would come, according to Communist theory, only "after socialism is adopted by the entire world and becomes a matured system internationally."

The volume falls into five chapters. The first describes what the author calls the Soviet league of nations; the second chapter is given up to the examination of the largest of these republics, the Russian, and some of the peoples comprised within it. The peoples of Soviet Europe (outside the Russian republic) are discussed in the third chapter, followed by one dealing with those of Soviet Asia. The concluding chapter contrasts the Soviet with the Czarist policy regarding minorities, constitutional provisions and political rights, the liberation of women, and some other aspects.

The volume contains a great deal of useful information on Soviet minorities policy and its application. Unfortunately, its value is attenuated by the lack of any attempt on the part of the author to analyze and explain certain developments in his selected field. Thus, mention is made of the dissolution of four national divisions during the last war, viz.: Chechen-Ingush, Crimean and Kalmuck autonomous republics (by methods other than those provided for in the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.), and the Karachai autonomous region. Reference is also made to the abolition of the German Volga Republic "because many of its citizens were carrying on activities on behalf of Adolf Hitler." It is of great importance to students of Soviet policy to understand what caused these drastic measures, which were accompanied by deportation of hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens. In the case of the German republic, was the disloyalty caused by the inability of the Soviet educational system to overcome Hitler's propaganda, or could it be traced to certain features of agricultural collectivization? On what grounds did some of the Caucasian and Kalmuck groups lend their help to the Nazi invaders? These important questions are left unanswered by the author.

The excursions into prerevolutionary history seem to indicate the author's lack of

acquaintance with basic sources of information on the topics he discusses. One would not suspect, for example, from his statements on pp. 122 and 123, that under the guidance of a well-organized internal migration department millions of peasants *voluntarily* moved to Siberia from European Russia under the old regime. From 1906 to 1910, for example, 2,600,000 persons moved to Siberia in this manner. Even a superficial study of the standard *Géographie Universelle* of P. Vidal de la Blache and L. Gallois (v. V) would have made available to the author better bibliographical guidance than he seems to have had at his disposal. Remarks on p. 57 appear to indicate that Mr. Lamont does not clearly understand the changes in the status of Finland within the empire.

The volume is not free of factual errors. Remarks on p. 49 regarding "Little Russians" are misleading. The number of "white" emigres in the United States is rather below 20,000—not "about 200,000" as the author would have us believe. Whoever helped the author in the translation of the Czar's title (p. 33) has apparently little understanding of the language.

D. FEDOTOFF WHITE
Philadelphia, Pa.

MOORE, HARRIET L. *Soviet Far Eastern Policy 1931-1945*. Pp. xv, 284. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945. \$2.50.

Miss Moore's study, which contains 150 pages of text and 127 pages of documents, is a useful compilation of the record of the Soviet Union in eastern Asia. It is based on Russian sources, supplemented and balanced by American publications or English-language source materials issued by official or semiofficial agencies in Japan.

In his Introduction, Mr. Lattimore indicates the importance of Miss Moore's book. It analyzes Soviet foreign policy without recourse to special pleading. It treats Russia as any other nation. During the period 1931-45 Russian policy sought understandable objectives by understandable means. The course of events resulted from the give-and-take of rival nations or groups of nations: Russia versus Japan, Russia versus China, or Russia

versus the Western imperialistic powers. Russia's success or failure depended upon its relative strength, the degree of political embarrassment of its rivals, and the comparative skill with which both sides played their cards.

Russian policy in eastern Asia is correlated with contemporary political events in Europe and America. The clue to Russian adamance in Asia is often found in its temporary successes in Europe. Russian reasonableness in one part of the world can be explained by its complications or difficulties elsewhere.

The chapter headings are: The Setting; The Soviet Union in 1931; The Manchurian Crisis; The Sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1933-1934; Frontier and Fisheries Disputes, 1935-1936; From the Sino-Japanese War to the European War, 1937-1939; The U.S.S.R. at War, June 1941 to Peace in Europe. Appendix I contains important documents—treaties and agreements; Appendix II is a series of statements of Russian officials or publicists; and Appendix III is a table of Soviet Far Eastern Trade Statistics. A supplement gives the text of the Soviet-Chinese treaties and agreements of August 14, 1945 as monitored from the Moscow radio.

For the first time, a student of international affairs has placed in one handy volume a collection of documents together with intelligent interpretations. The collection is not exhaustive, but it is adequate. Quotations are fair, chosen with intent to explain and not to praise.

Miss Moore's study is of particular value in that it exemplifies an open-minded and restrained approach to Russian diplomacy. Fear of Russia or fear of war with Russia often springs from prejudice based on lack of knowledge. Russians are looked upon as unintelligible and Russian behavior is dismissed as the product of sinister motives and ruthless activities. On the other hand, extremists on the Left cause more confusion than enlightenment by their uncritical apologia for everything Russian. Miss Moore has set high standards in scholarly analysis and objective presentation. It would contribute immeasurably to public understanding if these standards

were accepted and followed by every student, commentator, and government official who deals with Russian policy, whether in eastern Asia or elsewhere in the world.

CLAUDE A. BUSS

University of Southern California

SCHUMAN, FREDERICK L. *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad*. Pp. xix, 663, xxv. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946. \$4.00.

While reading books on Russia these days, one must struggle to keep one's head above the morass of contradictions. What is particularly distressing at times are the writings of men who, under the label of pseudo-objective scholarship, smuggle in extremely potent subjective interpretations. Professor Schuman holds a respectable position of his own. He has never been an ideological juggler who balances between "passionate lovers" and "hysterical haters"; he has persistently followed his line and continues to do so in his latest work. The author is no pint-size scholar, despite his "ideological line"; there is no ideological vagrancy in his political philosophy, which he states with crystalline transparency, and his erudition does not carry the odor of the stuffy study with its midnight oil. He is vigorous in style, clear in conviction and faith. This is a rare phenomenon these days.

*Denkt er ewig sich im Rechte
Ist er ewig schön und gross.*

The purpose of writing *Soviet Politics* is explicitly stated by the author in his Preface: it is "frankly intended to foster unity through a fuller understanding of the U.S.S.R. on the part of the citizens of the Atlantic communities." The ogreish reputation of the Kremlin must be dispelled, the yawning pit between America and the U.S.S.R., portentous with catastrophic consequences, bridged, and Moscow "politics" given sense and meaning; such is the task of Professor Schuman. This was no small undertaking, and for it we must all be grateful to the writer. But in explaining Moscow's policies the writer at times reaches a degree of adulatory encomiums which is apt to deepen misgivings among both enemies and "vacillators."

"Beware of explaining everything lest you end by excusing everything," a wise Frenchman once said. Too many writers who believed in rendering a service to the U.S.S.R. have "explained" too much. Professor Schuman, however, has the courage to point out some stains on the Gracchian mantle of Stalin. Referring to the unfortunate war with Finland, he admits that it was based "upon misinformation and tragic miscalculation of probable results." The Soviet-German Pact of 1939 draws this skeptical comment: "The only moral to be derived from the study of power politics is that there is no morality in power politics."

But it is in the discussion of internal politics of the U.S.S.R. that the author touches a hornet's nest and glides over some very dangerous roads: It is apt to raise sound challenges. His characterization of the peasant will call forth justified resentment and the accusation of being an opinionated urban intellectual. Incidentally, it was the same "slovenly and unkempt" peasant that so generously contributed his blood to the defeat of Nazism. The acceptance of Soviet totalitarianism as a sort of glorified benevolence will certainly be met with a resounding protest from many corners of democratic camps. Nor will Schuman's interpretation of the role of the Communist Party as a mouth-piece of the nation find unanimous consent. All in all, however, the author presents a thesis which one cannot lightly brush aside. It is forcefully stated, ably defended, and adequately supported. And if criticism of interpretation is met, it is only a logical democratic phenomenon and a privilege not everywhere enjoyed these days.

Space does not permit a full review of this bulky work. Despite or because of the debatable nature of the subject, the book should be read by a wide public, for it contains much that the public should know if it is to pass intelligent judgment and influence American foreign policy. It may be an elliptical book, but so are some written by the opponents, and when both are consulted we may be better informed and have a broader grasp of a truly Gargantuan task before us; then only will we

achieve "a fuller understanding of the U.S.S.R. on the part of the citizens of the Atlantic communities."

ANATOLE G. MAZOUR
University of Nevada

DICKINSON, ROBERT E. *The Regions of Germany*. Pp. 175. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945. \$3.50.

This useful volume in the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction was written by a British geographer who played an important part in the planning of the British effort against Germany. The book is not always easy reading, and those who are not familiar with the geographic framework of Germany will do well to keep an atlas at hand to supplement the useful but somewhat sketchy maps included in the text.

The book is especially valuable because it draws on German sources not easily available to most American scholars. The first chapter is concerned with German ideas on the regional subdivisions of Germany, with special attention to the reorganization of the German economic and political structure. The second chapter sums up the geography of Germany as a whole, including its physical, economic, commercial, and historical aspects. The remainder of the book presents factual data in turn for each of the eight major regions of Germany. Nontechnical descriptions of the physical setting, the economic history, the prewar economic structure, and the urban development are included under each region. Especially noteworthy is the attention given to the relations between the cities and the surrounding economic regions.

Dickinson makes no attempt to suggest a plan for the future of Germany, but his data raise doubts as to the feasibility of several existing plans. For example, the disruption caused by the zonal subdivision of Germany is apparent from his economic maps. Although, as is pointed out, Germany normally produces 85 per cent of her own food requirements, "the remaining 15 per cent . . . [is] nevertheless a vital proportion, essential to her national life." Furthermore, this food production is unevenly distributed, so that the southern

half of Germany must import grain, potatoes, and pigs. Those who would eliminate German heavy industries should note that "the numerous branches of the iron, steel, and nonferrous metal industries . . . employ over a quarter of the total employed population," considering the country as a whole.

To sum up, here is a convenient book which, not pretending to cover everything, outlines the physical nature of Germany, tells where the Germans live and how they made their living, and portrays the geographic background of the problems involved. This volume is not for those who wish to learn all about the German problem at one sitting. It should, however, be on the book shelves of those who must make decisions as to the future of Germany.

OTIS P. STARKEY

University of Pennsylvania

LOEWENSTEIN, PRINCE HUBERTUS ZU. *The Germans in History*. Pp. xii, 584. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945. \$5.00.

The Germans in History is not a history of Germany. Rather it is a series of contemplative essays on certain phases of German history that happened to interest the author as a German patriot, a liberal statesman, and a Roman Catholic philosopher. The American reader will like the author, whose kindly spirit and broad sympathies are evident on every page; and yet it is the sort of book which no American or Englishman would have written. Prince Loewenstein lifts the practical political problems which we think of as the "German question" into realms of abstract metaphysics. He presents diagrams which compare the concepts of his favorite modern philosopher, Hegel, with those of Karl Marx (pp. 233, 249). He grounds socialism on the writings of medieval theologians (p. 255). He has a passionate interest in such subjects as the strife of Ghibelline and Guelph, the reasons why the "Holy Roman Empire" should rather be called the "Sacred Roman Empire" (p. 79), and the technical illegalities of the Hitlerites. "Thus after Hindenburg's death, the President of the Supreme Court, Dr. Erwin

Bumke, would have been Chief Executive of Germany until the election of a new Reich President. . . . Constitutionally speaking . . . Dr. Bumke was and still is Acting Reich President" (footnote, pp. 499-500).

On subjects of more immediate interest, Loewenstein is moderate and cautious. He favors a republic based on universal suffrage, but with a strong independent executive, who is not necessarily hereditary. Yet he is careful to say that it is not a particular merit for a nation to be republican; the choice between republic and monarchy depends on the particular phase of history in which one lives. He expresses admiration for the prudence and moderation of Bismarck, and even has some kind words for his rival Napoleon III, but he is more enthusiastic over the idealists of 1848. He considers Wilhelm II as a pacific ruler who blundered into a war in 1914 which Bismarck would have avoided, but more from clumsiness than ill intent. Loewenstein turns with a legalist's scorn from the Nazis and all their works; Hitler's regime, to him, was not a state tyranny but its opposite—mere anarchy, lawlessness, mob rule, "the state's and history's worst enemy" (p. 480). He warns the reader that defeat of Hitlerism merely strips the last and ugliest mask from the underlying evil, the divorce of international politics from Christian ethics: "A society of relativistic values resting precariously on a naturalistic view of man may in the infernal mirror of totalitarianism recognize its own ravaged face . . . the downfall of one type of totalitarianism in one specific country may create an order that does not differ in essence, but rather one that varies only in degree of tolerability from National Socialism's 'New Order'" (p. 486).

PRESTON SLOSSON
Ann Arbor, Michigan

ENGEL-JANOSI, FRIEDRICH. *The Growth of German Historicism*. Pp. 101. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1944. \$1.25.

This learned little monograph affords a good example of how an otherwise valuable and suggestive essay can be at least partly vitiated and distorted by being constructed around a somewhat pedantic and

artificial framework and an arbitrary terminology—in this case "Historicism." Had the same space been taken for a brief summary and appraisal of the historical concepts and achievements of the writers considered, the result would have been far more illuminating and informing.

Dr. Engel-Janosi defines "Historicism" as follows: "The attitude which centered around history, which saw most of the spheres of intellectual life as permeated by history, which made history the *magistra*, if not of active life, at least, to a great extent, of theoretical life, will be understood here under the term 'historicism.'" Just why any intelligent historian would not be encompassed and motivated by "historicism" is not made clear.

The author refers to an earlier work of his own on *Politics and History in the Age of the Enlightenment*, and points out that the historians of that age were primarily concerned with three problems: development, individuality, and success. After admitting that the German historians of the nineteenth century, with whom he deals in this work, had rather different main interests, he nevertheless organizes his exposition of their writings chiefly about these three same problems. The result is a warped, distorted, and limited treatment, which reaches absurdity in his brief handling of Niebuhr and Schopenhauer, who neither possessed "historicism" nor were interested in the problems of "development, individuality, and success."

Dr. Engel-Janosi deals with Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Goethe, Niebuhr, the romantic school, Hegel, Ranke, Marx, Schopenhauer, and Burkhardt. Since only fifty-six pages are devoted to these writers, several of whom can scarcely be regarded as historians in any literal sense of that term, the book gives only a very selective and scanty view of German "historicism." A number of great historians could have been selected from the Germany between 1776 and 1876 who better exemplify permeation with the historical spirit and interest in development, individuality, and success than most of the authors chosen.

Yet there are some acute observations and stimulating analyses in the sketch, which amply repay reading. Such are the

account of Herder's interest in the genesis and unfolding of the human soul throughout history; Humboldt's interest in human ideas; Ranke's search for facts and for the unity of the historical process which gives "sense" to the sequence of events; Marx's thesis of historical necessity; and Burkhardt's tendency to give us cross sections of culture rather than the evolution of culture, and his "basic predilection for the constant, the recurrent." In short, it is a good little book for those who like that kind of book; the reviewer prefers to take his historiography "straight."

HARRY ELMER BARNES
Cooperstown, N. Y.

SALOMONE, A. WILLIAM. *Italian Democracy in the Making*. Pp. xix, 148. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945. \$2.50.

The Italians seem to have learned from their Roman forebears the lesson of the futility of war, and they have not once waged aggressive warfare throughout the centuries (Chapter I). They have fought among themselves; they fought valiantly during their *risorgimento* to expel foreign tyrants; but in the main they have devoted themselves to the arts of peace. And what they have produced by painstaking cultivation and beautification of their country, in beauty of physical form, in marital and familial devotion, in the culinary arts, in literature, painting, music, sculpture, architecture, science, the theater, religion, and song, is an imperishable monument to themselves and a contribution to the arts of peace. In fact, Italy's millennial achievement has been and is "almost in inverse ratio to [her] military and material strength. . . . And beyond the achievement, great though that is in every field of human activity, is the idea of Italy itself, supreme and eternal in the mind of Western man, a distinct concept unlike any other." (Vincent Sheean, *Saturday Review of Literature*, January 12, 1946.)

That very devotion to the arts of peace, however, has cost the Italians very dearly. It made their country the "checkerboard of Europe," a mere "geographical expression," the "classic land of invasion," the

"prize and goal of conquerors" (p. 2). And worse, perhaps, it made the Italians themselves the pawns of dictators big and small, duped into believing that, because the world owed them much, they deserved to and could regain the "grandeur that was Rome."

Giolitti, Prime Minister from 1903 to 1914, whose "era" is detailed in the present book, was almost a sinister figure. A shrewd, unscrupulous politician, "cynical subduer" of men and things, "Minister of the Underworld," as Salvemini called him in a book by that title, he was in some respects the immediate forerunner of Mussolini and the Fascist tragedy. He and his supporters dangled "empire" before the tortured soul of the Italians and baited them into the Libyan conquest, as Mussolini later tricked them into the rape of Ethiopia; fanned provincial and class differences into hatreds; built a political machine that out-tammanied Tammany; and all to the glory and power of the House of Savoy.

As this book shows, during Giolitti's "reign" as "socialist monarch," marked developments occurred in Italian industry and commerce, in co-operative and socialist enterprises, in labor organization. Catholics came out of their hiding places and entered the political arena, near-universal suffrage became a reality, illiteracy decreased greatly. But these must not be attributed to Giolitti, as this book tends to imply. These achievements were brought about by the people and not by Giolittism. Europe had been undergoing reforms of that character for half a century or more; Italy was just catching up; and Giolitti made political capital of them.

The book is scholarly, objective, well documented, has an excellent bibliography. It is in the best of print and format. It moves with well-measured, firm strides. If it lacks historical perspective, and if a kind of *apologia pro patria paterna* pervades its pages, it is probably due to the youthfulness of the skillful author and promising historian, to the fact that it was written in the very hour of Italy's agony, and written in the United States where the deeper forces at work in Italy are scarcely understood. Yet the volume offers ample

objective proof that the Italians are capable of running a democracy no less efficient, no more corrupt, than the most advanced.

It is of profoundly human significance that the beloved, iconoclastic, vitriolic Salvemini, once Giolitti's archenemy, should now—in the ripeness of age, distant in time and space from the early battleground, sobered by actual experience in other democracies—sing the mellowing song he does in the "Introductory Essay" to this book.

CONSTANTINE PANUNZIO

University of California
Los Angeles

MOORE, WILBERT E. *Economic Demography in Eastern and Southern Europe*. Pp. 299. New York: International Documentary Service, Columbia University Press, 1945. \$3.00.

Eastern and southern Europe are primarily agrarian, with low farm yields and incomes, and with high birth and mortality rates. Before World War I the surplus agrarian population was able to emigrate overseas, but after the war the gates were shut. Autocracy made rapid progress in this region, first in Italy, then in Spain and all eastern Europe. The region is largely a global slum.

The author of this League of Nations publication, Wilbert E. Moore, first presents the principal problems, accenting population shifts, due to economic causes. Tradition, religion, and politics also play important roles. Several excellent graphs help to make the author's points clear.

Then Mr. Moore turns his attention to those solutions of the problem that appear to be feasible at the present moment: Large-scale emigration from these blighted areas is not one of them, as "freedom of movement" is not one of the postwar freedoms. The solutions must therefore lie within the competence of the countries in the region. Mr. Moore pays special attention to two solutions: agricultural improvements, and industrialization. He debunks several popular fallacies. Good will and strong hands are not sufficient to improve the tired soil. What is needed above all is capital, and that is exactly

what the region lacks. The landholding system is uneconomical, too. Constant atomization has pulverized the land to the point where machines could not be employed. Yet, the scythe is impotent against the monster tractor on America's vast prairie bread factories.

Mr. Moore points to the success of the Soviet kolkhoz, but he also points out that it took time before the collective system hit its stride. Furthermore, small-bourgeois traditions in eastern and parts of southern Europe are arrayed against such an experiment.

More industries should be established in this region, Mr. Moore says. They enhance living standards. But industries also require capital, skilled management, competent workers, and the prospect of at least a modest market. Capital is not likely to flow into this region from established industrial countries fearful of fostering competition. But the field must not be neglected.

Mr. Moore believes that the antiquated ways of experimentation may be of little use. There must be a measure of government planning. After all, this is the age of planned economy, whether it is the capitalist monopoly or the Soviet "trust." International co-ordination of economic production is just as indispensable as co-operation in the diplomatic field. Monetary reforms must not be overlooked, either.

The book is factual and convincing throughout. Mr. Moore has no axes to grind. He merely tries to find the best solution for some of the problems of Europe's "problem regions."

EMIL LENGYEL

New York University

MUNRO, KATHARINE. *France Yesterday and Today*. Pp. 107. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1945. \$1.25.

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. *France and Britain*. Pp. 110. London, 1945. \$1.75.

Designed to give the general British reader an intelligible basis on which to form opinions on future Anglo-French re-

lations, these two publications of the Royal Institute of International Affairs present on the one hand a concise, coherent account of recent internal developments in France to the spring of 1945, and on the other hand an analysis of the problems of Anglo-French relations.

The author of *France Yesterday and Today* has written a compact description of French political and public institutions of the Third Republic, France's overseas empire, geography, resources, economy, and population problems. A very brief sketch (6 pages) of the history of France to 1914 is given, together with a somewhat more detailed treatment (20 pages) of the period since September 1939. Although the material is highly factual and the purpose sober, the lively style makes for enjoyable reading.

The second volume, *France and Britain*, is a summary of the conclusions of "a group of experts who have been intimately concerned with the practical problems of Anglo-French relations and who are drawn from many different walks in life." Setting out to answer the question of "how Anglo-French co-operation fits into the general framework of British policy," the authors arrive at the conclusion that "our relations with France are the key to our relations with Europe. . . ." "These arguments," they say of the arguments leading to the conviction of absolute necessity for the closest possible collaboration with France, "would still apply even if France failed to recover her former military strength, and even if she was, in consequence, unable to make any considerable contribution in manpower and industrial power to the maintenance of security."

Basically, the reasoning leading to this conclusion stems from the premise that Britain cannot retreat from her position of European leadership, and that France occupies a strategic position as continental ally for which there can be no substitute. An Anglo-French entente, or alliance, is fitted into the larger pattern of international security as a necessary complement to the Russian system of alliances in eastern Europe. The two systems would tie together and be given continued *raison d'être* by a resurrected German menace.

These are, of course, conclusions of late 1944 or early 1945. To what degree scientific advances in the field of weapons will change strategic considerations, and to what extent antagonisms between Great Britain and the Soviet Union may alter international alignments, are questions which are not posed. Nor is adequate consideration given to the effects of such possible developments as a communist regime in France and a noncommunist government in Great Britain.

France and Britain is particularly valuable as a general analysis of the continuing problems which have plagued Anglo-French relations since the formation of the Entente in 1904. While the approach to the problem is frankly British, every attempt is made to see it from the French viewpoint as well. The volume is a model of clarity in writing.

JOSEPH J. MATHEWS

Washington, D. C.

WARBURG, JAMES P. *Unwritten Treaty*. Pp. 186. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946. \$2.00.

Presenting convincing facts and lucid arguments, Warburg tells how to institute an "unwritten treaty" that will convert written treaties into something more than pious hopes frequently exploded. He believes that peace is possible but that it is only possible by outlawing psychological as well as military and economic warfare. The outlawing of psychological warfare can only result from the establishment of freedom of information everywhere in the world. Without such world-wide freedom of information, "all freedom becomes an illusion, and peace merely another armistice."

Warburg shows how psychological warfare "consists of two basic elements—the threat, or appeal to fear, and the bribe, or appeal to cupidity." He then proceeds to summarize how the major Allied and Axis powers utilized psychological warfare techniques during World War II and what they are doing with such efforts during the present conversion processes. Will the instrumentalities of psychological warfare continue to reflect national and joint in-

ternational policies, or will they return to private hands? What are the probable consequences of such changes?

Unwritten Treaty calls for the establishment of a Department of Information in this country which would presumably be able to gain sympathy and understanding for us abroad and would co-operate with similar foreign agencies to promote here the understanding of other peoples and their problems. This would involve, among other things, an "international agreement to define the type of international propaganda which shall be considered harmless and therefore permissible in time of peace."

In other words, Warburg's current book is prescribed reading for peddlers of other panaceas for the prevention of a war already begun, World War III. Since we have not eliminated fear and cupidity and are not likely to do so very quickly, we shall continue to sign written treaties of doubtful merit and neglect Warburg's proposed "unwritten treaty" at home as well as abroad. Adequate devices for promoting "the free flow of information and hence mutual understanding and trust among the peoples of the world" would also work to minimize strikes and minority persecutions within our own country. We are far from achieving this "free flow" here, not to mention the more controversial subject of "free flow" elsewhere.

Warburg's formula is fundamentally an elaboration of one suggested two thousand years ago by Jesus Christ. The earlier version has not been tried yet, either.

ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE
Wayne University

KARIG, WALTER, EARL BURTON, and STEPHEN L. FREELAND. *Battle Report: The Atlantic War*. Pp. xvii, 558. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1946. \$3.50.

This book has many of the strengths and weaknesses apparent in the first volume, which dealt with the early stages of the Pacific war. The end of the war has brought a somewhat relaxed censorship, but this is, the reader must remember, an official account, prepared by naval officers. It is well to note, therefore, at the very

beginning, that this is no objective analysis of our Navy's strategy and tactics in the Atlantic.

The authors have divided their book into eight parts, each part dealing with a separate phase of the Atlantic naval war: neutrality patrol; arctic operations; anti-submarine war; African invasion; opening of the Mediterranean campaign; the Normandy invasion; the final phase of the war in the Mediterranean; and the crossing of the Rhine. In each section the account of the naval action is well balanced and reasonably complete. There is an abundance of thrilling incident and vivid description. This is good narrative history, and will be both interesting and useful for many years. Its value is enhanced by the lack of parallel accounts comparable to those of Gilbert Cant and Fletcher Pratt for the more spectacular Pacific war.

This book contains little critical analysis, much glossing over of official mistakes, "rank" consciousness, and a minimizing of the part played by the Coast Guard which would be expected in an official Navy version.

Regrettable as are these faults, they shrink into relative unimportance in comparison with the strong points. The three authors have edited huge masses of lifeless, official reports and have welded parts of them into a narrative which is as vivid, as changeable, and as colorful as the sea itself. Within the limits which were set by their official connection with the Navy—and the censorship which no doubt existed—they have done a superb job. Whether writing about comparatively well-publicized phases such as the antisubmarine patrol, less well-known engagements such as the Navy's part in the African landings, or the crossing of the Rhine, which few have thought of as a naval maneuver, the authors have given an outstanding performance. The accounts of individual ships and the personal anecdotes are numerous and often dramatic. Physically, the book is a work of art, and the pictures alone are worth the cost of the volume.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN

New York City

DIFFIE, BAILEY W., assisted by JUSTINE WHITFIELD DIFFIE. *Latin-American Civilization, Colonial Period.* Pp. 812. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Sons, 1945. \$4.50.

This is the most comprehensive treatment of the colonial period in Latin America that has appeared in recent years. With a profusion of detail and a considerable amount of interesting and well-selected statistical material, Professor Diffie seeks to give a picture of all phases of life and culture both in the regions occupied by Spain and in Brazil. He emphasizes social evolution and daily life somewhat more than the governmental and economic institutions, which have hitherto received a major share of the attention of North American historians. By far the greater part of the book is devoted to the Spanish colonies.

The author points out that some of his ideas differ from those of the majority of writers on Latin American history. In particular, he is more disposed to defend Spanish policy and to stress the benefits brought by the Conquest. He feels, for example, that the development of mining, far from being a curse to the colonies, was in reality "the spark which started their economic life." The value of Spain's contribution to agriculture and the arts, especially in the introduction of new crops and superior handicraft techniques, is well brought out. The Indian civilizations were, in his opinion, decidedly less advanced and less worthy of preservation than they have seemed to some other historians. He disputes the idea that the Conquest caused a great decrease in the aboriginal population, though he would probably agree that the evidence which he has assembled on this point is not very conclusive. On the other hand, he paints a very dark picture of the condition of the Indians under the colonial regime.

Among the best chapters are those dealing with cultural life in the Spanish colonies. There is an interesting description of the schools and universities and a good summary of the evidence relating to the importation of "forbidden" books and the extent to which they were read. Native, or Creole, art and literature are dealt with

more extensively than in most general works on the colonial period.

The book obviously represents a vast amount of reading and study. Professor Diffie has made use of the works of a great number of Latin American and European as well as North American authors, and his footnotes, by themselves, will be useful to students as a guide to the best books which have been written in the field.

DANA G. MUNRO

Princeton University

FORBES, W. CAMERON. *The Philippine Islands.* Pp. xv, 412. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1945. \$5.00.

Mr. Forbes was Governor General of the Philippines from 1909 to 1913, and before that he was a member of the Commission which administered the islands. He returned as a member of the Wood-Forbes Commission which investigated the state of the Philippines in 1920. Mr. Forbes's long and intimate acquaintance with the islands peculiarly fitted him to write the history of the American occupation. His book covers in detail the period from the conquest in 1898 to 1926. Subsequent events are briefly summarized.

Mr. Forbes is more favorable to the Spanish period than many writers. He regards it as a regime which had brought important benefits to the Filipinos, but had deteriorated badly by the latter half of the nineteenth century. The fault seems to have lain less with the Government of Spain than with the officials and the priests in the Philippines.

The desire for independence was a result of the revolt against Spain, and the American policy was to encourage and develop it. The author writes with sympathy and understanding of the Filipinos' wish to govern themselves; but he feels that desire outran capacity. He believes that power was transferred too rapidly to the Filipino leaders between 1913 and 1920, and that the civil service was Filipinized much too fast. Not enough senior American officials were left to carry on the administration and to train the large number of inexperienced Filipinos who were appointed to positions. The result was

the decline in efficiency and reliability which he and General Wood found in 1920. Officially, all Filipinos demanded immediate independence; but quite a number secretly trusted that its arrival would be postponed. Many who asked for it in public visited Mr. Forbes privately to ask that their request should not be taken too literally. They realized that a longer period of apprenticeship was needed; but they dared not jeopardize their political careers by saying so publicly.

Mr. Forbes refers with disappointing brevity to the widespread evils of debt slavery and its concomitant the cacique, who is a combination of usurer and local political boss. The American administration's efforts to introduce reforms had only a limited success; and caciquism is still a very serious obstacle to the establishment of a genuine Philippine democracy.

LENNOX A. MILLS

University of Minnesota

HOBBS, WILLIAM HERBERT. *The Fortress Islands of the Pacific.* Pp. xiii, 186. Ann Arbor: J. W. Edwards, 1945. \$2.50.

It is greatly to be regretted that this book did not appear before the end of the war, for it would have given the public a far clearer understanding of the campaigns in the western Pacific. The value of the work is by no means ended, however, by the close of hostilities. The peace settlement has still to be made; and the author's account of the Pacific islands and their strategic and commercial importance will clarify the reasons for the American demand for naval and air bases.

Professor Hobbs deals in turn with all the islands of the Pacific from the Aleutians to New Guinea and New Zealand, and from Okinawa eastward to the Hawaiian Islands. He omits the Japanese homeland and most of the Dutch East Indies. Professor Hobbs traveled extensively in the region he describes. He was one of the few foreigners who was permitted to visit the Japanese mandate islands before they were fortified. The book is illustrated by eighty-three maps and plans which explain the strategic importance of each group of islands, and there is a very complete index.

The first chapters describe in simple and nontechnical language the various kinds of islands, how they were formed, and the strategic value of each type. Professor Hobbs next takes up each island in turn, describing its topography, the suitability of its harbors and airfields, its climate, population, and natural resources. Maps and sketches made from photographs are given of all the principal islands. There is a chapter on the earthquakes, typhoons, and other visitations of Nature which afflict the area. In describing Pearl Harbor the author remarks that while it will continue to be the principal American naval base, owing to its position, air power has made it unsuitable for the defense of a battle fleet. The harbor is so small that it does not permit maneuvering under air attack, and the entrance is too narrow to allow quick escape. When hostilities were expected, the battle fleet had standing orders to rendezvous in the Lahaina Channel, ninety miles from Pearl Harbor. In the concluding chapter Professor Hobbs lists the island fortresses which the United States should annex in order to control several routes across the Pacific. It is regrettable that this topic was not treated at considerably greater length.

LENNOX A. MILLS

University of Minnesota

ARNE, SIGRID. *United Nations Primer*. Pp. 156. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1945. Trade: \$1.25; text: 95 cents.

In the *United Nations Primer*, Sigrid Arne has succeeded in giving a very readable account of the United Nations conferences from the meeting of Churchill and Roosevelt on the North Atlantic in August 1941 to the San Francisco Conference in 1945. Less than one-third of the volume is devoted to the eight conferences on problems arising out of the joint prosecution of the war. The rest deals with laying the foundations of the coming peace.

Beginning with the Hot Springs Conference of May 1943, the author traces the series of meetings which, taken together, were designed to lay foundations for international co-operation on a functional level. In the discussions on food and nu-

trition at Hot Springs, it became evident that other factors such as monetary and trade policies must be considered. At Philadelphia in the following April, the International Labor Organization adopted a declaration broadening its jurisdiction over economic problems and injecting the demand for full employment into practical international politics. Later that summer at Bretton Woods some forty of the United Nations met and in agreeing upon plans for the establishment of a stabilization fund and an international bank for reconstruction and development, they gave expression to a conference recommendation to the effect that the governments should seek:

"... to reach agreement as soon as possible on ways and means whereby they may best: (1) reduce obstacles to international trade and in other ways promote mutually advantageous international commercial relations; (2) bring about the orderly marketing of staple commodities at prices fair to the producer and consumer alike; (3) deal with the special problems of international concern which will arise from the cessation of production for war purposes; and (4) facilitate by co-operative effort the harmonization of national policies of member states designed to promote and maintain high levels of employment and progressively rising standards of living."

These suggestions will be dealt with at the international conference on trade and employment to be called in the spring of 1946.

At Chicago in November 1944, the United Nations met again to chart the future course of international civil aviation. And finally, at San Francisco, building on the proposals agreed to at Dumbarton Oaks, the Charter of the United Nations was formulated. The atmosphere of these conferences and their recommendations are dealt with in terms understandable to the man in the street, and the accounts are spiced with enough human interest stories and pithy colloquialisms to hold his interest throughout.

Miss Arne has no particular axes to grind, yet her opinions are not in the least neutral. At points there are evidences of

strain in her attempt to put the most hopeful possible interpretation on the course of United Nations development. In discussing Yalta, the author showed that she stands with Morgenthau and Lord Vansittart in her analysis of the causes of modern warfare. She fails even to suggest the case of those who fear that too great emphasis on retribution will lead to the overlooking of the deeper continuing causes of war. On the matter of the treatment of Germany she suggests, in fact, that this nation should "have sense enough to keep its collective mouth shut when its advice is not welcome."

It is not yet the time to write a complete history of the development of the United Nations machinery for peace, but Miss Arne, in her capacity as a skillful journalist, has given us the most comprehensive sketch of the growth of the United Nations idea yet published.

AUSTIN VAN DER SLICE
Michigan State College

RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER, EGON F. *The International Secretariat*. Pp. xxvii, 500. New York: International Document Service, Columbia University, 1945. \$4.50.

PURVES, CHESTER. *The Internal Administration of an International Secretariat*. Pp. 78. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1945. \$1.25.

A number of books and articles have been published recently describing the old League of Nations, its organization, administration, and work. Among these one may mention the *International Secretariat of the Future*, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and a series of monographs sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace.

The first book to be reviewed here is by the pen of Mr. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, a former official of the Information Section of the League's Secretariat and now attached to the State Department. It is the third of the series of "Studies in the Administration of International Law and Organization" of the Carnegie Endowment, and gives a broad picture of the organization and administration of the first great

experiment in international collaboration. Indeed, this study seems likely to become a standard work in its field. It is from now on an indispensable reference book for all interested in or responsible for international administration. It is well balanced, well documented, and at a first reading free from serious factual inaccuracies. The author has, it seems, maintained fair judgment of men and events still too close and too controversial to be judged with the impartiality of history. He draws, however, as a former journalist, on personal experience and impression. This lends color and interest to the narrative, but lets familiar scenes stand out in sometimes unfamiliar light. By way of example, this reviewer doubts if the loyalty of the members of the International Labor Office was really ever as "highly personalized" as the author imagines. He does not believe that there existed any deep-seated "estrangement" and a "sort of social antagonism" between the members of the Secretariat and those of the I.L.O. He does not feel that Geneva was so provincial and socially forbidding as the author does. But these are minor points on which views may legitimately differ. Mr. Ranshofen-Wertheimer's old colleagues have found in him a good interpreter of their common work that now, in spite of all, promises to be of some lasting significance.

The second book is written by Mr. Chester Purves—a former member of the Secretariat's Personnel Office. He is concerned with questions of internal administration, in particular staff matters. One gleans that the League Secretariat was not too successful in solving the problems encountered. One misses the illumination that could have been thrown on these questions by a comparative analysis of the wise and human practice adopted by the sister organization, I.L.O., and further developed under the dynamic leadership of John Winant. One concludes that personnel questions are far too vital to the success of any future international organization to be delegated to narrow bureaucrats stifled by their own rules and moving mysteriously in the unhealthy atmosphere of secrecy. Mr. Purves' book can be recommended as an authoritative account of

the old League in the aspect in which it is least worthy of imitation.

JOHN LINDBERG

Princeton, N. J.

EDWARDS, CORWIN D. (Ed.). *A Cartel Policy for the United Nations*. Pp. vi, 124. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945. \$1.25.

This volume, edited by Professor Corwin D. Edwards, contains five papers by distinguished experts, originally presented as lectures at Columbia University in the spring of 1945. Fritz Machlup discusses the problematical elements attendant upon the operation of international cartels; Ben W. Lewis, the legal, political, and economic position of cartels in postwar Europe; Robert P. Terrill, the possible role of cartels as an instrument of world peace, and the repercussions of cartel operations upon national and international security; Theodore J. Kreps, the possibilities of and experiences with unilateral actions of nations in the realm of cartel policies; and, finally, Corwin D. Edwards, the auspices of various types of government actions in the field of an international policy toward cartels.

One of the principal merits of all five studies is that the questions asked and answered are well formulated. The authors are aware that the problem of international private monopolies is but one sector (though a very important one) within the indefinite array of perspectives relative to the economic intercourse of nations. The planned brevity of the papers made it impossible for the authors to elaborate on important assumptions upon which their reasoning was founded. There is no doubt that they do not accept the proposition (often implied in cartel discussions) that the mere absence of cartel arrangements will necessarily result, in all fields of business, in a workable pattern of economic rivalry. They also realize that the doctrine of the international harmony of interests needs many qualifications with reference to common cartel policies. The five authors seem to agree on the proposition that arrangements of private entrepreneurs "regulating" competition almost invariably result in a socially undesirable situation.

They do not attach much hope to co-operative efforts of private businessmen which would aim at enlarging the volume of international production and maintaining reasonable trade terms.

Indeed, to visualize a workable policy on entrepreneurial co-operation on the international scale is a timely and important task. A large number of statesmen, scholars, and men in the street all over the world believe that private monopolistic arrangements significantly contributed to the rise of the two world wars. Many also believe that, if not deprived of influence, these bulwarks of private monopolistic power will be the main factors responsible for a third world upheaval. These voices are sounded from all regions of the world. The latest emphatic warning was contained in the eve-of-election speech of Premier Joseph Stalin. According to him, "The war broke out as an inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism."

Of course, monopolistic power is attacked from entirely different angles in various countries. The expectations attached to a social order in which private monopolistic power will be absent vary with the predilections of authors. Opinions also differ as to the possibility and probability of permanent competition on various international markets, and as to the political repercussions of entrepreneurial co-operation. This difference in approach and expectations makes the matter under discussion even more fascinating. That an important section of German economic warfare was shrouded in private monopolistic agreements is an additional reason for an adequate discussion of cartel policies from all possible aspects. Each of the five studies contributes to the elucidation of modern cartel policies. The inclusion of one or more studies focused on behavior patterns of private entrepreneurs would have added to the value of the symposium.

The cohesion of our social system and the protection of certain human groups require an elaborate network of "vested" rights. However, in the opinion of the authors (and this reviewer), the actual ex-

tent of these entrenched "rights" (approved, tolerated, or condemned by democracies) far exceeds the limits desirable. The fact that the fundamental political and economic problems underlying this situation appear daily to the man in the street in the form of queer little contradictions only aggravates the issues involved. To face squarely, with insight and foresight, the national and international problems attendant upon restricted marketing is an unfinished task of social science.

It is impossible to offer an adequate review of the particular studies in a brief space. Even those who do not agree in all details with the authors of these very instructive papers will read them with interest and profit. They contain much new material and new reasoning, along with the presentation of traditional cartel opinions. The volume is well organized, clearly written, and deserves to be read widely by experts and laymen alike.

ERVIN HEXNER

University of North Carolina

HEXNER, ERVIN. *International Cartels*. Pp. xiv, 555. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1945. \$6.00.

This book carries a title that has been particularly common in the literature of international economics during the past two decades. Dr. Hexner's contribution is, however, more than just another study in the field of international business relationships. Drawing on his earlier industrial experience in Czechoslovakia and on the fruits of considerable research since coming to the United States, the author has given us a comprehensive compendium of pertinent case material supported by careful analysis.

The elements essential to the cartel concept comprise such a complex amalgamation of entrepreneurial interests and purposes that they virtually defy classification. In their political implications they have assumed, in the mind of the average citizen, a meaning almost as mysterious as the researches into atomic energy. Although private entrepreneurs have for centuries co-operated in one way or another in international economic intercourse, the term "cartel" has long had a somewhat

odious aroma. The close identification of international cartels with the political tension of the thirties and with the German Government's utilization of them as instruments of economic warfare has associated the term with the worst evils of restricted production, market allocation, and price fixing.

Dr. Hexner does not succumb to the emotionalism which has characterized much of the popular discussion of the cartel issue. He concludes that "the experience gained from the operation of international cartels in the politically unique period of the thirties may be applied only with many reservations to a future regime of hoped-for political security." It is impossible to make reliable generalizations with reference to international trade mechanisms on the basis of research to date, a shortcoming which will perhaps persist until some future international economic organization assumes the responsibility for adequate analysis and study.

The author's analysis rests on the tentative definition of a cartel as "a voluntary, potentially impermanent, business relationship among a number of independent, private entrepreneurs, which through co-ordinated marketing significantly affects the market of a commodity or service." The complex elements in the definition are then divided into their constituent parts and analyzed. Dr. Hexner finds that, like a mechanical tool, the cartel may serve socially undesirable, neutral, or desirable objectives. Cartels have often arisen from a desire to increase profits and to avoid competition, they have retarded the rate of technological progress, and they have imposed by private treaty artificial barriers to international trade which have led to friction and disputes. Yet these need not be the inescapable consequences of co-operation among entrepreneurs in international markets. Nor have the results always been socially undesirable. One of the unfinished tasks of social science is that of investigating the conditions under which economic rationality operates in various directions.

International Cartels does not pretend to close any of the more conspicuous gaps in international economic research. The

author's analysis of the cartel concept and his evaluation of primary and secondary materials on cartel structure, cartel policy, and related political issues are brilliantly and thoroughly done. The case materials, which comprise more than two-thirds of the book, are well documented. A series of appendices and indices adds greatly to the reference value of the book.

AMOS E. TAYLOR

Washington, D. C.

PEARSON, FRANK A., and FLOYD A. HARPER. *The World's Hunger*. Pp. 90. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1945. \$1.50.

This book, clearly in the tradition of the Gannett National Food Conference held in Chicago in 1943, apparently was activated by the statement made in the report of the Hot Springs Conference on Food and Agriculture to the effect that the world's food-producing resources were enough to provide a good diet for all people. Thus the second chapter concludes: "Most of the world's 'social uplifters' are people of means who have enjoyed a luxurious diet and are sympathetic toward those whose diet is less delectable. Most of them have little or no comprehension of the amount of land and human effort required to produce the grain and forage for the production of these highly prized foods. These big-hearted people bring forth many grandiose schemes and plans for up-grading the world's diet" (p. 17). Also, "The current ideas of food surpluses contradict the laws of nature, the history of mankind, and the realism of Malthus" (p. 2).

There are no "ifs" in this book about the severe pressure of the population of the United States and Europe on their food supplies. The authors say: "When [italics mine] food in these areas becomes scarce in proportion to population, etc." (p. 53). In fact, the world has done wrong to Germany and to the memories of Kaiser Wilhelm and Hitler: "The blame was laid on those areas and persons that made strenuous efforts to correct real or presumed inequities. The Kaiser was generally believed to be the cause of World War I just as Hitler was blamed for World War II. They merely personified

the underlying causes" (p. 77). Also, "World Wars I and II were attempts at redistribution, and, as the pressure on the food supply increases, there will be more. . . . Hitler stated the fundamental causes of war very simply and clearly—more *lebensraum*" (p. 76).

In support of the foregoing are four short chapters of summary figures on land resources which add up to a conclusion that the 4 per cent of the earth's land surface now in crops could be increased to 7 per cent (p. 48), and increasing the production on present acreage holds "more promise for increasing the world's food supply than does expansion of acreage" (p. 61). If these two increases could be designated as 2- and 2+, they would multiply out to about 4, which is exactly what the German Penck optimistically estimated (assuming no change in food standards). The authors, however, think that the expansion will probably be slower than the population increase. They point to the period 1900-15 when food prices were rising because population was pressing on the food supply, neglecting the fact that this temporary situation merely marked a stage in European industrialization. (See Frank Notestein and others, *The Future of the Population of Europe and the Soviet Union*. Notestein and his associates now predict a leveling out of the population of Europe by the year 2000, and of Europe outside of Russia by 1960-65.)

This book is a splendid illustration of how "facts" do not give the right answers unless *all* the *pertinent* ones are included and then put together in logical relationship. Considerable parts of the world, including much of western Europe, had already reached the point before 1940 when food supply was increasing at least as fast as the population and the income with which to buy food. Other regions will be added to these as industrialization proceeds. Industrialization and agricultural development advance in tandem, and most of the new products of industry are exchanged for more food and raw materials in the same country. Eventually, even Asia will find a way of balancing its industries, food supply, and population at a higher nutritional level than now prevails.

Another credo of the Hot Springs resolutions was that establishing such a balance is the task of each nation for itself, but that if the nations work together they can make headway faster. The Food and Agriculture Organization has been set up to facilitate this working together. A reasonable expectation is that the possible fourfold increase predicated by Penck, and by the authors, perhaps unwittingly, will never be needed.

JOHN D. BLACK

Harvard University

KNORR, K. E. *World Rubber and Its Regulation*. Pp. x, 265. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1945. \$3.00.

This book is a greatly needed and timely contribution to worth-while rubber literature. Dr. Knorr as associate economist in Stanford University's Food Research Institute, which is engaged in a series of studies on commodity control schemes, had won well-deserved attention by earlier writings on *Tin Under Control* and *Rubber After the War*, so his present work is postulated on a peculiarly fitting background. *World Rubber and Its Regulation* should win even more widespread recognition of the personal talents which he lends to his efforts.

An economist would be expected to keep cool in discussing controversial matters, but while preserving dispassionate equilibrium, Dr. Knorr does not hesitate to reach forthright conclusions. He has an unusual flair for exactitude of expression. The evidence and logic that he marshals to prove his points reveal painstaking source research and original thought, and the result reads convincingly. Happily for the lay reader, use of formal economic language is minimized. No other economic analysis of rubber is at once equally comprehensive, well balanced, and readable. This book is meaty, attaining brevity without abruptness.

That rubber is a key commodity is generally granted, but that the industry has bellwether propensities in international economics is less well understood. Yet, no other modern commodity has so much accumulated experience in regimentation; it

has led the field of international commodity control schemes. Dr. Knorr analyzes the results of the past rubber production controls, and poses questions for national rubber policy makers and international planners. In doing this, he excusably separates "rubber" and its "regulation" from world trends toward regimentation evidenced in other commodity controls, cartels, and authoritarian states; but the reader may well bear in mind this general world context, including the American experiment with the National Recovery Administration in 1934. Consideration may be given, also, to the general financial position of the United Kingdom and the bearing of rubber profits on British taxpayers and government economy as a *raison d'être* for past restriction. The interest of rubber-products manufacturers in fairly stable rather than very low prices, stemming from their need to maintain dollar volume sales for profitable operations, is mentioned but not emphasized.

Certain war statistics were not available to the author when he wrote. The only consequential inaccuracies noted by the reviewer were on pages 180-81, including gross overstatement of 1942-43 exports from Ceylon, understatement of Liberian exports, and faulty summarization of results of the tropical American rubber procurement program, which actually provided the United States with an import tonnage of natural rubber, from 1942 through 1945, nearly equivalent to the American stockpile remaining at the end of the period.

The book is decidedly not an argument in favor of regulation or government control in general, any more than for past rubber controls, though the possibility of future regulation is conceded and discussed. The author explodes many fancied benefits of control advanced by McFadyean in *History of International Rubber Regulation*. He finds that the restriction plan involved interference with economic processes that was entirely out of line with requirements of an expanding world economy, after submitting the crucial question of whether it solved an admittedly urgent problem in such a manner that short-run and long-run disadvantages did

not grossly outweigh short-run benefits. And he finds that businessmen as well as governments tend to orient policies toward the short-run approach; that an efficient policy is possible only if government, desiring a remedy effective in the long run, makes its support of control contingent on industry acceptance of unpalatable control features. Plenty of food for thought here—for those whose recommendations will some day be coldly appraised by other writers.

E. G. HOLT

Department of Commerce

WERNER, AUGUSTE-REYNALD. *La Croix-Rouge et les Conventions de Genève.* Pp. 447. Geneva: Chez Georg et Cie, S. A., 1943. 8 Swiss francs.

In 1862 Henry Dunant, a citizen of Geneva, published his book *Un souvenir de Solferino*, in which he developed his idea of charity toward wounded and sick soldiers of the armies in the field. From this origin has sprung up the International Red Cross, a world-wide institution, still closely connected with Switzerland and carrying as its distinctive sign the Red Cross on white ground in honor of Switzerland, whose national flag is a white cross on red ground.

The book under review, a strictly juridical study, containing at the end an excellent bibliography, attempts to give a complete legal analysis of the law governing the International Red Cross, both in its organic and substantive aspects.

The substantive law, contained in the International Red Cross conventions and The Hague conventions on the laws of war, climaxing in the Red Cross Convention and the Prisoners of War Convention of 1929, is strictly part of international law. The author gives a detailed analysis of this law, but remains on the level of the general, abstract rules of the conventions, without going to the problem of their application in the different wars.

The essential role of the Red Cross is charity on the battlefield: *inter arma caritas*. But the Red Cross has also a civil mission, both in war toward the civilian population, and in time of peace. These

activities are not regulated by international law.

The most interesting and original part of the book is dedicated to the organic law of the International Red Cross, a law in formation. It is not possible to go into details here. We mention only briefly that the International Red Cross is composed of the national Red Cross societies, the League of Red Cross Societies which has its seat at Paris, and the International Red Cross Committee in Geneva, founded in 1863. The International Committee, a unique institution, has juridical personality under Swiss law and an international status. It is strictly neutral, independent, and international, although composed exclusively of Swiss citizens. This Committee is entirely different from such international institutions as, e.g., the Universal Postal Union. Its authority is primarily moral as the guardian of the Red Cross principles; but it recognizes new national Red Cross societies, it controls the application of the Geneva conventions through delegates directly appointed to the belligerents, and it negotiates with the belligerents on an equal footing. In 1942 this Committee created the Foundation for the Organization of Red Cross Transports in Basel.

The highest organ of the International Red Cross is the International Red Cross Conference, which in 1928 adopted the Statute of the International Red Cross. At these Conferences delegations of the national Red Cross societies, of the League of Red Cross Societies, of the International Committee, and of the governments take part in the deliberations. There have taken place, up to now, four regional Pan American Red Cross Conferences; in 1941 a Pan American Bureau of the League of Red Cross Societies was created.

The International Red Cross has, therefore, a unique position in international affairs. Although the Conferences and the Statute have no diplomatic character, the governments take part at those Conferences; the substantive law is strictly international law; the functions of the International Committee are international and recognized as such. The author therefore suggests that the International Red

Cross has become, or is becoming, a true person in international law.

JOSEF L. KUNZ
University of Toledo College of Law

BLAKEY, Roy G. and GLADYS C. *Sales Taxes and Other Excises*. Pp. 199. Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1945. Paper: \$3.00; Cloth: \$3.75.

The seven chapters in this monograph are devoted to state sales and use taxes, the question of adoption of a national sales tax, gasoline and other motor fuels taxes, alcoholic beverage taxes, cigarette and tobacco taxes, chain store taxation, problems of intergovernmental relationships and shifting, incidence and other economic effects of sales taxes. Although the book was written before the close of the war, the relevant state tax legislation during 1945 has been included in an appendix.

The multitudinous facts and figures relating to the numerous sales and excise taxes in the United States in recent years are here presented in a comprehensive but conveniently usable form. One of the sixty-seven tables fills seven pages, and many of the others are full-page statistical compilations. It is unfortunate that such an excellent factual and statistical study of this kind must soon become outdated as a consequence of the constant changes in legislation, administration, and tax yields. Nevertheless, a most useful service has been performed in the collection and summarization of the vast amount of detailed information involved in the variegated experience with and extensive development of sales and excise taxation in this country in the past two decades.

In the chapter "Should We Adopt a Federal Sales Tax?" the authors give no definite answer on this question so highly controversial during the war years, but present the arguments for and against this proposal and the spending tax proposal as war finance measures. In a later chapter we are reminded that it is the fiscal system as a whole that should be evaluated and that an individual tax should be judged not as if it stood alone, but on the basis of whether or not it improves the whole system. In any event, it is to be expected that sales taxes and excises will continue

as important revenue sources for both the state and Federal governments.

On the controversial issue of chain store taxation it is concluded that the data are insufficient for a categorical answer, but "if chains do make greater profits and have greater ability to pay taxes, this ability could be reached by a net income tax." It is contended that such a tax would be equally fair for chains and independents, and that the evidence is that chains really perform a public service and that it would be contrary to public welfare to tax them out of existence by discriminatory taxes.

DENZEL C. CLINE
Michigan State College

LUTZ, HARLEY L. *Guideposts to a Free Economy*. Pp. ix, 206. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1945. No price listed.

This is a series of essays by Dr. Lutz which originally appeared in the pages of the *Tax Review*. It is a remarkably clear and popular representation of the fundamental problems of government interference and taxation.

In a brilliant manner, the author discusses and criticizes many "modern" plans of government economic policy. He has the rare gift of being able to express striking truths in a few words. In the chapter "Untaxing Business" he says: "Freedoms of various kinds have been promised to everyone except the businessman." He sustains this thesis in a noteworthy discussion. To him, "The concept of ability to pay does not require progressive or graduated tax rates."

At times, the author is very sarcastic. He derides the attitude of the Treasury in its repudiation of the sales tax in the recent program of tax reform. Dr. Lutz contends that instead of taxing small incomes by means of an income tax or victory tax, a Federal retail sales tax would be a much better approach. There is nothing particularly new in this statement—and the reviewer tried hard to expound this idea—but Dr. Lutz's presentation is a masterpiece of logic in his sharp criticisms of the Treasury's "considerations" respecting the sales tax. In the opinion of Dr. Lutz,

this tax would, in the present juncture, have offered "the only visible prospect of supplying a substantial revenue with a minimum of strain and inconvenience to the taxpayer."

Reviewing the "National Planning Rampart" and giving "A Simple Recipe for Prosperity," Dr. Lutz remarks: "When one puts together the bugaboo of mature economy, the seduction of the government guarantee, and the bludgeon of destructive taxation, their cumulative effect upon the spirit of enterprise is tremendous. Perhaps, this spirit has simply gone underground until the reign of terror is over."

This book is excellent reading and should be recommended to experts and laymen alike.

PAUL HAENSEL

Mary Washington College, Virginia

MAGILL, ROSWELL. *Taxable Income*. Pp. viii, 491. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1945. \$6.00.

What is the nature of taxable income? The primary purpose of this revised edition of Professor Roswell Magill's book, which originally appeared in 1936, is to analyze the innumerable court decisions to establish the fundamental premises that help to answer this question, because the concept of taxable income has admittedly outgrown the possibility of definition. The author propounds the thought that, irrespective of the economic or accounting concept, the tax concept of "profit" includes the ideas of severance from capital and realizability in various forms. Professor Magill in this learned treatise traces the legislative and judicial interpretations of income since the first modern income tax provisions in 1913 through its hectic history to the present. Economists particularly might quarrel with these findings, but his conclusions are nevertheless legally correct. Tax authorities should be thankful to Magill for this laborious and scholarly study of income, which is the basic ingredient of their daily pabulum.

J. H. LANDMAN

National Industrial Conference Board

SCHULTZ, THEODORE W. *Agriculture in an Unstable Economy*. Pp. xix, 299. New

York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1945. \$2.75.

COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. *Agriculture in an Expanding Economy*. Pp. 45. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1945. Free.

Professor Schultz's volume is an attempt "to lay the foundations for a national policy with regard to agriculture." To accomplish this, he first sketches the present situation of American agriculture and indicates those forces—both long-term and war-induced—which have produced the present setting. Having set forth the basic problems which must be solved in the future, and having pointed out that the present postwar boom has merely temporarily obscured these problems, not solved them, he presents a number of important suggestions for policy makers, including both objectives and techniques.

To this reviewer, the greatest virtue of this volume seems to be the over-all point of view of agriculture as a component of the entire economy, vitally affected by what takes place in other economic fields, and in turn affecting them. Thus the author points to the instability of industrial output and employment as the primary factor causing instability in farm prices, incomes, and welfare, and draws the corollary that only by over-all measures putting our entire economy in balance can the basic agricultural problem, the achievement of optimal resource allocation, be solved. All measures of policy concerned only with farm prices or farm incomes fail to eradicate the basic difficulties arising from the absence of full employment and high production in the economy as a whole. Much of present agricultural price policy is condemned by Professor Schultz, since, as he demonstrates, it aggravates maladjustments and prevents necessary resource shifts. Professor Schultz's breadth of view and concern for the national welfare come as a refreshing tonic to anyone who has been accustomed to the narrow outlook and special-interest point of view of many of agriculture's representatives in Congress and the Department of Agriculture.

Since the fiscal and monetary measures

necessary to obtain optimum conditions in the entire economy are matters outside the province of his book, the author confines his specific policy suggestions to things that must be done when the economy is not at full employment and high production levels, in order to minimize instability of incomes and suffering in agriculture, and then suggests an over-all technique of price policy to permit optimum resource allocation within agriculture. In times of depression, he argues, it is best to keep farm income up by means of compensatory payments rather than by attempting to maintain farm prices, and he indicates the very substantial social advantages arising from this new technique. To accomplish the long-run objective of minimizing price uncertainty facing farmers when they make decisions on how to use their resources, he proposes a system of forward prices which will enable the farmers to plan their production program so as to produce the commodities that will be needed in the future and that can be bought at satisfactory price levels.

Professor Schultz's volume represents an important contribution to the current literature on agriculture economics, both because of the soundness of his analysis of current problems and because of the merit of his suggestions for policy changes. The book deserves a wide reading public, and one cannot but hope that among those who read it will be the persons in farm organizations, Congress, and the Department of Agriculture who have the responsibility of shaping our agricultural policy.

The CED statement on *Agriculture in an Expanding Economy* combines an admirable summary of the present and prospective farm picture, largely based on Professor Schultz's book, with a number of recommendations which flow from the preceding analysis and make a good deal of sense as aids to bridging the transitional and more permanent problems of American agriculture. The authors of the statement endorse government subsidization of low-income nutrition to increase domestic farm product consumption. They urge the elimination of trade barriers to increase foreign trade, and measures, such as improved educational opportunities, designed

to increase mobility of farm labor (including both hired and family workers) in order to diminish the excess agricultural labor supply. The fundamental importance to agriculture of high production and employment for the entire economy is stressed, but various possibilities are suggested for easing the impact of short-run adjustments resulting from future failure to maintain the entire economy in health. To counteract the natural risks involved in farm, a system of crop insurance for areas of high climatic risk is mentioned.

The most interesting aspect of the CED report is its frank recognition that government must remain indefinitely in agriculture as an active economic force. The explicit admission of this by a group of outstanding businessmen deserves more than passing notice.

HARRY SCHWARTZ

Silver Spring, Md.

WEAVER, HERBERT. *Mississippi Farmers, 1850-1860*. Pp. 139. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1945. \$2.50.

Mississippi Farmers is a detailed analysis of the economic and social structure of the agricultural population of Mississippi during the ten years prior to the Civil War. It is a distinct contribution because of the exactness of the data which it presents. The author selected representative counties in ten physiographic or soil-type regions of the state and analyzed the holdings of every landowner in each sample county.

The importance of this type of analysis is best indicated by a few sentences from the author's introduction. He says: "Perhaps no region has been more misrepresented than the ante bellum South. Materials for study have been abundant but have tended to give a distorted view. . . . As a result of the natural tendency of observers to comment only upon the unusual or spectacular, the badly distorted conception of the ante bellum South as the home of the great planters with hundreds of slaves and of miserable, unkempt 'poor whites' became a stereotype. Meanwhile a vast middle group of sturdy, self-reliant, law-abiding farmers was ignored because they were conventional and prosaic." This

document ignores no portion of the population. It may at places be prosaic, but in some ways that is the measure of meticulous research.

The study contains all the pertinent statistics available, and the interpretation of these statistics is made out of what others have written concerning the period 1850 to 1860 from an analysis of newspapers and other documents of the period and from numerous other secondary sources. A dozen such careful studies at different places throughout the South would be exceedingly valuable.

CARL C. TAYLOR

Department of Agriculture
Washington, D. C.

TAIT, SAMUEL W., JR. *The Wildcatters: An Informal History of Oil-Hunting in America.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946. \$3.00.

In spite of the profound influence on our civilization exerted by the petroleum industry, the history of its development has been sadly neglected. Many of the books and articles written on the historical aspects have dwelt on the spectacular and sensational episodes. In recent years, however, a small but growing number of scholarly studies on the more substantial aspects of oil history have appeared. Tait's book, *The Wildcatters*, is a welcome addition to the last-mentioned category of books; it makes a noteworthy contribution and helps to provide a better appreciation and understanding of the petroleum industry—especially the wildcatters. The ability of a lawyer, the practical experience of an oil operator and scout, residence in the oil regions, an early and continuous interest in the literature on oil, and a wide range of research have combined to produce this excellent volume.

Written with a sympathetic interest in the subject, yet objectively, the author presents in an informal style a fascinating history of the wildcatters—those men who hunt for oil in new and untested territory—in the United States and Canada from the time of Drake to Gutowsky. For the first time we have an account, though brief, of the opening of our major oil-producing

fields. While the emphasis is on individuals who played an important role in the opening of these new fields, the reader will find much of value about teamsters, pipe lines, new uses for petroleum, salt wells, methods of drilling, shooting wells, waterflooding, oil towns, and other related subjects. A strong flavor of geology runs through the book. Interesting anecdotes and personal recollections enliven its pages. A fine sense of humor prevails. Chapter headings like "Doodlebugs and Rock-hounds," "Poor Man's Paradise," and others arouse the reader's curiosity and lure him on. The author writes as if he were thoroughly enjoying the work. It is hoped that he will do a companion volume on the American wildcatter abroad.

The book makes an attractive appearance. Appropriate maps and a variety of pictures, old and modern, relating to different oil regions add interest. A good index is provided. The chief criticism to be noted is the complete lack of footnotes; there is nothing to indicate the source of some of the quotations and other important data, except a general statement at the end.

PAUL H. GIDDENS
Allegheny College
Meadville, Pa.

GLENDAY, Roy. *The Future of Economic Society.* Pp. viii, 320. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1944. \$4.00.

Yielding to the theme so attractive to thinkers in all ages, Glenday offers a new interpretation of laws of social and economic growth to explain the past, clarify the present, and ordain the future. Books of this kind ordinarily invite professional pooh-pooh, but coming with the keen insight of an "economic adviser to the Federation of British Industries," this one is a refreshing exception.

The nub of Glenday's thesis is derived from observed natural phenomena discussed in Part I of the book. Its essentials can be set forth in a series of simple propositions. Every economic system reflects an adjustment between population and environment, each growing at different rates and making possible only a

rough, ever changing equilibrium between them. Growth proceeds in discontinuous waves according to a pattern having these stages: early geometric progression, resistance of the environment, adjustment between the forces at work, and resumption of the growing process at a declining rate. Ultimately, a limit is reached to all growth within the existing framework because universal law fixes a convenient size (limit) to growth of any kind. When this limit is reached, a major breakdown occurs which must be followed by a fundamental reconstruction.

Glenday, in Part II, examines history from this point of view and, as might be expected from a man with a thesis, he illustrates his contentions. Applied to the present state of the world in Part III, "the present collapse (industrial society, depression, war, etc.) is seen to be the result . . . of a breakdown of a structure built up on a particular idea—the economic idea: the individual pursuit of unlimited wealth." The process (of rearranging the existing pattern of population and environment) "has now been taken to its limit within the present economic framework." Growth is approaching a standstill. A new economic structure on a higher level of organization is necessary. This means an entire reconstruction of society in which the "group" will have to replace the individual as the prime building block of a new structure. Operations once found valid when individuals formed the social unit are no longer adequate; modern society is group society with an existence and laws of its own. The sooner this is understood and encouraged, the sooner life and work can be reconstituted in a new pattern (a "communal system") offering greater promise of a fresh advance in civilization.

The limited space of a review can never do justice to a book with a thesis spread on such a wide canvas. With proper discount for the weaknesses, distortions, and contradictions inherent in any treatment of the "laws" of society, professional readers will find considerable pay dirt in this volume.

GEORGE H. E. SMITH

Washington, D. C.

MAYO, ELTON. *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization.* Pp. xvii, 150. Boston: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1945. \$2.50.

This little book is published by the Division of Research of the Graduate School of Business Administration of Harvard University. It gives the results of certain studies by Professor Mayo and his associates concerning the mental attitudes of industrial workers. A distinction is drawn between what is described as an *established* society as it existed in former times, in which group action and codes determined the social order, and an *adaptive* society as it exists today, where change of the individual from group to group is common. The thesis is that in such social grouping men have difficulty in relating themselves to others or to other groups, and hence follows solitariness, unhappiness, and industrial inefficiency.

Realizing that return to simpler and supposedly happier days is impossible, Professor Mayo has been conducting studies in industrial plants trying to find out how some degree of group action or collaboration can be attained under modern conditions. Several actual experiments in the development of group action in modern factories are cited, with greatly increased efficiency on the part of the workers. To quote from the accompanying digest, "These studies showed that the human desire for co-operative activity still persists in the ordinary person, even in communities of social chaos, and can be utilized by intelligent and skilled management." One may doubt the degree of group interest that can be attained in some types of modern industry, but certainly the high degree of division of labor and the assembly-chain methods now so common may need an antidote of some kind.

Professor Mayo stresses the point that while we have made great advances in the technical skills, we have fallen far behind in the development of social skills. He states, "If our social skills had advanced step by step with our technical skills there would not have been another European War." Well! one is led to wonder about Germany, where, while preparing to con-

quer the world, great efforts were made to secure great strength through social grouping—"Strength through Joy" movements, and so forth. It would appear that some thought must be given to the *direction* of our social skills if universal peace is to be attained. Nevertheless, the book is well worth reading for its humanitarian philosophy.

DEXTER S. KIMBALL

Cornell University

ELFENBEIN, HIRAM. *Socialism from Where We Are.* Pp. x, 214. New York: Samson Press, 1945. \$1.50.

This volume attempts a new approach to the problem of attaining socialism. The author is highly critical of previous efforts by Socialists to achieve their goals. In his judgment, the party has failed to think through the problems which it faces, and has often given only lip service to its ideals. Its members have been either divided or neutral on such burning issues as participation in a capitalist war, co-operation with labor unions and other bourgeois reform movements, and the like. There has been an attempt to expand membership at the cost of diluting principles. Thus, the English Labor Party did not really campaign on a socialist platform, but rather rode to power on an anti-Conservative groundswell. Socialists in labor unions and co-operatives have sacrificed their integrity to promote temporary gains. By contrast, Mr. Elfenbein proposes a militant, thorough, and immediate program of action.

Socialism is to be achieved through three main steps. In the first place, a capital levy is to be imposed on business in order to liquidate the national debt. Once the debt is removed, a program of "surplus taxation" is to be instituted. This implies a level of taxes so high that the Government will realize an annual surplus of sizable proportions. This surplus will be used to purchase stock in one hundred designated industrial corporations, thus leading to gradual and peaceable socialization of these industries. The process will be continued until all industry is owned by government. To achieve this, of

course, political action is required. Here the author proposes, as his third step, a rejuvenation of Socialist political action. It is his conviction that an honest, aggressive Socialist program will win support from intellectuals and thinking workers. The failure of capitalism to provide employment will give added impetus to the program.

Apparently the author is not thoroughly convinced of the practicability of his own proposals, since he devotes an entire section to the proposition that socialism may possibly emanate from non-Socialists. The thought here is that the failure of capitalism may lead to the managerial, totalitarian state. Such a state, however, would be impelled to seek full employment at high levels, and thus give the benefits of socialism to the workers. In this regard, the author seems to be singularly complacent over the possible destruction of basic civil liberties, provided high economic standards are achieved (pp. 158-60). Likewise, his criticism of the Soviet regime is that it is non-Socialist rather than that it is undemocratic.

The critical reader will discover that this book, like most Socialist literature, dogmatically assumes that capitalism cannot make the adjustments necessary to survive, and that socialism will of necessity bring about higher living standards. The assertion, in answer to Hayek's objections that a planned economy must be totalitarian, that workers can elect the managers of the industries where they work appears to be incredibly naïve, in view of Soviet failure to achieve satisfactory results by such methods. The author deserves credit for an honest attempt to face difficulties and to criticize shortcomings in previous Socialist literature, but he leaves many problems unsolved. Perhaps the answer is that democratic socialism is inherently utopian, being unable to inspire the idealism which alone would make it successful.

JOHN F. CRONIN
Washington, D. C.

DORFMAN, JOSEPH. *The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 1606-1865.* Two volumes: Vol. I, pp. xii, 499; Vol.

II, pp. vii, 503 to 987. New York: The Viking Press, 1946. \$7.50 for set.

Professor Dorfman's volumes are both a delight and an exasperation; a delight because of the rich new data that he reveals to his readers, and an exasperation because he leaves so many questions unanswered. Yet these two quite variant qualities arise from the same base—the general novelty of the effort that he is making.

Previous efforts at chronicling the changes in American economic thought have been monographic in character, insofar as they have done justice to the materials. Such was E. A. J. Johnson's excellent survey of the seventeenth century, or Harry E. Miller's examination of theories relating to money and banking before 1860. On the other hand, those who have tried to record the broad sweep and alternations in social thought have not dealt adequately with "the economic mind," which needed first extensive exploration by a specialist. Here in these two volumes that carry the story through the fratricidal war (which will be followed soon by a volume or by volumes dealing with the later decades) we have an effort to supply the missing element—a general survey, seemingly directed toward the area of our social thought, the "mind in American civilization."

The product thus far issued is unquestionably scholarly in the sense that the author has sought widely and diligently for writings pertinent to his theme. Some thirty of the books and pamphlets that he cites are not recorded in the Library of Congress' printed catalogue; he devotes whole sections to books that will be found in very few libraries of the country; he goes beyond books to pamphlets and manuscript remains of correspondence; and he brings to proper attention writers hitherto unknown or at least unsung: John Blackwell and Jacob Cardozo, David Starr and Stephen Colwell, and a host of other personages.

In structure, the book gives the impression of a progressively more turbulent stream. In the early periods, such as the seventeenth or eighteenth century, the individual writers were few enough to be conveniently merged into chapter-narra-

tives that present brief backgrounds of events and problems. As the periods advance, more individuals rise to prominence above the general level until in the era from Jackson to Lincoln the chapter-story of the period's broad character is quite overshadowed by studies of conspicuous authors, although it still serves as a medium for noting the less important or more specialized writers. As one result, the later chapters become collections of more or less separate essays; and, for example, one finds a chapter on "The Northern Protectionists" starting out immediately with an appraisal of Daniel Raymond—who is followed by Willard Phillips, Calvin Colton, and John Rae—without a preliminary or concluding survey of "northern protectionists" in the large.

Each period is treated conceptually as a unit, and the several chapters are mere conveniences. Actually, Professor Dorfman appears at times hard pressed to find logical cubbyholes into which to thrust his authors. The criteria of time and its political content, of geography, of public issues, and of dominant personalities all have influence; and we find such apparently jumbled chapter themes as "Social Philosophies of the Founding Fathers," "The Virginia Contingent," "Monetary Reformers," and "The Carey-Colwell School." We also have potpourri such as "The International Commercial Mind"—a chapter that brings together such diverse figures as Tom Paine, Robert Fulton, and Erich Bollmann; or "The Western Contingent: Upholders of Traditional Ideals," with an equally varied group. Still, the whole story hangs together, since, as just suggested, the several periods form the chief divisions and all else is subordinated thereto.

The "exasperating" features are a not unnatural resultant of the factors now mentioned. In an exploratory essay covering so broad a field, Professor Dorfman had to choose among alternative procedures. He elected to emphasize men and their writings: they had such and such careers and interests; they expressed such and such views on contemporary issues; and they elaborated such and such economic principles or criticisms of others'

principles (including English writers, chiefly Smith, Ricardo, and Mill). And Professor Dorfman always gives sympathetic statements of his writers' propositions—if anything, too sympathetic, in that he tends to overlook errors and forgive inconsistencies. He withholds his own criticisms, except for an occasional light comment.

Among the alternatives that Professor Dorfman denied himself is that of extensive correlations of his "economic mind" with the popular thought of his periods and with legislation. He does display the leading figures in his chapter on "The 'Labor' Literature," but he neglects the pioneer labor journals, and pretty largely the early efforts at labor organization as evidences of thought. Similarly, he gives the commercial views of Virginians from Jefferson to Beverley Tucker; but he does not relate what was being said in Virginian newspapers or in Virginia's legislature, or what economic policy was evident in Virginia's laws of the period.

But, as I have said, Professor Dorfman had to choose. And the direction of his choice—at least for the later decades—is suggested by the introduction of two chapters on "The Higher Learning" relating specifically to the periods 1789–1829 and 1829–1861. He essays to cover academic and literary economics rather than, or at least much more than, the economics of the man in the street or of the legislator either in Congress or in the state assemblies.

Again, in the matter of arrangement, Professor Dorfman had to choose. Chiefly he follows a time sequence, with the periods broken down by certain subjects, and below that by authors. As a consequence, the reader will find it difficult to trace the course of thought on a number of important themes: To what extent were American writers original and to what extent did they merely borrow from abroad? What were the trends of thought in the Middle Atlantic states, or relative to population or land policy or the corporation or other topics not selected for special treatment? Or what was the progress of thinking in this country on such formal economic ideas as rent, interest, or profits? Even the

Index does not wholly make such data evident.

Yet Professor Dorfman's volumes will prove a mine to students for many years. Some men will find in them inspiration to attempt some of the syntheses that I have mentioned—syntheses which could hardly be hazarded without this exploratory survey. Economic historians will find in the writings of these decades, as now revealed by Professor Dorfman, a background for their specialized inquiries which has long been wanting. And students of social thought will dip into the book for data that will help to round out their broader chronicles. Professor Dorfman deserves the thanks of all social scientists for the fruitful results of his long labors.

ARTHUR H. COLE
Harvard University

CRANSTON, RUTH. *The Story of Woodrow Wilson*. Pp. xv, 478. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945. \$3.50.

There is no tried and true formula by which the accolade of greatness is bestowed upon its leaders by a free people. Time is the great arbiter, and after only two decades it becomes increasingly apparent that Woodrow Wilson is destined for a place among the American immortals.

Mrs. Cranston's avowed purpose, in this most recent biography of the twenty-eighth President, was to create "a one-volume story of Wilson covering the entire sixty-eight years of his life in detail, plus a somewhat detailed account of the Peace Conference, the Senate fight, and, finally, a record of the institution for which he literally gave his life: the League of Nations." To the performance of her task she brought some very definite assets—some of which were also partial liabilities: a wide personal acquaintance with the Wilson family, dating back to her college friendship with two of the Wilson girls; access to the mountainous Wilson papers; the personal interest and encouragement of members of the family; extensive writing experience, of both fiction and nonfiction; and a decade of work with the League of Nations.

In the preparation of a one-volume bi-

ography of any prominent person, the author is always faced with the difficult problems of what to include and what to exclude, and of the proper division of space. Mrs. Cranston has done a commendable job of resolving these problems. More than a third of the book is devoted to Wilson as a "Peace-Maker." The solid accomplishments of the first term receive twice the attention given to the war years. His life up to the election of 1912 is covered in two chapters totaling a hundred pages.

It is a very human individual that emerges from this well-rounded and extremely interesting volume. The descriptions of Wilson's home life and of the members of his family are particularly well done. Not all the appraisals are objective, however. The second Mrs. Wilson receives a noncritical approval, while the author is less than just in her attitude toward Tumulty and Colonel House. On the other hand, Mrs. Cranston's judgment of the influence of Henry Cabot Lodge coincides very closely with that of Lodge's latest biographer—Karl Schriftgiesser; her scathing condemnation of the "irreconcilables" is as just as it is keen.

A highly controversial figure in his lifetime, a rejected prophet now coming into his own, Woodrow Wilson will certainly be the subject of many future biographies. Some of them will be critical, scholarly appraisals of a challenging figure in American politics, of a world statesman. Others will be efforts to understand and assay the personality and character of the man, and to make that understanding available to all. In either case, the authors will need to consider Mrs. Cranston's very real contribution to both an understanding of the man and an appraisal of his place in history.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN

New York City

SMITH, HAROLD D. *The Management of Your Government*. Pp. xiii, 179. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1945. \$2.50.

Following training and experience in state and local public administration, the

author of this work became Director of the Bureau of the Budget of the United States in 1939. Since that time, under difficult circumstances, he has transformed the Bureau from a small unit that was occupied mainly in checking budget estimates, into a large, complex, efficient agency of administrative management for the entire National Government. As a principal aid to the President since 1939, the Bureau deals not only with the making of the annual budgets but also with problems of departmental organization and procedure, legislation that affects the administration, administrative rule-making, the utilization of personnel, fiscal policy, statistical standards, and administrative records and reports. The man who presides over this agency is at the center of the National Government's administrative business and should be able to appraise it more authoritatively than anyone else.

This book is directed to reasonable men who are not unduly swayed by partisan or doctrinal bias. It is a simple, straightforward account of certain main questions of public management in the National Government. The author does not denounce or declaim or view with alarm, but presents his thoughts calmly and with due restraint.

At the outset the author disposes rather effectively of the main arguments of the antibureaucracy literature that is now so much in vogue. Speaking from facts and experience he points out that big government does not destroy democracy, and that, under democratic controls, public administrators can plan and manage the public business without inviting the establishment of a dictatorship. On this point the recent works of Paul Appleby (*Big Democracy*) and Herman Finer (*The Road to Reaction*) furnish excellent collateral reading. Public planning is shown, indeed, to be very much the same thing as public management. The author urges administrators to be more concerned about the purposes and objectives of their work and to pay less attention to administrative methods and techniques—a piece of advice that applies also to the training of administrators.

In its contents the book covers not only

some of the general aspects of public management but also the specific functions of the Bureau of the Budget, the administrative and fiscal relations of national, state, and local governments, and certain fiscal and budgetary issues connected with public works and plans for full employment. No thoughtful person can fail to profit from a cover-to-cover reading of this book.

WILLIAM ANDERSON

University of Minnesota

WHITE, LEONARD D. (Ed.). *Civil Service in Wartime*. Pp. vii, 253. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945. \$2.50.

Any function of society is subjected to terrific strain by the abnormal. Our civil service in wartime has been no exception. Designed to procure satisfactory employees for the multitudinous services of Government in time of peace, it was asked to increase its capacities—in some instances over 1000 per cent—to take care of the war emergency. That it succeeded without breaking down, or even cracking, speaks well for its legal and social foundations, as well as for the abilities of its administrators.

Leonard D. White, as the editor of and one of the contributors to this little volume, deals with the general scope of the larger problem that confronted the Civil Service Commission—a problem suddenly realized with the news of Dunkerque. How could the Government immediately enlarge its capacities in many fields without discarding the prime factors of examinations, conferences, personality tests, lists, and the other machinery necessary to maintain popular control of efficient bureaucracy? It was done, and the methods used make interesting as well as instructive reading.

The Government was able to mobilize exact scientists and social scientists, often having rosters on hand before emergencies actually arose. The salary problem of major administrators was largely solved by the use of carefully screened and selected "dollar-a-year" men. Throughout these lectures one finds a pardonable pride in the success of government administrators—bureaucrats, if you please!—in meeting an

emergency that was only a half-step ahead of catastrophe.

Egon F. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, in the ninth lecture, gives an interesting résumé of the building up of a professional secretariat by the League of Nations, and also presents a provocative outline of the possibilities of an international civil service under the United Nations. The difficulties in the selection of the "principals" for such a service are much greater than twenty-seven years ago, but the writer gives sufficient details of methods open to the new secretariat to indicate that an excellent international civil service is possible.

This book is not only recommended to those interested in the administrative field, but should be of constructive interest to many public-spirited citizens as well. The coldly factual presentation of the problems of men, jobs, and salaries is excellent refutation of the unfortunately popular attitude (in some circles) toward government service in general. The short story presented of the overnight establishment of ration boards by state governments, working under national direction, is at least a partial answer to those who fear for state autonomy in "local" matters.

LENT D. UPSON

Wayne University

KONEFSKY, SAMUEL J. *Chief Justice Stone and the Supreme Court*. Pp. xxvi, 290. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1945. \$3.00.

The prominence of Chief Justice Harlan Stone has increased substantially since the departure of both Justices Holmes and Brandeis from the Supreme Court. In general, he is the understanding student of those two magnificent legal scholars. And they speak today through the opinions of Stone. The Chief Justice was handicapped while they were on the bench. He lacked the philosophic power of Holmes, and Brandeis' enthusiasm for the social sciences as a guide to legal theory. But he presents in his legal philosophy a curious admixture of those two outlooks.

This is shown especially in the Chief Justice's advocacy of a flexible *stare decisis*. Constitutional interpretation should, he

thinks, be kept generally germane with prior decisions, but not if the incidence of regularity exacts too great a price upon the general welfare. The so-called verities should, therefore, be frequently examined in the light of the demands of modern times. This reminds one at once of the traditional Stoic faith in frequent rearrangement and restatement of formulas for purposes of philosophic refinement. To the Chief Justice, as especially with the great Holmes, the truth of one age may be less than the truth in the epochs which ensue; and if no re-evaluation of juridical principles is practiced by the judges of the highest court, constitutional law may well deteriorate in its fundamental quality.

The author traces the constitutional interpretation upon intergovernmental immunity from its original statement by Marshall in *McCulloch v. Maryland*, through *Collector v. Day* and like cases, to the Chief Justice's majority opinion in the Gerhardt case (1938). That immunity from taxation might have been necessary in the early years of our national existence is admitted, but he denies that the employees of the New York Port Authority should be relieved of the necessity for paying state income tax because payment would constitute an onerous burden on the National Government. The power to tax does not necessarily involve the power to destroy, and, as Mr. Justice Holmes remarked, especially while the Supreme Court sits as a protection against such speculative destruction.

Professor Konefsky traces the evolution of Chief Justice Stone's theories on other constitutional questions, but those relating to the commerce clause and to civil rights are the most important. In the latter, the disagreement between the Chief Justice and Justice Frankfurter is effectively presented. To the former, the judiciary must protect individuals from arbitrary government as well as from other forms of tyranny. This viewpoint is expressed in the *Barnette flag-salute* case.

On the whole, the work is an interesting nontechnical discussion of recent developments in constitutional interpretation. Charles Beard's short introduction contains some crisp comment on some personal fac-

tors of the Supreme Court during the past half-century.

CORTEZ A. M. EWING
University of Oklahoma

VANDERBILT, ARTHUR T. (Ed.). *Studying Law*. Pp. 753. New York: Washington Square Publishing Co., 1945. \$4.75.

Legal education is in the process of being greatly reformed, partly in response to the practical needs of a changing world, and partly to provide the same sort of improvements which are being sought by college educators. The latter movement in the law schools is briefly designated as the "integration of law and nonlegal disciplines" and as "liberal legal education." (The reviewer has discussed these problems in 56 *Harvard Law Review* 245 and in 30 *Iowa Law Review* 394.) Whatever the terminology, the facts are evident. Law schools in ever increasing number are seeking to broaden legal education, to transform it from a largely vocational training into one that is also cultural and professional. In this endeavor they need the collaboration of nonlegal scholars, especially in the first years of crucial experiment. Unfortunately these scholars have not been informed of what is going on in the law schools, and they are apt to exhibit attitudes of professional bias. Worthy programs for significant reform of legal education have been defeated because of hostility resulting from lack of information and traditional professional prejudices.

This foreword to the review of the essays collected by Dean Vanderbilt is suggested by the fact that the book, while designed especially for prelaw and beginning law students, could also be read with profit by nonlegal scholars, for whom it would provide some insight into what modern legal educators are trying to do. For the book is broadly conceived. The essays are mostly by legal scholars well known for the breadth of their learning: Munroe Smith, Pound, Wigmore, Goodhart, and Wambaugh.

Inevitably there will be differences of opinion regarding such collections. Bevridge is rather definitely dated in his perspective; and the required reading of Zane's 127 pages on legal history would

be hardly less than "cruel and unusual punishment." Elsewhere the book shows evidence of Mr. Vanderbilt's nostalgic reliance on his own school days rather than a fresh approach representative of the current situation in legal education. The book will be better and more enjoyably read if the reader starts on page 171. Everything from that page on is worth reading and studying. It reveals a wide terrain of rich mines of learning which make the study of law a challenge and an inspiration. Dean Vanderbilt's book will be especially appreciated by thoughtful young men of good cultural background who have all too often been lost to the legal profession because technicality and vocationalism have been the apparent salient features. The book will be helpful to those prospective lawyers who lack intellectual curiosity, and it should give these warning and perhaps encourage them to enter some other vocation. For, although the pursuit of the lawyer's profession requires technical proficiency, it also and increasingly needs learning, imagination, philosophic understanding, and social comprehension. Dean Vanderbilt's book is a welcome addition to the literature which is designed to further these more challenging objectives of twentieth-century legal education.

JEROME HALL
Indiana University Law School

METZ, HAROLD W. *Labor Policy of the Federal Government.* Pp. ix, 284. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1945. \$2.50.

Mr. Metz presents in his book a systematic and thorough analysis of the development of the labor policy of the Federal Government. Such an analysis, without a personal judgment by the author on the wisdom of the policy, is a great contribution to clarity of thought on a subject always controversial and particularly critical today. The treatise deals with: (1) the role of the Government in regard to the concerted action of employees, including the promotion of collective bargaining; (2) governmental policies on the conditions of employment

(union preference, wages, and labor standards); (3) the settlement of labor disputes—permanent machinery and wartime machinery for the adjustments of labor disputes; and (4) major trends in Federal labor policy.

Throughout his work, Mr. Metz emphasizes the difficulty (if not the impossibility) of developing a unified labor policy in the United States. The difficulty arises from the nature of the Constitution, which creates one Federal jurisdiction and forty-eight state jurisdictions. As a result, many aspects of the labor problem are within the sole jurisdiction of the states. Strikes, picketing, boycotts, and the internal affairs of labor unions come within the scope of state laws or under the principles of the common law. In cases involving diversity of citizenship, the Federal courts attempt to apply the interpretations of the common law followed by the courts of the states in which the disputes arise. Particular difficulty results from the fact that Federal labor legislation (which is essentially an exercise of police power) must be constitutionally justified as a regulation of interstate commerce. The exceptions to this statement are found in laws denying judicial relief against certain labor activities and in certain laws involving Federal expenditure. The book shows clearly that the transition in judicial interpretation from the police theory of the functions of government to the theory that government has a positive function in the social order has been slow and strenuous.

The author handles his material with great skill. This is particularly true in his analysis of the decisions of the courts and the awards of the administrative agencies. Generalization on these matters is often impossible because of the complexity of issues which arise on the labor problem and the paucity of decisions and awards on specific issues. The reviewer believes that the author should have given greater acknowledgment to earlier studies on certain aspects of the subject, particularly on the history of labor laws before the Supreme Court and on the legal effects of collective agreements.

Mr. Metz has contributed a very useful

book for students of current labor problems.

JAMES P. ROWLAND
Chestnut Hill College

WILLIAMSON, S. T., and HERBERT HARRIS. *Trends in Collective Bargaining*. Pp. ix, 254. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1945. \$2.00.

The major part of this volume is a discussion and review of unionism and of practices in collective bargaining, and as such it is one of the best short summaries available at the present time. Twelve of its chapters deal with such standard subjects as unions and their structure, employers' bargaining agencies, types of collective agreements, individual issues in such agreements (e.g., wages, hours of work, and job security), union work rules, the administration of grievances, examples of union-management co-operation, and war experience in labor relations. An additional chapter considers the problems of public employer-employee relations. And the fourteenth, on "The Human Side," presents the same high points of recent investigations and thought with regard to plant psychology, industrial morale, emotional adjustments, and leadership in personnel relations and management negotiations. This chapter, though general in nature and secondhand in flavor, is, nevertheless, an interesting reading on some newer techniques of labor management. Up to this point the book is highly recommended.

It is the final chapter (pp. 215-50), the Report and Recommendations of the Labor Committee of the Twentieth Century Fund, that adds a disappointing ending. On this committee the membership is William H. Davis (Chairman), William L. Chenery, Howard Coonley, Clinton S. Golden, Frazier D. MacIver, Sumner H. Slichter, Robert J. Watt, and Edwin E. Witte. From so prominent and well-informed a group, given so vital a national problem, an unhurried, wise, and challenging report might well have been expected. But unfortunately the material is in spots ivory-towerish and academic; it seems to have been inadequately considered by the group as a whole and to have been pub-

lished before final revision was made. For example, many of its facile statements and conclusions, challenged by its own members, clearly required reworking (in some instances, probably mere rephrasing) to bring the picture into better focus. Instead, these criticisms were inserted the easy way, as footnotes, and in some cases they detract from the document as a "committee" report. In any event, the recommendations take in far too much ground and are often inadequately unsupported at critical places.

HERMÁN FELDMAN
Dartmouth College

PEARSE, INNES H., and LUCY H. CROCKER. *The Peckham Experiment*. Pp. 333. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945. \$3.50.

This is the record of a British experiment in the promotion of public health, originated and guided by a group of physicians and biologists. It grew out of a previous experiment which showed that periodic physical examinations are not adequate unless new environmental conditions are provided making possible the exercise of new rules of living; also that the family, not the individual, is the real unit in health maintenance.

The description of the plan is preceded by forty pages of rather obscure, largely meaningless, philosophistry about man and living things; as, "man himself is but a cell in the body of the Cosmos." If one persists, he comes to what is clearly a pioneering experiment not only in public health but in community organization. At the center was a building, 120 by 160 feet, three stories high, of concrete, with cork floors and glass partitions, so that the scientific observers could see from central points what was going on throughout the building. Facilities were provided for numerous activities for persons of all ages: swimming, dancing, billiards, bridge, music, and whatever else was desired. There was a staff of several doctors, a biochemist and an assistant, a nurse and a midwife, two nursery supervisors, a cafeteria manager, and others. A family was required to enroll as a unit, so that all members would be present at the first general overhaul.

Thereafter there was a similar overhaul of the entire family at twelve- to eighteen-month intervals, with frequent examination of infants and children. Much attention was paid to pregnancy; young couples especially were taken in hand before conception; after parturition at a hospital the mother was returned home after the second day in order to solidify husband-wife relationships. The mother was weaned from oversolicitous care of her infant by the nursery. All members of a family were given as clear an understanding as possible of all familial traits and conditions affecting health.

In other words, this was a more or less glorified neighborhood house. It was unique in making the family the unit, each family paying one shilling a week for membership, and each individual paying a small sum for each activity in which he engaged. It provided leisure-time activity for every member of the family, from the baby to the grandparent. It thus integrated the lives of all members of the family, supplying nourishment for their physical, mental, and social well-being.

It is impossible to judge the success of the experiment from any statistical summaries given in this report. The authors are enthusiastic, and one can readily believe that the members found the center of great constructive value. Apparently not over one-fifth of the families of the district joined, and one suspects that those who needed it least were among the first to join. The center was not self-supporting, though the doctors were poorly paid. This is, however, not an objection, since the community could well afford to pay a subvention to such institutions. The case studies reported indicate great success in increasing family solidarity, especially of husband and wife. This was associated with increased occupational efficiency, and, interestingly enough, with a desire for more children. Population students might find a cue here.

On the whole, this may prove to be an experiment of great historical interest. It is unfortunate that the report is so badly written. It is filled with obscure phraseology, mystical figures of speech, and turgid circumlocutions. The authors ex-

press an evangelical fervor by italicizing hundreds of words and phrases. However, these should not deter the thoughtful reader; there is here meat for thought.

FRANK H. HANKINS
Smith College

STRECKER, EDWARD A., and KENNETH E. APPEL. *Psychiatry in Modern Warfare*. Pp. viii, 88. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1945. \$1.50.

This book, written by acknowledged leaders in psychiatry, has the great merit of brevity; but its 88 pages, plus 3 pages of preface, are enough for its purpose: to point out the dangerous disregard by authorities of the lessons of history (not a new discovery, alas, but noteworthy) and to present the gist of what is known and believed about the soldier's psychosoma and his treatment during and after the war, in the Army and after discharge.

"Certain lessons were not learned from World War I." Perhaps it was also a matter of indifference to knowledge that was really quite obvious. The "lessons" are described in some detail, and are worth noting. "In World War I the rate of admission to Army hospitals for psycho-neurotic reasons was over thirty times as high as the rate for civilian hospitals. Approximately the same figures hold for the present war, despite more careful screening." Maybe the screening was more careful, but some of us who participated in it and had to make decisions on the basis of five-minute—or less—contacts still feel uneasy about it. We probably kept many effective soldiers out of the Army because of poor adjustment in civil life, and admitted some valuable but sensitive citizens who were not very useful in the Army.

"The return to civilian life demands a change in attitudes, orientation, and behavior." That sentence implies the problem of our cultural values and our personal needs; the contrast between civil life where your "friend" may (figuratively at least) knife you in the name of business, and Army combat where your enemy is definitely defined and your teammate will risk his life as you do, for a simple and immediate common objective.

The words "modern warfare" relate as

much to civilian and soldier psychology as to weapons and tactics. We are still naïve, but less so in some ways than last time. "Conversion hysteria is relatively infrequent. . . ." Anxiety reactions are more frequent; the simpler escapes are less often possible. The terrifying anxiety of isolation in a lost world is felt more directly by the susceptible ones, in or out of service. The authors devote, quite properly, a good deal of space to the returnee and the world in which he finds—or does not find—himself.

One more statement deserves quoting, for practical reasons: ". . . the vast majority of military neuropsychiatric diagnoses do not signify an incapacity to become an effective worker." Of interest also is the fact that "several reports from industry would seem to indicate that psychoneurotic discharges have a better work record than civilian workers who have not been in the Army."

The bibliography is, naturally, very important. It numbers sixty references, from international sources; and it includes Ernie Pyle, who was there.

JOSEF A. KINDWALL, M.D.

Wauwatosa, Wisconsin

GUNN, SELSKAR M., and PHILIP S. PLATT. *Voluntary Health Agencies*. Pp. xviii, 364. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1945. \$3.00.

This is a timely and competent study of the performance by and the problems facing our twenty thousand local, state, and national voluntary health agencies. The volume should be of great service (in fact, it is a "must" item) not only to the executives and the members of these health agencies, but to all executives of city, county, state, and Federal health agencies. This three-year study was financed by the Rockefeller Foundation and guided by the Executive Committee of the National Health Council (Dr. Louis I. Dublin, chairman) and an Advisory Committee of 26 outstanding leaders in medicine and public health.

The problems facing our voluntary health agencies are clearly analyzed. Among these are: (1) more effective co-ordination of public and voluntary health agencies to

prevent duplication of effort; (2) better co-ordination in fund raising, so that a greater percentage of these funds may be applied to health service and essential research; (3), a better coverage by our voluntary health agencies of all aspects of ill health; (4) and finally, "the 64-dollar question," How can we maintain and stimulate voluntary interest, individual and local responsibility in fundamental matters of health in face of the growing efforts at placing the care for health in the hands of our Federal and state governments? There are no certain and final answers to this important question.

This study is objective, reliable, and timely. Hence, it merits the attention of all informed citizens. In view of the general excellence of the study, it will come as a surprise to some people that the voluntary agencies (Alcoholics Anonymous, Research Council on the Problems of Alcohol) in our Public Health Problem Number 4, alcohol addiction, are not even mentioned.

A. J. CARLSON
University of Chicago Medical School

SITTE, CAMILLO (CHARLES T. STEWART, Translator). *The Art of Building Cities*. Pp. xi, 128. New York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1945. \$5.50.

This Viennese architect's tract, published in German in 1889, long available in French and Spanish, has at last been made available in English (after abortive steps twenty years ago) in a competent translation by the former director of the Urban Land Institute. It is surrounded by four author's prefaces, a translator's preface, an introductory note by Eliel Saarinen acknowledging his intellectual debt to Sitte in his own formative years at the beginning of the century, an introduction by Ralph Walker, F.A.I.A., and a supplementary chapter by Arthur C. Holden, F.A.I.A., on Sitte's significance today—a rather top-heavy armament for this straightforward monograph that might have been allowed to stand on its own feet.

Sitte's plea is the classic statement against the rectangular pattern of city plattting that became prevalent in the nine-

teenth century under the dominance of the engineer. It analyzes the elements of art in civic design that gave life and harmony to European cities of an earlier day. His major insight is that open spaces used to be part of architectural mass, a roofless concert hall, the theater for pageants and religious festivals. He propounds an interesting relationship between increasing rectangularity of pattern and the growth of the science of perspective drawing. He is acutely aware that it is not paper symmetry, but what you can see on the spot that is the touchstone of art; thus mere size does not give a sense of magnitude. While he deplores the dead hand of bureaucracy in official design, he recognizes a lack of fructifying tradition among private developers. Thirty years before Mumford he stressed the facilitation of speculation as one of the motives for proliferation of rectangular lots; he anticipated by fifty-six years my argument in the November 1945 issue of *THE ANNALS* that great places are needed for the locus of mass affirmations of civic solidarity.

We should welcome at this time a book—even a new translation of an old one—that is frankly concerned with the art of city building. At the turn of the century Sitte was followed by Unwin, Lanchester, Robinson, and others who dared to write of civic design and the art of city building. First the engineer and sanitarian, then the social scientists took over the city planning and it became not quite respectable to dwell on art. As a result, men like Saarinen and Churchill, with keen aesthetic insights and great powers of architectural criticism, feel impelled to sandwich their mature and significant judgments and precepts on art between slices of “organic decentralization” and precut patent-flour chapters on taxation and finance.

Sitte shows an awareness of the need for population estimates, economic analysis, and topographic charting as a sound basis for city planning, but he is not ashamed to write of “the art of city building in accordance with its artistic fundamentals.” May this belated translation hearten our contemporaries to the same boldness.

CHARLES S. ASCHER

New York

BRYSON, GLADYS. *Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century*. Pp. ix, 287. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945. \$3.00.

Ten words for Francis Hutcheson, six for Monboddo, and no words at all for Ferguson, Kames, Reid, Adam Smith, or Dugald Stewart: this is the cavalier treatment accorded an important and vigorous group of thinkers by the author of a recent *History of Western Philosophy*, written with particular attention to “its connection with political and social circumstances.”

The contribution to the understanding of these pioneers of the democratic intellectual tradition provided by Miss Bryson’s book is particularly welcome to those of us who would like to see students at least as familiar with the social impact of democratic philosophy as with that of every other philosophy under the sun. Miss Bryson concentrates mainly on the men noted above, in addition to the ubiquitous Hume, who, as she remarks, “was almost certain to have been there first, if only with an essay.”

The treatment avoids the easy method of biographical presentation; attention is directed rather to the thought of the “school” on such topics as moral philosophy, psychology, history, institutions, politics, and religion. Continuity and coherence are likely to become a bit strained in the analysis of such a group of individualists, and Miss Bryson at times seems to have difficulty in this respect. Her frame of reference is that of sociology or social psychology, and there is occasional evidence of the fluidity of interest characteristic of these fields. A few of her editorial comments seem rather uncritical: for example, the remark that “no age before or since the eighteenth century has had such confidence in institutions for their efficiency and sufficiency.” Too, the repetition of one quotation from Ferguson no fewer than four times becomes a little tiresome.

Such reviewer comments cannot minimize the importance and the quality of the research which has gone into this exposition. The main sequence of thought is from Pufendorf to Hutcheson, through Hume and Mandeville, to Adam Smith; the latter’s doctrines are taken as “a piece

. . . with the whole pattern of thought we have been discussing." This pattern is the fundamental individualism which, in the words of Hume, began with the premise that "the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences." The science of man as explored by these eighteenth-century thinkers got lost on false trails and constructed some vehicles which to us now appear ludicrous. But the method of investigation was the empirical, "common-sense" analysis and calculation of the problems of man in society—a method which, during the following hundred years, was to shape the practical thinking of the men who themselves cast the mold in which our democratic society has worked out its problems.

If anyone questions the importance of these Scottish philosophers, let him read Schlesinger's *The Age of Jackson*. Miss Bryson's sympathetic exhibition of the intellectual initiative of this eighteenth-century speculation clarifies much that has occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of our history.

GLENN R. NEGLEY

University of Illinois
(On military leave)

BURGESS, ERNEST W., and HARVEY J. LOCKE. *The Family*. Pp. xv, 800. New York: American Book Co., 1945. \$4.25.

This book is not a marriage course text written to interest and advise students. Rather it is a solid sociological treatise presenting in sociological terms the best scientific knowledge accumulated to date concerning family behavior. It is a highly significant contribution to sociology. Students reading this text will get the facts and the theories without much simplification or sugar coating. If they care to make the effort, they can make applications to their own problems. The book contains a wealth of case-history material which gives reality and vividness to the factual analysis.

The theme of the book is the transition of the family from institutional to companionship organization. While all the methods known to social science are represented, the emphasis is on typology, i.e., the analysis in terms of "ideal" or theo-

retical types. While findings of various disciplines are presented, the approach is resolutely sociological in that concepts developed by sociologists are most commonly employed. The content of the book is based largely on the facts of the American scene. The two notable exceptions are the chapters on the Chinese family and the Russian family.

The book is divided into four parts concerned respectively with (1) the family in social change, (2) the family and personality development, (3) family organization, and (4) family disorganization and reorganization. Instead of historical and anthropological material, the authors present descriptions of various contemporary family systems. By contrasts between rural and urban family life the trend of social change toward family unity based on companionship is brought out. The rather heavy section on personality development shows the influence of genetic, psychogenic, and cultural factors, with stress on expectations and roles. The four fundamental wishes are discussed somewhat more broadly than is called for in a family textbook. Family unity receives a penetrating if abstract analysis. Courtship and mate selection are realistically treated with the aid of good case-history material and research findings from the Burgess-Wallin study of engaged couples. The chapters on marital success and predicting marital adjustment are compact and illuminating. These chapters, together with the appendix containing improved adjustment and prediction scales, represent the most original contribution of the book.

Family disorganization is objectively analyzed in terms of process rather than problems to be viewed with alarm. The chapter describing the influence of war on the family is competent and up to date. The final chapter surveys the reorganization process in terms of movements and organizations concerned with family security, education, and counseling.

Such a monumental work could hardly be perfect. One could cite an occasional repetition, passages approaching the platitudinous, and rare instances of loose optimism (p. 626, last paragraph). The style, while clear, would hardly galvanize a

sophomore in search of three easy credits into enthusiasm. Available statistics are sometimes piled high to prove a fairly obvious point, say the decline of economic functions.

Despite these minor criticisms, the book must command respect. The authors have written in sociological terms one of the most comprehensive and scientific accounts of the family institution thus far achieved. Their research and writing will add to the stature of sociology in the eyes of the thinking world.

CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK

University of Minnesota

BOTKIN, B. A. *Lay My Burden Down.* Pp. xxi, 286. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945. \$3.50.

This volume is a systematized assortment of folk-material from the Slave Narrative Collection of the Federal Writers' Project. According to my count, 264 informants are listed, including 22 born outside of slavery. Since the median age (in 1937) of the slave informants was 85, it is probable that the collection relates more to childhood impressions and to attitudes of parents than to direct slave experiences during mature life.

The material presents some interesting side lights on the sociology of the aged as well as on the Negro past. The usual tendency towards the forgetting of the unpleasant clashes with the possible prestige value of recounted ante bellum horrors. Informants are about equally divided on the subject of good versus bad treatment by masters, but are fairly united on the desirability of freedom. Some may claim that "them was the best days that any darky has ever seed," but others lament over slaves "so poorly thin they ribs would kinda rustle against each other like corn stalks a-drying in the hot winds." It is at this point that information regarding the race and background of the amateur collectors would have been particularly helpful.

Through the dim eyes of age the unpleasant occupational routine of the plantation tends to be slurred over and forgotten. Likewise the material on marriage and family life is thin, except for occasional

mention of marriage by broom-jumping or of tearful separation of family members. There are a few random accounts of plantation dancing, but in general amusements are not stressed, aside from the sedentary pastimes of joking and tale-telling. Tall tales appear less vigorous among slaves than among American whites.

Religion, on the other hand, is intensely important to the aged, and the picture of slave religious life is reasonably complete. Some slaves were given no religious instruction; others sat on the floor in the back of the white folks' church, or else attended separate services of their own. Sermons stressed *obedience* and *honesty* and sometimes hinted at no heaven at all for Negroes, or at least a segregated hereafter ("God got a clean kitchen to put you in"). "Hants" and hoodoo likewise receive a fair amount of notice.

In spite of the distortions inherent in multiple collecting and editing, Mr. Botkin has done a remarkably good job of allowing the ex-slave to speak his own mind. This verbal exhumation of a deceased institution may be a "kind of legendary history" rather than real history, but in its half-folklore of paterrollers, of Yankees, of overseers, of Abraham Lincoln, of the Freedmen's Bureau, and of the Ku Kluxers, it shows clearly what drastic social change meant to the common folk. The interesting photographs and the unique binding add much to the charm of this colorful portrayal of a disappearing generation.

NEWBELL N. PUCKETT
Western Reserve University

RADIN, PAUL. *The Road of Life and Death: A Ritual Drama of the American Indians.* Pp. xiv, 345. New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1945. \$4.50.

Nearly forty years ago (1908) Paul Radin, trained in anthropology by Franz Boas, began an ethnographic investigation of the Winnebago Indians that culminated in a standard monograph on this tribal group. (*The Winnebago Tribe*, 37th Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology, Washington, 1923.) He has also published autobiographical accounts of the lives of two Winnebago Indians, the most famous of which is *Crashing Thunder*

(1926). From the very beginning of his work Radin was inspired by Boas to collect as much material as possible in text, and the latest volume he offers us is essentially a free translation of one such text describing "the greatest and most secret of all Winnebago ceremonies"—the Medicine Rite.

Leadership in this ritual was confined to a few individuals. Indeed, the entrance requirements in the old days were so rigorous that usually only men of middle age secured membership; the only way a younger man could join was by taking the place of a deceased member. "Admission to the Rite entailed being shot and 'killed' by a missile and coming to life again." Historically, this shooting ritual was probably borrowed from the Ojibway midewiwin. But what Radin calls the ethical-philosophical part "consisted in strict adherence to a high code of behavior laid down for you and enforced by the older members of the Rite. Only by adherence to it can you surmount death." By steeling yourself to being shot innumerable times you obtain mastery over death so that "when full of years, you actually die, the passage from life to death will become mere incident and, being born again, will, for yourself, constitute no break with your former existence." For, by a belief in reincarnation, the Winnebago bridge the gulf between Life and Death. As an integral part of this world-view it is interesting to observe that Radin stresses the fact that the rite was to serve concrete purposes; "it was not the vision of a Road to Perfection to be rewarded by eternal peace and happiness in heaven but, on the contrary, the vision of a Road of Perfection which was to be rewarded by a return to earth and to the vicissitudes of living. It was life that was to be faced, with all its imperfection, trials, and with all the comedies and tragedies that often played such havoc with ideals of perfection."

While this book is an essential part of the author's earlier account of Winnebago culture as a whole, and achieves full meaning only in this context, nevertheless it has an intrinsic interest from a philosophical and psychological point of view.

And for those totally unfamiliar with the Winnebago, a brief summary of their social organization, religion, and ritualism, and the history and recording of the Medicine Rite is given in the Introduction.

It is a miracle that such an esoteric ritual was ever recorded at all in so authentic a form. If Jasper Blowsnake, the older brother of Crashing Thunder, has not joined the Peyote cult and decided to put aside the older rite, and had not besides received a vision that it was his destiny to tell about the Medicine Rite, it would never have been on record. The dictation of the original text in Winnebago required two months' work—seven days a week—and a little longer period was necessary to make the translation. Before the latter was undertaken, Blowsnake insisted that Radin go over the text again, and some changes were made. This took another month. We have, then, a very unusual document that has retained its aboriginal flavor in a translation designed to mediate its esoteric symbolism and allusions to the English reader. The Prologue, which comprises bits of autobiographical narrative, the myth of the origin of the world, and the ghost's journey to spiritland, has been introduced by the author as an orientation to the ceremony itself. A section of footnotes at the end of the book is also useful for a further understanding of the text.

A. IRVING HALLOWELL
Northwestern University

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

February 10, 1946

Dear Dr. Sellin:

It seems incredible that in the "Statement of Essential Human Rights" prepared by a committee of the American Law Institute and reprinted in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (January 1946) does not appear *the most important human right: the freedom to emigrate* from the country of birth and of official allegiance.

This freedom does not mean that anyone may demand admittance to any other country. No, this freedom simply recognizes the right to leave a country without

being threatened with forced detention or excessive visa fees. The right to travel abroad should be definitely protected.

The Atlantic Charter promised a peace "which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want and would enable all the men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance."

How is it possible to guarantee such liberties unless there is the right to emigrate, if a citizen considers that his native land does not give him adequate protection and opportunity? A country which does not recognize this right is a tyranny.

The right to emigrate is more important than all other freedoms since it represents the final test of the actual application of a free regime in any country. All American history is based on this right and the United States of America must demand an official proclamation of this fifth freedom as binding on all the United Nations in a new world order.

PAUL HAENSEL

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

March 15, 1946

As Mr. Paul Haensel has said, it would have been incredible that the Statement of Essential Human Rights prepared by a Committee of the American Law Institute should omit the Freedom to Immigrate as an essential right had their assignment from the Institute been to draft a declaration of human rights. But this was not the duty imposed upon the Committee by the Institute. They were requested to report the "rights" on which their membership were in substantial accord. The Committee interpreted this instruction as requiring them to omit any right which more than one or two of their members would not regard as essential. Furthermore, they were requested to make a short, clear statement of any right agreed upon. They all felt that the right to immigrate was an essential right, but when they tried to make a "short, clear statement" of the right they found they could not agree on its expression. The discussion forced the acknowledgment that while they did agree on "some right of immigration" they were so

far apart on what it was that in view of their instructions from the Council of the Institute they would have to omit it. I think we all greatly regretted the necessity for this conclusion.

I note that Mr. Haensel calls it "the most important human right." As the person who presided over the Institute's Committee, I received the impression that none of them regarded any right as inherently more important than any other. They regarded Freedom as the result of a combination of essential rights.

Respectfully,
WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS

BOOKS RECEIVED

Arab World and the Arab League, The. Pp. 12. Washington, D. C.: The Arab Office, 1946. 5 cents.

ATTEBERY, GEORGE C., JOHN L. AUBLE, and ELGIN HUNT. *Introduction to Social Science.* Pp. 787. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946. \$4.00.

BORCHARD, EDWIN. *American Foreign Policy, 1776-1946.* Pp. xiii, 69. Indianapolis: National Foundation Press, 1946. \$1.00.

BRANT, IRVING. *The New Poland.* Pp. 116. New York: Universe Publishers, 1946. \$1.50.

BROGAN, D. W. *The Study of Politics.* Pp. 22. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1946. 50 cents.

BURNS, EDWARD J. *Some Financial Trends of Commercial Banks of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1915-1941.* Pp. 122. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1945. \$1.50.

CASE, W. T. *Florida Becomes a State.* Pp. 481. Tallahassee: Florida Centennial Commission, 1946. \$3.50.

CASSIRER, ERNST. *Language and Myth.* Pp. 103. New York: Harper and Bros., 1945. \$2.00.

CHATHAM HOUSE STUDY GROUP. *The Pattern of Pacific Security.* Pp. 73. New York: New York Publications Office, 1946. 75 cents.

CITIZENS' FACT-FINDING MOVEMENT OF GEORGIA. *Georgia Facts in Figures.* Pp. 179. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1946. No price.

COMMITTEE ON HISTORIOGRAPHY, REPORT OF. *Theory and Practice in Historical Study.* Pp. ix, 177. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1946. \$1.75.

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